Kevin Dixon, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Kevin Dixon appeals his conviction for escape as a level 6 felony. He asserts the trial court abused its discretion in admitting statements from his police interview into evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 22, 2021, Dixon signed a Post-Conviction Acknowledgment of Electronic Monitoring Terms and Conditions which provided that he would not possess non-prescribed drugs in his residence, he would not possess firearms, and there would be no weapons in the residence regardless if any resident had a valid weapon permit. It also provided that Dixon waived his rights regarding search and seizure of his person and effects and that he agreed to permit law enforcement or community corrections staff to search his person, residence, and vehicle.

[3] On August 23, 2021, Jill Jones, a law enforcement liaison at the Marion County Community Corrections, conducted a compliance check on Dixon's residence while accompanied by law enforcement officers including Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Detective Garland Cooper. After knocking on the door several times without a response, Jones called her operation center and asked them to call Dixon and have him come to the door. Several minutes later, Dixon came to the door, and Jones noticed the odor of marijuana present at the front of the residence and that Dixon was “very nervous and sweaty like he had been running around.” Transcript Volume III at 13.

[4] At that time, Dixon, his mother Erika Williams, DaWanda Dunn, and Dixon's four-year-old daughter were present. Jones observed marijuana shake on the porch. Law enforcement handcuffed Dixon and cleared the house for safety purposes. Detective Cooper observed shake on the front porch and pink and white powder substances that appeared to be crushed pills in the southeast bedroom, which was Dixon's bedroom.

[5] Detective Cooper observed that Dixon, who was sitting in a chair in the living room, started “sweating profusely” and appeared to be nervous. Transcript Volume II at 94. It was hot in the residence, “but nobody else was sweating like that.” Id. Out of concern for Dixon's health “and to be overly cautious that he was ok,” Detective Cooper called medics to “check him out to make sure he didn't ingest any narcotics or if he didn't have some type of health concern that needed to be checked out on scene.” Id. At some point, officers plugged in an industrial fan and directed it at Dixon. After “a little while,” Dixon's “sweating and hard breathing went down.” Transcript Volume III at 21. After the medics arrived, they “checked [Dixon] out.” Transcript Volume II at 111. He did not go to the hospital.

[6] Detective Cooper applied for a search warrant for the residence and vehicle, which was granted.¹ After receiving the warrant and approximately thirty to forty minutes after the medics left, Detective Cooper read the warrant to all three adults and advised them of the Miranda warnings. Dixon acknowledged his Miranda rights by nodding his head yes and looking in Detective Cooper's direction when asked if he understood. Detective Cooper recorded the audio on his cell phone reading the search warrant and his reading of the Miranda rights to all three adults.

[7] In Williams's office, officers discovered a backpack containing a large amount of crack cocaine, powder cocaine, fentanyl, pressed pills, scales, methamphetamine, marijuana, and a firearm. Law enforcement officers also found over fifty grams of crack cocaine and a gun in a purse that Dunn had on her when law enforcement entered the residence.

[8] Detective Cooper then interviewed each adult separately beginning with Williams and Dunn. While speaking with Williams, Detective Cooper determined that the backpack did not belong to her. Before interviewing Dixon, Detective Cooper asked him again if he understood his rights, and Dixon “again acknowledged with a yes, a shake ․” Id. at 103. While he conducted the interview, Detective Cooper observed that Dixon's condition had “changed for the better,” “[t]he sweating stopped,” “he calmed down,” and he “was very coherent of what was going on.” Id. at 99.

