Jay D. White, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jay D. White appeals his convictions for murder, a felony,¹ and obstruction of justice, as a Level 6 felony.² We affirm.

Issues

[2] White raises three issues for our review, namely:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the results of a polygraph examination.

2. Whether the State committed acts of prosecutorial misconduct that cumulatively amounted to fundamental error.

3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for murder.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 14, 2021, Tyler Byers, who was living at White's father's house, drove White to a party at White's sister's house. White took his AR-15 with him. Later in the evening, Elizabeth Stevens asked Byers for a ride. Byers agreed, and he, Stevens, and White all left the party in his truck. Byers drove, White sat in the front passenger seat with his AR-15, and Stevens sat in the rear driver's side seat. Byers drove to a liquor store to purchase beer, and, at Stevens’ request, drove to a house. When they arrived, Stevens exited the car, entered the house, retrieved a bag of clothing, and returned to the car. Byers then left the house and drove toward White's father's house.

[4] At some point, Stevens began having a “panic attack,” and she was “yelling.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 215. Byers asked Stevens to stop, but she continued. Byers then “looked over,” and White “had the gun up and shot her.” Id. Byers drove “a little bit down the road,” then White “pulled the gun up” and told Byers to get Stevens out of the truck. Id. at 216. Byers stopped the truck and opened the rear driver's side door. Stevens “fell out.” Id. at 217. Byers got back in the truck, and White instructed Byers to drive to White's house. Byers complied. When they arrived at White's house, White got out of the truck, “got a water hose,” and “started cleaning the truck.” Id. White then burned the clothing that Stevens had picked up. Byers “thought about running,” but he was scared that White would hurt his wife. Id. at 218. After White finished cleaning the truck, Byers and White drove to White's father's house.

[5] A passerby saw Stevens’ body and called 9-1-1. Officers with the Owens County Sheriff's Department responded. When they arrived, officers observed Stevens “on the side of the roadway.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 132. Stevens’ brain was “exposed,” and there “were pieces of skull laying around her body.” Id. She had “blood on her,” and there was “brain matter on her clothing.” Id.

[6] Officers went to White's house and spoke to him. They stated that Stevens was missing and asked if White had any information. White informed the officers that he and Byers had left the party with Stevens but that they had dropped her off at a Circle K gas station. The officers reviewed the surveillance footage of the gas station and saw “no vehicle matching the description of [Byers’] truck that pulled into that Circle K like [White] earlier reported.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 140. Officers spoke with White again and told him that Stevens had been murdered. White provided a report to officers that was “almost identical” to his first. Id. After officers left, White used Byers’ wife's phone to call Byers. He told Byers to tell anyone who asked that they had “dropped [Stevens] off behind Circle K.” Id. at 219.

[7] The morning after the incident, Byers went to work and told his wife to move their belongings out of White's father's house because they were in danger. Byers’ wife used Byers’ truck and a trailer to move their belongings. Byers’ wife saw blood in the truck. Thereafter, officers spoke with Byers, who gave them consent to search his truck. During the search, officers saw a “material consistent with blood” dripping from the truck and there were “little puddles” under both driver's side doors. Tr. Vol. 3 at 222. There was also an indication that someone had “wiped” something off one of the doors. Id.

[8] Officers executed a search warrant on White's house. In an area outside the home, officers found blood and what “was believed to be brain matter.” Id. at 134. Officers also found a “spent shell casing believed to be a 223 round” on the ground in White's driveway. Id. at 144. Officers observed “burnt spots” on the driveway along with the “remnants of burnt clothes.” Id. at 188, 196. Officers did not locate an AR-15 during the search, but they found “223 ammunition” in the house. Id. at 191. Officers arrested White on September 20, and on September 24, White's wife found White's AR-15 with a brown jacket “kinda wrapped around it,” and turned it into police. Tr. Vol. 4 at 59. Laboratory testing revealed that White's DNA was on the handguard and White's and Steven's DNA were on the carrying handle. And a firearms examiner was able to determine that White's gun had fired the shell casing officers had found on White's driveway.

