Chastity Lynn Brown, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] While working as a cook at the Shelby County Jail, Chastity Lynn Brown (Brown), sold her suboxone pills to an inmate. After a tip from a confidential informant led police to Brown, she ultimately agreed to plead guilty to trafficking with an inmate, a Level 5 felony, and dealing in a Schedule III controlled substance in a penal facility, a Level 5 felony. Within the sentencing parameters contemplated by her plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Brown to two concurrent sentences of three years, eighteen months of which would be served in the Department of Correction (DOC) and the remaining eighteen months on probation. Brown appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by failing to identify seven mitigating circumstances when imposing her sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 26, 2023, Shelby County Sheriff's deputies learned of possible drug trafficking at the Shelby County Jail. A confidential informant told the deputies that a jail employee known as “Chatty” was selling suboxone within the jail. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 22. The deputies discovered that an employee working as a cook in the jail's kitchen, Brown, had a Facebook profile with the name Chatty Guinn Brown. Detectives interviewed Brown who admitted to bringing suboxone pills into the jail and selling them to an inmate. In recovery since 2015, Brown had been prescribed suboxone to treat her addiction to opioids. During the investigation, she provided detectives with her prescription pill bottle and access to her Cash App account.  ¹ Following her confession, Brown was fired from her job at the jail and subsequently arrested. On June 29, 2023, the State charged Brown with Count I: Trafficking with an Inmate,² a Level 5 felony, and Count II: Dealing in a Schedule III Controlled Substance,³ a Level 5 felony.

[3] Brown pled guilty to both counts. Pursuant to Brown's plea agreement, the trial court had discretion to determine her sentence with the total sentence capped at four years, no more than three of which could be executed in the DOC. The sentences were required to be served concurrently. Brown also admitted that she committed the crime while in a pretrial diversion program for a 2022 theft case in another county.

[4] At her sentencing hearing on July 17, 2024, Brown admitted to selling an inmate three suboxone pills for $100 each, but she told the trial court “I would never have done it if they would have left me alone and not pressured me into this.” Transcript at 65. According to Brown, while she claimed she “never wanted any money” for her suboxone, the inmate insisted on paying her because he was aware of her financial trouble, and Brown accepted payment through Cash App. Id. at 64. Brown testified that she knew the inmate, a participant in a jailhouse addiction treatment program, had a history of addiction and she was providing him with suboxone to help him avoid other drugs ⁴ in the jail. Finally, Brown told the court that she was “never told” that she could not bring things into the jail. Id. at 62–63. Then Brown apologized to the trial court for her crimes, stating, “I cannot say I'm sorry enough[,]” to her family, the trial court, and “[t]o the public for breaking their trust.” Id. at 83. She also promised to never work in a penal facility again.

[5] As part of her request for leniency, Brown testified that she and her stepbrother helped care for her dying stepfather. She believed that her inability to act as a caregiver would be a significant hardship to her stepfather and stepbrother. Brown discussed how she had been working two jobs: one at the Pilot Travel Center, where she had recently been promoted, and one as the manager of the campground and mobile home park where she lived with her husband. Her manager at the Pilot Travel Center testified that Brown is a “go getter” who never hesitates to “go the extra mile,” and that she would be able to continue her employment if she was sentenced to home detention. Id. at 39.

[6] Brown's son also testified in support of his mother. He said his mother's crime was “stupidly out of character for her,” and described his mother as “the closest thing to an angel to walk the Earth[,]” who often helped care for neighborhood children in need. Id. at 44-45.

[7] Brown's attorney recommended the trial court sentence her to three years executed on home detention and one year suspended to probation with community service. In support of her argument for no prison time, Brown's attorney cited seven mitigating circumstances, including:

(1) that the crime did not cause serious harm,

(2) the circumstances were unlikely to recur,

(3) the victim induced the crime,

(4) Brown's minimal criminal history,

(5) Brown's employment,

(6) Brown's remorse and positive character traits, and

(7) the undue hardship Brown and her stepfather would suffer as a result of incarceration.

[8] Referring to the mitigating factors it had considered, the court stated, “[s]ome I think can be supported. Some can't. And to the extent that I don't find suggested mitigating circumstances, I would just say that the Court rejects those mitigating circumstances or don't believe they're supported by the evidence.” Id. at 99. The court acknowledged Brown's guilty plea as a mitigator because it “involves, to a degree, an acceptance of responsibility.” Id. The trial court also found several aggravating circumstances, including the fact that Brown committed these crimes while she was on court supervision for another case, violated her position of public trust as a jail employee, and dealt suboxone to an inmate in the jail's drug treatment program who suffered from substance abuse addiction. The trial court sentenced Brown to concurrent sentences of three years on each of the two counts with eighteen months executed in the DOC and eighteen months suspended to probation, including forty hours of community service. Brown appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Standard of Review

[9] Brown contends it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to only consider her plea of guilty as a mitigator to the exclusion of the others she raised. Sentencing decisions, including the finding of mitigating circumstances, “rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) clarified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007); see also Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind. 2002). When a trial court's sentencing statement includes a finding of mitigating circumstances, it must “identify all significant mitigating circumstances.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (emphasis added). As the Indiana Supreme Court further explained in Henderson:

A court does not err in failing to find mitigation when a mitigation claim is highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance. While a failure to find mitigating circumstances clearly supported by the record may imply that the sentencing court improperly overlooked them, the court is obligated neither to credit mitigating circumstances in the same manner as would the defendant, nor to explain why he or she has chosen not to find mitigating circumstances.

769 N.E.2d at 179. (citations and quotations omitted).

[10] “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind. 1999). Furthermore, “[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)).

2. Mitigating Circumstances

[11] Brown lists seven mitigating circumstances she believes the trial court should have found, including: “(1) Brown's positive character traits; (2) the crime was the result of circumstances that are unlikely to recur; (3) the offense was out of character for Brown; (4) Brown's history of gainful employment; (5) Brown's confession; (6) Brown's potential for rehabilitation; and (7) the hardship that Brown and her step-father will suffer due to Brown's incarceration.” Appellant's Br. at 10-11. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1 provides a non-exclusive list of mitigating and aggravating circumstances a trial court may consider in imposing a sentence. Although three of Brown's seven “mitigators”—positive character traits, history of gainful employment, and confession to the crimes—are not listed as mitigators in Ind. Code section 35-38-1-7.1(b), “courts may consider factors beyond those enumerated by statute.” Scott v. State, 162 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Brown argues that four of her circumstances have corresponding statutory language, including:

(2) The crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.

․

(7) The person is likely to respond affirmatively to probation or short term imprisonment.

(8) The character and attitudes of the person indicate that the person is unlikely to commit another crime.

․

(10) Imprisonment of the person will result in undue hardship to the person or the dependents of the person.

I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(b).

A. Positive Character Traits

[12] Brown contends that her positive character traits, such as being a “conscientious and dedicated worker, a loving and devoted mother and grandmother, and an extremely generous and kind-hearted person[,]” are valid mitigating factors. Appellant's Br. at 11. While these positive characteristics find some support in the record, the trial court also took into consideration facts that reflected unfavorably on Brown's character, such as her recent criminal history. Brown was participating in a pretrial diversion program for an unrelated theft charge when she committed the offenses in this matter. “Even a minor criminal history reflects poorly on a defendant's character for the purposes of sentencing.” Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Brown's offense involved dealing a controlled substance to vulnerable inmates, including at least one involved in a counseling program to help inmates “struggling with substance abuse and addictions.” Tr. at 101. Given the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to note Brown's positive character traits as a mitigating factor.

B. Circumstances Unlikely to Recur

[13] Brown also claims the trial court should have found as a mitigator that she is unlikely to reoffend as these circumstances are not likely to recur. In support, she notes that the probation officer preparing her Pre-Sentence Investigation Report found her risk of re-offending to be “low.” Appellant's Br. at 14. The scores produced by “offender recidivism risk assessment instruments do not function as aggravating or mitigating circumstances for the purpose of determining the length of sentence appropriate for each defendant.” J.S. v. State, 928 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ind. 2010). Brown also notes that this crime is unlikely to recur because she sold suboxone to an inmate and she does not “intend to work at a penal facility again in the future.” Appellant's Br. at 12. While trafficking with an inmate is associated with a correctional facility, committing this offense does not require her to be employed at one. She could commit this offense by bringing contraband into or onto the premises of a detention center, jail, or prison. And although dealing a Schedule III controlled substance in a penal facility also involves a correctional facility, selling one's prescribed suboxone to others could occur anywhere outside of such a facility. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by being unpersuaded to find Brown committed the offenses under circumstances unlikely to recur as a mitigating factor.

