Regina Dell Evans, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Regina Dell Evans (“Evans”) appeals the trial court's order revoking her probation and ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence. Evans argues that the trial court: (1) failed to follow the due process safeguard of issuing a written statement setting forth the evidence relied upon and reasons for revoking her probation; and (2) abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence. Concluding that: (1) Evans’ admission to violating the conditions of her probation made it unnecessary for the trial court to follow the due process written statement procedural safeguard; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court denied Evans due process.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Evans to serve her previously suspended sentence.

Facts

[3] In June 2022, the State charged Evans with: (1) Level 5 felony possession of a narcotic drug; (2) Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine; (3) Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance; (4) Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe; and (5) Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Evans was released on her own recognizance.

[4] In March 2023, Evans entered into a plea agreement, in which she agreed to plead guilty to the Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine in exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining four charges. The plea agreement also provided that Evans would be sentenced to a two (2) year suspended sentence with 545 days on probation.

[5] The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) revealed that then fifty-year-old Evans reported that she had started using marijuana and prescription pain medication at age twenty-five, cocaine at age thirty, heroin at age forty, and methamphetamine at age forty-one. Evans also reported that she had developed a dependence on the pain medication and that she had started taking non-prescribed pain medication at age thirty-nine. Additionally, Evans reported that she had used heroin daily for five years and that she had used it even after her arrest in this case.

[6] In May 2023, the trial court sentenced Evans, pursuant to the terms of her plea agreement, to a two (2) year suspended sentence with 545 days of probation. The standard conditions of Evans’ probation required her to, among other things, cooperate and be truthful with her probation officer and to not use or possess illegal drugs. As a special condition of probation, Evans was required to submit to a substance abuse assessment and follow all treatment recommendations.

[7] A couple of months later, in July 2023, the State filed a notice of probation violation (“first probation violation notice”), alleging that Evans had violated probation by: (1) being “dishonest with her probation officer regarding her use of illegal drugs” on June 8, 2023; (2) using illegal drugs; and (3) being non-compliant with the probation requirement to submit to a substance abuse assessment. (App. Vol. 2 at 112). In regard to Evans’ use of illegal drugs, the State specifically alleged that Evans had had a positive drug screen for amphetamine, methamphetamine, cocaine metabolite, and THC on June 8, 2023. Additionally, the State alleged that on July 14, 2023, Evans had admitted to her probation officer that she had last used heroin on July 13 and had been using it daily, that she had last used marijuana in the prior week, and that she had last used crack cocaine three days prior. The trial court then issued a warrant for Evans’ arrest. Evans was arrested in February 2024 and later released on bond in March 2024.

[8] During Evans’ April 2024 probation revocation hearing, Evans admitted that she had violated the conditions of her probation as alleged in the first probation violation notice. Based on Evans’ admission, the trial court found that Evans had violated her probation. The trial court set the dispositional hearing for June 7, 2024. The trial court instructed Evans that when she returned for the dispositional hearing, she needed to report what treatment she had done. The trial court acknowledged that Evans was “addicted” and informed her that “it would be much worse if [she] just continued relapsing as opposed to going back to treatment.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 28).

[9] Also in April 2024, about one week after the probation revocation hearing, the State filed a second notice of probation violation (“second probation violation notice”), alleging that Evans had violated probation by: (1) being “dishonest with her probation officer regarding her use of illegal drugs” on April 5, 2024; and (2) using illegal drugs and having a positive drug screen for cocaine metabolite, nor-fentanyl, and THC on April 5, 2024. (App. Vol. 2 at 125).

[10] Thereafter, Evans failed to appear for the June 2024 dispositional hearing on the first probation violation notice. The trial court issued a warrant for Evans’ arrest, and she was then taken into custody on June 18, 2024.

[11] The trial court held a probation revocation hearing on the second probation violation notice in August 2024. During the hearing, Evans admitted that she had violated the conditions of her probation as alleged in the second probation violation notice. Based on Evans’ admission, the trial court found that Evans had violated her probation and revoked her probation. The trial court then set a dispositional hearing on the first and second probation violation notices for October 2024 and ordered Evans to be evaluated by community corrections. The trial court explained to Evans that when she returned for the October dispositional hearing, “[her] attorney and the State w[ould] make an argument about the appropriate sentence [she] should receive for [her probation] revocation.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 42).

[12] During the October 2024 dispositional hearing, Evans testified that she had been screened for community corrections but had been denied admission. Evans acknowledged that she had had positive drug screens in June 2023 and April 2024. She testified that she had attended a drug treatment program in August 2023, had tried to attend another one in June 2024, and that she had been “clean” since she had been incarcerated for her latest probation violations. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 50). Evans testified that part of the reason why she had relapsed was because her mother and three family members had died and her son had been diagnosed with lymphoma. Additionally, Evans asked the trial court to give her a “third” chance so she could “show the Court[ ] and Probation that [she] c[ould] do this clean.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 50). When the parties submitted argument on the disposition for Evans’ admitted probation violations, Evans’ counsel stated that Evans did not have a specific recommendation for the trial court and asked the trial court to consider that Evans was “obviously suffering with substance abuse issues.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 54). The State agreed that Evans had a substance abuse problem and stated that Evans had not fully addressed it while on probation.

[13] At the end of the dispositional hearing, the trial court revoked Evans’ probation and ordered her to serve her previously suspended sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction. The trial court stated that it would consider a future sentence modification and stated that Evans needed to make “sobriety․ her first choice.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 58).