[9] White volunteered to submit to a polygraph exam, and he signed an Agreement of Stipulation of Polygraph Examination. Pursuant to that agreement, White agreed “that the results of said examination may be used in any cause of action which should arise against him as a result of this investigation.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 64. The parties further agreed that the “results and/or opinions of said examination are to be released orally and in writing by the examiner to both sides within 20 days after the administration of the final polygraph test.” Id. at 65.

[10] On October 6, White submitted to the polygraph examination, which was conducted by John Campbell. During the pre-examination interview, Campbell asked White about his health, and White “didn't disclose any issues with his health.” Id. at 103. He then asked White if “there was any reason why he couldn't go through with the polygraph,” and White responded, “no.” Id. Campbell then asked White about the events that took place in Byers’ truck, and White told Campbell that Stevens had stated that she “want[ed] to die” and that “she wished someone would shoot her” before using the rifle to shoot herself. Id. at 76. He also stated that Byers was the person who had cleaned the truck. Then, during the examination, Campbell asked White three questions: “Did you shoot that woman,” “Did you clean out that truck,” and “Did you shoot that woman in that truck.” Id. White answered all three questions in the negative.

[11] Immediately following the exam, Campbell informed White that he had failed. Then, in a written report, Campbell opined that White had been “deceptive” when he answered the three exam questions. Id. at 77 (emphasis removed). On November 1, twenty-six days after the exam, Campbell emailed the report to the State, and the State disclosed the report to White on the same day. Then, in late 2023 and early 2024, the State provided White with supplemental discovery items related to the polygraph exam, which included charts, notes, an algorithm that indicated a less than one percent probability that White's results were “produced by a truthful person,” and research regarding polygraph validity. Id. at 87. On April 4, 2024, Campbell submitted to a deposition. During the deposition, White questioned Campbell about a prior traumatic brain injury White had sustained and whether that “might affect” White's polygraph. Id. at 117. Campbell responded that “it could have affected” the results but that “there's an equal chance that it would not affect it.” Id.

[12] On April 8, White filed a motion to exclude the polygraph on the ground that the State had breached the terms of the contract when it did not provide Campbell's report until six days after the twenty-day deadline and when it did not provide Campbell's “full results, opinions, notes, videos and charts” until late 2023 and early 2024. Id. at 58. The State responded and asserted that the additional items were “not explicitly required by the stipulation to be provided within 20 days.” Id. at 79. And, while the State acknowledged the six-day delay in providing Campbell's report, the State argued that it had acted “in good faith” when it provided the report “within hours of receiving it” such that the “extraordinary remedy of rescission” was not warranted. Id. at 82.

[13] The court found that the delay was “not a material breach of contract” and denied White's motion to exclude. Id. at 94. The court continued that, even if it constituted a breach of contract, the delay did not warrant exclusion of the polygraph results. With regard to the supplemental discovery, the court found that, while the State was obligated to provide those documents to White, “there was no specific deadline agreed to by the stipulation.” Id.

[14] The trial court held a seven-day jury trial beginning on April 16. Byers testified to the events that had occurred in his truck and that he had witnessed White shoot Stevens. He further testified that he did not witness Stevens “try[ ] to use that gun on herself” and that Stevens never had the AR-15 “in the back seat after [they] left the party.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 232, 235. Chief Deputy Matthew Miller testified that four videos, including a video of White's wife's second interview with police, an interview with an inmate, and videos from the execution of two search warrants were inadvertently deleted.

[15] Detective Brandon Gasparovic testified that, during the two interviews officers had conducted with White, White stated that he and Byers had left Stevens at the Circle K gas station. The State then moved to admit the video recordings of those two interviews. White objected on the ground that it was repetitive of Detective Gasparovic's testimony and that playing the videos amounted to “unfair bolstering” of his testimony. Id. at 165. The court overruled the objection and allowed the State to play both videos for the jury.

