NORWOOD v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary 1

[1] Destanie Norwood was convicted of Level 5 felony domestic battery and Level 6 felony strangulation for beating her eleven-year-old son. She appeals, arguing that the State failed to rebut her parental-privilege defense. Finding the State rebutted Norwood's defense, we affirm her convictions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In June 2022, Norwood left for work and told her eleven-year-old son, L.N., to stay home and she would return for lunch. Although L.N.’s father (Father) had primary custody of L.N., L.N. was staying with Norwood that day. Norwood was unaware that Father gave L.N. permission to spend the day with Father's friend, Layna Greenwald, who had provided childcare for L.N. in the past. Sometime that morning, Greenwald picked up L.N. from Norwood's home and they left in her car.

[3] Unable to reach L.N. at home, Norwood left work to look for him. While searching, she spoke to Father, who told her that Greenwald had picked up L.N. from Norwood's house. Norwood drove to Greenwald's apartment but did not find L.N. or Greenwald there.

[4] After leaving the apartment complex, Norwood stopped at a local grocery store. As she pulled into the parking lot, she spotted L.N. climbing into the back seat of a car in the lot. She approached the vehicle and “yelled at [L.N.] three [ ] times to get out of the car.” Transcript Vol. 1 at 242. L.N. refused.

[5] Norwood, about five feet, eight inches tall and weighing “about 200 pounds[ ]” was “substantially larger” than L.N., who was only about four feet, eight inches tall “and probably about 100 pounds less in weight.” Id. at 190. She became “outrage[d]” by her son's refusal to get out of the car. Id. at 242. As she reached into the back seat to drag him out of the car, L.N. punched her. Norwood “roughly snatched him out [of] the car” by his hair, and “threw him up” against the side of the car. Id.; State's Exh. 7 at 2:40-2:50. Shouting “I'm sick of this, I'm sick of you,” Norwood “abruptly slammed” L.N. to the ground. Tr. Vol. 1 at 248; State's Exh. 23. When he stood up, she grabbed him in a headlock and choked him.

[6] L.N. tried to free himself from Norwood's headlock, but she grabbed him by his t-shirt and swung him around the parking lot, causing L.N.’s pants to slip down, exposing his buttocks to several bystanders. State's Exh. 7 at 3:20-3:45. Eventually, Norwood brought him back to the ground, “sat on him and punched him.” Tr. Vol. 1 at 231; State's Exh. 7 at 4:18.

[7] Officer Jason Beldon from the Fort Wayne Police Department was dispatched to the scene and found Norwood sitting on top of L.N. “holding him down.” Tr. Vol. 1 at 188-89. After Officer Beldon “yell[ed]” at Norwood to get up, she “used both hands and intentionally put them on [L.N.’s] face and pushed off of his face” to stand up. Id.; State's Exh. 7 at 7:10. Still on the ground, L.N. “became enraged, [ ] emotionally uncontrollable and started kicking” at Norwood. Tr. Vol. 1 at 190.

[8] After Officer Beldon separated Norwood and L.N., Norwood continued “displaying ․ pre-attack indicators” and was “in a charging stance,” with her fists clenched. Id. at 199; State's Exh. 7 at 7:17. Then she yelled, “you're going down b****” and ran toward L.N. again. Tr. Vol. 1 at 199. Officer Racquel Rodriguez, who had arrived at the scene, subdued Norwood who “was very angry” and kept yelling. Id. at 200. She informed Officer Rodriguez that L.N. had punched her in the face, but the officer did not observe any visible marks on Norwood.

[9] Meanwhile, L.N. continued crying hysterically, struggled to breathe, and “began [ ] throw[ing] up”. Id. at 192. L.N. told the officer that Norwood sat “on him and punched him in the face.” Id. He told the emergency medical technician (EMT) that “he was grabbed aggressively by his mom, [ ] hit multiple times” with a closed fist, and “choked [ ] until he started to vomit[.]” Id. at 213-14. The EMT recorded “some swelling to [L.N.’s] left cheek,” redness on his chest, and dried secretions and vomit on his face—with vomiting being a common indicator of having been choked. Id. at 213.

