Ayden I. Lee, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On the evening of October 29, 2023, then-fourteen-year-old Ayden Lee went over to his then-thirteen-year-old ex-girlfriend's home and, while in the home with a number of other juveniles, shot M.S. twice in the chest, killing him. After being waived to adult court, Lee was charged with murder. At trial, Lee admitted that that he had shot and killed M.S. but claimed to have acted in either self-defense or sudden heat. The jury found Lee guilty of murder, after which the trial court sentenced him to an advisory fifty-five-year sentence. Lee challenges both his conviction and sentence on appeal, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence, the State failed to rebut his self-defense claim, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his murder conviction because the evidence established that he had acted in sudden heat, and his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the evening of October 29, 2023, Lee and a friend went to A.S.’s Allen County home. When Lee arrived, other juveniles, including M.S., were also in A.S.’s home. At some point, A.S. became upset with Lee and she and the others repeatedly told him to leave. Lee refused to leave.

[3] Eventually, M.S. became frustrated and angry with Lee. M.S. “didn't get in [Lee's] face or anything, he was just, like, bro you gotta go[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 95. Lee continued to refuse to leave and stated that he was going to “call [his] people.” Tr. Vol. I p. 95. The group took this comment as an indication that Lee planned to “start some drama or something.” Tr. Vol. I p. 96. In another apparent effort to get Lee to leave, M.S. and others indicated that they would also call their “people.” Tr. Vol. I p. 96. As Lee continued to loiter, M.S., with “a little bit of tone in his voice[,]” again told Lee “bro, you gotta go.” Tr. Vol. I p. 96. At that point, Lee pulled a firearm from his pants; pointed it at M.S., who was standing approximately five feet away; and shot M.S. twice in the chest. M.S. died as a result of his injuries.

[4] On November 7, 2023, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that Lee had committed what would be murder if committed by an adult and had used a firearm in the commission of the offense. Lee was waived to adult court, after which he was charged with murder. The case proceeded to trial, during which Lee did not dispute that he had shot M.S. but claimed to have done so in self-defense or, alternatively, in sudden heat. The jury ultimately rejected Lee's self-defense and sudden-heat claims, finding him guilty of murder. On June 28, 2024, the trial court imposed an advisory fifty-five-year sentence.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[5] Lee contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain photographs and data from his cellular telephone at trial. The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260 (internal citation omitted). “[W]e will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[6] At trial, the State sought to introduce photographs found on Lee's cellular telephone, four of which depicted Lee holding firearms and one of which depicted a firearm. The State also sought to introduce metadata recovered from Lee's cellular telephone indicating that each of the photographs had been taken within the ten days before Lee shot M.S. The analytical documentation further indicated that each of the photographs had been deleted from the cellular telephone on October 30, 2023. The photographs and analytical documentation were admitted into evidence over Lee's objection.

[7] Lee argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence because the “the photographs and data are irrelevant under Rules 401 and 402 of the Indiana Rules of Evidence.” Appellant's Br. p. 23. Indiana Evidence Rule 401 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Generally, relevant evidence is admissible but irrelevant evidence is not. See Evid. R. 402.

[8] Lee asserts that the challenged evidence was not relevant or, alternatively that its relevance was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature, because the evidence does not “prove or disprove” whether he acted in self-defense or under sudden heat when he shot M.S. Appellant's Br. p. 24. In rebutting Lee's self-defense and sudden-heat claims, the State presented evidence that tended to show that Lee had access to a weapon similar to that used in the murder and had instigated the physical confrontation by pulling a firearm and shooting M.S. without provocation.

[9] One of the firearms depicted in the photographs appears to be similar to the firearm Lee used to murder M.S. “Evidence that a defendant had access to a weapon of the type used in a crime is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act.” Pickens v. State, 764 N.E.2d 295, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Thompson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. The evidence regarding the firearms was relevant to show Lee's access to the type of weapon used in the murder. Id.

[10] Additionally, the State argued below, and argues on appeal, that the challenged evidence was relevant to disprove Lee's initial claim that he had not had access to or brought a firearm with him to A.S.’s home on the night in question. When Lee was interviewed by police following M.S.’s death, he told police that (1) M.S. had had a gun and had pointed it at him, (2) M.S. and D.J. had tried to rob him, and (3) he had taken the gun from M.S. and had shot him. The State asserts, without contradiction, that at the time the photographs were admitted, Lee had not offered to stipulate that he had brought the gun to A.S.’s home. Although Lee ultimately changed course and admitted that he had been in possession of a firearm when he came to A.S.’s home, there was no indication at the time the challenged evidence was admitted that he would do so.

