HAMPTON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Tyrone Hampton guilty of Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon, and the trial court sentenced him to four years executed on home detention. Hampton appeals, arguing that the State produced insufficient evidence to rebut his self-defense claim, and the sentence he received was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 12, 2023, Hampton met SaPrina Ashburn (SaPrina) as she was walking home from her job at a Family Dollar store in Indianapolis. This was the start of a tumultuous relationship that lasted only a week. On May 29, 2023, Hampton called SaPrina at least five times before she picked up the phone while she was on her break from work. When she answered Hampton's call, SaPrina was outside the store hanging out with her brother, Aaron Ashburn (Aaron), who had come to see her on her break. Aaron overheard SaPrina's conversation with Hampton, during which Hampton threatened to come to her work and pistol whip her. As the call ended, SaPrina and Aaron could hear Hampton starting up his vehicle. Before returning to her shift, SaPrina told Aaron to leave because she “didn't want him to have anything to do with what was going on with” Hampton. Tr. Vol. 2 at 154.

[3] A few minutes later, Aaron entered the store, and Hampton “walked in behind him.” Id. Hampton did not know Aaron at the time. Hampton approached SaPrina's cash register and watched her help two customers complete their transactions. State's Exh. 4 at 00:07-1:40. After both customers left, Hampton approached the checkout counter and, with his arms crossed, demanded SaPrina leave the store and “come with him.” State's Exh. 4 at 1:40-2:50; Tr. Vol. 2 at 157. SaPrina was “terrified” because she believed that Hampton had a firearm. Tr. Vol. 2 at 158.

[4] Aaron, who was concerned for SaPrina's safety, approached Hampton and stuck him in the face with a can of beans. State's Exh. 4 at 3:00-3:16. Aaron dropped the can and chased Hampton around the checkout aisle. State's Exh. 2 at 00:00-00:05. Hampton then drew a semiautomatic handgun. Aaron ran out of the store, and Hampton ran after him. State's Exh. 1 at 00:00-00:04. Outside, Aaron sprinted along the sidewalk with Hampton chasing approximately ten feet behind him. State's Exh. 5. After chasing Aaron for over ten seconds and “about 150 feet, or half a football field[,]” Hampton fired at least two shots, hitting Aaron's right heel and rendering him unable to run. Tr. Vol. 3 at 64; State's Exh. 5. Surveillance cameras inside and outside the store captured most of the incident, including Hampton firing his weapon.

[5] After he was shot and while he was still on the ground, Aaron begged Hampton for his life. When a police officer arrived, Hampton was pointing the handgun at Aaron. The officer told Hampton to drop the firearm, which he did, and he submitted to the arrest.

[6] The State charged Hampton with Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon ¹ and Level 5 felony intimidation.² At his February 2024 jury trial, Hampton claimed self-defense and testified that Aaron's blow to his face made him feel “[i]n fear of [his] life” because he was struck by “an individual that [he] did not know” who then chased him. Id. at 25. Hampton said he “was seeing stars” after the blow to his head and that he “started gaining conscience [sic]” as he initially ran from Aaron. Id. at 26. When Hampton turned and saw Aaron “right there again with his fists balled up trying to attack [him] again[,]” Hampton pulled out his weapon. Id. When asked why he chased after Aaron, Hampton testified, “I thought he was going to retrieve another weapon or something. I didn't know.” Id. at 27.

[7] The jury found Hampton guilty of Level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon but not guilty of intimidation. The trial court sentenced him to four years executed on home detention.

Discussion and Decision

1. Self-defense

[8] Hampton argues the State produced insufficient evidence to negate his self-defense claim. When the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is challenged, the standard of review is the same as the standard for any sufficiency claim. Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d 367, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. When determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we “ ‘consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict’ ” and do not reassess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005)).

[9] A defendant may assert self-defense as a justification for an otherwise criminal act. Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021), reh'g denied; Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2. A person is legally justified in using reasonable force against another person to protect himself from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). He is justified in using deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat if he reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself. I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c)(1)-(2). The “Indiana self-defense statute requires both a subjective belief that force was necessary to prevent serious bodily injury and that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have such an actual belief.” Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d 342, 349 (Ind. 2013) (citing Littler v. State, 871 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 2007)). While the defendant's perception of the circumstances is relevant testimony for the jury to consider, the defendant's own account is not required to be believed and “the standard is still the reasonableness of the belief of the defendant.” Id. “A person claiming self-defense cannot reasonably base a belief that [a] threat is imminent on the actions of another who has withdrawn from the confrontation.” Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. 2003).

[10] To prevail on a self-defense claim, “the defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002) (citing McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 90 (Ind. 1998)). When the defendant's claim finds support in the evidence, the burden shifts to the State to negate at least one of the necessary elements. Id. To meet its burden, the State may rebut the defense directly, affirmatively show the person did not act in self-defense, or rely upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Turner v. State, 183 N.E.3d 346, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Whether the State met its burden is a question of fact reserved for the jury. Stewart, 167 N.E.3d at 376. We reverse a conviction only if no reasonable person could say the State rebutted the defendant's self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670.