[10] The State charged Norwood with Level 5 felony domestic battery on a person less than 14 years of age ² causing bodily injury and Level 6 felony strangulation.³

[11] At the jury trial in June 2024, Norwood denied strangling L.N. and claimed that she was merely “trying to restrain him” because she did not want him to hit her. Id. at 244. She testified she wanted “to show him that [she was] the parent” and that she gave the orders. Id. And though she admitted punching L.N., she denied hurting him, claiming it was a “love tap” that “made him respect [her] more.” Id. at 250. Norwood conceded that in the future, she “would try to do [ ] better” to develop “more of an understanding” and “try to talk” with L.N. Id.

[12] The jury also heard evidence that in July 2021, L.N. had run away from summer camp. When an officer located L.N., he was scared and crying, and he explained that his mom had chased him through the park in her car, driving over the fairways and greens of the local golf course threatening “to beat his a**.” Id. at 170. The officer contacted the Department of Child Services because he was concerned for L.N.’s safety if L.N. was returned to Norwood's care.

[13] The jury found Norwood guilty as charged. On June 28, the trial court sentenced Norwood to an aggregate sentence of six years, with four years executed and two years suspended to probation. Norwood appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Although Norwood contends in a single sentence that the convictions violated several of her constitutional rights, her only cogent argument is whether the State established sufficient evidence to negate an element of her parental-privilege defense.⁴ In other words, Norwood alleges that the State failed to present evidence to demonstrate that she used unreasonable force or that she had an unreasonable belief that such force was necessary to control L.N. and prevent his misconduct.

1. Standard of Review

[15] “The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a defense of parental privilege is the same as the standard for any sufficiency claim.” Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 182-83 (Ind. 2008). “The decision of whether a [defense] of parental privilege has been disproved is entrusted to the fact-finder[,]” and we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 182, 183 (citing Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999)). “If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, the verdict will not be disturbed.” Id. at 183 (citing Sanders, 704 N.E.2d at 123).

2. Parental-Privilege Defense

[16] “A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a familial relationship with his or her child.” Id. at 180. “This fundamental interest includes the right of parents ‘to direct the upbringing and education of children,’ including the use of reasonable or moderate physical force to control behavior.” Id. (quoting Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)). Even so, “the potential for child abuse cannot be taken lightly” and “the State has a powerful interest in preventing and deterring the mistreatment of children.” Id. Because there is no bright-line rule governing what constitutes appropriate and reasonable punishment of a child by a parent, prosecutors and courts are left with the difficult task of determining “when parental use of physical force in disciplining children turns an otherwise law-abiding citizen into a criminal.” Id.

[17] “The defense of parental privilege, like self-defense, is a complete defense. That is to say, a valid defense of parental privilege is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Id. at 182 (citing I.C. § 35-41-3-1). To balance these interests, our Indiana Supreme Court grafted the common law defense of parental privilege onto Indiana Code section 35-41-3-1, which generally provides that “[a] person is justified in engaging in conduct otherwise prohibited if he has legal authority to do so.” Id. at 181; I.C. § 35-41-3-1. Therefore, “[a] parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his [or her] child as he [or she] reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education.” Id. at 182 (quoting Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 147(1) (Am. L. Inst. 1965)).

[18] To uphold a battery conviction after the defendant has asserted a defense of parental privilege, “the State must prove that either: (1) the force the parent used was unreasonable or (2) the parent's belief that such force was necessary to control her child and prevent misconduct was unreasonable.” Id. The State may disprove the parental-privilege defense by either relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence during its case-in-chief or by directly rebutting the claim. See Pava v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1071, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

A. Norwood's Force was Unreasonable

[19] The first element of the privilege examines whether the parent's use of force is reasonable; if the force is deemed unreasonable, the privilege cannot be a defense and the parent may be criminally liable.⁵ See Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 182.