[11] Lee essentially argues on appeal that the question before the jury was not whether he had shot M.S., but rather his level of culpability for shooting M.S. Given Lee's prior statement that he had been threatened by and had disarmed M.S. before shooting him, coupled with the lack of a stipulation and the uncertainty regarding whether Lee would admit to having been in possession of a firearm on the night in question, we agree with the State that the photographs and analytical documentation were, at the time they were admitted, relevant to prove that Lee had had access to firearms around the date in question. Id. The fact that Lee ultimately testified that he had been in possession of the firearm does not eliminate the relevance of the photographs and analytical documentation at the time they had previously been admitted into evidence.

[12] Alternatively, Lee argues that “if the photographs and data are relevant, they are inadmissible under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403 because their probative value is substantially outweighed by their prejudicial impact.” Appellant's Br. p. 23. Indiana Evidence Rule 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” In making this alternate argument, Lee asserts that “the only disputed facts in this case was [sic] whether Lee acted in self defense or in sudden heat.․ Therefore, [Lee] respectfully requests that this Court find the trial court erred in admitting these exhibits as either being irrelevant or, if relevant, that their probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Appellant's Br. p. 25.

[13] “[A]ll relevant evidence is necessarily prejudicial in a criminal prosecution.” Bowman v. State, 73 N.E.3d 731, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “[T]he danger of unfair prejudicial impact arises from the potential for a jury to substantially overestimate the value of the evidence, or its potential to arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Id. at 734–35. We agree with the State that “Lee has not shown how or why the jury would have overestimated the value of the photos or how it inflamed the passions of the jury.” Appellee's Br. p. 25. Lee also has not provided any explanation as to why he believes that the probative value of the challenged evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial impact. Lee has failed to convince us that the challenged evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403. For the foregoing reasons, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.

II. Lee's Self-Defense Claim

[14] “A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000).

In order to prevail on such a claim, the defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements. If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, a mutual combatant, whether or not the initial aggressor, must declare an armistice before he or she may claim self-defense. The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed.

Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800–01 (Ind. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

[15] Lee admits that he shot and killed M.S. He insists, however, that he did so in self-defense. In arguing that the State failed to rebut his self-defense claim, Lee asserts that the evidence established that he was in a place where he had a right to be; did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. We disagree.

[16] The evidence most favorable to the verdict demonstrates that Lee did not have a right to be at A.S.’s home. First, A.S.’s father had expressly forbidden Lee from being in the home, and, on the night in question, Lee had been aware that he had no right to be there. Second, even if then-thirteen-year-old A.S.’s invitation had given Lee the right to be at the home on the night in question, that right was extinguished when A.S. revoked the invitation and told Lee to leave. See Olsen v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming conviction for criminal trespass where defendant, who was originally an invitee, became a trespasser when he had refused to leave after being told to do so). Lee lingered in the home after being told repeatedly to leave. Lee, therefore, was not in a place that he had a right to be at the time he shot and killed M.S.

[17] The evidence most favorable to the judgment also indicates that Lee instigated the physical confrontation with M.S., who was not armed at the time of the confrontation. While Lee claimed that M.S. had initiated the confrontation by punching him in the head, multiple witnesses testified that M.S. had not touched Lee and had been standing approximately five feet away from Lee, and out of arm's reach, when Lee shot him. This evidence was supported by forensic evidence indicating that there had been no markings around M.S.’s wounds, such as stippling or charring, that would have indicated that M.S. had been in close proximity to the gun at the time he was shot. The only evidence Lee cites in support of his claim of self-defense is his own testimony that M.S. punched him, and that he was afraid of D.J. and M.S. because they were older and bigger. This self-serving testimony was before the jury, and it was entitled to disbelieve it. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (stating fact finders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted); Wolf v. State, 76 N.E.3d 911, 916 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (noting the trier-of-fact is entitled to determine which version of an incident to believe). Lee's contention that the State failed to rebut his self-defense claim amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801.

III. Sudden Heat

[18] Lee next contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his murder conviction.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[19] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Lee claims that the evidence established that he acted in sudden heat. “Sudden heat” is a mitigating factor that reduces a crime from murder to Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3. Because “sudden heat is a mitigating factor, not an element[,]” there “must be some evidence that a defendant acted in sudden heat before a jury may consider voluntary manslaughter.” Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 572 (Ind. 2018).