[16] Dr. Bamidele Adeagbo, the forensic pathologist who performed Stevens’ autopsy, testified that the bullet's entry wound was behind Stevens’ right earlobe and that the wound was “perfectly consistent with [a] distant gunshot wound.” Id. at 250. He further testified that the manner of Stevens’ death was a homicide and that it was not “likely to be a self-inflicted gunshot.” Tr. Vol. 5 at 4.

[17] The State then presented Campbell's testimony and the results of the polygraph as evidence over White's objection. Campbell testified that, prior to the start of the examination, he had asked White about any health concerns or if there was anything “mentally, physically, psychologically, [or] spiritually” that would cause him to “not be able to take a polygraph.” Id. at 45. Campbell testified that White “responded by saying [his health] was excellent.” Id. at 51. Campbell then testified that a score of “minus three is good enough to fail,” and that White's score was “a minus thirteen,” which was “[n]owhere near passing.” Id. at 61. On cross-examination, White questioned Campbell about White's prior traumatic brain injury. Campbell testified that a brain injury “could have an equal chance” of affecting the results but that “there's an equal chance it could not.” Id. at 76.

[18] White presented evidence in his defense and in support of his theory that Stevens had killed herself. Dr. Andre Loyd, a biomechanical engineer, testified that he had been unable to find any bullet holes in the truck, leading him to conclude that the bullet had exited the truck through the open rear driver's side window. Dr. Jennifer Nara, a pathologist, testified that the wound was not a contact gunshot wound, that contact gunshot wounds are common in suicide deaths, that she could not “rul[e] out” homicide as the manner of death, and that she “would have called the manner of death undetermined.” Id. at 224. And White presented the testimony of Colonel Anthony Dill, a retired Army veteran, who testified that he had used a similar truck to Byers to attempt to recreate the shot that killed Stevens. He testified that his testing “was unable to support hypothesis one that an intentional shooting from the front seat was possible” but that it “was able to support hypothesis two of an accidental shooting in the back seat.” Id. at 176.

[19] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found White guilty as charged, and the court entered judgment of conviction accordingly. Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced White to sixty years, with five years suspended to probation, on the murder conviction and a consecutive term of 360 days for the obstruction of justice conviction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Admission of Polygraph Results

[20] White first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the results of the polygraph exam. As our Supreme Court has stated:

Generally, a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is accorded “a great deal of deference” on appeal. Tynes v. State, 650 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind. 1995). “Because the trial court is best able to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, we review its rulings on admissibility for abuse of discretion” and only reverse “if a ruling is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.’ ” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013)).

Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015).

[21] Further, in Indiana, “polygraph results are generally inadmissible in criminal trials ‘[b]ecause of their inherent unreliability combined with their likelihood of unduly influencing a jury's decision.’ ” Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Smith v. State, 547 N.E.2d 817, 820 (Ind. 1989)). However, when admission is sought, there

are four prerequisites which must be met before the trial court may admit polygraph test results: 1) that the prosecutor, defendant, and defense counsel all sign a written stipulation providing for the defendant's submission to the examination and for the subsequent admission at trial of the results; 2) that notwithstanding the stipulation, the admissibility of the test results is at the trial court's discretion regarding the examiner's qualifications and the test conditions; 3) that the opposing party shall have the right to cross-examine the polygraph examiner if his graphs and opinion are offered in evidence; and 4) that the jury be instructed that, at most, the examiner's testimony tends only to show whether the defendant was being truthful at the time of the examination, and that it is for the jury to determine the weight and effect to be given such testimony.

Sanchez v. State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. 1996). On appeal, White challenges both his written stipulation and Campbell's qualifications. We address each argument in turn.

Stipulation

[22] White first asserts that, although he and his attorney signed a stipulation providing for the polygraph results to be admissible, the State breached that contract when it did not provide the results to him within twenty days and, as a result, the contract was “void.” Appellant's Br. at 19. It is well settled that a stipulation regarding a polygraph is a contract between the State and the defendant. See Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Ind. 1999). And White's contract required the “results and/or opinions of said examination” to be “released orally and in writing by the examiner to both sides within 20 days after the administration of the final polygraph test.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 65.