[9] Detective Cooper asked Dixon if he knew why they were there, and Dixon stated that the officers had “found something.” Transcript Volume III at 37. Detective Cooper asked if anything that was found in the residence “belonged to anybody else in the house, specifically Dunn and Williams, and Dixon stated, “no, they have nothing to do with nothing.” Id. The audio recording of the interview reveals that one of the officers asked Dixon if his mother or his friend had anything to do with what was found. State's Exhibit 2 at 0:53-1:03. Dixon answered that they had “nothing to do with nothing,” he had “nothing to do with nothing,” and he just let “the wrong motherf----- influence me” by convincing him to hold “some sh--” for him. Id. at 1:04-1:28. When asked what he was asked to hold, Dixon answered, “I don't even f------ know.” Id. at 1:52-1:55. One of the officers stated that they found two bags of crack cocaine in his friend's purse. Id. at 2:00-2:10. The other officer stated, “You understand that she's got two bags of crack cocaine in her purse with her gun. That's not good for her. You understand that right?” Id. at 2:15-2:24. Dixon replied, “Yes, I understand that. They ain't ․ got nothing to do ․ with none of this stuff.” Id. at 2:24-2:32. Later, one of the officers stated, “Your girl is screwed right now. She's in trouble.” Id. at 8:37-8:42. Dixon indicated that he was not the “dope man.”² Id. at 9:45-9:50.

[10] On August 26, 2021, the State charged Dixon with ten counts. In an amended information, the State charged Dixon on May 29, 2024, with Count I, dealing in cocaine as a level 2 felony; Count II, dealing in a narcotic drug as a level 2 felony; and Count III, escape as a level 6 felony. With respect to Count III, the State cited Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-4 and alleged that Dixon “did knowingly or intentionally violate a home detention order, to-wit: possessed non-prescribed controlled substances and/or a firearm.” Appellant's Appendix Volume III at 17.

[11] Meanwhile, on September 7, 2023, Dixon filed a Motion to Suppress requesting that the court suppress all statements made by him prior to, at the time of, or subsequent to his arrest. He alleged that his statement on August 23, 2021, in response to an interrogation, occurred in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, he asserted that his statements were obtained as a result of psychological and mental coercion illegally directed against him.

[12] On October 15, 2023, the court held a hearing on the motion. The State presented the testimony of Williams and Detective Cooper. Dixon testified that he was high when the police arrived. When asked if he felt that he was of sound mind talking to the police and if he was making coherent statements, he answered:

To be honest, I don't know truly where my mind was at. I just knew that it was ․ it was just a lot going on. So, I don't really ․ at that point and time, no. I'm just like, I didn't feel like talking to nobody. I didn't want to talk. So, I really can't tell you, you know, anything truly, honestly about that day, other than a lot of questions being asked and I just wanted to, you know, the best for my mother and my daughter here.

Transcript Volume II at 113. He stated that the officers told him, “how do you think this would turn out for your mom and your daughter if you don't cooperate.” Id. at 114. He indicated that his fear that his daughter would go with someone other than him or his mother and that the police might arrest his mother contributed to what he told the police. He also indicated that he did not recall the Miranda warning being read to him.

[13] On December 6, 2023, the State filed a written response. On December 10, 2023, the court entered an order denying Dixon's motion.

[14] On June 4 and 5, 2024, the court held a jury trial. During Detective Cooper's testimony, the trial court again denied the motion to suppress. Detective Cooper indicated that he told Dixon what had been recovered from Dunn's purse. When asked what Dixon said, Detective Cooper stated:

Initially, he said he didn't know anything about it, but then he went on further in this interview and stated that they were smoking marijuana inside the residence, he heard a dog barking. He went out back and saw police in his backyard. He started to panic. And he believes that Miss Dunn picked that up, put it in her purse to help him. But then he again stated that it's not hers. And he was, he made that very clear that the crack cocaine that was found in her purse was not hers.

Transcript Volume III at 37.

[15] Dunn testified that the crack discovered in her purse belonged to Dixon and he placed it in her purse prior to the arrival of the police. After the State rested, Williams testified that her two other sons had lived at the residence, had previously been arrested, and were incarcerated in August 2021. She also testified that she generally kept her office locked and that Dixon did not have a key to her office. She indicated that she was working in her office on August 23, 2021, and her door was closed. She stated that Dixon informed her about the presence of the police, he did not have anything in his hands when he entered her office, and she did not observe him place anything behind her door. She also testified that she had never seen Dixon with the backpack but had seen one of her other sons with it. She indicated that she never observed Dixon possess any drugs other than marijuana or place anything in Dunn's purse.

