WHITE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Richard White was found guilty by a jury of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and sentenced to thirty months in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). Because of this conviction, the trial court found he violated the probation he was serving at the time and ordered White to serve three previously suspended years of his sentence in that case. White appeals his sentence and sanction, raising two issues: (1) Is the sentence for his resisting law enforcement conviction inappropriate? and (2) Is the sanction for violating his probation an abuse of discretion? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2021, White pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman and was sentenced to six years, with three years executed in the DOC and three years suspended to probation (“Battery Case”). He was released to probation in November 2022. In July 2023, the State filed a petition alleging White violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer, failing to complete a Batterer's Intervention Program, and failing a drug test, among other things. A warrant was issued for his arrest.

[3] Later in July, St. Joseph County Police Department patrolman Simon Sanchez, in uniform and driving a marked car, activated his lights and initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle White was driving. After stopping and giving Sanchez his identification and the bill of sale and title for the vehicle, White drove away while the traffic stop was still ongoing. Sanchez did not give chase, but reported White had fled. When the car was located about two hours later, a rifle was in plain view in the back seat. White previously was convicted of a felony that prevented him from possessing a firearm. In November 2023, the State charged White with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement (“Resisting Case”).

[4] In February 2024, with the Resisting Case still pending, the State filed a second petition in the Battery Case alleging White violated his probation by committing new crimes. In June, a jury found White not guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon but guilty of resisting law enforcement.

[5] At the combined sentencing hearing, the trial court found the following aggravators relevant to the Resisting Case: White has “quite an extensive criminal history,” with eleven prior convictions; he violated the conditions of parole or probation in at least four cases; and he was considered high-risk for reoffending. Tr. Vol. 2 at 120. The trial court acknowledged the “good things” such as White trying to reestablish a relationship with his child and actively seeking work but declined to find any statutory mitigators. Id. The court sentenced White to thirty months for his Level 5 felony conviction.

[6] As for the probation violation in the Battery Case, the trial court found White had violated his probation by committing a new criminal offense in the Resisting Case, and ordered White to serve the previously suspended three years of his sentence in the DOC.

White's sentence in the Resisting Case is not inappropriate.

[7] White asks us to revise his sentence, arguing the nature of his offense and his character renders a maximum sentence inappropriate because such a sentence should be reserved for “the worst of the worst.”¹ Appellant's Br. at 9. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[8] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[9] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[10] We begin by examining White's character, considering a wide range of facts, including his age, criminal history, background, and past rehabilitative efforts. See Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). White was thirty-seven years old when he was sentenced. He had amassed a significant criminal history, including juvenile adjudications and eight felony and three misdemeanor convictions as an adult. He violated probation and was declared delinquent from parole in the past. At the time he committed this resisting law enforcement offense, he was on probation, a petition to revoke was pending, and there was an active warrant for his arrest. And when he was sentenced, he had pending charges in another county. White lists several mitigating factors he urges us to consider. Appellant's Br. at 10–11.² But none of these proffered mitigators are compelling evidence of “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” sufficient to overcome our deference to the trial court's judgment. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. In sum, White's continuing disregard for the rule of law and failure to benefit from grace previously extended reflect poorly on his character.

[11] With respect to the nature of his offense, White claims “[t]here is worse resisting than this,” noting he did not threaten Sanchez, cause a collision, or cause “any real harm to anyone.” Appellant's Br. at 9. Although we can imagine a worse factual pattern, the unremarkable nature of White's offense does not overcome his unfavorable character. White has not met his burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sanction for White's probation violation in the Battery Case.

[12] “Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed” and “[i]f this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and [sanctions] were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Therefore, we review trial court probation violation and sanctions determinations for abuse of discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, and we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008).

[13] Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) states the court may impose one or more of the following sanctions upon finding a violation: “(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions[;] (2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period[; or] (3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Here, the trial court ordered execution of the entirety of White's previously suspended sentence.

[14] White argues the sanction imposed by the trial court is not proportional to the violation because the sanction—three years—is six months longer than the maximum sentence for the crime that triggered the revocation.³

[15] The selection of an appropriate sanction depends on the severity of the defendant's probation violation. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618 (noting the selection of an appropriate sanction where defendant was alleged to have committed a new criminal offense as well as technical violations required determining whether the defendant committed a new crime and remanding for the trial court to make that determination under the correct legal standard). Contrary to White's argument, a probation sanction is not premised on the severity of the new crime but on the severity of the violation. Committing any crime while on probation is a particularly severe violation because it is an abuse of the grace and leniency probation represents. White knew the conditions of his probation and knew the consequences of violating one or more of those conditions included the possibility of serving his entire suspended sentence. He has a history of violating probation and was not a good candidate to return to probation in this case. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32 (probation officer quoted in presentence investigation report as saying, “[White] is not an appropriate candidate to be given the opportunity to be placed back on probation”); see also Tr. Vol. 2 at 122 (court noting probation officer's assessment).

[16] The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if those conditions are violated. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. Given the considerable leeway granted to our trial courts in probation revocation proceedings, the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in ordering White to execute all of his previously suspended sentence.

Conclusion

[17] White's sentence in the Resisting Case is not inappropriate and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sanction for his violation of probation in the Battery Case.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   White's thirty-month sentence is the maximum sentence authorized for a Level 6 felony. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b).

2.   For instance, White asks us to consider the hardship to his son if he is incarcerated, his employment history, and his traumatic childhood. These factors and others were argued to the trial court, which declined to find any mitigators. In many respects, White's argument resembles a claim of abuse of discretion in sentencing, as he lists specific statutory mitigators and suggests the trial court should have accepted the mitigators and then balanced them against the aggravators. See id. at 12. But because White requests revision of his sentence under Rule 7(B) we analyze it only under that Rule.

3.   White does not make a specific argument based on Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution, requiring that “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.”

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.