E.M., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In October of 2024, after seventeen-year-old E.M. admitted to being a juvenile delinquent in two separate cause numbers, the juvenile court ordered him committed to the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). E.M. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the DOC, while the State contends that the disposition is in the best interests of E.M. and the community. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 1, 2024, then-seventeen-year-old E.M. got into a fight with his father, after which he struck his father's vehicle with a golf club and ran off. On August 19, 2024, the State alleged, in cause number 71J01-2408-JD-271 (“Cause No. 271”) that E.M. was a juvenile delinquent for having committed what would be Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct if committed by an adult, an allegation E.M. admitted one week later. The juvenile court ordered home detention.

[3] On September 10, 2024, a probation officer requested a welfare check for E.M. because the officer had received a tamper notification from his ankle monitor. Police went to E.M.’s house and discovered that he was not there. E.M.’s parents told police that E.M. had run away to Chicago, and that was where he was eventually found. In cause number 71J01-2409-JD-303 (“Cause No. 303”), the State alleged that E.M. was a juvenile delinquent for having committed what would be Level 6 felony escape if committed by an adult, and E.M. admitted to this offense.

[4] On October 1, 2024, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing in Cause Nos. 271 and 303. The pre-dispositional report submitted by the probation department indicated that E.M. had previously been referred (1) for attempted murder and aggravated battery after he had shot his father in 2019, (2) for arson after he had set his family home on fire in 2021, (3) five times for battery, and (4) two times for leaving home without parental permission. The report indicated that E.M. had been detained at the Juvenile Justice Center six times and committed to the DOC for approximately one year after failing formal probation. The probation department recommended that E.M. be committed to the DOC because “it [was] not safe for him to remain in the community” and the “numerous” community services that E.M. had been provided over the years had failed to deter further criminal behavior on his part. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29.

[5] Stacey Poynter from probation testified that a neuropsychological evaluation of E.M. in 2022 had determined him to be “antisocial” due to his “patterns [of] child or adolescent antisocial behavior,” he had been diagnosed with “conduct disorder[,]” and he had been denied acceptance into the community-based treatment program at Rite of Passage due to his “level of aggression[.]” Tr. Vol. II pp. 33, 34, 36. Poynter opined that the most appropriate setting for addressing E.M.’s antisocial behavior was the DOC and that “the level of services that [probation] believe[s E.M.] needs” could be provided at the DOC, but not at the various home-detention alternatives. Tr. Vol. II pp. 37–38. The juvenile court took the matter under advisement. On October 15, 2024, the juvenile court concluded that it was in E.M.’s and the community's best interests to order him committed to the DOC.

Discussion and Decision

[6] E.M. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering him committed to the DOC. The disposition of a juvenile delinquent is committed to the juvenile court's sound discretion, “subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the community's safety, and the Indiana Code's policy of favoring the least harsh disposition.” E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. A juvenile court's disposition will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, which occurs only if its action is “clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.

[7] “Although the juvenile court is given wide latitude and great flexibility in determining the disposition of a delinquent child, its discretion is circumscribed by statute.” R.A. v. State, 936 N.E.2d 1289, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6 provides, in part, that “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that [․] is [․] in the least restrictive [․] and most appropriate setting available[.]” Although the statute requires the least-restrictive placement when appropriate, it recognizes that, at times, the best interests of the child are better served by a more-restrictive placement. K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 386–87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.

[8] We have little hesitation in concluding that E.M. has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. In the juvenile court's dispositional order, it noted that E.M. had already been committed to the DOC in July of 2022 (after he had shot his father and set his house on fire), where he had stayed for almost a full year. The juvenile court also noted the myriad other measures that had been taken to prevent E.M.’s removal from the home, which had included supervised probation, home detention with GPS monitoring, psychoeducational testing, a psychological consultation, other psychological evaluations, emergency-shelter care, residential treatment at Oaklawn and Damar, aftercare home-based therapy, home-based casework/skills building, Bureau of Developmental Disabilities Services, psychiatric medication, and applied behavior analysis with Life Strategies. None of these efforts to find a less-restrictive solution, however, had been successful in curbing E.M.’s delinquent behavior.

[9] The juvenile court also adopted Poynter's report, in which she opined that, while neither relative care nor placement in a residential treatment program was currently appropriate for E.M., commitment to the DOC was. Specifically, Poynter opined that the DOC was “the only option with the level of structure and supervision to protect both [E.M.] and the community. The [DOC] will provide [E.M.] with academic instruction, therapy, and programs to address his criminogenic and antisocial cognition.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29. In light of the evidence of E.M's history of delinquent behavior, the fact that he has exhausted all other viable options for treatment, and the reality that only the DOC has the resources to offer him the care he requires, we cannot say that the juvenile court's disposition is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. See, e.g., J.S. v. State, 881 N.E.2d 26, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“However, it is well settled that there are times when commitment to a suitable public institution is in the best interest of the juvenile and society.”) (citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).

[10] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.