LEONARD v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Steevenson Leonard appeals his convictions for child molesting, a Level 4 felony, and criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony, claiming that his convictions violate double jeopardy prohibitions and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Leonard further maintains that we must remand this case to the trial court with instructions to correct clerical errors on documents relevant to his convictions and sentence.

[2] We affirm and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Leonard is married to L.M.’s mother (Mother). Following L.M.’s birth in 2008, she split her time living with Mother and her father at their respective Indianapolis residences. In 2021, L.M., then thirteen years old, was living with Mother and Leonard.

[4] One night between August and November 2021, while Mother was working, Leonard walked into the bedroom where L.M. and her baby brother were sleeping. Leonard touched L.M.’s breasts, thighs, stomach, and vagina with his hands while she was lying on her back. Leonard then turned L.M. on her stomach and pinned her down. L.M. claimed that Leonard rubbed his penis on her and might have inserted his penis in her vagina. Although L.M. told Leonard “no,” she was unable to push him off of her and escape. Transcript Vol. III at 197. L.M. did not tell anyone about the incident at that time.

[5] On January 9, 2022, Mother and Leonard engaged in a verbal and physical altercation. When L.M. tried to intervene, Leonard shoved her into a wall. L.M. called 911, and when police officers arrived, they observed bruising on L.M.’s right arm and cuts, scratch marks, and bruising on Mother's chest. During the encounter, L.M. stated that Leonard did not deserve to be in the house because of what he had done to her. L.M. then disclosed the assault that had occurred a few months earlier.

[6] The next day, L.M. told a detective about Leonard's attack. During the interview, a Department of Child Services (DCS) caseworker observed that L.M. maintained eye contact with the detective and was very detailed and forthcoming about the incident. On February 10, the detective conducted a follow-up interview with L.M., and it was determined that Mother had pressured L.M. to lie about the molestation so she could “save her marriage.” Id. at 198. Thus, L.M. told the detective that her initial recount of the events was a lie. During that interview, L.M. appeared “shut down,” did not make eye contact, and gave brief and short answers to the detective's questions. Id. at 182. At some point, Mother sent L.M.’s best friend messages on L.M.’s Snapchat account—appearing as though from L.M.—indicating that she had lied about the sexual assault. The messages contained no abbreviated words and proper punctuation was used. At L.M.’s deposition that was taken after she went to live with her father and stepmother, L.M. again asserted that Leonard had molested her.

[7] On January 11, 2022, the State charged Leonard with Level 1 felony child molesting (Count I), Level 3 felony rape (Count II), Level 4 felony child molesting (Count III), two counts of Level 5 felony confinement (Counts IV and V), Level 6 felony domestic battery (Count VI), and Class A misdemeanor battery (Count VII). The State subsequently dismissed the charge of confinement of Mother in Count V.

[8] During a three-day jury trial that commenced on February 20, 2024, L.M. testified that Leonard touched her “boobs, thighs, stomach, and vagina with [his] hands” while she was lying on her back. Transcript Vol. III at 196. L.M. further testified that Leonard then turned her on her stomach, “held [her] down and held [her] hands down, ․ made sure that [she] didn't go anywhere or push him off,” and that Leonard penetrated her vagina with his penis. Id. at 196-97. Leonard cross-examined L.M. extensively regarding the inconsistencies and contradictions in her initial statement, the two interviews with police, and her trial testimony. L.M. also testified that she had not sent the messages to her best friend via Snapchat because she would have abbreviated some words and would not have used correct punctuation had she authored the texts.

[9] Following the presentation of evidence, Leonard was found guilty of Level 4 child molesting (Count III), Level 5 confinement of L.M. (Count IV), Level 6 domestic battery of Mother (Count VI), and Class A misdemeanor battery of L.M. (Count VII). The trial court declared a mistrial on child molesting, a Level 1 felony (Count I) and rape, a Level 3 felony (Count II), because the jury was unable to reach a verdict on those counts.¹ The trial court entered judgments of conviction on Counts III, IV, VI and VII, for which Leonard was subsequently sentenced to an aggregate term of nine years with two years suspended to probation.

[10] Leonard now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Double Jeopardy

[11] Leonard argues that his convictions for both Count III child molesting and Count IV confinement cannot stand in light of double jeopardy prohibitions. Leonard contends that his confinement of L.M. was a lesser-included offense of child molesting because the confinement was “the means used to commit the child molesting.” Appellant's Brief at 10.

[12] Whether convictions violate Indiana's prohibition against double jeopardy is a question of law reviewed de novo. Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 237 (Ind. 2020); Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020). The Wadle test applies “when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements[.]” 151 N.E.3d at 247. The Powell test applies “when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute and results in multiple injuries.” 151 N.E.3d at 263. Both parties correctly posit that the substantive double jeopardy framework promulgated in Wadle applies here.

[13] Under the multi-step analysis in Wadle, we first look to the statutes. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 235. If the language of either statute “clearly permits” multiple punishments, there is no double jeopardy violation. Id. at 248. If the statutes are unclear, we apply our included-offense statutes. Id. If either offense is inherently or factually included in the other, there may be a double jeopardy violation. Id. In that case, we proceed to the third step of Wadle and ask whether the defendant's actions are “so compressed in terms of time place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. Id. at 249. If the facts show only a single crime occurred, entering judgment on the included offense violates substantive double jeopardy. Id. at 256.

