Mirabella Troncoso, a Minor, b/n/f Shannon Troncoso, Appellants-Plaintiffs v. Cathy Hale, Appellee-Defendant (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] When 12-year-old Mirabella Troncoso tried to open the storm door of her family's rental home by pushing on one of its glass panes, the glass shattered and injured her arm. Her mother sued their landlord, Cathy Hale (Landlord), on Mirabella's behalf, claiming Landlord breached her duties to maintain the premises in a safe condition and to warn that the storm door lacked non-shatterproof glass.

[2] The trial court granted summary judgment in Landlord's favor, finding, among other things, that Mirabella designated no evidence showing that the unbroken glass was a latent defect, that Landlord was aware of any latent defect, or that Landlord violated any relevant statutes or housing codes by failing to replace a door with old glass panes. Mirabella appeals, claiming a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Landlord breached her duty to Mirabella. Finding no such evidentiary dispute exists, we affirm.

Facts

[3] Mirabella's family rented an older home from Landlord. In 2017, Mirabella was injured while trying to open the home's storm door by pushing on one of its eight glass panes. The glass pane broke and cut Mirabella's arm. Just before this, the door contained fully intact panes of old, thick glass that had remained unchanged since Landlord purchased the home in 1975.

[4] Just before Mirabella's family moved into the home 16 months earlier, Landlord inspected the property and found no safety hazards that she did not fix. Neither Mirabella nor her family observed or complained about any problems with the exterior storm door before Mirabella was injured. Until that point, Landlord did not know whether the glass was shatterproof.

[5] Mirabella's mother filed suit against Landlord on behalf of Mirabella, who was a minor at the time. The complaint alleged that Landlord breached her duty to Mirabella by failing to maintain the premises in a safe condition and by not warning her of latent defects. Mirabella further claimed that the glass pane in the storm door, which was not shatter resistant, constituted a hazardous condition that Landlord should have remedied or disclosed.

[6] Landlord moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) she owed no duty to warn of the glass pane's condition, as it was not damaged when the premises were leased; and (2) she complied with her statutory and contractual obligations as a landlord. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in Landlord's favor, finding no evidence that Landlord had actual knowledge of any latent defect in the storm door's glass and that, under Indiana law, a duty to warn does not arise without such actual knowledge. The court also determined that Mirabella failed to designate evidence showing that the unbroken glass was a latent defect or that Landlord violated any relevant statutes or housing codes.

[7] Mirabella filed a motion to correct error, contending that the determination of a breach of duty should be decided by a jury and the court therefore erred in granting summary judgment. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion June 21, 2024. By operation of Indiana Trial Rule 53.3, the motion was deemed denied on Monday, July 22, 2024, but the court also issued an order denying the motion on August 21, 2024—two days after Mirabella filed her notice of appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[8] We review the trial court's denial of Mirabella's motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Knowledge A-Z, Inc. v. Sentry, Ins., 891 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Mirabella's motion to correct error rests on a claim that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment, an argument that normally requires de novo review. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009).

[9] Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidence establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Ind. Trial Rule 56. The party who moved for summary judgment—here, Landlord—has the burden of making a prima facie showing of these two requirements. Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). Once met, the burden shifts to the non-moving party—Mirabella—to establish facts showing a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

[10] When facts or inferences are in doubt, they must be construed in favor of Mirabella, the non-moving party. See id. Mirabella, as the party appealing the trial court's summary judgment determination, bears the burden of persuading us the ruling was erroneous. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng'rs/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 913 (Ind. 2017).

[11] To prevail on her negligence claim, Mirabella was required to prove: (1) a duty owed by Landlord to her; (2) Landlord's breach of that duty; and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by Landlord's breach of duty. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Blue Sky Innovation Grp., Inc., 230 N.E.3d 898, 906 (Ind. 2024). Under Indiana law, a landlord must deliver rental premises to the tenant in a safe and habitable condition. Ind. Code § 32-31-8-5(1). Mirabella contends summary judgment was improper because she designated unrefuted evidence that Landlord breached this duty by failing to replace the original glass panes in the storm door or warn her about the glass. Mirabella notes that, while the existence of a duty is a question of law, whether the defendant breached that duty is generally a question of fact for the jury. See, e.g., Delta Tau Delta, Beta Alpha Chapter v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 974 (Ind. 1999).