[16] The jury found Dixon guilty of escape as a level 6 felony and not guilty of the other two charges. The court sentenced Dixon to 730 days.

Discussion

[17] Dixon argues that his statements to law enforcement were obtained in violation of his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. He asserts that his statements were not voluntarily made because he was under the influence of drugs when he spoke to law enforcement, the State failed to prove that he voluntarily waived his right to remain silent or speak to an attorney, and law enforcement coerced his statements by implying that his friend or his mother would suffer consequences if he “did not tell officers what they wanted to hear.” Appellant's Brief at 13. With respect to his argument that he was under the influence, he “does not argue that, standing alone, his intoxication would render his statements involuntary.” Id. at 14. Dixon acknowledges that, “[a]s the Court can hear from Exhibit 2, during his interrogation, [he] did not sound intoxicated, and his statements were responsive to the officer's questions.” Id.

[18] Generally, we review the trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1134 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied. We reverse only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied. We may affirm a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998), reh'g denied. We review de novo a ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we give deference to a trial court's determination of the facts, which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008); see also Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (holding that the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo). In ruling on admissibility following the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court considers the foundational evidence presented at trial. Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1001. If the foundational evidence at trial is not the same as that presented at the suppression hearing, the trial court must make its decision based upon trial evidence and may consider hearing evidence only if it does not conflict with trial evidence. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 n.1 (Ind. 2014). It also considers the evidence from the suppression hearing that is favorable to the defendant only to the extent it is uncontradicted at trial. Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1001.

[19] The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person ․ shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ․” Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[n]o person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself.” “Statements to police are admissible so long as they are voluntarily given.” Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 692 (Ind. 2019) (citing Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 115 (Ind. 2005), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 910, 126 S. Ct. 2936 (2006)), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 553 (2020). “We examine the totality of the circumstances as presented by the record, and are guided by several factors including police coercion; the length, location, and continuity of the interrogation; and the defendant's maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health.” Bond v. State, 9 N.E.3d 134, 137 (Ind. 2014) (citing Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 767-768 (Ind. 2002)). “The critical inquiry is whether the defendant's statements were induced by violence, threats, promises or other improper influence.” Id. (quoting Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209, 1212-1213 (Ind. 2000)).

[20] When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of his or her confession under the United States Constitution, the State must prove the statement was voluntarily given by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 114). “However, the Indiana Constitution requires the state to prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights, and that the defendant's confession was voluntarily given.’ ” Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 114-115 (quoting Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 767 (quoting Schmitt v. State, 730 N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind. 2000))).

[21] On appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence but instead examine the record for substantial, probative evidence of voluntariness. Id. at 115. We examine the evidence most favorable to the State, together with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion, it will not be set aside. Id.

[22] If voluntariness of a statement is challenged on the basis that the defendant was under the influence of drugs, the defendant has the burden to introduce evidence from which it could be concluded that the amount and nature of the drug consumed would produce an involuntary statement. Id. The mere fact a statement is made by the defendant while under the influence of drugs, or that the defendant is mentally ill, does not render it inadmissible per se. Id. Intoxication, drug use and mental illness are only factors to be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether a statement was voluntary. Id. A defendant must show specific instances where his impaired abilities have an effect on voluntariness in order to prevail on a claim that his mental condition prevented him from knowingly waiving his Miranda rights. Id. Although a person's mental condition is relevant to the issue of susceptibility to police coercion, where the person voluntarily makes a confession without police coercion the confession may be considered in spite of the mental condition. Pettiford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind. 1993). “Statements are inadmissible due to intoxication only when an accused is intoxicated to the point that he is unaware of what he is saying.” Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ind. 2009) (citing Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 115 (plurality opinion) (citing Williams v. State, 489 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Ind. 1986)), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 981, 131 S. Ct. 414 (2010). “Intoxication to a lesser degree goes only to the weight to be given the statement.” Id.

