IDLEWINE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Rickey Idlewine appeals his sixteen-year sentence for two convictions of Level 4 felony child molesting.¹ Idlewine raises two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by failing to find his relative lack of criminal history to be a mitigating factor, and

2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Idlewine and his girlfriend, Mary Singleton, lived together in Anderson, Indiana. Singleton had two granddaughters, S.C. and R.C., who moved from Jamaica to Indiana in 2020. S.C. was around seven or eight years old at that time. From 2020-2022, the granddaughters visited Singleton and Idlewine almost every weekend for Saturday night sleepovers. Although only blood-related to Singleton, S.C. viewed Idlewine as “grandpa” and referred to him as “Papaw Rick.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 60.)

[3] Singleton and Idlewine's home had a playroom containing various toys that the girls would play with during their visits. On several occasions during these sleepovers, when Idlewine was in the playroom alone with S.C., he used his hand to touch and rub S.C.’s vagina over her clothes or to rub and squeeze her breasts over her clothes. On another occasion, Idlewine stuck his hand down S.C.’s pants and rubbed her vagina over her underwear. Idlewine touched S.C.’s breasts or vagina on more than ten different occasions. On yet another occasion, Idlewine squeezed and rubbed S.C.’s buttocks as she got into his vehicle to go buy marbles from a dollar store.

[4] Around September 2022, S.C. stopped going to Singleton and Idlewine's home for sleepovers because S.C. was “getting uncomfortable when he was touching me[.]” (Id. at 83.) In November 2022, when S.C. was ten years old, she told her school friend, A.G., about Idlewine's inappropriate touching. A.G. encouraged S.C. to tell her mother what happened. Later that night, S.C. told her mother that Idlewine had been touching her in a sexual manner during the sleepovers. S.C.’s parents reported Idlewine to the police the following day.

[5] On March 9, 2023, the State charged Idlewine with three counts of Level 4 felony child molesting. On March 12, 2024, the State amended the charges to allege only two counts of child molesting. On April 4, 2024, the trial court held a jury trial. Following trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. On May 8, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, wherein the trial court judge considered several aggravators and mitigators before imposing Idlewine's sentence. The trial court found Idlewine's position as the grandfather of S.C. and the multiple occurrences of molest as aggravators. Idlewine argued the trial court should find a mitigator in his criminal history because it included only two misdemeanor convictions from 1989 for driving under the influence. The trial court considered Idlewine's remote criminal history and did not find it to be a mitigator or an aggravator. The trial court found the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Idlewine to eight years on each count, to run consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of sixteen years in the Indiana Department of Correction.

Discussion and Decision

1. Abuse of Discretion

[6] Sentencing decisions rest firmly within the discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). Thus, if the sentence imposed by a trial court falls within the statutory range for the criminal offense, we review it for abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” Id. (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to enter a sentencing statement, imposes a sentence based on mitigators and aggravators not supported by the record, imposes a sentence without considering mitigators and aggravators clearly supported by the record, or imposes a sentence based on considerations that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. A trial court has no obligation to weigh mitigators and aggravators and thus cannot “be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 147, 155 (Ind. 2000)).

[7] Idlewine argues the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to find a mitigating factor in his “lack of criminal history and 35 plus years as a law-abiding citizen[.]” (Appellant's Br. at 23.) The trial court has discretion to determine mitigating circumstances. Mehringer v. State, 152 N.E.3d 667, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “ ‘An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.’ ” Russel v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 847 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind. 1999)), cert. denied 145 S. Ct. 424 (2024). “In cases where the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing only ‘if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.’ ” Id. (quoting Bryant v. State, 959 N.E.2d 315, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).

[8] Here, the trial court did consider Idlewine's remote criminal history in its sentencing. The court found that Idlewine's remote criminal history, while not necessarily an aggravator, was also not a mitigator:

As far as mitigation the Court does not find that there's the mitigator as to having no criminal history. The Court doesn't find it ․ a criminal history aggravator ․ but also the Court will not find that it is a mitigator that there is no criminal history. There is very remote as both parties have underlined, remote criminal history from many years ago but that prevents the court from finding it as a mitigating circumstance.

