Daniel Rhodes, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Daniel Rhodes appeals from his conviction of murder, alleging fundamental error in the filing of a habitual offender enhancement and in the admission of his confession as well as error in his sentence. Finding no error, fundamental or otherwise, we affirm.

Issues

[2] Rhodes presents three issues for our review, which we restate as:

I. Whether the State's untimely filing of the habitual offender enhancement constitutes fundamental error.

II. Whether the admission of Rhodes’ confession amounts to fundamental error.

III. Whether Rhodes’ sentence is inappropriate.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 3, 2021, Daniel Rhodes was at the apartment of his aunt, Angela McGhee, and her boyfriend, Ronald Thompson. Also present at the apartment was Michael McDowell. At some point, McGhee and Thompson left, and McDowell and Rhodes both remained at the apartment. While McGhee and Thompson were gone, Rhodes shot McDowell in the head with a rifle, killing him.

[4] On July 7, the State charged Rhodes with murder; battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; two counts of intimidation, both Level 5 felonies; and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony. The battery charge and both counts of intimidation were later dismissed, leaving the charges of murder and unlawful possession of a firearm for trial. In August 2022, the State filed its notice of intent to file a habitual offender enhancement, which was followed up with the filing of an information on February 7, 2024 alleging Rhodes is a habitual offender.

[5] A jury found Rhodes guilty of murder and unlawful possession, and the State subsequently dismissed the unlawful possession charge. Rhodes waived his right to be tried by the jury on the habitual offender enhancement, and the court found him to be a habitual offender. The court subsequently sentenced Rhodes to sixty-two years for his conviction of murder, enhanced by twenty years for his status as a habitual offender. Rhodes now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Belated Filing of Habitual Offender Charge

[6] Rhodes first argues that his habitual offender adjudication should be vacated because the court committed fundamental error by permitting the State to belatedly file the habitual offender charge.

[7] To preserve a challenge to the court sanctioning a belated habitual offender filing, a defendant must object to the filing and, if the court overrules the objection and allows the filing, request a continuance. See White v. State, 963 N.E.2d 511, 518 (Ind. 2012) (stating precedent has consistently held that to preserve this issue for appeal defendant must request continuance after court permits belated habitual offender filing and noting that rule has no exceptions). Rhodes did not object to the State's belated filing, nor did he request a continuance; consequently, he has waived this issue for appeal.¹

[8] Acknowledging that this issue was not properly preserved, Rhodes claims fundamental error. See Appellant's Br. p. 14. The fundamental error doctrine is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule that applies only when the error amounts to a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. Garcia-Berrios v. State, 147 N.E.3d 339, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. To qualify as fundamental error, the error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible. Evans v. State, 81 N.E.3d 634, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “This exception is available only in egregious circumstances.” Garcia-Berrios, 147 N.E.3d at 344.

[9] Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5(e) provides that an amendment of an information to include a habitual offender charge must be made at least thirty days before the commencement of trial. However, upon a showing of good cause, the trial court may permit the filing of a habitual offender charge at any time before the commencement of the trial if the amendment does not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights. Ind Code § 35-34-1-5(e). If the court permits the filing of a habitual offender charge less than thirty days before trial begins, the court shall grant a continuance at the request of the defendant, for any reason, or the State, for good cause shown. Id. “ ‘The purpose of Section 35-34-1-5(e) is to allow a defendant sufficient time to prepare a defense for the habitual offender charge.’ ” Jackson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 29, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Land v. State, 802 N.E.2d 45, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. Accordingly, “ ‘[a] defendant who challenges the State's filing of an habitual offender allegation on the ground that it is filed outside of the time limit must demonstrate that he was prejudiced.’ ” Id.

[10] Here, the State filed the habitual offender charging information on February 7, 2024, twenty-six days before Rhodes’ trial began. Additionally, two years prior in August 2022, the State had filed its notice of intent to file a habitual offender enhancement. And again at a pretrial conference in September 2023, the State confirmed to the court and defense counsel that it would proceed on a habitual enhancement if the case went to trial. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 20. At the end of the hearing the court reiterated the State's intention: “So the Defendant is then made aware that by October 12th, if he has not chosen to accept the offer, then the State would be filing a habitual ․ ” Id. at 22. Rhodes knew well in advance that the filing of a habitual offender charge was likely, even definite, and he does not allege that he had an inadequate amount of time to prepare his defense to the habitual offender charge. Because he has not presented any explanation of how he was prejudiced by the filing of the charge twenty-six days prior to the commencement of trial, he has not demonstrated any error, much less error that was so prejudicial to his rights as to make a fair trial impossible.

II. Admission of Confession

[11] Rhodes next seeks reversal of his conviction of murder, asserting the court erred by admitting his confession into evidence at trial. Because Rhodes failed to object to the admission of his confession, the issue is waived for appeal, and he now claims the admission resulted in fundamental error.