[20] L.N. was an eleven-year-old boy, “probably about 100 pounds less in weight” than Norwood, who refused to obey Norwood's command to get out of the car. Tr. Vol. 1 at 190. It was following his refusal that Norwood “roughly snatched him out [of] the car” by his hair, and “threw him up” against the side of the car. Id. at 242; State's Exh. 7 at 2:40-2:50. Then she “abruptly slammed” L.N. to the ground and when he stood up, she grabbed him in a headlock and choked him. Tr. Vol. 1 at 248; State's Exh. 23. As L.N. tried to escape Norwood's headlock, she swung him around the parking lot by his t-shirt, causing L.N.’s pants to slip down, exposing his buttocks to several bystanders. State's Exh. 7 at 3:20-3:45. Norwood finally brought him back to the ground, “sat on him and punched him.” Tr. Vol. 1 at 231; State's Exh. 7 at 4:18. When police arrived and ordered Norwood off of L.N., he was crying hysterically, struggling to breathe, and “began [ ] throw[ing] up[.]” Tr. Vol. 1 at 192. Norwood's actions provide sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion that the force she used to discipline L.N. was unreasonable.

B. Norwood's Belief that Such Force was Necessary was Unreasonable

[21] The parental-discipline defense is phrased in the disjunctive, requiring the State to prove either the force the parent used was unreasonable or the parent's belief that such force was necessary to control her child and prevent misconduct was unreasonable. Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 182 (citing Restatement, supra, § 147) (emphasis added). Although we have found that Norwood used unreasonable force in disciplining L.N., we opt to also review whether her belief that such force was necessary was unreasonable.

[22] By the time Norwood saw L.N. in the parking lot, she knew Father had given him permission to spend the day with Greenwald. But L.N. refused to get out of the car as Norwood instructed prompting the beating she gave L.N. as recited above. There was evidence that in the past Norwood had chased L.N. in her car through a park, driving over the fairways and greens of the local golf course threatening “to beat his a**” because he had run away from summer camp. Tr. Vol. 1 at 170. Even Norwood acknowledged that her belief in the necessity of using force to ensure L.N.’s obedience with her order to get out of a car was unreasonable. Norwood conceded at trial that she could have developed “more of an understanding[,]” and tried to talk to him. Id. at 250. A parent “is not privileged to use a means to compel obedience if a less severe method appears to be likely to be equally effective.” Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 183 (quoting Restatement, supra, § 150 cmt. d.). Given the facts in this case, there is ample evidence to support the conclusion that Norwood's belief that using such force on L.N. was unreasonable.

Conclusion

[23] Based on the circumstances before us, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Norwood's defense that she was protected by parental privilege in the discipline she imposed upon L.N.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1); (c)(5)(A).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-2-9(c).

4.   Norwood also argues that her convictions were entered in violation of her rights to procedural and substantive due process, due course of law, and a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article One, Sections Twelve and Thirteen of the Indiana Constitution. Beyond these generalized claims, Norwood does not develop an argument or include any citations to the record, transcript, or legal authority to preserve the issues. By failing to present a cogent argument, she waived these claims for our review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning.”)

5.   In determining whether a parent's use of force is reasonable for the control, training, or education of a child, we consider the following factors:(a) whether the actor is a parent;(b) the age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the child;(c) the nature of his offense and his apparent motive;(d) the influence of his example upon other children of the same family or group;(e) whether the force [ ] is reasonably necessary and appropriate to compel obedience to a proper command;(f) whether it is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm.Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 150 (1965). “In addition to this non-exhaustive list of factors, ‘[t]here may be other factors unique to a particular case that should be taken into consideration.’ ” Carter v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1041, 1045-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 182), trans. denied. “Not all of the listed factors may be relevant or applicable in every case.” Id. at 1046 (quoting Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 182).

DeBoer, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.