IN RE: the MARRIAGE OF Kenneth SPURLOCK (deceased) and Mary Ellen Spurlock (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Kenneth Spurlock passed away, the special administrator of his estate petitioned to annul Kenneth's marriage to his wife, Mary Ellen Spurlock. Mary Ellen moved to dismiss, claiming the special administrator lacked standing to seek the annulment. The trial court denied Mary Ellen's motion. Mary Ellen then initiated this interlocutory appeal, raising the following issue: Does the special administrator of an estate have standing to seek the annulment of a decedent's marriage on the grounds the marriage is void because the decedent was mentally incompetent when the marriage was solemnized? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Kenneth was diagnosed with dementia in 2017. In May 2018, Kenneth's then-wife, Pamela, sought to be appointed guardian over Kenneth's person and estate. Less than a month later, Kenneth petitioned to dissolve his marriage to Pamela. While the dissolution was pending, the trial court appointed Kenneth's daughter, Cheryl Thomas, as temporary guardian “for a period of time necessary to act on behalf of [Kenneth] in the dissolution action[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 50. In October 2019, the parties reached a mediated settlement agreement in the dissolution case.

[3] About two months later, Cheryl moved for an expedited hearing in the guardianship matter, citing Kenneth's plans to soon marry Mary Ellen. The trial court granted Cheryl's request, approved the mediated settlement agreement, dissolved Kenneth and Pamela's marriage, and dismissed the guardianship, finding there was “no need to maintain” it. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 45. Kenneth and Mary Ellen married on December 29, 2019.¹

[4] Kenneth passed away in April 2023. Cheryl was appointed personal representative of Kenneth's estate. In July 2023, Mary Ellen, as Kenneth's surviving spouse, filed notices to take against Kenneth's will and to take a spousal allowance. A few weeks later, several of Kenneth's children petitioned the court to appoint a special administrator “for the limited purpose of bringing a separate proceeding to annul the marriage of Mary Ellen Spurlock and Kenneth Spurlock.”² Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 26. In their eyes, Kenneth lacked the requisite mental capacity to marry Mary Ellen approximately three- and one-half years earlier. The trial court appointed attorney Sophia Arshad to serve as special administrator of Kenneth's estate, granting her “all of the powers and duties necessary to prosecute an action to determine the capacity of Kenneth Spurlock at the time of his marriage to Mary Ellen Spurlock, to determine then the validity of the marriage of Mary Ellen Spurlock and Kenneth Spurlock, and to bring legal proceedings to challenge or otherwise annul the marriage of Mary Ellen Spurlock and Kenneth Spurlock.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 155.³

[5] In January 2024, the special administrator petitioned to annul Kenneth and Mary Ellen's marriage. The special administrator provided three statutory bases for annulling the marriage: “Indiana Code § 31-11-8-4 (marriage void due to incompetency), Indiana Code § 31-11-9-2 (incapacity to marry due to mental incompetency), and Indiana Code § 31-11-10-2 (actions to annul voidable marriages).” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 17. Mary Ellen moved to dismiss, claiming the special administrator lacked standing to challenge the validity of Kenneth and Mary Ellen's marriage following Kenneth's death.

[6] During a hearing on Mary Ellen's motion to dismiss, the special administrator clarified its position on the “narrow issue” before the court: “This is not an action involving a voidable marriage. Here, we're talking about a marriage that needs to be declared to be void not voidable, so there is that distinction.” Tr. Vol. 1 at 10. In response, Mary Ellen argued the special administrator needed a specific statutory basis providing it with standing, which she claimed it did not have. After taking the issue under advisement, the trial court concluded the “Special Administrator ․ was authorized as a matter of law to pursue an action to determine whether [Kenneth] was mentally competent to marry [Mary Ellen]; moreover, the Special Administrator has the requisite legal standing to pursue an action to void and annul [Kenneth's] marriage to [Mary Ellen].” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 15. The trial court later certified its order, Mary Ellen sought an interlocutory appeal, and this Court accepted jurisdiction. See Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B).

The special administrator of Kenneth's estate has standing to seek to annul Kenneth and Mary Ellen's marriage as void.

[7] Mary Ellen claims the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because the special administrator lacked standing to seek the annulment of Kenneth and Mary Ellen's marriage. “A claim of lack of standing is properly treated as a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” McPeek v. McCardle, 888 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Ind. 2008). “Such a motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, not the facts supporting it.” Id. We therefore review a trial court's denial of a 12(B)(6) motion de novo. Babes Showclub, Jaba, Inc. v. Lair, 918 N.E.2d 308, 310 (Ind. 2009). When conducting our review, we “take the alleged facts to be true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and draw every reasonable inference in that party's favor.” Hoosier Contractors, LLC v. Gardner, 212 N.E.3d 1234, 1239 (Ind. 2023). For the motion to be successful, the lack of standing must be apparent on the face of the complaint. Thomas v. Blackford Cnty. Area Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 907 N.E.2d 988, 990 (Ind. 2009).

[8] “Marriage is a civil contract, the validity of which may be challenged in court.”⁴ Est. of Estridge v. Taylor, 187 N.E.3d 275, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Indiana “draws a distinction between marriages that are void in contrast to those that are merely voidable.” McPeek, 888 N.E.2d at 174–75. Although courts sometimes use the terms “void” and “voidable” interchangeably, there is a “technical—but nonetheless important—difference between their meanings.” Trook v. Lafayette Bank and Tr. Co., 581 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied; Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind. 1998) (“The distinction between a void and voidable judgment is no mere semantic quibble.”).