[12] A duty to deliver the home in a safe and habitable condition does not transform landlords into insurers against all possible injuries on the premises. Historically, landlords did not have a duty under the common law “to protect tenants from injuries due to defective conditions on the property once possession and control of the property had been surrendered” to the tenant. Zubrenic v. Dunes Valley Mobile Home Park, Inc., 797 N.E.2d 802, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The gist of this “caveat lessee” or “let the lessee beware” policy is that a tenant who was permitted to inspect the property before accepting it was considered to have accepted the property in its existing condition and usually could not later complain about a defect. Dickison v. Hargitt, 611 N.E.2d 691, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

[13] However, a landlord may be liable for injuries caused by a latent defect known to the landlord but not disclosed to the tenant, who is otherwise unaware of it. Id. at 695. A landlord's liability to a tenant also may arise from negligence based on the landlord's violation of a duty imposed by statute or ordinance. Erwin v. Roe, 928 N.E.2d 609, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[14] With this background, we turn to Mirabella's specific claims on appeal. Mirabella argues that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Landlord breached her duty to Mirabella by: (1) failing to inspect the storm door for hazards, dangerous conditions, or latent defects; and (2) violating a state statute and the local housing code. We find neither claim to be persuasive.

I. Mirabella's Failure-to-Inspect Claim

[15] Mirabella acknowledges that the designated evidence showed Landlord conducted a safety inspection of the rental home before leasing it to Mirabella's family. Yet Mirabella contends that “[t]he record is devoid of any evidence that [Landlord] inspected the subject storm door for hazards, dangerous conditions, or latent defects.” Appellant's Br., p. 12.

[16] Mirabella ignores designated evidence that Landlord observed no hazards presented by the door, which appeared to Landlord to be in excellent condition. The glass panes within the door were thick, unbroken, and lacking any cracks. As a result of her safety inspection and before Mirabella's family moved in, Landlord repaired or replaced everything that she observed to need such attention. And before Mirabella's injury, Landlord had never received any reports or concerns about the door. Landlord did not know whether the glass panes were laminated, shatter resistant, or shatterproof before Mirabella's injury.

[17] Given this evidence, Mirabella's claim that Landlord failed to inspect the door is unfounded. Mirabella also failed to designate any evidence refuting Landlord's claim that Landlord had conducted the safety inspection and fixed everything needing repair or replacement. The trial court did not err in rejecting this claim.

II. Mirabella's Code-Violation Claims

[18] Mirabella also claims Landlord breached her duty to Mirabella by violating Indiana Code § 32-31-8-5 (Landlord Statute) and the City of Richmond's Housing Code § 151.13 (Housing Regulation). The obligations imposed on landlords by the Landlord Statute include:

(1) Deliver[ing] the rental premises to a tenant in compliance with the rental agreement, and in a safe, clean, and habitable condition.

(2) Comply[ing] with all health and housing codes applicable to the rental premises ․

Ind. Code § 32-31-8-5(1)-(2).

[19] The Housing Regulation provides:

151.13 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND MAINTENANCE No person shall occupy, either as owner or as tenant, or permit another to occupy, any dwelling or dwelling unit, for the purpose of living, sleeping, cooking, or eating therein, which does not comply with the following provisions.

***

(b) Every window, exterior door, and basement hatchway shall be reasonably weather tight and rodent proof, and shall be kept in good, safe, sound, and workable condition and repair.

City of Richmond's Housing Code § 151.13.

[20] Without citation to authority, Mirabella simply contends the designated evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she violated these provisions of the Landlord Statute and the Housing Regulation. She points to designated evidence showing:

• Landlord had lived in the home 1975-1988, improved it in various ways between 1975 and Mirabella's injury, and had not made any changes to the door since 1975.

• Landlord did not know whether the glass planes in the door were laminated, shatter resistant, or shatterproof.

• Landlord had replaced some old glass in that home and in other rental homes she owned.

[21] Mirabella's argument seemingly rests on an assumption that old glass whose level of shatter resistance is unknown is per se defective, unsafe, and not in good repair. Yet she cites no authority establishing that old glass in a storm door violates the Landlord Statute, Housing Regulation, or any other statute or regulation. The designated evidence shows that the door was functioning properly and observed to be in good repair as required by the applicable codes. The mere presence of old glass capable of shattering, without more, is not a latent defect requiring warning or replacement, particularly when the door had performed safely for many years and had no visible defects. No evidence suggests the glass was cracked, loose, or otherwise defective when the property was delivered to Mirabella's family or at any other time before the incident.

[22] Given the absence of any designated evidence that Landlord breached her duty or that the door was unsafe when delivered to Mirabella's family, we conclude that Landlord was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Mirabella's motion to correct error.

[23] We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Landlord.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges May and Scheele concur. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.