Sudden heat exists when a defendant is provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection. Evidence of sudden heat may be found in either the State's case or the defendant's.

Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Anger alone is not sufficient to support an instruction on sudden heat.” Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “Nor will words alone ‘constitute sufficient provocation to warrant a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter,’ and this is ‘especially true’ when the words at issue are not intentionally designed to provoke the defendant, such as fighting words.” Id. (quoting Allen v. State, 716 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Ind. 1999)). “It is up to ‘the jury to decide whether the evidence presented constitute[s] sudden heat sufficient to warrant a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.’ ” Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 572 (quoting Bane v. State, 587 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind. 1992)) (brackets in original).

[20] In arguing that the evidence established that he acted in sudden heat, Lee claims that he had been “essentially cornered” by D.J. and M.S., the latter of whom had battered him. Appellant's Br. p. 21. Again, the evidence most favorable to the judgment does not support Lee's claim. Only Lee's self-serving testimony, which, again, the jury was not required to credit, suggested that M.S. had physically confronted Lee. See Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149. The evidence most favorable to the verdict demonstrates that Lee had had multiple opportunities to leave but repeatedly refused to do so. Further, to the extent that Lee suggests that he had become upset and had felt threatened by M.S.’s alleged taunts, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that “insults or taunts alone are not sufficiently provocative to merit a conviction for voluntary manslaughter instead of murder.”¹ Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. 2008).

[21] Whether an individual acted in sudden heat is “a classic question of fact” to be determined by the jury. Hall v. State, 166 N.E.3d 406, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotation omitted). The jury was instructed on sudden heat and provided a verdict form with the option of finding him guilty of Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter instead of murder. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the jury erred in rejecting Lee's claim that he had acted in sudden heat. Lee's argument on appeal effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

IV. Appropriateness of Sentence

[22] Finally, Lee contends that his fifty-five-year sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[23] Lee was convicted of murder, and “[a] person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). The advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006). “We are unlikely to consider an advisory sentence inappropriate.” Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “The defendant bears a particularly heavy burden in persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate when the trial court imposes the advisory sentence.” Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[24] The nature of Lee's offense is this: a senseless killing of an unarmed victim. Lee acknowledges that his offense “was senseless and reprehensible” but claims that the offense “was not particularly heinous.” Appellant's Br. p. 28. In support, Lee asserts that “[t]here was no torture, battery[,] or abuse of [M.S.] beyond the shooting.” Appellant's Br. pp. 28–29. Lee appears to downplay his actions, classifying himself as having “made a tragic decision for both he and [M.S.].” Appellant's Br. p. 29. While Lee indeed made a tragic decision, we agree with the State that “[t]here is nothing in the nature of [his] offense that is less egregious or makes it different from” the typical murder. Appellee's Br. p. 27.

[25] As for Lee's character, Lee argues that his youth at the time he killed M.S. should have been taken into account and would have supported a less-than-advisory sentence. In sentencing Lee to an advisory fifty-five-year sentence, the trial court considered Lee's youth, finding it to be a significant mitigating factor. Lee also had a history of delinquent behavior, having been adjudicated delinquent for dangerous possession of a firearm approximately three months prior to M.S.’s murder. As a result of this adjudication, Lee was under “operational supervision,” which the State suggests was akin to probation, at the time he armed himself with a firearm and murdered M.S. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 98. The fact that Lee committed the offense while under court supervision “is a substantial consideration in our assessment of his character.” Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. In addition, Lee also admitted to having been a regular user of marijuana since the age of ten and to having used marijuana on the day that he shot and killed M.S. Lee's drug use also reflects poorly on his character. See generally, Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 874 (Ind. 2012) (providing that the trial court did not err in considering the defendant's drug use in sentencing the defendant). Lee has failed to meet the “particularly heavy burden” of convincing us that his fifty-five-year advisory sentence is inappropriate. See Fernbach, 954 N.E.2d at 1089.

[26] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Even if M.S.’s alleged statements could be considered as a taunt, A.S. testified that M.S. only referenced calling his “people” in response to Lee stating that he was “going to call [his] people[,]” which A.S. and the others took as Lee threatening “to try to call somebody to, you know, start some drama or something.” Tr. Vol. I pp. 95, 96.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.