Maria Magana, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Ivy Tech Community College, Appellee-Defendant (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In April of 2021, Ivy Tech Community College made Maria Magana a conditional offer of employment that was subject to her satisfactory completion of a sixty-working-day probationary period. Eighty working days after the probationary period began, Ivy Tech terminated Magana's employment due to numerous performance-related issues. In June of 2023, Magana sued Ivy Tech for breach of contract, violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contract, and emotional distress. Both parties moved for summary judgment, with Magana raising a due-process claim for the first time in her summary-judgment motion. In September of 2024, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ivy Tech on all of Magana's claims. Magana contends that the trial court erred in several respects in so doing. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Ivy Tech is a public community college with a campus in Lake County. As of 2021, Magana had worked at Ivy Tech as a part-time tutor and adjunct faculty member for approximately fifteen years. Ivy Tech maintains a handbook (“the Handbook”) for full-time employees, which provides, in part, that “[n]o statement in this handbook is intended to create an employment contract between you and [Ivy Tech.]” Appellee's App. Vol. III p. 13. All newly-hired, benefits-eligible administrative and support staff at Ivy Tech are subject to a probationary period, during which an employee's work performance is evaluated, and an employee's work performance “must be acceptable by the end of the probationary period to successfully complete the formal hiring process.” Appellee's App. Vol. III p. 7. “Newly hired employees are evaluated at the conclusion of the probationary period[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. III p. 68. The Handbook also notes that successful completion of the probationary period does not change an employee's at-will employment status, specifically providing that “nothing in this policy shall be construed as changing the at-will status of an employee or creat[ing] entitlement to continuing employment with [Ivy Tech].” Appellee's App. Vol. III p. 68. As stated in the Handbook's “Performance Improvement” provision, “[n]ew employees who are still in their probationary period or have had this probationary period extended, may be terminated during their probationary period without any prior action taken.” Appellee's App. Vol. III p. 69.

[3] On April 9, 2021, Magana received an offer of conditional employment as a full-time academic advisor at Ivy Tech's Lake County campus with a starting salary of $40,000.00 per year (the “Offer Letter”). According to the Offer Letter, Magana's start date was Monday, April 26, 2021. Magana's continued employment was “based upon successful completion of a sixty-working day probationary period, a satisfactory sixty-day probationary performance review, and [Magana's] compliance with all [Ivy Tech] policies.” Appellee's App. Vol. III p. 202. The Offer Letter also provided that it was “not an employment contract between [Magana] and [Ivy Tech]” and “[n]o statements made by [Ivy Tech] officials or staff can or should be construed as creating any terms, conditions or promises beyond those contained within this letter or any [Ivy Tech] policy.” Appellee's App. Vol. III p. 202.

[4] The earliest Magana's probationary period might have ended was July 19, 2021, or sixty working days after her start date. On July 15, 2021, Magana's supervisor noted that, during Magana's probationary period, she had routinely failed to (1) timely calendar walk-in appointments; (2) timely place student advising notes on Ivy Tech's storage systems; (3) provide accurate information in a training exercise; and (4) provide appropriate customer service to students. On August 26, 2021, Ivy Tech terminated Magana's employment due to unsatisfactory performance during her probationary period. Magana unsuccessfully attempted to appeal her termination through Ivy Tech.

[5] On June 20, 2023, Magana filed suit against Ivy Tech, alleging breach of contract in Count I, violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Count II, tortious interference with contract in Count III, and emotional distress in Count IV. On April 5, 2024, Magana moved for summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III and asserted, for the first time, a claim alleging a due-process violation. Ivy Tech cross-moved for summary judgment on all of Magana's claims, including the due-process claim.

[6] On September 10, 2024, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ivy Tech on all claims. The trial court's order provides, in part, as follows:

25. Taking the low-hanging fruit first, Indiana law does not recognize Count II or Count IV as cognizable claims.

26. Related to Count I and Count III, the PLAINTIFF failed to establish that a contract existed, or that she was ever a full time employee who had completed her probationary period, as a matter of law.

DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT

27. In her brief and at the hearing of September 3, 2024, the PLAINTIFF spent a good deal of time claiming certain Due Process Clause violations by the DEFENDANT.

28. The Court reviewed the PLAINTIFF'S complaint, filed on June 20, 2023, which does not mention, or refer to, a Due Process Clause claim.

29. The Court cannot consider a Due Process claim for the first time on summary judgment.

[․.]

34. To be clear, there was never a contract between the PLAINTIFF and the DEFENDANT, only agreements.

35. The PLAINTIFF and the DEFENDANT only ever agreed to—for most of her career with the DEFENDANT—that the PLAINTIFF was an at-will employee; and then the parties later agreed that, for a period just prior to her termination, the PLAINTIFF was a probationary employee of the DEFENDANT.