[23] We acknowledge that the State provided the written results to White six days after the twenty-day deadline had passed. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the results of the polygraph because the State substantially complied with the terms of the agreement. “Contract law has long recognized substantial performance rather than strict performance as being sufficient in many situations.” ShermansTravel Media, LLC v. Gen3Ventures, LLC, 152 N.E.3d 616, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “The doctrine of substantial performance applies where performance of a nonessential condition is lacking, so that the benefits received by a party are far greater than the injury done to him by the breach of the other party.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[24] Here, the State provided the written results of the polygraph to White within hours after it had received them from Campbell. And, while the disclosure of those results was six days past the deadline, White still received them more than two years before his trial date, which allowed him plenty of time to prepare a defense. Thus, any injury to White regarding the delayed release of Campbell's written report was minimal, and the State substantially complied with the obligation.

[25] Still, White also contends that the State breached the agreement when it did not provide the additional documents, which included charts, notes, an algorithm that indicated a less than one percent probability that White's results were truthful, and research regarding polygraph validity, until late 2023 and early 2024. However, we agree with the trial court that those “additional supporting” documents were not “specifically called for within the stipulation,” such that the twenty-day deadline did not apply to them. Tr. Vol. 4 at 180. Rather, the stipulation required the State to provide Campbell's “results and/or opinions,” and the State substantially complied with that requirement when it sent White Campbell's written report twenty-six days after the polygraph exam. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 65.

[26] In any event, White has not directed us to any information contained within those additional documents that he needed for his defense or otherwise explained how he was harmed by the timing of the disclosure of those documents. Indeed, the only new information those documents contained was the numerical value assigned to the likelihood of his truthfulness and research regarding the validity of polygraph examinations. Before White received the additional documents, Campbell had informed him both orally and in writing that he had failed the exam. As such, White has not demonstrated that he was harmed in any way by the timing of the disclosure, and we cannot say that it rendered the contract void.

Campbell's Qualifications

[27] White next contends that the court should have excluded the results of the polygraph due to “Campbell's lack of expertise and ability[.]” Appellant's Br. at 20. Specifically, White contends that Campbell had a “lack of knowledge regarding any empirical studies linking the results of a polygraph to deceit” as well as a “lack of knowledge about [White's] suitability to take a polygraph examination.” Id. at 22. To support his assertion, White points only to his own cross-examination of Campbell, where Campbell testified that he was unable to quote research “off the top of [his] head” and that a traumatic brain injury may or may not have impacted White's ability to take a polygraph exam, and argues that Campbell was not qualified as an expert. Tr. Vol. 5 at 66.

[28] Indiana Evidence Rule 702(a) provides that a “witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Here, the evidence demonstrates that Campbell had undergone all of the requisite training to give polygraph exams, which included specialized training, a lengthy internship, and the completion of “a number of tests.” Tr. Vol. 5 at 39. In addition, Campbell had performed “about nine hundred” polygraph exams. Id. at 40. As such, Campbell was qualified as an expert, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when admitted his testimony. White's arguments regarding Campbell's inability to quote research and lack of knowledge regarding a past traumatic brain injury did not render him unqualified as an expert. The jury was able to hear all of that testimony, and it was the jury's role to determine what weight to assign to Campbell's testimony.³

[29] Because the State substantially complied with the terms of the stipulation and provided Campbell's written report to White only six days after the twenty-day deadline and mere hours after it had received the report, and because Campbell was qualified as an expert, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the results of the exam as evidence.

Issue Two: Prosecutorial Misconduct

[30] White next alleges that the State committed numerous acts throughout the trial that amounted to prosecutorial misconduct and cumulatively constituted fundamental error. “To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must—at the time the alleged misconduct occurs—request an admonishment to the jury, and if further relief is desired, move for a mistrial.” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014).⁴ Here, while White makes several claims of prosecutorial misconduct, he did not make any request for an admonishment to the jury or move for a mistrial at the time of any of the alleged acts of misconduct.⁵ Thus, he has not properly preserved any claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

[31] When a party does not properly preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, “the defendant must establish not only the grounds for the misconduct but also the additional grounds for fundamental error. Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception that allows a defendant to avoid waiver of an issue.” Sobolewski v. State, 889 N.E.2d 849, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006)), trans. denied.