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 99.) Indiana law says a trial court “may” find a mitigator if a “person has no history of delinquency or criminal activity, or the person has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period before commission of the crime.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(6). Idlewine has two criminal convictions of driving under the influence from 1989; thus, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to find Idlewine had “no history of ․ criminal activity[.]” Id. Nor can we say the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to find Idlewine had led a law-abiding life prior to his conviction when the record demonstrates Idlewine was repeatedly molesting S.C. for over two years. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion when it refused to label Idlewine's remote criminal history as a mitigating factor. See, e.g., Storey v. State, 875 N.E.2d 243, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding remoteness in time does not render a prior conviction irrelevant or preclude the trial court from considering it as an aggravating circumstance), trans. denied.

2. Inappropriate Sentence

[9] Even if a trial court acts within its discretion in imposing a sentence, Indiana Appellate Rule 7(b) provides an avenue for “independent appellate review and revision of a [defendant's] sentence.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. An appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” App. R. 7(b). The trial court has discretion when imposing a sentence and the “court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stevenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The primary goal of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers, ․ not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. “Whether a sentence should be deemed inappropriate ‘turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.’ ” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224).

[10] Idlewine argues the nature of his offense was “not particularly egregious” because S.C. suffered no physical harm, did not sustain long-term psychological damage or undergo counseling afterward, and was not molested by Idlewine every time she stayed at the house. (Appellant's Br. at 12). We disagree. Idlewine repeatedly took advantage of his custodial role and position of trust. Idlewine fondled S.C.’s breasts and vagina on more than ten occasions and, on one occasion, Idlewine put his hand down S.C.’s pants and rubbed her vagina over her underwear. On another occasion, Idlewine, while helping S.C. into the car, grabbed and squeezed her buttocks. Idlewine had access to S.C. because of familial trust and relationships, and he continued to molest S.C. until she removed herself from the situation. S.C. was eight to ten years old during the time Idlewine molested her. Although S.C. testified that Idlewine molested her “mostly every time” she spent the night and sometimes they just played with toys in the playroom, (Tr. Vol. 2 at 82), those facts do not mollify the reprehensible nature of Idlewine's crime.

[11] Moreover, S.C.’s mother testified at trial that, during the years when Idlewine molested S.C., S.C. became distant and non-talkative, was often upset, and slept frequently. S.C. testified that she feared that her mother would “never forgive [her]” for what Idlewine did to her. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 140.) These facts demonstrate that S.C. experienced, at a minimum, mental and emotional distress due to the molestations. The nature of Idlewine's offense supports his imposed sentence of sixteen years because he abused his position of trust, molested S.C. on multiple occasions, and caused emotional and mental distress in S.C. See, e.g., Hart v. State, 829 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that “[a]busing a position of trust is, by itself, a valid aggravator which supports the maximum enhancement of a sentence for child molesting”).

[12] Idlewine also argues his character warrants a downward revision of his sentence because he is an elderly man who led a mostly law-abiding life prior to this case and has ample support from friends and family. In addition, he notes he was gainfully employed up until these convictions. However, while Idlewine was charged with only two counts of child molesting, S.C. testified at trial that Idlewine molested her “mostly every time” she spent the night at Idlewine and Singleton's home. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 98.) This testimony undermines Idlewine's claim of leading a mostly law-abiding life, as he was engaging in criminal conduct consistently for two years prior to being charged. Furthermore, Idlewine perpetuated sexual abuse against his wife's granddaughter for two years and had a remote history of two DUI convictions, which demonstrates that his character is not as admirable as he asserts. See Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”). Idlewine's employment and financial support of his family reflect well on his character, generally; however, the weight of those attributes does not warrant a downward revision of his sentence. See Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that “[m]any people are gainfully employed such that this would not require the trial court to” consider employment as a mitigating factor or afford it significant weight), trans. denied. Idlewine has not convinced us that his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate for his offense and character.

Conclusion

[13] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to find lack of criminal history as a mitigating factor. Furthermore, Idlewine's sentence was not inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense or his character. We accordingly affirm the sixteen-year sentence imposed by the trial court.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b).

May, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur.