IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.H. and E.H. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] C.G. (“Father”) appeals the Howard Circuit Court's termination of his parental rights over his minor children A.H. and E.H. (collectively, “the Children”). Father presents a single dispositive issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside of his home will not be remedied.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] H.H. (“Mother”)¹ gave birth to the Children, twin girls, on November 29, 2022. The Children were placed in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (“NICU”) at the hospital because they were premature. Mother had lost custody of her four prior-born children due to her abuse and/or neglect of them.

[4] On December 3, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Mother, who had admitted to hospital staff that her other children had been removed from her care, was not feeding the Children properly and did not appear capable of properly caring for them. Mother's probation officer told the DCS caseworker that “the family had [few] supports in place to assist with bringing two infants into their home.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 98. Accordingly, DCS opened informal adjustments for the Children to address Father's and Mother's needs for parenting education and to address “the instability in their own relationship.” Id. at 121.

[5] On March 4, 2023, Father battered Mother while the Children were present in the family home. When the officers and a DCS service provider arrived, they found blood “streaming down” Mother's face. Id. Officers arrested Father and transported him to jail. Also that day, a DCS family case manager (“FCM”) noticed that A.H. “did not make any eye contact” and that her eyes “rolled to the back of her head and moved rapidly from side to side.” Id. A medical examination of A.H. revealed multiple rib fractures which were determined to be “non-accidental.” Id. at 98-99. DCS immediately removed the Children from Father's and Mother's care and placed them with a family friend.

[6] DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Father and Mother admitted the Children were CHINS, and the trial court adjudicated them as such. Following a dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered Father to, among other things, maintain weekly contact with the family case manager; maintain safe and suitable housing; maintain a stable and legal source of income; refrain from using illegal substances; submit to drug screens; and complete a parenting assessment and participate in any recommended program.

[7] In early May, Father was arrested for having contact with Mother in violation of a no contact order. After a short time in jail, Father was arrested in late May for having contact, again, with Mother in violation of the no contact order. In addition, the State charged Father with neglect of a dependent for the injuries to A.H. Father ultimately pleaded guilty to that charge. During his incarceration, Father engaged in home-based counseling with Tyson Minix.

[8] During the spring of 2024, Father was released from jail and transitioned to work release. Father continued home-based counseling with Minix. But, after he tested positive for fentanyl, Father returned to jail for the fourth time since the Children's birth.

[9] In June, DCS filed petitions to terminate Father's and Mother's parental rights over the Children. During an evidentiary hearing on those petitions, Minix testified that he had worked with Father on issues related to parenting, mental health, and interpersonal relationships. Minix also supervised Father's few visits with the Children when Father was not incarcerated. Minix testified that Father intended to live in a homeless shelter upon his release from jail. And Minix testified that Father intended to continue a romantic relationship with Mother despite their history of domestic violence. In addition, FCM Jennifer Miles testified that Father had admitted to a long history of substance abuse. During his testimony, Father admitted to accidentally ingesting fentanyl in violation of his work release.

[10] Following the hearing, the trial court issued findings and conclusions in support of terminating Father's and Mother's parental rights over the Children. The trial court found in relevant part that Father was “caught in a predictable pattern of recidivism and incarceration, a pattern that comes at the expense of his parental relationship to [the Children].” Id. at 107. As a result, the court found that “neither Child can truly be expected to know [Father] or to recognize him in any sense as their father and parental protector.” Id. at 107-108 The court went on:

[Father] emphasizes that he has worked with providers like Mr. Minix on his pattern of poor decision making and his unavailability to his young girls. But he is currently incarcerated for using drugs while under Court supervision․ His poor decisions continue to negatively impact his own health, safety, and freedom. And without proof of change, he wishes this Court to allow him further access to these young girls. The risk of that option is simply to[o] great for these Children.

Id. at 108.

[11] The court concluded that it is reasonably probable that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal and led to the continued placement outside of Father's home, “namely the immature conduct of the parents, the recidivism and poor decision making exhibited by both parents, the persistence of violence in their lives, and their overall inability to safely parent their Children and to prioritize the Children's needs over their own,” will not be remedied. Id. at 112-13. The court also concluded that the continuation of the parent-child relationships between the Children and Father poses a threat to the Children's well-being. And the court concluded that termination of Father's parental rights is in the Children's best interests “in that further efforts to reunite the parents with the Child[ren] are unlikely to succeed.” Id. at 114. In particular, the trial court stated:

This case ends with no substantive progress having been made on any of the issues that led to removal. If there is a constant in this case, it is that the Father and Mother exhibit habitual instability and a propensity for poor decision making that is as deleterious to their own health and well-being as much as it is to their Children's. They could have chosen a different path and demonstrated a dedication to change. They did not. There is simply nothing to show that providing more time will yield a different result. In fact, more time would only pose more risk to [the Children]’s stability and well-being. [The Children] remain the only wholly innocent parties throughout this process. The failure to terminate the parental relationship[s] will deny them the opportunity to find the stability and permanency to which they are entitled, and which has already been denied to them for too long. It is in the Children's best interests to have permanency, not perpetual wardship and uncertainty in their lives.