[12] As with our evaluation of fundamental error in Issue I., we review the admission of Rhodes’ statement for resulting error that is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible. Evans, 81 N.E.3d at 637. We remain mindful that this exception to the waiver rule is available only in egregious circumstances. Garcia-Berrios, 147 N.E.3d at 344.

[13] Rhodes asserts admission of his statement was error because it was involuntary. “[I]t is the State's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's statement was voluntary.”² Williams v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). When evaluating a claim that a statement was not given voluntarily, the crucial inquiry is whether the defendant's statements were induced by violence, threats, promises, or other improper influence. Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances, including: the critical element of police coercion, the length of the interrogation, its location, its continuity, and the defendant's maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health. Id. Intoxication, drug use, and fatigue are other factors to be considered in determining whether a statement was voluntary. Id.

[14] On appeal, we examine the record for substantial, probative evidence of voluntariness, but we will not reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's conclusion as well as reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Id. We will not set aside the trial court's decision if there is substantial evidence to support it. Id.

[15] Here, Rhodes challenges the voluntariness of his confession on the basis of alleged sleep deprivation and prior drug use that caused him to be in a manic state. However, the video recording of Rhodes’ statement does not substantiate his assertion that fatigue affected his ability to give a voluntary confession. Though the interview began at 3:37 a.m., the detective pointedly asked Rhodes, “Are you good and awake?” and Rhodes responded affirmatively. State's Ex. 50 at 1:05. Throughout the entirety of the interview Rhodes appears awake and alert. Other than the late hour, Rhodes identifies no evidence in support of this argument, and we are unpersuaded that he was suffering from such fatigue that it rendered his confession involuntary.

[16] Rhodes also claims that his prior drug use caused him to be in a manic state that affected the voluntariness of his statement. To support this argument, he directs us to his explanation of the circumstances surrounding the shooting of McDowell.

[17] Our Supreme Court “has long held that a confession may be given knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, notwithstanding voluntary intoxication as a result of alcohol, drugs or a combination of both.” Brooks v. State, 683 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Ind. 1997). A confession will only be deemed involuntary when a defendant is so intoxicated that he is not conscious of what he is doing or when the intoxication produces a state of mania. Keith v. State, 127 N.E.3d 1221, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Any lesser degree of intoxication goes merely to the weight to be given to the confession not to its admissibility. Id. When the voluntariness of a defendant's statement is challenged on the basis that the defendant was under the influence of drugs, “the defendant has the burden to introduce evidence from which it could be concluded that the amount and nature of the drug consumed would produce an involuntary statement.” Wells v. State, 904 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

[18] The video shows that as soon as Detective Jones walked into the interview room, Rhodes had the presence of mind to immediately ask about his mother's condition. State's Ex. 50 at 00:36. Further, the interview took place on Sunday morning. Detective Jones asked Rhodes if, other than the “little bit of weed” he had smoked, he had ingested any other drugs in the last few days. Id. at 15:36-40. Rhodes responded that he had ingested the drug ecstasy on Thursday night and that it did not have “a strong dose to it.” Id. at 15:47, 16:01, 17:01. Later in the interview, when the detective told Rhodes that the evidence looked like he “killed somebody in cold blood for no reason,” he explained that “they” were trying to rob him. Id. at 46:29. Rhodes explained that the situation was a “set-up,” with one person in the closet to whom McDowell was talking and another person in the bathroom. Id. at 48:27. McDowell kept “fidgeting,” so Rhodes shot him. Id. at 55:54.

[19] Although at times Rhodes mumbled and did not enunciate, he did not slur his words, and throughout the interview he was alert, able to answer questions appropriately, and track the conversation. During the course of the interview, the detective told Rhodes several times that she could not understand him or could not hear him because he would mumble, speak quietly, or cover his mouth with his hands.

[20] At trial Detective Jones testified that when she interviewed Rhodes there was no indication that he was under the influence of any substance. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 35. She then specified that Rhodes did not slur his speech, did not have red eyes, and did not smell of drugs or alcohol. Id. She confirmed there was no indication that Rhodes did not understand the questions she asked him and that he was able to respond and discuss what occurred such that she had no reason to believe she should not have been taking a statement from him. Id.

[21] Rhodes has not satisfied his burden of producing evidence from which we could conclude that the amount and nature of the drug he consumed would produce an involuntary statement. See Wells, 904 N.E.2d at 272. Moreover, the video dispels any argument that he was so intoxicated that he was not conscious of what he was doing or that he was in a manic state. See Keith, 127 N.E.3d at 1232. Under the totality of the circumstances shown by the record, we cannot conclude that Rhodes’ statement was involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court's admission of his statement at trial does not amount to fundamental error.

