IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.H. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] E.H. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to R.H., E.H., and J.H. (“the Children”). Father raises the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the evidence presented supported Finding 16; and

II. Whether the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous.

[2] Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and S.C. (“Mother”)¹ are the biological parents of three minor children: R.H., born August 10, 2017; E.H., born July 9, 2018; and J.H., born November 8, 2019. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) first became involved with the family in 2018 in a previous Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) case, where R.H. had received injuries that the parents could not explain. There were also concerns about domestic violence in the home. Mother and Father were both living in the home at the time the CHINS petition was filed. However, while the case was pending, Father failed to attend hearings and was not compliant with services. After Mother participated in services and the safety concerns for the children were addressed, DCS moved to dismiss the prior CHINS case, which the trial court granted on December 18, 2019.

[4] On May 2, 2022, DCS became involved with the family again when the Children were removed from Mother's care due to her arrest. Mother was arrested because she tested positive for methamphetamine while on probation. She was also charged with neglect of a dependent due to being the sole caregiver for the Children while under the influence of methamphetamine. At the time of the Children's removal, Father was incarcerated in the Scott County Jail and unavailable to care for the Children.

[5] Two days later, on May 4, 2022, DCS filed CHINS petitions for each of the Children. At a detention hearing held the same day, the trial court determined that DCS did not need to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family because Mother's arrest and Father's incarceration left the children without an immediate suitable caregiver. Neither parent appeared at this hearing. On June 15, 2022, the trial court held an initial hearing for Mother where she entered a general denial of the CHINS petition and was appointed counsel. On October 19, 2022, the trial court conducted an initial hearing and fact-finding hearing for Father, at which Father did not appear. After that hearing, the trial court found the Children to be CHINS because the Children did not have “a parent that [was] willing and able to care for them.” Ex. Vol. III pp. 55–56.

[6] At a CHINS pretrial conference on February 1, 2023, Mother signed stipulations agreeing that the Children were CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. The same day, the trial court issued a dispositional decree removing them from Mother's care and granting wardship to DCS. The dispositional decree ordered Father to participate in reunification services, including participating in a treatment program, maintaining contact with DCS, participating in recommended programs, keeping all appointments, maintaining suitable and safe housing, securing legal and stable source of income, submitting to random drug screens, and attending all scheduled visitation with the Children.

[7] Father was released from jail to attend a rehabilitation program in May 2023, at which point he went to the Salvation Army in Fort Wayne for such programming. No services were provided to Father by DCS during his rehabilitation. Father successfully completed the rehabilitation program in November 2023. After completing the program, Father moved to Scott County to live with his father.

[8] On May 21, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. A termination hearing was held on August 28, 2024. At the hearing, family case manager (“FCM”) Shalynn Pitzer (“FCM Pitzer”) testified that she had been assigned to the family from the time the Children were removed in May 2022 until March 7, 2023. During her tenure as FCM, Father did not engage in services and was inconsistent in his visitation with the Children. Although Father was offered ten visits with the Children over FCM Pitzer's time, he only attended four of them.

[9] FCM Mitchell Hein (“FCM Hein”) took over the case in March 2023 and continued for the duration of the case. He testified that when he began working with the family, Father was not involved in the Children's lives and was still incarcerated. After Father was released from incarceration and completed rehabilitation programming, DCS provided referrals for Fatherhood Engagement and supervised visitation both through National Youth Advocate Program (“NYAP”). However, NYAP closed the referral in May 2024 because Father missed several appointments and visits with the Children. Because NYAP offered both the Fatherhood Engagement services and supervised visitation, his sessions and supervised visits were scheduled at the same time. From December 2023 through May 2024, Father was offered twenty-one visits with the children and Fatherhood Engagement sessions but attended only seven of them.

[10] Father failed to maintain weekly contact with FCM Hein as required and would only sometimes respond when DCS left him messages. As of August 16, 2024, Father had been required to call fifty-two times for random drug screening but had only called six times. Due to this failure to call in, Father had a total of eleven presumed positive drug screens. FCM Hein testified that Father had been made aware of his responsibility to call in for random drug screens, and when asked why he had not been doing so, he had no valid excuse. Father also failed to attend Child and Family Team Meetings (“CFTMs”) and did not notify anyone when he would not be attending. On February 29, 2024, when Father did attend a CFTM, he became very aggressive and confrontational with FCM Hein.