[14] Evans now appeals.

Decision

[15] Evans argues that the trial court: (1) failed to follow the due process safeguard of issuing a written statement setting forth the evidence relied upon and reasons for revoking her probation; and (2) abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence. We will review each argument in turn.

1. Due Process

[16] Evans does not dispute that she violated the conditions of her probation. Indeed, she admitted that she had violated probation as alleged in the two probation violation notices filed by the State. Instead, Evans contends that the trial court violated her right to due process by failing to specify, in a written statement, the reasons for revoking her probation.

[17] “Probation revocation is a two-step process.” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). “First, the [trial] court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred.” Id. Second, “[i]f a violation is proven, then the trial court must determine if the violation warrants revocation of the probation.” Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1972); Stephens v. State, 818 N.E.2d 936, 941-42 (Ind. 2004)).

[18] “A probation hearing is civil in nature[,]” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999), reh'g denied, and “probationers do not receive the same constitutional rights that defendants receive at trial.” Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2007), reh'g denied. “Although probationers are not entitled to the full array of constitutional rights afforded defendants at trial, ‘the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [does] impose [ ] procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of the conditional liberty created by probation.’ ” Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640 (quoting Debro v. State, 821 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. 2005)). One of the minimum requirements of due process provided to a probationer at a revocation hearing includes a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied upon and reasons for revoking probation. Parker v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489). See also Terrell v. State, 886 N.E.2d 98, 100-01 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.¹ The requirement for a written statement “is a procedural device aimed at promoting accurate fact finding and ensuring the accurate review of revocation decisions.” Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (footnote omitted).

[19] However, “[w]hen a probationer admits to the [alleged probation] violations, the procedural due process safeguards and an evidentiary hearing are not necessary.” Terrell, 886 N.E.2d at 101 (citations and italicization omitted). See also Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640 (“When a probationer admits to the violations, the procedural safeguards of Morrissey and the evidentiary hearing are unnecessary.”) “Instead, the [trial] court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants revocation.” Terrell, 886 N.E.2d at 101 (citations and italicization omitted).²

[20] Here, the State filed two separate probation violation notices and alleged that Evans had violated her probation by using illegal drugs—including amphetamine, methamphetamine, cocaine metabolite, and THC in June 2023 and cocaine metabolite, nor-fentanyl, and THC in April 2024—and by being dishonest with her probation officer about her illegal drug use. Evans admitted to violating her probation as alleged in both probation violation notices. Because Evans admitted to those violations, “the procedural due process safeguards and an evidentiary hearing [we]re not necessary[,]” and it was “unnecessary” for the trial court to follow the due process procedural safeguard regarding a written statement setting forth the evidence and reasons for revoking probation. See Terrell, 886 N.E.2d at 101 (explaining that the probationer's admission to the alleged probation violations made it “unnecessary for the trial court to follow the procedural safeguards of Morrissey” regarding a written statement with reasons for revoking probation). See also Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order revoking Evans’ probation.³

2. Order to Serve Suspended Sentence

[21] Evans argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence. We disagree.

[22] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Id. See also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a). Indeed, violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. Gosha v. State, 873 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). “Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not given to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. As a result, we review a trial court's sentencing decision from a probation revocation for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[23] The record reveals that the trial court had a sufficient basis for its decision to order Evans to serve her previously suspended sentence. Here, Evans initially pleaded guilty to the Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine in exchange for the State's dismissal of the four other charges, which included Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. The plea agreement also provided that Evans would be sentenced to a two-year suspended sentence with 545 days on probation. At the time of Evans’ sentencing, she acknowledged that she had had a history of using marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. Within one month of being placed on probation, Evans tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, cocaine metabolite, and THC. Additionally, she had been dishonest with her probation officer. Following her positive drug screen, Evans also admitted to her probation officer that she had been using heroin. During the probation revocation hearing on Evans’ first probation violation notice, Evans admitted to violating her probation as alleged. The trial court instructed Evans that when she returned for the dispositional hearing, she needed to report what treatment she had done. Evans, however, failed to appear for the dispositional hearing. The State filed a second probation violation notice after Evans had tested positive for cocaine metabolite, nor-fentanyl, and THC and had lied to her probation officer about her illegal drug use. Evans admitted to violating her probation as alleged. Before the dispositional hearing on the two probation violation notices, the trial court had Evans screened for community corrections, which denied her acceptance into the program. Evans asked the trial court to give her a “third” chance and to be continued on probation. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 50). The trial court refused Evans’ request, noting that Evans needed to make “sobriety․ her first choice.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 58).

[24] Based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Evans to serve her previously suspended sentence. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The other minimum requirements of due process provided to a probationer at a revocation hearing include: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (b) disclosure of the evidence against the probation; (c) an opportunity to be heard and present evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; and (e) a neutral and detached hearing body. Parker, 676 N.E.2d at 1085 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489).

2.   During that second step, “a probationer who admits the allegations against [her] must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation.” Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640. Evans does not argue that she was denied the opportunity to provide mitigating evidence.

3.   Moreover, our review of the record reveals that the trial court's rationale for revoking Evans’ probation was clear from the transcript and the trial court's order. Specifically, the trial court's reason for revoking Evans’ probation was based on her admitted violations of her probation conditions. See Terrell, 886 N.E.2d at 101.

Pyle, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Kenworthy concur. Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.