Id. at 114-15. The court also found that DCS had a satisfactory plan for the care of the Children, namely, adoption.

[12] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[14] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[15] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required, in relevant part, to prove

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024).

[16] In addition, DCS must prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances relevant here:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(4). We need only discuss one of these elements raised by Father in this appeal, namely, whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied.

[17] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[18] Father first blames DCS for the Children's continued placement outside of his home. He contends that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve his relationships with the Children as required by Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.5. Father's argument in support of that contention is difficult to discern. Father asserts that “[i]t appears ․ that the trial court is terminating the parent-child relationship between [Father] and the Children due to his prolonged period of incarceration.” Appellant's Br. at 12. And Father points out that incarceration, without more, is not a sufficient reason for terminating a parent's parental rights. Id. (citing K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 643 (Ind. 2015)).

[19] But Father does not challenge the trial court's findings regarding his failure to take advantage of services offered by DCS. While Father participated in home-based counseling, the trial court found that he did not make “tangible progress ․ towards reunification.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 126. Indeed, Father does not explain what services could have been offered to him that would have made a difference in the outcome here. We cannot say that DCS did not make reasonable efforts to preserve Father's relationships with the Children.

[20] Still, Father contends that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside of his home will not be remedied. Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal, and, second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the child's continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[21] Here, the Children were initially removed from Mother and Father's care due to Father's battery of Mother while the Children were present, for which he was arrested and jailed, and due to the intentional injuries A.H. had suffered.² Father's two subsequent arrests for violating the no contact order against him kept him out of the Children's lives for even longer. Finally, while Father was on work release, he ingested fentanyl, which sent him back to jail. As the trial court found, Father's “pattern of recidivism and incarceration ․ c[ame] at the expense of his parental relationship to [the Children].” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 107.

[22] Since the Children were adjudicated CHINS, Father has been out of jail only long enough to visit with the Children a few times, and those were supervised visits. Father was incarcerated at the time of the final hearing in September 2024, and he was set to start work release in October. The GAL, Sharon Hogan, testified that after seven months of work release, Father “planned to go to [a] shelter” and then sometime “down the road,” he planned to “live with a grandparent in Logansport.” Tr. p. 81. Father acknowledged that any plan to have the Children returned to his care would require “baby steps” over “quite some time” to address his addiction issues and lack of housing. Id. at 53.

[23] In sum, Father asks us to give him more time to show that he can provide the Children with a safe and stable home.³ But that is a blatant request that we reweigh the evidence. The trial court found that Father and Mother

continue to live chaotic lives that leave even them without stable environments to call home. They continue to make poor decisions and prefer the easiest roads over those that would bring them lasting and sustainable stability. This Court has heard no proof that the parents have changed these fundamental and self-serving character traits. There is nothing to indicate that, given more time, they will now put in the self-sacrificing hard work that is required to ensure these girls are safe, secure, and never harmed again.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 109 (emphasis added).

[24] The trial court's conclusion that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside his home will not be remedied are supported by the findings, and the findings are supported by the evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment on this issue. DCS presented sufficient evidence on each of the required statutory elements, and we affirm the court's termination of Father's parental rights over the Children.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated Mother's parental rights to the Children, but she does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Father ultimately pleaded guilty to neglect of a dependent.

3.   Father attempts to analogize this case to K.E., where our Supreme Court reversed the termination of an incarcerated father's parental rights. 39 N.E.3d at 652. But the father in K.E. was not serially incarcerated as Father has been here. Rather, the father in K.E. was serving one ten-year sentence. Moreover, the evidence in K.E. showed that the father's rights were terminated solely because of his incarceration. That is not the case here. Finally, Father has not demonstrated any relationship with the Children, which is distinguishable from the father in K.E., who engaged in “nightly phone calls” with his children. Id. at 643.

Mathias, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.