[11] During the visits that Father attended, he made promises to the Children that when they would “go live with dad,” they would “be able to stay up until [ten] o'clock and have TVs in [their] rooms.” Tr. Vol. II p. 26. There was testimony at the hearing that, when visits with Father occurred, there was an increase in behavioral issues in the foster home for the Children. Douglas Beaker (“Beaker”), the foster parent who cared for the Children from February 2023 to May 2024, described their behavioral regression and emotional challenges following visits with their parents. Beaker testified that the inconsistency with visitation from Father resulted in “voids” in the Children's lives. Id. at 26. He also testified about an incident that occurred where prior trauma suffered by the Children began to manifest. E.H. came after Beaker's wife with a knife, and after E.H. was calmed down, he stated that he did not want to hurt the wife, but he had seen “these things” and did not “know how to express that ․ [he] wanted attention right now.” Id.

[12] Victoria Wilhite (“Wilhite”), a therapist with Centerstone, testified regarding her treatment of R.H., in which she utilized play therapy and art techniques. Wilhite testified that, whenever either Mother or Father was mentioned in the discussion, R.H. resisted talking about either of them. She testified to behaviors that R.H. displayed after Father's visits began in February of 2024, including increased defiance, impulsivity, and hyperactivity in the classroom. Specifically, R.H. began receiving in-school suspensions and had more behavioral consequences in the classroom. Similarly, Amanda Schwartz (“Schwartz”), a care specialist who treated J.H., teaching life skills, coping skills, and emotional regulation skills, testified. She stated that J.H. resisted discussing Father during sessions and would cover his ears and said he did not want to “hear anything ․ about [Father].” Id. at 33. In her sessions with J.H., Schwartz utilized play therapy with toy cars, and she testified about a time where, when prompted to choose a car to represent Father, J.H. became aggressive with the toy cars.

[13] At the termination hearing, testimony was also presented from court appointed special advocate Deena Personett (“CASA Personett”). She stated that she had been involved in the case since September 2023 and that the Children have lots of trauma and all attend therapy. CASA Personett stated that the Children have learning disabilities and speech impairments, and all needed dental surgery due to severe dental issues. She pointed out that the Children needed parents who would be able to be there for them and to attend to their needs. CASA Personett concluded that termination of parental rights as to both parents was in the Children's best interests, stating that the Children needed permanency and consistency in their lives.

[14] At the time of the termination hearing, although Father was residing with his father, Father did not have a safe and stable home for the Children because the home did not have adequate space for the Children. Father had also never provided DCS with any documentation of employment even though he had been requested to do so multiple times. The Children were never returned to the care of Father at any time the case was pending.

[15] On September 6, 2024, the trial court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights to the Children. The trial court concluded that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory elements required for termination. The court found that Father had “never substantially complied” with the dispositional order and the services provided by DCS despite having been given opportunities to do so. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 58–59. The trial court further found that Father continued to be inconsistent with visitation with the Children throughout the case and that Father did not have consistent contact with the Children and they had “never been in his care at any period since the beginning of the underlying CHINS case.” Id. at 59. The trial court determined that there was a reasonable probability that Father would not remedy the reasons for the Children's removal, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to the Children's well-being, that termination was in the best interests of the Children, and that DCS's plan of adoption was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children.² Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[16] While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re. J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[17] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). In evaluating the trial court's findings and conclusions in an order terminating parental rights, we review only for clear error, and we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

I. Finding 16

[18] Father initially argues that the trial court's Finding 16 was not supported by the evidence presented and, therefore, should be disregarded. A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which support it. Stewart v. Randolph Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 804 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Even erroneous findings are not reversible error if they are harmless. See, e.g., In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“We may reverse a trial court's judgment ․ only if its findings constitute prejudicial error ․ A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless it directly supports a conclusion.”), trans. denied. An erroneous finding is “merely harmless surplusage” when the unchallenged findings “provide ample support for the trial court's ultimate conclusion.” Id.