[23] Dixon does not claim that his intoxication caused him to be unaware of his statements during the interview. Indeed, he acknowledges that he did not sound intoxicated during the interview and his statements were responsive to the officers’ questions. The record reveals that Williams testified that the medics “checked [Dixon] out.” Transcript Volume II at 111. Upon questioning by the court, Williams stated that the medics stood in front of Dixon and “I guess they might have checked his heart rate and everything and they asked him if he wanted to go to the hospital.” Id. at 112. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Cooper testified that, while he conducted the interview, he observed that Dixon's condition had “changed for the better,” “[t]he sweating stopped,” “he calmed down,” and he “was very coherent of what was going on.” Id. at 99. When asked, through his training and experience as a police officer for fifteen years, if he believed at the time of the interview that Dixon was under the influence of either drugs or alcohol, he answered, “No, I did not.” Id. at 100. We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that Dixon's interview was not involuntary due to intoxication.

[24] With respect to whether Dixon waived his right to remain silent, Detective Cooper testified that he read Dixon his Miranda rights and that Dixon acknowledged them by nodding his head yes and looking in Detective Cooper's direction when he asked him if he understood. Before interviewing Dixon, Detective Cooper asked him again if he understood his rights, and Dixon “again acknowledged with a yes, a shake ․” Id. at 103.

[25] As for Dixon's assertion that he testified that one of the officers asked him “how do you think this would turn out for your mom and your daughter if you don't cooperate,” id. at 114, Dixon does not cite to any other portion of the record for this argument. We also observe that the trial court's order denying Dixon's motion to suppress found that Dixon was not a credible witness. Under the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say reversal is warranted. See Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1231 (Ind. 2000) (finding no evidence of violence, threats, promises, or improper influence regarding the defendant's confession).³

[26] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Dixon's conviction.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Detective Cooper indicated that the contract with community corrections entitled search of “their person, their bedroom, and anything that they have easy access to,” and the search warrant “is much more inclusive of the entire building, not just their bedroom.” Transcript Volume III at 22.

2.   The audio recording of the interview of Dixon was approximately thirty-three minutes.

3.   To the extent Dixon cites Hall v. State, 255 Ind. 606, 266 N.E.2d 16 (1971), we find that case distinguishable. In Hall, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of a defendant's written confession. 255 Ind. at 610, 266 N.E.2d at 19. The defendant argued that he was intimidated into signing the confession in that police officers stated that his wife was a prime suspect in the burglaries along with him, and there was a clear implication if he did not confess, she would be charged, which would necessitate the placement of the defendant's small children in the custody of others. Id. The record does not reveal that Dixon and Dunn were married. Indeed, in his brief, Dixon refers to Dunn as “his friend” in his brief. Appellant's Brief at 13. Thus, Hall is distinguishable in this respect. See Coppock v. State, 480 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ind. 1985) (observing that “appellant's relationship with D.T. inferably did not rise to the level of Hall's near and dear spousal relationship and would not be as susceptible to coercion by threat or promise”); Johnson v. State, 513 N.E.2d 650, 652 (Ind. 1987) (“A relationship other than a spousal relationship is not as susceptible to coercion by threat or promise. Likewise, an accused's expectation that his confession will gain his friend's release does not render his confession involuntary.”) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238 (Ind. 1997). We cannot say that Hall warrants reversal. See Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 802 (Ind. 1999) (finding Hall distinguishable and stating: “First, in Hall the police gave a ‘clear implication’ to the defendant that if he did not confess, they would arrest his wife. Here, the police did not state that Defendant must confess to avoid the arrest of his siblings. Rather, they suggested that given the cooperation of Defendant's siblings, Defendant's own lack of cooperation could only magnify their roles as suspects in the crime. In any event, we find that the alleged ‘threats’ alone did not render Defendant's statement involuntary. Considering the fact that Defendant's siblings gave statements implicating him in the victim's death, we are not convinced that the possibility of their arrest would have had an unduly coercive effect on Defendant.”) (citation and footnote omitted).

Brown, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Tavitas concur. Altice, C.J., and Tavitas, J., concur.