IN RE: the Civil Commitment of J.K. J.K. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] J.K. was the subject of a temporary civil commitment order obtained by Community Health Network, Inc. (“Community Health”). J.K. now appeals the temporary commitment order and presents several issues for our review. Community Health responds to J.K.’s issues but also argues that this appeal is moot.

[2] Because we conclude that J.K.’s appeal is moot without exception, we dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In July 2024, J.K. was hospitalized several times for manic behavior. According to her boyfriend, J.K. would slam doors, throw things in their apartment, “tak[e] pictures off the wall,” unplug items, move items and lose them, call people “all hours of the day and night,” talk at a rapid speed, and “want[ ] to do excessive amounts of laundry.” Tr. Vol. II at 52. J.K.’s boyfriend stated J.K.’s behavior “becomes very unmanageable for whoever she's living with [be]cause ․ her mind is racing so fast.” Id.

[4] On July 24, J.K. was admitted to Community Health after another manic episode, and on July 26, Community Health applied for an emergency detention order for J.K., who Community Health alleged was “experiencing worsening confusion, delusional thinking,” and not “making safe choices,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 14. The trial court granted Community Health's application, and J.K. was detained. On August 2, while J.K. was still subject to the emergency detention, Community Health filed a petition for a commitment hearing, alleging J.K. was suffering from schizoaffective disorder bipolar type and was gravely disabled. In the accompanying Physician's Statement, Doctor Shilpa Guggali stated that J.K. was “not compliant with psychotropic medications,” “lack[ed] insight and judgment,” and “ha[d] refused to begin voluntary treatment.” Id. at 19.

[5] On August 8, the trial court held a hearing on Community Helath's temporary commitment petition. J.K.’s boyfriend, with whom she had been living prior to these proceedings, described J.K. before the July 26 emergency detention as “getting more and more manic” and stated her behavior “becomes very unmanageable for whoever she's living with [be]cause ․ her mind is racing so fast.” Tr. Vol. II at 52. J.K.’s boyfriend had moved to Ohio by the time of the commitment hearing, and he did not know if J.K. was “fully aware of [the couple's] relationship status” due to her current mental condition. Id. at 54; see also id. at 42.

[6] Dr. Guggali testified that when J.K. was hospitalized immediately before the July 26 emergency detention, she was experiencing delusions and increased confusion, not making safe choices, making odd comments, and being disruptive. Dr. Guggali further testified that she witnessed J.K. respond to internal stimuli, “dodg[e] hallucinations,” and exhibit delusional and paranoid behavior. Tr. Vol. II at 19. In particular, Dr. Guggali observed J.K. talking and “giggling” to herself; she also noted that J.K. demonstrated disorganized thoughts and behavior, spoke at a rapid speed, and appeared irritable and agitated. Id.

[7] Additionally, according to Dr. Guggali, J.K. often did not take her medicine as prescribed, even during her current hospitalization, and she also refused to take long-acting anti-psychotic medications in the form of injections based on her fear of needles. Instead, J.K. had expressed a desire to treat her mental illness using supplements such as potassium. J.K.’s stepfather testified that J.K. does not trust doctors or “big pharma,” Tr. Vol. II at 9, and spends a large portion of her money on “supplements, essential oils, herbal teas, CBD gummies, [and] hemp teas,” id. at 10. To that end, J.K.’s stepfather stated that J.K. does not manage her finances well; J.K.’s boyfriend testified to the same, noting that J.K.’s ability to manage money is further impaired when her mental health deteriorates. Both J.K.’s boyfriend and stepfather testified that J.K. could not live with them upon her release from the hospital, and J.K. had refused the apartment her mother and stepfather had secured for her in Greenfield. J.K. intended to stay with a friend in Fishers upon her release and intended to seek work with a former employer.

[8] The trial court determined that J.K. was gravely disabled and committed her to the care, custody, and treatment of Community Health for not more than 60 days. This appeal ensued; neither party requested this appeal be expedited pursuant to the Marion County Expedited Mental Health Appeals Pilot Project;¹ and while this appeal was pending, J.K.’s temporary commitment ended.

Discussion and Decision

J.K.’s Appeal Must Be Dismissed Because It Is Moot Without Exception

[9] J.K. argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her temporary commitment. Because J.K.’s temporary commitment ended while this appeal was pending, this appeal is moot. “A case is moot when the controversy at issue has been ended, settled, or otherwise disposed of so that the court can give the parties no effective relief.” E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022) (citing T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019)). However, there are certain circumstances in which we will address the merits of an otherwise moot appeal, including the public interest exception, E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 466 (quoting In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ind. 1991)), and the collateral consequences doctrine, C.P. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 219 N.E.3d 142, 147–49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. not sought. J.K. argues both the public interest exception and the collateral consequences doctrine apply here. We address each argument in turn.