[9] “Void” is properly used only when the marriage is “of no effect whatsoever ․ and is incapable of confirmation or ratification.” Trook, 581 N.E.2d at 944 (inserting the term “void ab initio,” which means “void from the beginning,” to denote an act or action that “never had any legal existence at all because of some infirmity in the action or process”); see Void Marriage, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “void marriage” as a marriage that “is invalid from its inception, that cannot be made valid, and that can be terminated by either party without obtaining a divorce or annulment”). “Voidable,” on the other hand, describes a marriage that remains in effect “until the fatal flaw is judicially ascertained and declared.” Trook, 581 N.E.2d at 944; see Voidable Marriage, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “voidable marriage” as a marriage that is “initially invalid but that remains in effect unless terminated by court order”). As suggested by the special administrator below, this case focuses on whether the special administrator can challenge Kenneth and Mary Ellen's marriage as void, not voidable.⁵ See Tr. Vol. 1 at 10.

[10] Indiana Code Chapter 31-11-8 specifically addresses void marriages. Relevant here, “[a] marriage is void if either party to the marriage was mentally incompetent when the marriage was solemnized.” I.C. § 31-11-8-4 (1997). Because a void marriage is “good for no legal purpose, ․ its invalidity may be shown in any court, between any parties, either in the lifetime of the ostensible husband and wife or after the death of either or both of them.” Pry v. Pry, 75 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ind. 1947) (quoting Wiley v. Wiley, 123 N.E. 252, 255 (Ind. App. 1919), overruled on other grounds, State v. Larue's, Inc., 154 N.E.2d 708 (Ind. 1958)); see also Garwood v. State, 77 N.E.3d 204, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (explaining voidness is “a concept of the law of procedure that has precisely one legal consequence: what is void may be collaterally attacked at any time by any person”), aff'd in relevant part, 84 N.E.3d 624 (Ind. 2017). Again, we see the distinction between a “void marriage” and a “voidable marriage” matters. The former is subject to direct or collateral attack at any time by any person. See Pry, 75 N.E.2d at 913. The latter, however, is subject only to attack through direct appeal. See Kitchen v. Kitchen, 953 N.E.2d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[11] Because the special administrator claims Kenneth and Mary Ellen's marriage is void, not voidable, based on Kenneth's alleged mental incompetence at the time of solemnization, it may bring this collateral attack.⁶ See Est. of Estridge, 187 N.E.3d at 276 (addressing the merits of an estate's petition to annul as void a marriage based on the decedent's alleged lack of mental competency when the marriage was solemnized); see also In re Estate of Moster, 158 N.E.3d 775, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (same, regarding a successor personal representative's petition). Whether the special administrator will succeed in its challenge is a question left for a later day. At the motion to dismiss stage, we judge only the legal sufficiency of the petition. See McPeek, 888 N.E.2d at 173.

Conclusion

[12] The trial court properly denied Mary Ellen's motion to dismiss.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Kenneth and Mary Ellen had previously been married decades earlier. During their first marriage to each other, Kenneth and Mary Ellen had four children together: Linda Coleman, Cheryl, Gary Spurlock, and David Spurlock. At some point, the pair divorced. In-between his marriages to Mary Ellen, Kenneth was married to and later divorced three other women.

2.   A special administrator is a type of personal representative appointed for a special purpose with limited powers and duties. Pope by Smith v. Pope, 701 N.E.2d 587, 589 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Ind. Code § 29-1-10-15(b) (2022) (“The appointment of a special administrator may be for a specified time to perform duties respecting specific property, or to perform particular acts as shall be stated in the order of appointment.”).

3.   Mary Ellen moved for the trial court to certify for interlocutory appeal its order appointing Arshad as special administrator. The trial court did so. Soon after, however, the special administrator asked the trial court to reconsider its certification decision. The trial court then vacated its certification order. See I.C. § 29-1-10-15(c) (“The order appointing a special administrator shall not be appealable.”); see also Est. of Sandefur, 685 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining a trial court has “complete discretion in the appointment of special administrators,” because an order appointing a special administrator is not appealable).

4.   Actions for annulment of marriage and dissolution of marriage are separate causes of action. See Cruz v. Cruz, 186 N.E.3d 152, 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Here, we deal only with an annulment action.

5.   Framing the issue this way makes sense. Even assuming, without deciding, the special administrator had standing to argue Kenneth and Mary Ellen's marriage was voidable due to Kenneth's mental incompetency, any such ability extinguished at Kenneth's death. See Adkins v. Holmes, 2 Ind. 197, 201 (1850) (noting a marriage voidable based on the mental incompetency of one partner prior to the marriage is “valid for all civil purposes, unless sentence of nullity be declared in the lifetime of the parties; and it cannot be declared void for those causes after the death of either party”).

6.   At times, Mary Ellen's appellate argument reads as a runaround challenge to the trial court's initial appointment of the special administrator. Indeed, Mary Ellen previously, but unsuccessfully, sought an interlocutory appeal of that decision. But, as discussed, a trial court's decision to appoint a special administrator is not appealable. See I.C. § 29-1-10-15(c). Plus, it would be at least somewhat odd to reach a result contrary to the one we reach today. Operating in a realm of complete discretion, a trial court can appoint a special administrator “for a specified time to perform duties respecting specific property, or to perform particular acts as shall be stated in the order of appointment.” I.C. § 29-1-10-15(b). Here, the trial court exercised this unfettered discretion, appointing the special administrator to bring the exact challenge Mary Ellen now claims it does not have standing to pursue. Such a result would appear contrary to the statutory authority provided to our trial courts on these matters.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.