SCHOFIELD v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a bench trial, Joshua Schofield was convicted of operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in his blood, a Class C misdemeanor. Schofield appeals and claims that the State failed to prove that the traffic stop that led to Schofield's arrest was valid. Schofield, however, waived this claim because he did not object to the admission of any of the evidence he now claims was improperly obtained. Waiver notwithstanding, Schofield's argument fails because the traffic stop was valid. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Schofield presents one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that was obtained following a traffic stop of Schofield's vehicle.

Facts

[3] On the night of October 26, 2022, Indiana State Police Troopers Matthew Hatchett and Clay McBride were in separate patrol vehicles parked near a laundromat in Bloomington when they observed a vehicle drive by. The Troopers noticed a broken taillight and a blue light underneath the car that shone toward the back of the car. Due to these violations, the Troopers activated their emergency lights to pull the vehicle over. By the time they got onto the street, however, the car had turned, and the Troopers briefly lost sight of the car. Trooper McBride turned his vehicle around and saw the car parked in the parking lot of an apartment complex. He checked the license plate number of the car and learned that the registered owner, Schofield, had a suspended driver's license and an active out-of-state warrant. Shortly thereafter, when the car pulled out of the parking lot and back onto the street, the Troopers initiated a traffic stop.

[4] When Trooper Hatchett approached Schofield's car, Schofield admitted that his license was suspended. Schofield also admitted that he had marijuana in the car, and Trooper Hatchett found a marijuana grinder and scales in the car. Schofield told the Troopers that he had smoked marijuana earlier in the day. Because of this admission and the fact that Schofield had bloodshot eyes, Trooper McBride performed field sobriety tests on Schofield. Based on the results of these tests, Trooper McBride read the Miranda advisement and the Indiana implied consent law to Schofield. Schofield consented to a blood draw and an examination by a drug recognition expert. Schofield's performance on the examination indicated that he was under the influence of cannabis and stimulants. The Troopers took Schofield to the hospital, where his blood was drawn. Laboratory testing of Schofield's blood indicated the presence of THC—the active component in marijuana—and its metabolites.

[5] On August 25, 2023, the State charged Schofield with operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; and operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the blood, a Class C misdemeanor. Before trial, the State dismissed the Class A and Class B misdemeanor charges, leaving only the Class C misdemeanor charge for trial.

[6] A bench trial was held on November 6, 2024. At trial, Schofield did not object to the admission of any of the evidence seized or discovered as a result of the traffic stop of his vehicle. Schofield testified on his own behalf and admitted that his license was suspended, that he told the officers he had smoked marijuana on the day of the traffic stop, and that his car had a blue “under-glow” light. Tr. Vol. II p. 36. He claimed, however, that the stop was “illegal” because his taillight was not broken and his blue light did not shine toward the back of his car. Id. at 38. During closing argument, Schofield's counsel stated that “you've heard Mr. Schofield's concern with this stop. [O]bviously the stop was bad. (Inaudible) [T]he evidence is also tainted.” Id. at 41. The trial court found Schofield guilty as charged and sentenced Schofield to 180 days suspended to probation. Schofield now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Schofield claims that the State failed to prove that the traffic stop of his car was valid. Although Schofield cites the standard of review for sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims,¹ a valid traffic stop is not an element of the crime for which he was convicted.² Instead, Schofield frames his argument as the improper admission of evidence. See Appellant's Br. p. 7 (“With the traffic stop being unjust, any and all evidence of Mr. Schofield's conviction for Operating a Vehicle with a Schedule I or II Controlled Substance is fruit of the poisonous tree.”).

[8] As already noted, Schofield did not object to the admission of the evidence he now claims was improperly obtained. As we summarized in Woodward v. State:

“It is axiomatic that to preserve a claim of evidentiary error for purposes of appeal, a defendant must make a contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is introduced.” Shoda v. State, 132 N.E.3d 454, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Laird v. State, 103 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). “Our supreme court [has] reiterated that ‘[a] contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is introduced at trial is required to preserve the issue for appeal, whether or not the appellant has filed a pretrial motion to suppress.’ ” Id. at 460-61 (quoting Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010)).

187 N.E.3d 311, 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[9] Because Schofield made no contemporaneous objection to the evidence he now claims was improper, Schofield has waived appellate review of this issue. See id. (holding that defendant waived issue of improper admission of evidence by failing to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of the evidence at trial).³

[10] Waiver notwithstanding, the Troopers had reasonable suspicion to stop Schofield's vehicle. A check of the license plate number of Schofield's car revealed that Schofield's driver's license was suspended and that he had an active warrant for his arrest. Thus, regardless of whether the taillight was broken or the blue “under-glow” light on Schofield's car was legal or illegal, the Troopers had ample cause to initiate the traffic stop. See Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 321-22 (Ind. 2009) (holding that police have reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop when an officer knows that the registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license and the officer is unaware of any evidence or circumstances that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle); United States v. Pyles, 904 F.3d 422, 424-25 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that, “[o]nce an officer discovers that a car's owner has an outstanding arrest warrant, he needs only reasonable suspicion that the owner is in the vehicle․ It is fair to infer that the registered owner of a car is in the car absent information that defeats the inference.”). Accordingly, any objection to the admission of the evidence obtained during the traffic stop would have been meritless and properly overruled.⁴

Conclusion

[11] Schofield waived his claim of evidentiary error by failing to make a contemporaneous objection to the evidence he now claims was improperly obtained. Waiver notwithstanding, Schofield's argument fails on the merits. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Schofield makes no claim that the evidence that was actually admitted at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. He claims only that the evidence that supports his conviction should not have been admitted and that, without this evidence, the State could not prove its case. But this confuses a claim of improperly admitted evidence with a claim of insufficient evidence, which are distinct. Indeed, when considering a claim of insufficient evidence, “an appellate court considers the evidence as presented at trial, including that which may have been erroneously admitted.” Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997); see also D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 229 (Ind. 2009) (citing Joyner).

2.   See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(c) (“A person who operates a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II of IC 35-48-2 or its metabolite in the person's blood commits a Class C misdemeanor.”); Ind. Code § 35-48-2-4(22) (including marijuana in the list of Schedule I controlled substances).

3.   A defendant who failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of evidence will often seek to avoid appellate waiver of the issue by claiming fundamental error. See Woodward, 187 N.E.3d at 317 (“Ordinarily, the failure to object to the admission of evidence at trial would consign an appellant to the doctrine of fundamental error.”). Here, however, Schofield makes no claim of fundamental error, and we will not craft such an argument on his behalf.

4.   Schofield's citation to United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1999), is unavailing. In that case, the Court held that the police did not have authority under Texas law to stop the defendant's vehicle based on a broken taillight. Id. at 288. Although the Troopers here may have started following Schofield's car based upon the broken taillight and the blue under-glow lights, by the time they initiated the traffic stop, they had learned that Schofield's driver's license was suspended and that he had a warrant for his arrest. Accordingly, the condition of Schofield's taillight is immaterial. The Troopers’ subjective reasons for the stop are similarly irrelevant. See Staten v. State, 946 N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“If there is an objectively justifiable reason for the stop, ‘then the stop is valid whether or not the police officer would have otherwise made the stop but for ulterior suspicions or motives.’ ”) (quoting Jackson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied), trans. denied.

Tavitas, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.