Public Interest Exception

[10] First, J.K. claims the public interest exception applies. That exception “may be invoked when the issue involves a question of great public importance which is likely to recur.” E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 466 (quoting In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ind. 1991)). As our Supreme Court has explained:

Temporary civil commitments can often fit within this public interest exception to mootness because they are transitory in nature and require the delicate balancing of a person's fundamental liberty interest with the safety of individuals and the public. But this exception should be applied on a case-by-case basis. In other words, appellate courts are not required to issue an opinion in every moot temporary commitment appeal, but they may readily do so to address novel issues or close calls, or to build the instructive body of law to help trial courts make these urgent and difficult decisions.

Id. at 465–66.

[11] Here, J.K. argues her appeal presents a novel issue, namely that she “has been subjected to confinement and forced medication because of this commitment—something she has never been subjected to [in] the twenty (20) years she has been managing her illness.” Appellant's Br. at 30. Temporary commitments necessarily involve confinement and medication of a patient who is unwilling or unable to care for themselves due to mental illness. See B.D. v. Ind. Univ. Health Bloomington Hosp., 121 N.E3d 1044, 1051–52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (discussing when a patient's will regarding the administration of medication may be overridden). Thus, while a temporary commitment and its attendant circumstances may have been novel to J.K., her appeal does not present a novel issue for our review. The public interest exception therefore does not apply to J.K.’s appeal.

Collateral Consequences Doctrine

[12] Second, J.K. asserts the collateral consequences doctrine applies. This doctrine holds that “appeals are not moot where meaningful relief may still be had by our review of those appeals on their merits.” C.P., 219 N.E.3d at 147; see also M.T. v. Cmty. Health Network, 219 N.E.3d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting C.P., 219 N.E.3d at 147), trans. not sought; J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 222 N.E.3d 1020, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing C.P., 219 N.E.3d at 148–49), trans. pending. For instance, in C.P. v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc., this court held that the collateral consequences doctrine applied because the appellant had shown he had “long exercised his right to possess a handgun” and his temporary commitment order, if invalid but left in place, would prohibit him from continuing to possess any firearms. 219 N.E.3d at 149. Similarly, in M.T. v. Community Health Network, this court held the collateral consequences doctrine applied because the appellant, who had a history of mental health hospitalization, had shown his commitment “would potentially contribute” to the evidence used against him “in a future commitment proceeding just as his existing history contributed to the evidence against him here.” 219 N.E.3d at 155.

[13] Importantly, when an appellant seeks to have the merits of a temporary commitment appeal reviewed under the collateral consequences doctrine, the appellant must demonstrate “a particularized collateral consequence flowing from the temporary commitment order.” J.F., 222 N.E.3d at 1024 (citing C.P., 219 N.E.3d at 148–49). That is, the appellant “must demonstrate a particularized collateral consequence to him individually, rather than the more generalized collateral consequence attributable to the class of persons subject to a commitment order.” M.C. v. Sandra Eskenazi Mental Health Ctr., -- N.E.3d --, No. 24A-MH-1364, slip op. ¶ 11 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2025) (mem.) (following approach in J.F., 222 N.E.3d at 1024); see, e.g., M.T., 219 N.E.3d at 155–56 (limiting holding to facts of case and noting the appellant's identified harmful collateral consequence was “adequately developed in the record and in the briefing” on appeal).

[14] J.K. specifically argues that temporary commitment orders “can affect a person's ability to possess a firearm and maintain special licenses and permits”; she further argues they “carry a stigma that, if discovered, can lead to social isolation and negative perceptions from members of society.” Appellant's Br. at 29. Yet J.K. does not identify any negative collateral consequences she may suffer as a result of the temporary commitment order in this case, nor does she explain what meaningful relief may be had if we address the merits of her appeal. Without any particularly identified harmful collateral consequence, without any identified meaningful relief that we may be able to provide to her, we cannot say the collateral consequences doctrine applies to J.K.’s appeal. See C.P., 219 N.E.3d at 147; J.F., 222 N.E.3d at 1024; M.C., No. 24A-MH-1364, slip op. at ¶¶ 11–12.

Conclusion

[15] In sum, neither the public interest exception nor the collateral consequences doctrine applies to J.K.’s appeal, so it is moot without exception. We therefore dismiss J.K.’s appeal as moot.

[16] Dismissed.

[1] I respectfully dissent. I would reach the merits of J.K.’s appeal under the collateral consequences doctrine. Mental health adjudications have inevitable collateral consequences for those who are involuntarily held or committed.

[2] J.K. could have sought complete relief, including release from her allegedly unlawful commitment order, under our pilot expedited process. However, she was not required to do so. The decision to instead seek partial relief, that is, from the collateral consequences that follow an order of involuntary commitment, was her choice to make.

[3] The issue of whether non-expedited appeals from expired temporary commitments are moot is currently pending before our Supreme Court. Therefore, I express no opinion on the merits of this appeal.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In re the Marion Cnty. Expedited Mental Health Appeals Pilot Project, No. 24S-MS-190 (Ind. July 16, 2024).

Felix, Judge.

Judge Foley concurs. Judge Mathias dissents with separate opinion. Foley, J., concurs. Mathias, J., dissents with separate opinion.