III. Sentence

[22] Rhodes asks this Court to exercise its authority to revise his sentence downward. Article 7, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes the Court to review and revise sentences. Appellate Rule 7(B) implements this authority, stating the Court may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[23] “Sentence modification under Rule 7(B) ․ is reserved for ‘a rare and exceptional case.’ ” Wilmsen v. State, 181 N.E.3d 469, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018)). “When conducting this review, we generally defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court.” Wilmsen, 181 N.E.3d at 472. Our deference to the trial court will prevail “unless the defendant persuades us the sentence is inappropriate by producing compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense—such as showing restraint or a lack of brutality—and the defendant's character—such as showing substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of positive attributes.” Id. at 472-73. “We consider the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court and also any other factors appearing in the record.” Williams v. State, 170 N.E.3d 237, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[24] When considering the nature of the offense, we begin with the advisory sentence. Id. Rhodes was convicted of murder, for which the advisory sentence is fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (2015). The minimum sentence for murder is forty-five years and the maximum is sixty-five years. Id. Rhodes was also determined to be a habitual offender, for which the court could enhance his sentence by six to twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1) (2017). The court sentenced Rhodes to sixty-two years for his murder conviction and enhanced that by twenty years for his adjudication as a habitual offender. His sentence is three years shy of the maximum possible sentence of eighty-five years.

[25] “Our analysis of the ‘nature of the offense’ requires us to look at the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). As characterized by Detective Jones, Rhodes shot and killed a man “in cold blood for no reason.” State's Ex. 50 at 46:29.

[26] Turning to the character of the offender, our analysis “involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Pritcher, 208 N.E.3d at 668. We first observe that at the time Rhodes ended McDowell's life by shooting him in the head with a rifle, he was categorized as a serious violent felon and was therefore prohibited by law from possessing a firearm.

[27] The remainder of Rhodes’ criminal history reflects just as poorly on his character. In addition to the two felonies underlying the allegation of his habitual offender status in this case, Rhodes’ criminal history consists of six juvenile adjudications, seven adult misdemeanor convictions, and five adult felony convictions, which the court found to be shocking. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 141. Further, Rhodes has a record of seventeen juvenile arrests and thirty-six adult arrests. Although a record of arrests by itself is not evidence of a defendant's criminal history, it is appropriate to consider such a record as a poor reflection on the defendant's character because it may reveal that he has not been deterred even after having been subjected to police authority. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Moreover, Rhodes previously accumulated four prison conduct reports while incarcerated and, while in jail on the present case, he was the subject of two major conduct reports for assault. He has been placed on probation five times, and each time his probation was revoked as unsuccessful. In sum, his many contacts with the criminal justice system have not caused him to reform his behavior.

[28] Rhodes cites Messel v. State, 80 N.E.3d 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied and Rhoton v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied to support his request for sentence revision. In Messel, this Court affirmed an aggregate eighty-year sentence comprised of sixty years for murder and a twenty-year habitual offender enhancement. Although the circumstances of the murder in Messel were more brutal than in this case, the defendant had a significant criminal history like the court found here. Given the deference we show to the trial court's sentencing decision and the fact that Rhodes’ sentence for murder exceeded Messel's by only two years, we cannot say Rhodes’ sentence is one of those rare and exceptional cases that demands sentence revision.

[29] In Rhoton, the defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of eighty-one years that consisted of sixty-five years for murder, eight years for burglary, and a habitual offender enhancement of eight years. Rhoton's conduct was more vicious than Rhodes’, which is reflected in Rhoton's maximum sixty-five-year sentence for murder as compared to Rhodes’ sixty-two-year sentence. Moreover, a comparison of their aggregate sentences is not helpful because Rhoton's aggregate eighty-year sentence was owing to an agreement between Rhoton and the State whereby his habitual offender enhancement would attach to the sentence imposed for burglary not murder.

[30] Rhodes has not produced any compelling evidence that portrays the nature of his offense or his character in a positive light to overcome the deference we show to a trial court's sentencing determination. Accordingly, we decline to revise his sentence.

Conclusion

[31] In light of the foregoing, we conclude that neither the State's untimely filing of the habitual enhancement nor the court's admission of Rhodes’ confession at trial amount to fundamental error. Further, Rhodes’ sentence is not inappropriate in light of his offense and his character.

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We pause here to clarify the procedure on this matter. Rhodes asserts the State was required to make a good cause showing in order to be permitted to belatedly file the habitual offender charge and, because the State did not make such a showing in his case, the trial court erred in permitting the filing. Appellant's Br. p. 12. However, he is mistaken. It is well settled that the State does not need to make such a showing until the defendant requests a continuance. See White, 963 N.E.2d at 518 (holding that to preserve for appellate review issue of untimely filing of habitual offender charge, defendant must request continuance after trial court permits tardy habitual offender filing, and, once defendant requests continuance, burden lies with State to make showing of good cause to trial court).

2.   Our Supreme Court has held that the Indiana Constitution requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights and that his confession was voluntarily given. Wells v. State, 904 N.E.2d 265, 271 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 114-15 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied. Rhodes does not develop a separate argument based on the Indiana Constitution, and we therefore only address his argument under the federal constitution. See id. Nevertheless, the State presented evidence that met even this more stringent standard.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Judges Bailey and Felix concur. Bailey, J., and Felix, J., concur.