G.D., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The juvenile court adjudicated G.D. to be a delinquent child based on G.D. committing acts that would constitute felony and misdemeanor offenses if committed by an adult, and the juvenile court ordered G.D. to serve a suspended sentence on probation. The State filed six probation violation petitions, and G.D. admitted to violating the terms of his probation. No suitable residential facility was willing to accept G.D., so the juvenile court modified the dispositional order to place G.D. under the wardship of the Department of Correction (“DOC”). G.D. appeals and argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering this placement. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] G.D. raises one issue, which we restate as whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by modifying the dispositional order to place G.D. under the wardship of the DOC.

Facts

[3] On August 12, 2021, in Cause No. 62C01-2108-JD-235 (“Cause No. 235”), the State alleged that G.D. was delinquent for committing acts that would constitute the following offenses if committed by an adult: Count I, burglary, a Level 5 felony; Count II, theft, a Class A misdemeanor; Count III, criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count IV, criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor. The delinquency petition alleged that G.D. broke into his high school's baseball field concession stand, where he stole beverages and defecated on the men's bathroom floor.

[4] On December 2, 2021, in Cause No. 62C01-2112-JD-297 (“Cause No. 297”), the State filed a second delinquency petition that alleged that G.D. committed acts that would constitute intimidation, a Level 6 felony, if committed by an adult. The delinquency petition alleged that G.D. threatened to harm a student for filing a police report regarding G.D.

[5] The juvenile court held a hearing on both cases on February 28, 2022. G.D. admitted to committing acts that would constitute criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, in Cause No. 235, and intimidation, a Level 6 felony, in Cause No. 297. On March 3, 2022, the juvenile court issued orders in both cases ordering G.D. committed to the DOC but with the commitment suspended to probation.

[6] On April 26, 2022, in Cause No. 62C01-2204-JD-96 (“Cause No. 96”), the State filed a third delinquency petition that alleged G.D. committed acts that would constitute: Count I, auto theft, a Level 6 felony; Count II, criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor; Count III, unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle, a Class B misdemeanor; and Count IV, operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license, a Class C misdemeanor. The allegations stemmed from G.D. stealing a car from a car dealership. The juvenile court issued an order authorizing the State to take G.D. into custody, and he was detained at the Youth Care Center.

[7] On May 2, 2022, the State filed petitions alleging that G.D. violated the terms of his probation in Cause Nos. 235 and 297 by: (1) committing the offenses alleged in Cause No. 96; (2) being suspended from school for bringing a vape pen on a field trip; and (3) posting a photo of himself at the probation office on social media.¹ The State requested that the juvenile court revoke G.D.’s probation.

[8] Following a detention hearing on June 6, 2022, G.D. was released from the Youth Care Center and ordered to be placed on home detention with electronic monitoring. He was released from home detention on June 23, 2022.

[9] On October 3, 2022, the State filed a second probation violation petition, this time alleging that G.D. was suspended from school for “poking another student in the leg with a pencil with a thumb tack sticking out of the top of the eraser, drawing a significant amount of blood.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 60, 123. G.D. was again ordered to be detained at the Youth Care Center. On November 1, 2022, G.D. was released from the Youth Care Center and again placed on home detention with electronic monitoring.

[10] On September 5, 2023, the State filed a third probation violation petition alleging that G.D. tested positive for marijuana. On September 25, 2023, the State filed a fourth probation violation petition alleging that G.D. tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.

[11] On October 18, 2023, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a report alleging that G.D. was a child in need of services. The report alleged that fifteen-year-old G.D. was involved in a sexual relationship with his eighteen-year-old girlfriend, who stayed with G.D.’s family for several days, and that G.D.’s step-father was physically abusive. Following an initial hearing on the CHINS case, on October 26, 2023, the juvenile court ordered G.D. placed at Pierceton Woods, a residential drug-treatment facility. On February 12, 2024, the State filed a fifth probation violation petition alleging that G.D. was in possession of a vape pen at Pierceton Woods.

[12] The juvenile court held hearings on the petitions to revoke on April 30 and June 17, 2024, when G.D. was sixteen years old. Before the June 17, 2024 hearing, on May 15, 2024, the State filed a sixth probation violation petition regarding several incident reports at Pierceton Woods. The reports alleged that: (1) G.D. was not following program expectations and was disrespectful toward staff; (2) G.D. left the facility several times without permission; (3) G.D. “lured” another program participant outside and then punched him without provocation; (4) G.D. refused to take his medication; and (5) G.D. failed to follow directions and ran “off into the woods[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 76.

