IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of H.G. and C.G. (Minor Children); (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.G. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to C.G. and H.G. (“Children”). Father argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of his parental rights. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Father raises one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of his parental rights.

Facts

[3] H.G. was born in February 2011, and C.G. was born in October 2013 to Father and M.H., who is deceased.

[4] On December 6, 2021, law enforcement arrested Father for domestic violence in the presence of C.G., and the trial court entered a no contact order between Father and C.G. The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Children from Father's care at that time due to allegations of domestic violence, substance abuse, and housing instability. DCS then filed a petition alleging that Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”).

[5] After a fact-finding hearing at which Father did not appear, the trial court found that Children were CHINS on August 11, 2022. The trial court then entered a dispositional decree on August 30, 2022. Father was ordered to participate in home-based therapy; take a domestic violence assessment and participate in domestic violence classes if required; participate in random drug screens; and participate in supervised visitations with Children.

[6] Although Father consistently visited with Children, he made little progress on other services during the proceedings and was not successfully discharged from any of the services offered to him. Father failed to participate in a domestic violence assessment and did not participate in home-based therapy. Father's employment was inconsistent. Father worked with a home-based case worker and father engagement specialist but, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, Father had not completed more than half of the father engagement program.

[7] Father lived in multiple homes during the proceedings and was unable to establish stable housing suitable for Children. The father engagement specialist visited Father's residence on July 30, 2024, shortly before the fact-finding hearing. Father was sharing the residence with multiple other people, and Father's home contained “a lot of trash,” dog feces, and flying pests. Tr. Vol. II p. 27. The residence had no running water, the stove was inoperable, and the residence was not appropriate for children. The family case manager also visited Father's residence on August 1, 2024. She observed that the residence still had no operable stove and no running water.

[8] Father did participate in a substance abuse assessment and virtual substance abuse education, but Father was required to have three clean drug screens before he could be discharged from the program. Father, however, repeatedly tested positive for methamphetamine and other substances. On February 3, 2023, Father tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. On February 13, March 1, March 10, and March 14, 2023, Father submitted invalid samples for drug testing. On March 25, 2023, Father tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and norfentanyl. On April 10, April 26, and November 13, 2023, Father tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. On December 7, 2023, Father tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, THC, and fentanyl. On February 26 and July 18, 2024, Father tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. And on July 19, 2024, shortly before the fact-finding hearing, Father tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, THC, benzoylecgonine ¹ , and cocaine.

[9] In February 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights. A fact-finding hearing was held on August 5 and August 12, 2024. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Father challenges the termination of his parental rights. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). We recognize that parental rights are not “absolute” and must be “subordinated” to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[11] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.² Here, the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[12] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree;

* * * * *

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) [and] that termination is in the best interests of the child ․

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).³ DCS needs to establish only one of the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) before the trial court may terminate parental rights. Id.; In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Because the requirements of Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) are written in the disjunctive, DCS only needed to prove one of the three elements under subparagraph (B).”), trans. denied.

[13] DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009)). If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

A. The trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal will not be remedied is not clearly erroneous.

[14] Father argues that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal would not be remedied.⁴ As to the likelihood of remediation of conditions, “[w]e engage in a two-step analysis[.]” V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1145. “First, we must ascertain what conditions led to [Children's] placement and retention in foster care. Second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the first step, we consider not only the initial reasons for removal, but also the reasons for continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014).

[15] The trial court, however, must also “consider a parent's habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. In evaluating the parent's habitual patterns of conduct, the court may disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and weigh the history of the parent's prior conduct more heavily. Id. at 1234. DCS is not required to rule out “all possibilities of change”; rather, DCS only needs to establish that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Habitual conduct may include parents’ “prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment.” Id.

[16] Here, Children were removed from Father's care in December 2021 due to allegations of domestic violence in the presence of C.G., drug abuse, and housing instability. More than two years later, Father had made little, if any, progress in rectifying the issues that led to Children's removal from his care. Father failed to participate in domestic violence services; failed to obtain stable employment and stable housing appropriate for Children; and continues to test positive for methamphetamine, among other substances. Shortly before the fact-finding hearing, Father tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, THC, benzoylecgonine, and cocaine. Under these circumstances, the trial court's finding regarding the remediation of conditions is not clearly erroneous. Father's arguments to the contrary are merely requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

B. The trial court's conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights is in Children's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

[17] Father also argues that DCS failed to prove that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Children's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is “irreversibly harmed” such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is “permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[18] Children's therapist, the family case manager, and the guardian ad litem each testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Children's best interest. Although Children have a bond with Father, Father has been unable to demonstrate sobriety, consistency, and stability. In foster care, Children have blossomed and are excelling, and “consistency, routine and predictability is imperative to [Children's] success.” Tr. Vol. II p. 13. Given Father's continued substance abuse and lack of stability, the trial court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in Children's best interest is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[19] The trial court's termination of Father's parental rights to Children is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Benzoylecgonine is a metabolite of cocaine. See https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/O-Benzoylecgonine [https://perma.cc/6CQU-4DM6] (last visited April 1, 2025).

2.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

3.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024. DCS filed its petition in February 2024, under the prior version of the statute. Accordingly, we do not address Father's arguments regarding the new version of the statute.

4.   Father also argues that there was no reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Children. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. The trial court here found a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. Accordingly, we do not address whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Children.

Tavitas, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.