[19] Here, Father challenges the trial court's Finding 16, which stated:

As found below, parents never substantially complied or benefited from court ordered rehabilitative reunification services and that the parents have not been consistently involved in the [C]hildren's lives in since removal. Additionally, the continued parent child relationship between the [C]hildren and [Father], poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 54. Father asserts that this finding was erroneous because the evidence did not support that he “ ‘never substantially complied’ ” with reunification services and that he had “not been consistently involved in the [C]hildren's lives since removal.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. He also contends that the evidence did not support that his continued relationship with the Children was a threat to their well-being.

[20] Contrary to Father's assertion, the first sentence of Finding 16 was supported by the record. The evidence at the termination hearing established that although Father completed a rehabilitation program in November 2023, he never substantially complied with the reunification services ordered in the dispositional decree. He only minimally engaged in Fatherhood Engagement and supervised visitation, and his referrals for both of those services were closed due to missing multiple appointments. Indeed, before Father's referrals were closed, Father visited with the Children on only seven occasions, ultimately missing fourteen opportunities to visit with the Children. Further, although Father was aware of the requirement to call in for random drug screens he did so in only six out of the fifty-two required calls, and the failure to call in resulted in eleven presumed positive drug screens. This was sufficient evidence to support that portion of Finding 16 that Father “never substantially complied” with reunification services. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 54.

[21] As to the portion of Finding 16 that stated that Father had “not been consistently involved in the [C]hildren's lives since removal,” it too was supported by the evidence presented at the termination hearing. Id. The evidence demonstrated that, from May 2022, the time of removal, until November 2023, Father was either incarcerated or in the rehabilitation program, which hindered his ability to have visitation with the Children. We acknowledge that Father did have some visits with the Children and attended four out of ten offered visits. Following his completion of the rehabilitation program, DCS set up a referral through NYAP for supervised visitation with the Children. However, Father only attended seven out of twenty-one appointments, and the referral was closed. Additionally, there was no evidence presented that Father kept in contact with the Children in any other ways, such as phone calls, video calls, or letters, during the pendency of the case. We, therefore, conclude that evidence was presented to support that finding that Father has “not been consistently involved in the [C]hildren's lives since removal.” Id.

[22] To the extent that Father argues that the second sentence of Finding 16 was not supported by the record, we note that evidence was presented to support that “the continued parent-child relationship between the [C]hildren and [Father] poses a threat to the well-being of the [Children].” Id. At the termination hearing, evidence was presented that, when visits with Father did occur, there was an increase in behavioral issues for the Children, including behavioral regression and emotional challenges following the visits. Beaker, one of the Children's foster parents, testified that the inconsistency with visitation from Father resulted in “voids” in the Children's lives. Tr. Vol. II p. 26. He specifically testified about an incident that occurred where prior trauma suffered by the Children began to manifest. E.H. came after Beaker's wife with a knife, and after E.H. was calmed down, he stated that he did not want to hurt the wife, but he had seen “these things” and did not “know how to express that ․ [he] wanted attention right now.” Id. Additionally, Wilhite, R.H.’s therapist, testified that, whenever either Mother or Father was mentioned in the discussion, R.H. resisted talking about either of them and that R.H. displayed defiance, impulsivity, and hyperactivity in the classroom after Father's visits began in February of 2024. Schwartz, J.H.’s care specialist, testified that J.H. resisted discussing Father during sessions and would cover his ears and said he did not want to “hear anything ․ about [Father]” and acted aggressively during play therapy when prompted to choose a car to represent Father. Id. at 33. Therefore, evidence was presented to support Finding 16.

II. Sufficient Evidence for Judgment

[23] Father next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusions that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of the Children and the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be remedied, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children, and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interests of the Children.

[24] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). As stated above, a petition must allege the existence of one or more of the circumstances contained in subsection (d). Here, the pertinent alleged circumstances were:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), (4). The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations is one of clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added). Further, because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the trial court need only find one of the requirements of subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence, we need not address all of the requirements if we find that one has been proven. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d); A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1157 n.6.