[T]o establish fundamental error, the defendant must show that, under the circumstances, the trial judge erred in not sua sponte raising the issue because alleged errors (a) constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process and (b) present an undeniable and substantial potential for harm. The element of such harm is not established by the fact of ultimate conviction but rather depends upon whether [the defendant's] right to a fair trial was detrimentally affected by the denial of procedural opportunities for the ascertainment of truth to which he otherwise would have been entitled. In evaluating the issue of fundamental error, our task in this case is to look at the alleged misconduct in the context of all that happened and all relevant information given to the jury—including evidence admitted at trial, closing argument, and jury instructions—to determine whether the misconduct had such an undeniable and substantial effect on the jury's decision that a fair trial was impossible.

Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 667-68 (alteration and emphasis in original, internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, a finding of fundamental error essentially means that the trial judge erred by not acting when he or she should have. See id. at 668. “Fundamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been procedurally barred, not to provide a second bite at the apple for defense counsel who ignorantly, carelessly, or strategically fail to preserve an error.” Id.

[32] The statements White now challenges fall into five broad categories: 1) mischaracterization of evidence, 2) improper vouching, 3) improper questioning of defense witnesses, 4) failure to make accommodations, and 5) improper sentencing arguments. We address each argument in turn.

Mischaracterization of Evidence

[33] White first contends that the State “through questioning, objections, and arguments mischaracterized evidence throughout the trial.” Appellant's Br. at 25. Specifically, White contends that the State “attempted to minimize and mischaracterize the number of videos that were lost,” “mischaracterize[d] the mistakes made with retention and collection of [Steven's] wig from the autopsy,” and “falsely compared” testing the wig under a microscope with testing for gunshot residue. Id. at 25-26.

[34] During White's cross-examination of Chief Deputy Matthew Miller, White questioned him about missing videos, and Deputy Miller testified that four videos “were missing” or had been deleted from an internal computer system. Tr. Vol. 3 at 173. Then, on redirect, the State asked Deputy Miller what had happened with two of those videos, and Deputy Miller responded that they had been “downloaded to another storage device.” Id. at 178. We fail to see how the State's questions regarding two of the deleted videos constituted misconduct when the State's questions about these videos came after White questioned Deputy Miller about them.

[35] As for Steven's wig, White questioned Dr. Adeagbo about the wig that he had collected during the autopsy, which officers later misplaced, and Dr. Adeagbo testified that he had looked at the wig and did not see or feel any signs of stippling or soot but that the way to “be sure” about the presence of soot or stippling would be to examine the wig under a microscope. Tr. Vol. 5 at 23. Then, on redirect, the State asked: “I think when [White] asked you about gunshot residue testing—,” at which point White objected and stated that he “never said anything about gunshot residue testing.” Id. at 27. The State responded that it “thought [White] used the words gunshot residue at one point.” Id. Dr. Adeagbo then informed the parties that White had “just sa[id] testing.” Id. The State then asked if there were certain situations where gunshot residue testing “could be useful,” and Dr. Adeagbo responded that it is “not predictable.” Id. at 28. That question by the prosecutor did not amount to misconduct. Improper Vouching

[36] White next contends that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Campbell's credibility when he repeatedly referenced the polygraph results and for Detective Gasparovic's credibility when he played the videos of interviews the detective had conducted with White. A prosecutor may not personally vouch for a witness. Schlomer v. State, 580 N.E.2d 950, 957 (Ind. 1991). However, a prosecutor may “comment on the credibility of the witnesses as long as the assertions are based on reasons which arise from the evidence.” Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1127 (Ind. 1988)).

[37] During the trial, the State moved to admit the polygraph results, the video of the polygraph, and the video interviews with White, and the State referenced the polygraph during its closing argument. However, at no time did the State personally comment on the credibility of any of the witnesses. And to the extent White contends that the prosecutor used one piece of evidence to support the credibility of another, there is nothing improper about that.

