EBLER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Gregory Ebler (“Ebler”) appeals the trial court's March 2024 order that sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of twenty-six (26) years. He specifically argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to an aggregate twenty-six-year sentence because his October 2022 plea agreement (“the October 2022 plea agreement”) capped his sentence at twenty-two (22) years. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Ebler to an aggregate sentence of twenty-six years, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court, without holding a hearing, to resentence Ebler consistently with the terms of the October 2022 plea agreement.

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Ebler outside the terms of the October 2022 plea agreement.

Facts

[3] In September 2022, the State charged fifty-five-year-old Ebler in Cause Number 84D01-2209-F2-3230 (“Cause F2-3230”) with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. The State also alleged that Ebler was an habitual offender.

[4] In October 2022, pursuant to the terms of the October 2022 plea agreement, Ebler agreed, in Cause F2-3230, to plead guilty to Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and admit that he was an habitual offender. In addition, Ebler agreed to admit that he had violated the terms of his direct commitment and/or probation in two separate causes (“the separate causes”) (collectively with Cause F2-3230, “the three causes”).

[5] In exchange for Ebler's guilty plea and admissions, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges in Cause F2-3230. The October 2022 plea agreement further provided that “[t]he parties ha[d] no agreement regarding sentencing except that said sentence shall not exceed twenty-two (22) years, and the parties shall argue other terms of sentencing before the Court.” (App. Vol. 2 at 116). In addition, the October 2022 plea agreement provided that the sentences in the three causes would run consecutively to each other.

[6] At a November 2023 hearing, the trial court advised Ebler of the rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty. In addition, Ebler established a factual basis for his guilty plea and admitted to being an habitual offender. Ebler also admitted that he had violated the term of his direct commitment and/or probation in the separate causes. Further, both Ebler and the State argued the other terms of sentencing. In its argument, the State noted that it had “capped [Ebler's] total exposure at twenty-two years[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 51).

[7] That same day, the trial court issued a written judgment of conviction and sentencing order. In this order, the trial court outlined the terms of the plea agreement and found that Ebler had: (1) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights; (2) entered guilty pleas; and (3) established a factual basis for those pleas. In addition, the trial court entered judgment of conviction, thereby accepting the October 2022 plea agreement. The trial court took Ebler's sentence under advisement. In January 2024, the trial court sentenced Ebler to an aggregate term of more than twenty-two years.¹

[8] In March 2024, Ebler filed a plea agreement (“the March 2024 plea agreement”) that was nearly identical to the October 2022 plea agreement. Specifically, the only difference between the two plea agreements was that the March 2024 plea agreement capped Ebler's sentence at twenty-six years rather than twenty-two years. Ebler signed the March 2024 plea agreement. That same day, without holding a hearing, the trial court issued an order sentencing Ebler to an aggregate sentence of twenty-six years.

[9] Ebler now appeals.²

Decision

[10] Ebler essentially argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of twenty-six years. He specifically contends that his “sentence should be revised to conform to the terms of [the October 2022] plea agreement that bound him, the State, and the trial court.” (Ebler's Br. 9). Ebler further contends that the March 2024 plea agreement “had no legal effect, because Ebler never requested that he be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas under the [October 2022] plea agreement.” (Ebler's Br. 9). The State, on the other hand, argues that “this Court should remand for the trial court to determine which plea agreement controls and to sentence Ebler within the terms of that agreement.” (State's Br. 9). We agree with Ebler that the October 2022 plea agreement controls.

[11] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or when the trial court has misinterpreted the law. Remy v. State, 17 N.E.3d 396, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[12] The decision to accept or reject a plea agreement is also a matter that is left to the trial court's discretion. Koontz v. State, 975 N.E.2d 846, 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff'd on reh'g. However, plea agreements are contracts, and once a trial court accepts a plea agreement, the agreement and its terms are binding upon the trial court, the State, and the defendant. Archer v. State, 81 N.E.3d 212, 215-16 (Ind. 2017). “Strict adherence to the agreement is essential.” Knight v. State, 202 N.E.3d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. See also Ind. Code § 35-35-3-3(e) (stating that “[i]f the court accepts a plea agreement, it shall be bound by its terms.”).

[13] In other words, once the trial court has accepted a plea agreement, the trial court “possesses only that degree of discretion provided in the plea agreement with regard to imposing an initial sentence or altering it later.” State v. Holloway, 980 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (cleaned up). See also Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994) (explaining that once an agreement is accepted by the trial court, “a deal is a deal.”). Indeed, a trial “court's obligation to abide by the agreement does not ebb with time or circumstance.” Holloway, 980 N.E.2d at 335.

[14] Because a plea agreement is a contract, “to permit reduction or modification of the defendant's sentence would deprive [one of the parties] of its end of the bargain.” Id. (cleaned up). Stated differently, trial courts “are not empowered to change any of the terms [of a plea agreement].” Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229, 1234 (Ind. 2023) (citing Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 77 n.3 (Ind. 2008)) (explaining that trial courts cannot accept a guilty plea and then modify the plea agreement even if the modification is more favorable to the defendant).