[11] The State argues that it negated the third element: whether Hampton reasonably feared great bodily harm or death at the time he shot Aaron. The State may disprove that the defendant's fear of bodily harm was reasonable in part by presenting evidence that the defendant used force while the victim was fleeing. See Boyer v. State, 883 N.E.2d 158, 163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). For example, in Wilson, the Indiana Supreme Court found that Wilson was a “willing participant” in the shooting, that he “could not have been laboring under a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm” when he continued to shoot at the car as it attempted to leave the area, and that it was reasonable to infer that he shot the victim in retaliation for the initial assault. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801 And in Hobson v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1118, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, we held that it was reasonable to infer “that Hobson was a willing participant in the fight” and “was not laboring under a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm” when he grabbed a gun after the participants in the fight separated and shot the victim in the back as he ran away.

[12] Here, the evidence most favorable to the jury's verdict showed that after Aaron attacked Hampton, Hampton quickly drew his handgun. Aaron ran out of the store and Hampton closely followed him with his gun drawn. Once outside, both men continued to sprint with Aaron about ten feet ahead of Hampton. In total, Hampton's pursuit of Aaron lasted over ten seconds and covered half a football field before he shot Aaron from behind in the heel as he fled. Simply put, Hampton chased down Aaron and shot him in retaliation, not in self-defense.³ Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State successfully rebutted Hampton's self-defense claim, so we affirm his battery conviction.

2. Appropriateness of Sentence

[13] Hampton next argues that the sentence he received is inappropriate and should be revised given the nature of the offense and his character, in accordance with Appellate Rule 7(B).

[14] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) “permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019) (citing McCain v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1066, 1067 (Ind. 2018)). “The principal role of [Appellate Rule 7(B)] review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers[.]” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Our determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.

[15] Our review of the sentence imposed examines “the whole picture before us.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024). This can include consideration of “whether a portion of the sentence is ordered suspended or is otherwise fashioned to using any of the variety of sentencing tools available to the trial judge.” Zavala v. State, 138 N.E.3d 291, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied. We give deference to the trial court's decision and strive to determine whether the defendant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether a different sentence would be more appropriate. King v. State, 991 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The burden is on the defendant to convince us that his sentence was inappropriate. Id.

[16] We begin with the advisory sentence when considering the nature of the offense. Norton v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Hampton was convicted of Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon. A Level 5 felony conviction carries a sentence between one and six years, with the advisory sentence being three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). The trial court imposed a four-year sentence to be executed on home detention.

[17] “The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense and the defendant's participation.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh'g denied). When the trial court deviates from the advisory sentence, we consider how egregious the circumstances of the offense were compared to the typical offense accounted for in the advisory sentence. Norton, 235 N.E.3d at 1291. We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[18] As to the nature of the offense, Hampton shot Aaron from behind as Aaron was fleeing him. The shooting occurred in a public space outside Family Dollar, and there is no indication that Hampton considered the potential presence of pedestrians or shoppers as he fired his gun while sprinting or when he later fired a “warning shot” “up in the air.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 27. The shooting resulted in serious bodily injury to Aaron, who required surgery to remove the bullet from his heel and was rendered permanently disabled. Hampton has failed to establish that the nature of his offense supports a reduction of his marginally enhanced sentence on home detention.

[19] We next consider Hampton's character. A defendant's life and conduct illustrate his character. Morris v. State, 114 N.E.3d 531, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. The defendant's criminal history is a relevant consideration. George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Bryant v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1154, 1156-57 (Ind. 2006)). “ ‘Even a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character[.]’ ” Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 700 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1099, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)).

[20] Although Hampton has an extensive criminal history, mostly accrued as a minor and in early adulthood, he points out that it has been expunged. He also completed some substance use treatment in 2005 and received his GED in 2006. Before this offense, Hampton had been working full-time as a laborer and paying child support for three of his seven children as ordered. However, “most people are employed such that this consideration does not warrant a lesser sentence.” Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)), trans. denied. Given our deference to the trial court's sentencing decision, we cannot say that Hampton has demonstrated the “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” that warrant appellate revision of a sentence. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[21] Hampton's marginally enhanced sentence executed on home detention is not the kind of outlier that Appellate Rule 7(B) is meant to address. We conclude that his sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. See Faith, 131 N.E.3d at 160 (“[W]e reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.”).

Conclusion

[22] Sufficient evidence negated Hampton's self-defense claim and the sentence he received for committing Level 5 battery by means of a deadly weapon is not inappropriate considering the nature of the offense and his character.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (g)(2).

2.   I.C. §§ 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(2).

3.   Hampton points to the disorientation he felt after being struck in the head, the fact that he knew nothing about his attacker other than his propensity for sudden violence, and the short amount of time he had to calculate his reaction. Under these circumstances, it is possible that Hampton reasonably feared great bodily injury in the initial seconds of this incident. However, given these specific circumstances, Hampton's claimed fear was not reasonable at the time he shot Aaron after chasing him with a loaded firearm for over ten seconds.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.