[14] Leonard was convicted of violating Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (the Child Molesting Statute), that provides:

a person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child molesting, a Level 4 felony.

[15] Leonard was also found guilty under the confinement statute, I.C. § 35-42-3-3, which provides “(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally confines another person without the other person's consent commits criminal confinement. Except as provided in subsection (b), the offense of criminal confinement is a Level 6 felony.” And I.C. § 35-42-3-3(b)(1)(A) states that “[t]he offense of criminal confinement ․ is ․ a Level 5 felony if: (A) the person confined is less than fourteen (14) years of age and is not the confining person's child.” As neither statute clearly allows for multiple punishment, we turn to Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168, which provides that an included offense is one that:

(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;

(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or

(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.

[16] An offense, even if not inherently included in another, is factually included if the charging information alleges “that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense[.]” Norris v. State, 943 N.E.2d 362, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. If neither offense is an included offense of the other (either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy and “the analysis ends—full stop.” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1067 (Ind. 2024). But if one offense is included in the other, we must proceed to Step 3 under Wadle where the facts underlying the charged offenses are examined. See id.

[17] The State's charging information alleged that

Count III

On or about August 4, 2021, LEONARD STEEVENSON did perform fondling or touching with [L.M.], a child under the age of fourteen years, with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of LEONARD STEEVENSON or [L.M.]

Count IV

On or about August 4, 2021, LEONARD STEEVENSON did knowingly confine [L.M.], a person not the child of the defendant and under the age of fourteen years, without the consent of said person.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 188-89.

[18] In this case, Leonard argues that the offenses are factually included. We initially observe that there is no inherent overlap of evidence on the face of the charging informations that would create an ambiguity. Compare A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1072-73 (where the defendant was charged with possession of a machine gun and dangerous possession of a firearm, there was an ambiguity as to whether the firearm allegedly possessed in the second charge was the same firearm allegedly possessed in the first charge). Here, unlike the circumstances in A.W., neither offense is established by proof of the same or less than all of the material elements that establish the other. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168(1). The offenses each have material elements that the other does not. More specifically, child molesting as a Level 4 felony requires proof of a touching of a child under the age of 14 with the intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires. I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b). Confinement requires proof of a knowing or intentional substantial interference with the liberty of another person. I.C. §§ 35-42-3-1, -3. Moreover, confinement involves the element of force, while child molesting as a Level 4 felony (touching and fondling) does not. The confinement as charged here does not allege that Leonard confined L.M. by touching her breasts and vagina, i.e., that the means Leonard used to confine L.M. were the acts that constituted the sexual touching. Therefore, because child molesting and confinement are not included offenses, there is no double jeopardy violation. See Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[19] Leonard contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for child molesting and confinement.² More specifically, he complains that L.M.’s trial testimony and statements she made during the investigation were incredibly dubious because they were “inherently improbable, equivocal and contradictory.” Appellant's Brief at 11, 16.

[20] Our standard for reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence is well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783. A victim's testimony, even if uncorroborated, is ordinarily sufficient to sustain a conviction for child molesting. Bowles v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. 2000).

[21] Notwithstanding L.M.’s testimony, Leonard maintains that the incredible dubiosity rule bars his convictions because her testimony was unbelievable and contradictory. Leonard primarily focuses on the inconsistencies between L.M.’s trial testimony and her pretrial statements including the initial disclosure to police, the two police interviews, and her deposition. We note, however, that discrepancies between a witness's trial testimony and earlier statements made to police and in depositions do not render such testimony “incredibly dubious.” Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 497 (Ind. 2001). Such discrepancies go only to the weight and credibility of the testimony. Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Ind. 2002).

[22] Here, the record demonstrates that Leonard cross-examined L.M. extensively on the inconsistencies between her trial testimony and pre-trial statements. The jury also heard L.M. testify that she recanted some of the accusations in her second police interview because Mother had pressured her to do so. L.M. further testified that she did not message her friend that she had lied about the molestation and explained that Mother had used her Snapchat account to send those messages. L.M. also clarified that she would have abbreviated some of the words in her messages and would not have used proper punctuation had she authored those messages. Indeed, the screenshots of the texts from L.M. were written in complete sentences with no abbreviations, unlike her friend's responses. It was proper for the jury to examine those messages and decide whether L.M. had written them.

[23] In sum, Leonard has failed to show that L.M.’s testimony was incredibly dubious. Thus, we decline to impinge on the jury's credibility determinations and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Leonard's convictions.

III. Court Documents

[24] Leonard argues that remand is necessary so the trial court may correct various clerical errors in documents that relate to his convictions and sentence. Leonard correctly points out that the sentencing and probation orders and abstract of judgment incorrectly list Leonard's name as “Leonard Steevenson.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 27, 30, 35. Leonard also notes that the probation order erroneously indicates that Leonard was convicted on all seven counts that were originally charged. The State, however, dismissed Count V prior to trial, and Counts I and II were dismissed after the jury was not able to reach a verdict on those charges. The State concedes—and we agree—that remand is warranted so the trial court can correct these clerical/scrivener errors.

[25] Judgment affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State ultimately dismissed those charges after consulting with L.M.

2.   Leonard does not challenge his convictions for domestic battery and battery.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Scheele, J., concur.