A. Conditions Not Remedied

[25] Besides Finding 16, Father does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, so he has waived any arguments relating to the unchallenged findings, and we therefore accept all of the trial court's findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting this court accepts unchallenged trial court findings as true). Instead, Father first argues that the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of the Children and the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be remedied was not supported by sufficient evidence. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, a court engages in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, the court must determine what conditions led to the child's placement and retention in foster care, and second, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id.

[26] In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent's recent improvements against “ ‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’ ” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). Under this rule, “[trial] courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.” In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[27] In addition, DCS need not provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “We entrust th[e] delicate balance to the trial court, which has [the] discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. When determining whether the conditions resulting in removal would be remedied, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the offers of help from DCS or the service providers. D.B., 942 N.E.2d at 873.

[28] Here, the Children were removed from Mother's care on May 2, 2022, because Mother was arrested due to testing positive for methamphetamine while on probation and was also charged with neglect of a dependent as she was the sole caregiver for the Children while being under the influence of methamphetamine. Father was incarcerated in the Scott County Jail and, therefore, unable to care for the Children at the time of removal. Father was not released from incarceration until March 2023. At the time of the termination hearing, the Children had continued to remain outside of Father's care for over two years since the date of removal due to Father's failure to substantially comply with services provided by DCS, to have meaningful interaction and involvement with the Children through visitation, to comply with the court-ordered random drug screens, and to stay in contact with DCS and attend appointments with service providers and meetings with DCS.

[29] The evidence presented at the termination hearing revealed that Father did not comply with the court-ordered services ordered in the CHINS dispositional order. He failed to substantially attend Fatherhood Engagement even though DCS provided referrals for the programming such that Father could attend sessions on the same days he had supervised visitation with the Children. He also failed to attend regular visitation with the Children. Initially, from May 2022 until March 7, 2023, Father only attended four out of ten offered visits with the Children. Then, from December 2023 to May 2024, Father was offered twenty-one visits and only attended seven. As a result of Father's failure to consistently attend both Fatherhood Engagement and supervised visits, the referral with the service provider was cancelled. Further, Father did not keep in weekly contact with DCS as required and would only sporadically answer the messages left by the FCM. He did not keep appointments with DCS or service providers and failed to attend the CFTMs without notifying DCS he was not coming.

[30] Although Father participated and completed a rehabilitation program in November 2023, he was also ordered in the dispositional decree to submit to random drug screens. However, he failed to follow protocols for random drug screening even though FCM Hein had made Father aware of his responsibility to do so. He had been required to call fifty-two times for random drug screening but had only called six times, and due to this failure to call in, Father had a total of eleven presumed positive drug screens.

[31] A trial court may “properly consider the services offered to the parent by [DCS] and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.” D.B., 942 N.E.2d at 873. Evidence of a pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing services supports a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted), trans. denied. Additionally, “the failure to exercise the right to visit one's children demonstrates a ‘lack of commitment to complete the actions necessary to preserve [the] parent-child relationship.’ ” Id. (quoting In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).

[32] Father compares the present case to that of In re K.T., 137 N.E.3d 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), where a panel of this court reversed the termination of a father's parental rights, finding that a parent's failure to fully participate in services did not alone support termination. 137 N.E.3d at 328. However, the present case is distinguishable from K.T. in that Father's failure to fully participate in services was not the sole reason for termination. The evidence established that Father did fail to fully participate in Fatherhood Engagement but he also failed to consistently attend visitation or maintain contact with the Children throughout the case, and he failed to follow protocol for his court-ordered random drug screening. Additionally, in K.T., our court found that there was no evidence in the record showing reasons for the child's initial or continued placement away from the father and that, although the father initially missed several months of visitation with the child, he later attended eighty percent of the visits. Id. However, here, although the Children were removed from Mother's care when she was arrested, Father was incarcerated at that time, and therefore, there was evidence here as to why the Children could not be placed with Father at the time of removal. Further, Father only attended about a third of the offered visits with the Children throughout the duration of this case, unlike the father in K.T. All in all, here, the evidence demonstrated Father's failure to participate in services and failure to submit to random drug screens which in turn revealed the reasons for termination, namely Father's potential continued drug use, lack of interest in the Children and inability to bond with them after his long absence, and failure to demonstrate he was employed and capable of providing sufficient housing for the children which were necessary to establish a stable and safe environment for the Children. Such evidence makes this case readily distinguishable from K.T.