[38] Further, the crux of White's argument appears to be that the State used Campbell, the polygraph, and Detective Gasparovic to inform the jury that White “was lying, not trustworthy, [and] not credibl[e].” Appellant's Br. at 28. Stated differently, White does not actually argue that the prosecutor improperly vouched for a witness, but rather that the prosecutor used witnesses and evidence to discredit White. But there is nothing improper about the State putting evidence in front of the jury to rebut a defendant's version of the events. White has not shown that the prosecutor improperly vouched for witnesses.

Questioning Defense Witnesses

[39] White next contends that the prosecutor was “derisive and obtuse” while questioning his expert witnesses and mischaracterized their testimony. Appellant's Br. at 30. In particular, White alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct when it mischaracterized Colonel Dill's testimony and when the prosecutor called Colonel Dill a “so called ․ expert[.]” Tr. Vol. 5 at 243. And White alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he insinuated that Dr. Loyd had lied about a “prior deposition” and “equated Dr. Loyd's refusal to speculate ․ to a lack of knowledge in his field of expertise[.]” Appellant's Br. at 32. However, as to both witnesses, the prosecutor's statements were nothing more than ordinary cross-examination questions about the witnesses’ analysis and opinions of the case. And the prosecutor's use of the phrase “so called ․ experts” was a proper argument to the jury against the credibility of those witnesses. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct when he cross-examined White's witnesses.

Accommodations

[40] White also contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he failed to take reasonable accommodations to address White's attorney's hearing loss. White contends that the prosecutor knew of the hearing loss but was nonetheless asked to either speak up or use a microphone eighty-three times during the trial. And White contends that the prosecutor's actions “exploited” his attorney's disability and left him “at risk that the jury viewed his counsel as obstructing the State's case” through repeated interruptions. Appellant's Br. at 37.

[41] White is correct that the prosecutor was asked to speak up or reminded to use his microphone numerous times during trial. However, the record also reveals numerous instances where White's attorney was asked to speak louder, a witness was asked to speak louder, or the court mentioned the poor acoustics in the courtroom.⁶ Further, the parties were frequently required to turn their microphones on and off for bench conferences or while the other party was questioning a witness. The record as a whole does not demonstrate that the prosecutor intentionally sought to prevent White's attorney from hearing the prosecutor's questions or arguments or otherwise interfere with White's defense.⁷ The prosecutor's actions did not amount to misconduct.

Sentencing

[42] Finally, on this issue, White contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when it commented on the polygraph exam during the sentencing hearing. But, as discussed above, the polygraph exam and results were properly admitted as evidence. Because the evidence was properly admitted, it was not misconduct for the prosecutor to refer to it during the sentencing hearing.⁸

[43] In sum, White has not demonstrated that, due to any misconduct by the State, either individually or cumulatively, he was placed in a position of grave peril such that a fair trial was impossible. Accordingly, White has not established fundamental error on this issue.

Issue Three: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[44] Finally, White contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for murder. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[45] On this issue, White first contends that Byers, who was “the State's only witness connecting [White] to shooting [Stevens],” provided “incredibly dubious testimony” such that his conviction should not stand. Appellant's Br. at 44. White specifically contends that Byers’ testimony was “inconsistent,” that his allegations regarding the subsequent cleanup of the truck and burning of the clothes “are equally plausible” as to him, and that his version of the events and subsequent actions “are inconsistent, inexplicable, and ridiculous.” Id. at 45.

[46] As our Supreme Court has made clear:

Under our “incredible dubiosity” rule, we will invade the jury's province for judging witness credibility only in exceptionally rare circumstances. The evidence supporting the conviction must have been offered by a sole witness; the witness's testimony must have been coerced, equivocal, and wholly uncorroborated; it must have been “inherently improbable” or of dubious credibility; and there must have been no circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt.

McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 559 (Ind. 2018).