[15] Here, our review of the record reveals that, in November 2023, the trial court accepted the October 2022 plea agreement that capped Ebler's sentence at twenty-two years. Once the trial court had accepted the October 2022 plea agreement, the trial court was bound to it. Nevertheless, the parties agree that, in January 2024, the trial court sentenced Ebler to more than twenty-two years. Ebler did not appeal that order.

[16] Two months later, in March 2024, Ebler signed and filed the March 2024 plea agreement, which was nearly identical to the October 2022 plea agreement.³ Because the only difference between the two plea agreements was the sentencing cap, it appears that the trial court modified the October 2022 plea agreement to include a twenty-six-year sentencing cap rather than a twenty-two-year sentencing cap. The trial court simply did not have the discretion to change the terms of the October 2022 plea agreement. Such a modification would deprive Ebler of his end of the bargain. We further note that if a trial court cannot modify a plea agreement to be more favorable to a defendant, a trial court cannot modify a plea agreement to be less favorable to a defendant.

[17] We conclude that the trial court was bound to the October 2022 plea agreement, which capped Ebler's sentence at twenty-two years. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Ebler to twenty-six years. We, therefore, reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court, without holding a hearing, to sentence Ebler to a term consistent with the October 2022 plea agreement.

[18] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Both Ebler and the State allege that the trial court sentenced Ebler to thirty-two years. However, neither party has directed us to a chronological case summary or sentencing order that shows the imposition of a thirty-two-year sentence. In any case, the length of the January 2024 sentence is not relevant to this appeal because Ebler is appealing the trial court's March 2024 order.

2.   In July 2024, after filing Ebler's notice of appeal, Ebler's appellate counsel (“appellate counsel”) filed a motion to remand the case to the trial court (“the remand motion”). In this motion, appellate counsel explained that she had asked Ebler's trial counsel (“trial counsel”) why Ebler had filed the March 2024 plea agreement, wherein the cap on Ebler's sentence had been increased from twenty-two years to twenty-six years. According to appellate counsel, trial counsel had told her that “the old plea agreement contained an error that had to be corrected as to [Ebler]’s sentence, that he explained this to [Ebler], and that [trial] counsel did not believe a hearing was warranted because he believed, based on the mitigating evidence that he had presented at the sentencing hearing, that the trial court might impose a favorable total sentence.” (Court of Appeals Docket, July 17, 2024 entry, Motion to Remand at 3). In the remand motion, Ebler argued that the trial court had been bound to the terms of the October 2022 plea agreement, which included a twenty-two-year cap on Ebler's sentence. Ebler asked this Court's motions panel to remand Ebler's case to the trial court with instructions to impose a sentence that was consistent with the October 2022 plea agreement. Two weeks later, the State filed a response in opposition to Ebler's motion. On August 2, 2024, this Court's motions panel issued an order temporarily remanding the case to the trial court with instructions “to hold a new sentencing hearing and enter an Order either upholding or vacating its prior sentencing order.” (Court of Appeals Docket, August 2, 2024 entry, Order Granting Motion to Remand at 1).Following this Court's grant of the remand motion, appellate counsel exchanged several emails with trial counsel and told him that because the trial court had accepted the October 2022 plea agreement, the trial court was bound by that plea agreement and, on remand, could only resentence Ebler to no more than twenty-two years. In August 2024, the trial court held a hearing. According to the trial court's August 2024 order, Ebler had “reject[ed]” the March 2024 plea agreement. (Court of Appeals Docket, August 26, 2024 entry, Trial Court's August 22, 2024 order). Thereafter, the trial court set Cause F2-3230 for trial and ordered review hearings in the probation revocation cases. At the end of August 2024, appellate counsel filed a motion to vacate this Court's grant of the remand motion and the trial court's August 2024 order. Appellate counsel specifically argued as follows:Respectfully, the trial court acted outside its ․ authority under the law. Once a plea agreement is accepted by the trial court, it is bound by the terms of the plea agreement. Only the defendant can move – in writing – to withdraw his plea of guilty before sentencing. [Ebler] never indicated in writing that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. His rejection of the March 20, 2024 plea agreement had no legal effect, because the October 2022 plea agreement accepted by the trial court in November 2023 was the only agreement in effect.(Court of Appeals Docket, August 26, 2024 entry, Motion to Vacate at 3). Further, appellate counsel requested that this Court order the trial court to vacate its August 2024 order and to resentence Ebler pursuant to the terms of the October 2022 plea agreement. In September 2024, this Court's motions panel ordered the trial court to vacate its August 2024 order and to reinstate the March 2024 sentencing order. In addition, this Court modified its August 2024 order to deny the remand motion and resumed full jurisdiction of the appeal.

3.   We note, as did Ebler, that he did not file a motion to withdraw the October 2022 plea agreement. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-35-1-4, which governs motions to withdraw guilty pleas, “[a]fter being sentenced following a plea of guilty ․, the convicted person may not as a matter of right withdraw the plea. However, upon motion of the convicted person, the court shall vacate the judgment and allow the withdrawal whenever the convicted person proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” I.C. § 35-35-1-4(c).

Pyle, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Felix, J., concur.