[33] Participating in and completing the required services and attending visitation with the Children were necessary for Father to reunify with the Children and for the Children to be placed in Father's care. However, Father only minimally participated in such services, and over a period of more than two years, he only had a total of eleven visits with the Children, all supervised. There was also no evidence that Father attempted to maintain contact with the Children through any other means, such as phone calls, video calls, or letters, and his visits with the Children never progressed past supervised visitation. He also never maintained a suitable, safe, and stable home for the Children, as at the time of the termination hearing, he was living with his father in a home that did not have adequate space for the Children. Father, therefore, never established that he could safely parent the Children or demonstrate any meaningful and lasting change such that DCS could return the Children to his care. The trial court could reasonably conclude that based on Father's historical patterns of conduct and failure to show any substantial change there was a reasonable probability of future neglect if the Children were to be returned to his care. As the Indiana Supreme Court has observed, a child “ ‘cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). Based on the foregoing, we identify sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied.

[34] Father also asserts that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the Children. However, we need not address this argument because of the disjunctive nature of the subsection (d) and because we have concluded that the trial court's determination that the conditions for the Children's removal and continued placement outside of the home would not be remedied was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

B. Best Interests

[35] Father also cursorily asserts—without citation to caselaw or other legal authority—that there was insufficient evidence that terminating his parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. A party generally waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record. See N.C. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 56 N.E.3d 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. However, to the extent Father has not waived this issue, we note that in determining what is in the best interests of the child, a trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of a parent to those of the child. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d at 82. Testimony of the service providers, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. As earlier noted, before terminating the parent-child relationship, the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[36] Our review of the totality of the evidence leads to the conclusion that, at the time of the termination hearing, Father had not appreciably improved his ability to safely parent the Children. Indeed, although the Children had been removed from the home for over two years, Father never progressed to unsupervised visitations with the Children. As discussed above, DCS presented sufficient evidence that there was a reasonable probability that Father would not remedy the reasons for the Children's removal from his care. Additionally, CASA Personett testified that the Children needed parents who would be able to be there for them and to attend to their needs and opined that termination of parental rights was in the Children's best interests, stating that the Children needed permanency and consistency in their lives. Further, the trial court was presented with evidence that the Children had experienced trauma and were in need of care directed toward addressing their trauma. During the course of the proceedings, Father made progress in his own life after his release from jail by successfully completing rehabilitation programming. But with Father's ongoing failure to comply with drug screening requirements, limited participation in supervised visits or other services directed toward reunification, and no evidence Father maintained other contact with the Children, had arrangements for a safe, stable home for them, or had a legal, stable income source, we ultimately cannot say there was not evidentiary support for the trial court's determination that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interests of the Children.

[37] The trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that [his or] her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015). The Children should not have to wait any longer for Father to make changes to demonstrate that he is able to safely parent the Children. The trial court's conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Children's best interests was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Conclusion

[38] We, therefore, conclude that evidence was presented to support Finding 16, and the trial court did not err in its judgment terminating Father's parental rights to the Children.

[39] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother's parental rights were also terminated in the same proceedings as Father's. However, Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended, effective March 11, 2024, and we note that DCS filed its termination petition under the amended section, which was proper as the petition was filed after the effective date. Effective March 11, 2024, subsection (b)(2)(B)(i), (ii), and (iii) has been rewritten as subsection (d)(3), (4), and (5). See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4. Although the trial court issued its order terminating parental rights after March 11, 2024, and the petition was filed under the amended statute, in its order, the trial court cited to the old statutory language. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 52–53. However, as the cited statutory language is substantially similar as the new statutory language, and neither party raises any issues with the cited language in the order, we find no error in the cited language but remind the trial court and parties to cite to the current amended statute.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Felix concur. Bradford, J. and Felix, J., concur.