36. Without ever being a full time, non-probationary employee, the PLAINTIFF is not entitled to either an employment position moving forward, or to the benefits, entitlements, and compensation packages that she claims.

Appellee's App. Vol. II pp. 10–11.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Magana contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Ivy Tech on Counts I, II, and IV ¹ and her due-process claim. When reviewing the grant or denial of a summary judgment motion, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Simrell's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “Summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a party must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the other party's claim. Id. “Once the moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue does in fact exist.” Id. The party appealing the summary judgment bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court erred. Id.

A. Breach-of-Contract Claim

[8] To establish a breach-of-contract claim under Indiana law, one must prove (1) the existence of a contract, (2) a breach of that contract, and (3) damages from that breach. BloomBank v. United Fid. Bank FSB, 113 N.E.3d 708, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. The existence or non-existence of a contract, absent a factual dispute, is a determination of law for the court. Orem v. Ivy Tech State Coll., 711 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Here, the trial court determined that Magana's breach-of-contract claim failed because she had failed to establish the existence of a contract. Magana, however, contends the Offer Letter and Handbook created a contract for employment between Magana and Ivy Tech, while Ivy Tech contends that the trial court correctly determined that the designated evidence established that there had never been any such contract. We agree with Ivy Tech.

[9] The designated evidence clearly establishes that no written or oral employment contract was ever made between Magana and Ivy Tech. The Handbook and the Offer Letter state in no uncertain terms that nothing in either of them is to be taken as creating any sort of contract and that Magana would become a full-time employee if—and only if—she completed the sixty-day probationary period and passed the evaluation to be conducted at the end of it, which she did not do, due to multiple performance-related issues.

[10] Magana's argument is, in large part, based on the fact that she remained employed for approximately twenty additional working days after her sixty-day probationary period was originally supposed to have ended, which she would seemingly have us take as conclusive evidence that she had passed the evaluation and had therefore entered into an employment contract with Ivy Tech. This chain of inferences is simply not supported by the record or otherwise reasonable. The Offer Letter provided that Magana's evaluation was to occur after the end of the probationary period, not before, and that her continued employment was subject to compliance with all Ivy Tech policies. At best, her continued employment beyond the end of the probationary period can be viewed as an extension of that period, during which she could have been terminated “without any prior action taken.” Appellee's App. Vol. III p. 69.

[11] Magana also makes much of the fact that the trial court used the word “agreements” in its final order, identifying this as evidence that she and Ivy Tech had, in fact, entered into an employment contract. In the context of the trial court's order, it is abundantly clear that the “agreements” to which the trial court was referring were those contained in the Offer Letter, i.e., that Magana might be hired full-time if she satisfactorily completed the probationary period. As mentioned, the trial court's order makes perfectly clear its conclusion that the designated evidence did not establish the existence of an employment contract.

[12] Magana draws our attention to the Illinois case of Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill. 1987), for the proposition that an employee handbook may constitute a unilateral employment contract when certain conditions are met. Specifically, those conditions are that (1) the language of the employee handbook must contain a promise clear enough that an employee would reasonably believe that an offer had been made, (2) the employee handbook must be disseminated to the employee in such a manner that the employee is aware of its contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and (3) the employee must accept the offer by commencing or continuing work after learning of the terms of the employee handbook. Id. Even if we were to assume that Duldulao is binding on Indiana courts (it is not), it does not help Magana. As mentioned, both the Handbook and Offer Letter made it explicit that (1) they were not contracts, (2) they did not limit Ivy Tech's ability to terminate an employee without cause, and (3) any offer of permanent employment was subject to a satisfactory evaluation. No reasonable employee would interpret anything in either the Handbook or the Offer Letter as having made any sort of binding offer.

[13] Magana cites to Wior v. Anchor Industries, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. 1996),² for the proposition that “the failure to terminate an employee within the established [probationary] period implies acceptance of their performance,” resulting in a contractual agreement. Appellant's Brief p. 15. Nothing in Wior actually supports this proposition. Wior primarily addresses whether an employee provided adequate independent consideration to create an employment contract when he left a previous job to accept an employment offer. 669 N.E.2d at 176–77. In any event, as discussed below, because Magana did not successfully complete the probationary period set forth in the Offer Letter, her reliance on Wior is misplaced.