[47] The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply here. First, Byers was not a sole testifying witness. Rather, the State presented the testimony of fifteen individuals as evidence. While Byers was the only person who witnessed the shooting, the officers observed injuries on Stevens that were consistent with a gunshot wound, the forensic pathologist who conducted Stevens’ autopsy testified that the manner of death was homicide, White's wife turned in the gun used in the offense to officers after she found it in White's closet wrapped in a jacket, and officers found remnants of burnt clothes and a spent casing in White's driveway. Thus, there are other witnesses who at least partially corroborated Byers’ version of the events.

[48] Second, Byers’ testimony to the jury was not inherently contradictory. Rather, Byers consistently testified to the jury that he saw White shoot Stevens and that White cleaned out the truck, burned Stevens’ clothes, and told Byers to lie to police. Although White cites to his own evidence that is inconsistent with Byers’ testimony, the incredible dubiosity rule applies only when a sole testifying witness's testimony is “inherently improbable,” not when other admissible evidence called a witness's credibility into question. See id. Finally, as discussed above, there is not a lack of circumstantial evidence of White's guilt. Accordingly, White's incredible dubiosity claim must fail.

[49] Still, Byers contends that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction because “there was a combination of circumstantial and forensic evidence that, together, prevent[ed] a reasonable juror from finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant's Br. at 47. Specifically, he maintains that both “the forensic evidence and the defense expert testimony corroborate a suicidal or accidental shot from the backseat to [Stevens’] head.” Id. But Byers’ argument is simply a request for this Court to give more weight to his evidence and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we cannot do. The evidence most favorable to the jury's verdict includes Byers’ testimony that White killed Stevens and Dr. Adeagbo's testimony that the manner of death was a homicide. We acknowledge that White presented evidence to support his theory that Stevens had shot herself. But the jury heard that evidence and clearly decided that it was not credible. We cannot now second-guess that determination. The State presented sufficient evidence, and we affirm White's conviction for murder.

Conclusion

[50] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the results of the polygraph exam or the testimony of the polygraph examiner. In addition, the prosecutor did not commit any acts of misconduct, let alone acts that either individually or cumulatively amounted to fundamental error. And the State presented sufficient evidence to support White's murder conviction. We therefore affirm his convictions.

[51] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(3).

3.   Throughout his argument regarding Campbell's qualifications, White appears to assert that Campbell's testimony improperly commented on White's credibility. However, Campbell did not testify as to whether Campbell had or had not committed the offense or whether White was a truthful person. Rather, he simply testified that the results of White's polygraph indicated that he had not been truthful in answering the three specific questions given during the exam. And the court instructed the jury that Campbell's “testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with which the Defendant is [c]harged but at most tends to only indicate that at the time of the examination the defendant was or was not telling the truth.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 37.

4.   Our Supreme Court has recently held that, “moving forward,” where a defendant objects to alleged misconduct by the prosecutor and the court overrules the objection, “nothing further is required to preserve the issue for appeal.” Konkle v. State, —N.E.3d—, 2025 WL 782333, at *9 (Ind. March 12, 2025). But if “the trial court sustains the objection,” the defendant “must request an admonishment of the jury, and if further relief is required, move for a mistrial.” Id. (emphasis in original.)

5.   In some instances, White objected to questions and the admission of evidence on other grounds. But he did not timely object on the ground of alleged misconduct.

6.   See Tr. Vol. 3 at 14, 39, 108, 140, 148, 166, 172, 197, 203; Tr. Vol. 4 at 11, 32, 56, 79, 86, 97, 151, 165, 209, 227, 238; Tr. Vol. 5 at 11, 38, 102, 102, and 153.

7.   White also asserts that his attorney “was provided information by the trial court that the jury in the instant matter expressed concern that [the attorney's] repeated requests for the prosecutor to speak up were essentially to obstruct her case.” Appellant's Br. at 36. However, the court clarified at a hearing after the conclusion of the trial that the jurors did not make any such comment. See Supp. Tr. at 5-7.

8.   To the extent White asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct when it “argued for aggravating circumstances that were already contemplated within the crime itself” and “decried mitigators,” White has not identified any improper aggravator the prosecutor allegedly mentioned or which mitigators the prosecutor argued against. Appellant's Br. at 37.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.