[13] On June 13, 2024, DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Rachel Ellett filed an affidavit with the juvenile court, stating that Pierceton Woods notified her that G.D. would be terminated from the program unsuccessfully on June 27, 2024. FCM Ellett had searched for alternative placements, but none were available and/or willing to accept G.D.

[14] The juvenile court then held a hearing on the petitions to revoke probation on June 17, 2024. G.D. admitted to violating the terms of his probation by: (1) committing an act that would constitute auto theft, a Level 6 felony, if committed by an adult; and (2) possessing a vape pen at Pierceton Woods. G.D. requested that, as a sanction for his violation, the juvenile court place him in an “emergency placement” until he could be placed in a residential facility or that he be placed on home detention. Tr. Vol. II p. 152. The State requested that G.D. be placed under the wardship of the DOC because no suitable residential facility was willing to accept G.D., and DCS had “exhausted its resources.” Id. at 154.

[15] The juvenile court revoked G.D.’s probation in both Cause Nos. 235 and 297, modified the previous dispositional order, and placed G.D. under the wardship of the DOC for an “indeterminate” time. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 84, 149. The juvenile court found, “[D]ue to no placement being available, due to the behaviors of the juvenile, the Court does not find that the home environment would be in the best interest of the child, nor of the parents.” Tr. Vol. II p. 155. G.D. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[16] G.D. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by modifying the dispositional order to place him under the wardship of the DOC based on his probation violations. We disagree. Juvenile courts “have discretion in determining the disposition of a delinquent child, and we review such a decision only for an abuse of that discretion.” C.H. v. State, 201 N.E.3d 202, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing M.M. v. State, 189 N.E.3d 1163, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)); accord K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006). A court abuses its discretion “if its decision clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024). “In determining whether a juvenile court has abused its discretion, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Q.H. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1197, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[17] Juvenile courts have “a myriad of dispositional alternatives to fit the unique and varying circumstances of each child's problems.” R.J.G. v. State, 902 N.E.2d 804, 806 (Ind. 2009). The dispositional decree should prioritize rehabilitation over punishment. Id. Regarding the selection of an appropriate disposition, Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-6 provides:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

[18] After entering a dispositional order, a juvenile court may amend the order under certain circumstances. The probation officer may request modification of a juvenile's disposition based on a violation of the juvenile's probation. Ind. Code § 31-37-22-1(a)(2)(C); see K.A. v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that Indiana Code Section 31-37-22-1 “provides that a probation officer, among others, may request modification of a juvenile's disposition”), trans. denied.

[19] G.D. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by selecting the DOC placement instead of a less restrictive placement pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-6(1)(A). G.D. argues that the juvenile court should have placed him on home detention.

[20] Discussing the least-restrictive-placement requirement, this Court has explained:

Without question, the statute requires the juvenile court to select the least restrictive placement in most situations; however, the statute contains language that reveals that a more restrictive placement might be appropriate under certain circumstances. K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). That is, the statute requires placement in the least restrictive setting only “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child.” I.C. § 31-37-18-6. Thus, the statute recognizes that in certain situations the best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive placement. K.A., 775 N.E.2d at 386-87.

[I]t is well settled that “there are times when commitment to a suitable public institution is in the best interest of the juvenile and society.” D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added).

J.S. v. State, 881 N.E.2d 26, 28-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[21] Here, we are persuaded that placement under the wardship of the DOC was not an abuse of discretion. G.D. admitted to committing acts that would constitute felony and misdemeanor offenses if committed by an adult. He was given a lenient sentence that was suspended to probation. Less than two months later, he committed acts that would constitute auto theft, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult, which violated his probation. Five more probation violation petitions were filed throughout the case. G.D. was released from detention to electronic monitoring numerous times, yet he continued to commit violations. And due to G.D.’s behaviors, no suitable residential facility was willing to accept him at the time of disposition. Based on these circumstances, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the dispositional order to place G.D. under the wardship of the DOC. See K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 544 (holding that juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by modifying dispositional order to place juvenile under wardship of the DOC based on juvenile's numerous probation violations).

Conclusion

[22] The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the dispositional order to place G.D. under the wardship of the DOC. Accordingly, we affirm.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The alleged violations took place before G.D. was detained.

Tavitas, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.