IN RE: M.L. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On August 2, 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that J.L. (“Mother”) had been observed in public in a state of intoxication while caring for M.L. (“Child”). On August 5, 2024, DCS petitioned the juvenile court to adjudicate Child as a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Following a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court issued an order granting the CHINS petition. Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding Child to be a CHINS, specifically arguing that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence that Child's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered or that court coercion was necessary to provide services. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 2, 2024, DCS received a report that Mother had been observed in public in a state of intoxication while caring for Child. That same day, Greencastle Police Department Officer David Brown had been dispatched to a Walmart in Putnam County for a welfare check on a customer who “was reeking of ․ a strong odor of alcohol and had a small child with her.” Tr. Vol. II p. 49. When Officer Brown and another officer arrived, they were directed to a waiting area where they met Mother and Child. Surveillance footage revealed that Mother had driven a vehicle, with Child in the backseat, to the tire-and-auto center of Walmart approximately one hour before the dispatch.

[3] Officer Brown conducted a field sobriety test that Mother failed. After Mother's portable breath test indicated a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of .317, Officer Brown transported her to the hospital for a blood draw that resulted in a .294 BAC. Child was detained and placed with her maternal grandmother. On August 5, 2024, DCS petitioned the juvenile court to adjudicate Child as a CHINS. On the same day, the State charged Mother with neglect of a dependent and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. Mother pled guilty to the operating charge.

[4] Mother had a substantiated history with DCS, both for Child and three other children not then in her custody. One event involving Mother's other children had included a child being exposed to THC, and two other events had involved lack of supervision, with one of those events having resulted in Mother being charged with neglect of a dependent child. Child was born exposed to alcohol and THC. In October of 2023, Mother had been charged in an unrelated case in Montgomery County, where she had been “very intoxicated with [Child].” Tr. Vol. II p. 12.

[5] On September 3, 2024, the juvenile court conducted a status conference in which J.S. (“Father”) testified that he is Child's father, that he had communicated to DCS that Mother drinks alcohol “to the state of intoxication” while Child is present and that Mother had “done this frequently in the last nine months.” Tr. Vol. II p. 39. Father agreed that DCS should be involved “to protect [Child]” from Mother drinking while she has Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 41. On September 17, 2024, the juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing with regard to the CHINS petition. At the hearing, Officer Brown testified that Mother was “very functional for having such a high level” of alcohol but that she had still placed Child in danger when she had driven with Child in the vehicle. Tr. Vol. II pp. 53–54. He also testified that Mother's intoxication had interfered with her ability to supervise Child appropriately.

[6] Mother admitted at the fact-finding hearing that she had consumed whiskey on August 2nd before she had driven with Child in the car. She testified that she had consumed the whiskey because she had been “sick with the flu for four days before that.” Tr. Vol. II p. 75. She also admitted that, on that occasion, her consumption of alcohol had interfered with her ability to supervise Child safely. Mother testified that she did not believe that she needed treatment for substance abuse, stating, “I feel so much better than I did.” Tr. Vol. II p. 76.

[7] DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Larissa Freeman testified that she had begun working with Mother and Child on August 22, 2024. FCM Freeman testified that she had put in referrals for services for Mother, including random drug screens, a substance-abuse assessment, and supervised visits. Because the random drug screen provider had been unable to reach Mother, FCM Freeman had been administering the drug screens to Mother. Mother's drug screens had all returned negative. FCM Freeman also testified that Mother's house is clean and “up to standard” with no environmental concerns. Tr. Vol. II p. 69.

[8] Mother had not completed the substance-abuse assessment as of the fact-finding hearing. FCM Freeman testified that Mother had initially expressed to her that “she would do everything she could to get [Child] back[,]” but on another visit, Mother had expressed that she would not participate in services until she was able to have twelve-hour visits with Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 65. Mother had referred to the August 2nd incident as “this little mishap” and had told FCM Freeman that there were “worse other things out there” such as “[m]eth use and drug use[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 66. FCM Freeman testified that she believed that Child was a CHINS because Child did not have a sober caregiver, which placed her in danger. FCM Freeman also believed that coercive intervention of the court was necessary for Mother to participate in the substance-abuse assessment.

[9] Following the fact-finding hearing, on September 23, 2024, the juvenile court issued an order granting the CHINS petition, finding that the “coercive intervention of the Court is necessary to ensure [Mother]’s alcohol abuse does not endanger [Child] further.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 81. The juvenile court's order took judicial notice of Father's admission that Child is a CHINS due to Mother's alcohol abuse and of both of Mother's criminal cases involving Mother being “under the influence while caring for” Child. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 80. The juvenile court also found that Mother had “endangered [Child] when she drove while intoxicated with [Child] in her car on August 2, 2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 81.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding Child to be a CHINS.¹ Specifically, Mother contends that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence that (1) Child's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered and (2) court coercion was necessary to provide services.

When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.

In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

[11] In relevant part, the juvenile court took judicial notice of Father's admission that Child is a CHINS due to Mother's alcohol abuse and of Mother's criminal cases involving Mother's use of alcohol while caring for Child. The juvenile court also found the following:

5) Both of [Mother]’s criminal cases are less than one year apart.

6) [Mother]’s most recent criminal case in Putnam County, Indiana, happened while she was out on bond for a [case with] similar facts (caring for [Child] while intoxicated).

7) [Mother] was intoxicated on August 2, 2024, while caring for [Child].

