INDIANA STATE POLICE BOARD v. WILKINS (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The Indiana State Police Board (“ISPB”) appeals the trial court order granting Corporal Maurice Wilkins’ petition for judicial review and reversing ISPB's decision demoting Wilkins for conduct unbecoming an employee. ISPB raises several issues, but we address only the dispositive issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied ISPB's motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review for failure to comply with the requirements of the Indiana Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (“AOPA”). Answering that question in the affirmative, we reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 11, 2022, Indiana State Police (“ISP”) Superintendent Douglas Carter alleged that then-Sergeant Wilkins had committed conduct unbecoming an employee when he asked for a citizen's telephone number for personal reasons while he was on duty in a marked ISP vehicle. This was the second allegation against Wilkins for conduct unbecoming an employee in less than one year. Following an internal disciplinary hearing, Carter issued a disciplinary order finding that Wilkins had committed conduct unbecoming an employee and demoting Wilkins by two ranks.

[3] Wilkins appealed the disciplinary action to the ISPB. Following a hearing on June 19, 2023, ISPB found that Wilkins had committed conduct unbecoming an employee but found that Wilkins should be demoted by only one rank.

[4] On October 17, 2023, Wilkins filed a petition for judicial review of ISPB's decision. On the same day, Wilkins contacted ISPB and requested a copy of the agency record. On November 6, ISPB filed its response to Wilkins’ petition. On December 14, ISPB provided Wilkins with a copy of the record and also filed a motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review due to Wilkins’ failure to file the record with the court within thirty days of the filing of the petition. On December 27, Wilkins filed a motion to strike ISPB's motion to dismiss on the ground that it was filed in “bad faith” because ISPB had previously “acknowledged [Wilkins’] record [request] and told the Court that it would propose a briefing schedule and requested oral argument.” Appellant's App. v. V at 172. In an order dated December 28, the trial court found that Wilkins’ motion to strike was “sufficient,” and it denied ISPB's motion to dismiss. Id. at 174. Wilkins filed the agency record on February 12, 2024.

[5] Following oral argument, on July 12, 2024, the trial court granted Wilkins’ petition for judicial review, reversed the decision of ISPB, and ordered that Wilkins be returned to the rank of sergeant, receive back pay, and have the disciplinary action removed from his personnel record. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] ISPB contends that the trial court erred when it denied the motion to dismiss for failure to comply with AOPA. Our standard of review for motions to dismiss “depends on whether the trial court resolved disputed facts, and if so, whether there was an evidentiary hearing.” Teaching Our Posterity Success, Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of Educ. (TOPS), 20 N.E.3d 149, 151 (Ind. 2014). Where, as here, the trial court ruled on a paper record, our review is de novo. See id.

[7] AOPA governs administrative proceedings and judicial review of decisions of ISPB and certain other State agencies. Ind. Code §§ 4-21.5-2-0.1 to -6. When a person seeks judicial review, courts consider only the agency record, which is the “ ‘exclusive basis for agency action’ ” in administrative proceedings covered by AOPA. TOPS, 20 N.E.3d at 152-53 (quoting I.C. § 4-21.5-3-33(c)). At the time Wilkins filed his petition for judicial review, AOPA placed the burden of transmitting the record on the party seeking judicial review. See I.C. § 4-21.5-5-13(a) (2023).¹ And AOPA requires that the agency record be transmitted to the court “[w]ithin thirty days after the filing of the petition” for judicial review or “within further time allowed by the court or by other law.” Id. The statute further provides that “[f]ailure to file the record within the time permitted by this subsection, including any extension period ordered by the court, is cause for dismissal of the petition for review by the court.” I.C. § 4-21.5-5-13(b) (2023).

[8] Our Supreme Court has interpreted that statute as setting a “bright-line” rule that the record must be filed or an extension requested within the thirty days “in order for judicial review to proceed.” TOPS, 20 N.E.3d at 155. Such a definitive rule is necessary “to ensure that the review of agency action proceeds in an efficient and speedy manner, [ ] that the reviewing trial court has access to the record before rendering its decision, ․ [and] that no relevant evidence or materials are hidden, and no ‘new’ or ‘secret’ evidence is introduced to either contradict or support an agency decision.” Id. (quoting Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Meyer, 927 N.E.2d 367, 370 (Ind. 2010)). Therefore, when the petitioner fails to either file the record or request an extension within thirty days of the filing of the petition for judicial review, the petition for judicial review must be dismissed. Id.; see also Bookwalter v. Ind. Election Comm'n, 209 N.E.3d 438, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[9] Wilkins did not file the record or seek an extension of time to do so within thirty days of the date the petition for judicial review was filed. Therefore, “the [r]ecord is not, and will never be, properly before the trial court.” Allen Cnty. Plan Comm'n v. Olde Canal Place Ass'n, 61 N.E.3d 1266, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). And, without the record, the petition for judicial review “cannot be considered.” Id.

[10] Despite this definitive caselaw, Wilkins maintains that ISPB is “judicially estopped” from asserting the untimely filing of the record because it filed a January 30, 2024, joint motion in which it agreed that the agency record would be filed by February 12, 2024. Appellee's Br. at 16. However, our Supreme Court has made it clear that Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-5-13 “does not excuse untimely filing or allow nunc pro tunc extensions.” Meyer, 927 N.E.2d at 370. Rather, “[i]t is well settled that a reviewing court may grant a request for an extension under section 4-21.5-5-13 of AOPA only if the request is made during the initial thirty days following the filing of the petition for review or within any previously granted extension.” Id. at 370-71 (emphasis added) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, a trial court has no discretion to accept a belatedly filed agency record, as Wilkins seems to suggest. See id.

[11] The trial court erred when it denied ISPB's motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review for failure to timely file the record, as the dismissal was mandatory. See, e.g., Bookwalter, 209 N.E.3d at 442 (citing TOPS, 20 N.E.3d at 155). Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to enter an order dismissing the petition for judicial review with prejudice.

[12] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Effective June 30, 2024, the burden to transmit the agency record is on the “office or ultimate authority.” I.C. § 4-21.5-5-13(a) (2024); see also I.C. § 1-1-5.5-24 (providing effective date).

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.