[14] Finally, Magana contends that adequate independent consideration supports the existence of an employment contract, citing again to Wior: “ ‘[A]n employer cannot arbitrarily fire an employee when (1) the employer knows the employee had a former job with assured permanency (or assured non-arbitrary firing policies) and (2) [the employee] was only accepting the new job upon receiving assurances the new employer could guarantee similar permanency.’ ” Id. at 176 (quoting Romack v. Public Service Co., 499 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (Conover, J., dissenting), adopted and incorporated in relevant part by Romack v. Public Service Co., 511 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. 1987), trans. granted) (brackets in Wior). Even though the holding in Wior is at least relevant to this claim, it still does not help Magana. Even if we assume, arguendo, that Magana's previous position with Ivy Tech had had “assured permanency,” there is no designated evidence that Ivy Tech had ever made assurances of similar permanency with regard to her probationary position. Magana's “permanent” hiring was explicitly made subject to her satisfactory completion of the probationary period, which did not occur. The trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Ivy Tech on Magana's breach-of-contract claim.

B. Counts II and IV

[15] Magana contends that the trial court “negligently” concluded that her claims that Ivy Tech violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing and caused her emotional distress were not cognizable. Appellant's Br. p. 15. As for the first claim, “Indiana law does not impose a generalized duty of good faith and fair dealing on every contract; the recognition of an implied covenant is generally limited to employment contracts and insurance contracts.” Old Nat'l Bank v. Kelly, 31 N.E.3d 522, 531 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Allison v. Union Hosp., Inc., 883 N.E.2d 113, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), trans. denied. More to the point, in Hamblen v. Danners, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), we clarified that Indiana does not recognize a duty of good faith and fair dealing by an employer to an at-will employee. See also Mehling v. Dubois Cnty. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc., 601 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (“Kathleen argues that Co-Op breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated her. Indiana does not recognize such a cause of action in at will employment contexts.”). As mentioned, the record clearly establishes that Magana's employment with Ivy Tech was at-will at all times.

[16] As for Magana's claims of emotional distress, her claims are contract-based and “it is well-settled that emotional distress damages are not recoverable for breach of contract.” Jaffri v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 26 N.E.3d 635, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Moreover, to the extent Magana is actually attempting to allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, her claim must still fail: “Indiana does not recognize [intentional infliction of emotional distress] in a situation involving breach of an at will employment contract.” Mehling, 601 N.E.2d at 9. As mentioned several times already, Magana's employment with Ivy Tech was at-will.

C. Due-Process Claim

[17] Magana contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Ivy Tech on her due-process claim. In her summary-judgment motion, Magana attempted to raise, for the first time, a new due-process claim, alleging that Ivy Tech had violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution when it terminated her employment. As we have previously recognized, however, summary judgment “is not a proper place to assert a claim against a [party].” Briggs v. Finley, 631 N.E.2d 959, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied; see also 5200 Keystone Ltd. Realty, LLC v. Filmcraft Labs., Inc., 30 N.E.3d 5, 12–13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that a claim not pled in a party's complaint could not be presented for the first time in a summary-judgment motion absent notice and consent, which had not been given). The trial court correctly determined that it could not consider Magana's due-process claim because she had raised it for the first time in her summary-judgment motion and Ivy Tech had not consented to litigating it.

[18] Magana attempts to avoid her failure to properly raise a due-process claim by claiming, for the first time on appeal, that her fair-dealing claim in Count II sufficiently raised a due-process claim. Generally, parties may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal, and we reject Magana's argument on that basis. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sloan, 4 N.E.3d 760, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“As an initial matter, because NIPSCO did not raise this issue to the trial court, it cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.”), trans. denied. In any event, Magana's claim in this regard is unconvincing. In Count II of her complaint, Magana alleged that Ivy Tech had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by “forcing [her] to lie on her timecard in an attempt to pay her less wages, thereby violating the terms of the employment agreement and engaging in unethical conduct[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 20. Not only does Count II not contain the phrase “due process,” Magana does not even attempt to characterize this allegation as that of a deprivation of a cognizable property interest without due process. See, e.g., Reinoehl v. St. Joseph Cnty. Health Dep't, 181 N.E.3d 341, 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“The standard elements of a due process claim include whether the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of a cognizable property or liberty interest, and whether any such deprivation occurred without due process.”), trans. denied. The trial court properly denied Magana's due-process claim on the basis that she had raised it for the first time on summary judgment.³

[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Magana does not appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of Ivy Tech on Count III.

2.   The citation Magana actually provided was to Wior v. Avon Community School Corporation, 669 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). No case by the name actually exists.

3.   Magana makes an argument based on Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 60(B), which governs motions for relief from judgment. Magana, however, did not file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion in the trial court, rendering any discussion of its provisions irrelevant.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.