8) [Mother] refused to complete a substance abuse disorder assessment through [DCS]. [Mother] has not engaged in substance abuse treatment.

9) [Mother] did submit to random drug screens since being released from incarceration. However, [Mother] was immediately placed on probation when she was released from incarceration.

10) On August 2, 2024, [Mother] drank a fifth of whiskey[2] while she was the sole care giver of [Child]. [Mother] then drove with [Child] in the car after consuming whiskey.

11) [Mother] endangered [Child] when she drove while intoxicated with [Child] in her car on August 2, 2024.

12) [Mother]’s explanation for why she drank whiskey on August 2, 2024, is because she was sick with the flu. This explanation does not make sense to the Court.

13) [Father] stated he fears that [Mother]’s alcohol consumption effect on [Child]’s safety.

14) [Mother] has other children that are not in her care.

15) [Mother] has two previous assessments wherein she was found to have neglected [Child] in the past due to her alcohol abuse.

16) The coercive intervention of the Court is necessary to ensure [Mother]’s alcohol abuse does not endanger the child further.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 80–81.

[12] The juvenile court adjudicated Child a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides that a child is a CHINS if, before the child becomes eighteen years of age,

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

The final element “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families where parents lack the ability to provide for their children, not merely where they encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014) (quotation and emphasis omitted).

[13] Mother contends that, although she was intoxicated while caring for Child and “had a substantiated history of intoxicated parenting,” the evidence was insufficient to prove that Child's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered by Mother's intoxication. Appellant's Br. p. 8. Mother also contends that Child “was not in distress and was not in need of food or clothing” and that she “did not display impaired function on August 2, nor had she failed to supervise Child” on that occasion. Appellant's Br. p. 8.

[14] The evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing revealed that Mother had been intoxicated while Child was in her care on at least two occasions, both of which had resulted in criminal charges against Mother, with the second set of charges brought less than one year after the first. Child was born exposed to alcohol and THC, and Mother had had a substantiated history with DCS, with three other children taken out of her care due to either drug exposure or lack of supervision.

[15] Mother admitted that she had consumed whiskey on August 2nd before she had driven with Child in the backseat. After Mother had driven with Child, Mother failed a field sobriety test, her portable breath test indicated a .317 BAC, and her hospital blood draw indicated a .294 BAC. Mother also admitted that, on that date, her consumption of alcohol had interfered with her ability to supervise Child safely.

[16] Officer Brown testified that while Mother was “very functional for having such a high level” of intoxication, by driving with Child in the vehicle, she had placed Child in danger. Tr. Vol. II pp. 53–54. Officer Brown also testified that Mother's intoxication had interfered with her ability to supervise Child appropriately. While FCM Freeman testified that Mother's house was clean with no environmental concerns, she also testified that Mother had not completed the substance-abuse assessment as of the time of the fact-finding hearing and that Mother had expressed that she would not participate in services until she was able to have twelve-hour visits with Child. FCM Freeman testified that she believed that Child was a CHINS because Child did not have a sober caregiver, which placed her in danger. FCM Freeman also believed that coercive intervention of the court was necessary for Mother to participate in the substance-abuse assessment.

[17] Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the juvenile court erred in determining that Child is a CHINS. The evidence amply supported the juvenile court's conclusion that Mother's actions had endangered Child. Mother's contentions to the contrary are merely requests to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78.

[18] Mother also contends that DCS failed to present evidence that Child was in need of services that were unable to be acquired without the juvenile court's coercive intervention, arguing that Mother was already receiving services through Mother's probation. Mother points to her clean home and negative screens for ethanol or illegal substances at the time of the fact-finding hearing as evidence that there was no need for the juvenile court's coercive intervention. Mother also contends that the services she had been receiving at the time of the fact-finding hearing included a substance-abuse assessment, treatment, and random drug screens.

[19] Viewing only the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, we believe that the record supports the juvenile court's finding that coercive intervention was necessary. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78. Again, Mother has been found to be intoxicated with Child in her care on at least two occasions, both of which resulted in criminal charges against Mother. Child was born drug exposed to alcohol and THC, and Mother has a substantiated history with DCS involving her other three children, with one event concerning a child being exposed to THC, and two others concerning lack of supervision. Mother's other three children have been removed from her custody.

[20] Mother contends that she was receiving “the same services that were eventually ordered” through probation at the time of the fact-finding hearing. Appellant's Br. p. 9. At the fact-finding hearing, Mother testified that she had completed two drug screens for probation, had been calling the drug screening hotline daily, and had filled out a drug assessment for probation. However, Mother had not completed the substance-abuse assessment for DCS at the time of the fact-finding hearing, and Mother had expressed to FCM Freeman that she would not participate in services until she was able to have twelve-hour visits with Child. Mother indicated that she did not believe that she needed treatment for substance abuse, testifying, “I feel so much better than I did.” Tr. Vol. II p. 76. Furthermore, when FCM Freeman was asked about the treatment or assessments that Mother had been receiving through probation, she testified that Mother “has refused to share that” with DCS. Tr. Vol. II p. 68. FCM Freeman testified that coercive intervention of the court was necessary for Mother to participate in the substance-abuse assessment.

[21] Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the juvenile court erred in determining that coercive intervention was necessary. Mother's claim to the contrary again amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78.

[22] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother admitted to consuming half a pint of whiskey on August 2nd. While we note that nothing in the record supports the finding that Mother drank a fifth of whiskey, we observe that Mother does not challenge this finding.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.