C. Offense Out of Character

[14] At sentencing, Brown's son testified that his mother's conduct was out of character. However, it does not demonstrate good character for Brown to sell her prescribed medications to an inmate struggling with addiction in a recovery program. Also, her criminal history and the fact that she committed these crimes while participating in the pretrial diversion program weighs against Brown's request. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider Brown's character as a mitigating circumstance.

D. History of Gainful Employment

[15] Brown argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not recognizing her “history of gainful employment” as a mitigating factor. Appellant's Br. at 12. At the time of sentencing, Brown worked at Pilot Travel Center for slightly more than a year as the deli shift lead. While her manager testified to her work ethic and leadership ability, we note that “many people are gainfully employed,” so Brown's “employment is not necessarily a mitigating factor.” Holmes v. State, 86 N.E.3d 394, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied), trans. denied. While we appreciate that her manager at Pilot Travel Center spoke highly of her as an employee, it is difficult to ignore that she used her previous employment at the jail to make money selling drugs to inmates, which ultimately and rightfully led to her termination. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not crediting Brown's history of gainful employment as a mitigating circumstance.

E. Confession

[16] Brown argues that her confession to the police deserves consideration as a mitigating factor. Brown claims that she “confessed and fully cooperated with the police[,]” and provided police her “Cash App tag” and “prescription pill bottle.” Appellant's Br. at 13. She then pled guilty, which the trial court found as a mitigating factor. The trial court did not, however, abuse its discretion by failing to find Brown's confession to police as a separate mitigating factor. Brown did not report her crime to the police voluntarily; she gave a statement to police after she was a suspect. See Glass v. State, 801 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to consider Glass's cooperation with law enforcement as a mitigating circumstance. “ ‘Given the evidence against him, [Glass's] decision to plead guilty may have simply been a pragmatic decision.’ ․ The same might be said of Glass's cooperation with the authorities.”) (quoting Kinkead v. State, 791 N.E.2d 243, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied)). Therefore, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion by not crediting Brown's confession as a mitigating factor.

F. Potential for Rehabilitation

[17] Brown next argues that her high potential for rehabilitation should be a mitigating factor because the record “shows that [she] is unlikely to commit another crime, and she is likely to respond positively to probation or a short prison term.” Appellant's Br. at 14. Indeed, a court may consider a defendant's likelihood “to respond affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment” as a mitigating circumstance. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(7). Brown, however, does not point to any evidence in the record that overcomes the fact that she was on pretrial diversion for a different crime when she committed these felonies. In fact, these actions support the inference that her criminal behavior was escalating despite her involvement with the court system. While Brown argues that she has no violent criminal history, the trial court was under no obligation to assign mitigating weight to this fact. See Warlick v. State, 722 N.E.2d 809, 813, n.2 (Ind. 2000) (“In the non-capital context, a single conviction or juvenile adjudication may negate” lack of criminal history as a mitigating circumstance). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not finding Brown's potential for rehabilitation as a mitigating circumstance.

G. Undue Hardship

[18] Citing statutory language that a trial court may consider “undue hardship to the person or the dependents of the person” as a mitigating circumstance, Brown argues that imprisonment would cause undue hardship to Brown and her family because she serves as a caretaker for her stepfather who suffers from cancer. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(10). Brown testified that at the time of her sentencing hearing her stepfather had “maybe six months to a year left to live.” Tr. at 51. Although Brown argued incarceration would pose an undue hardship to her stepfather, “jail is always a hardship on dependents” and family members who rely upon the incarcerated individual will likely suffer to some extent. Vazquez v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1229, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Here, the trial court heard Brown's argument as to this potential mitigator and exercised its discretion in assessing whether the hardship to Brown and her stepfather was undue.

[19] Further, a trial court can properly assign no weight to undue hardship when a defendant fails to show why incarceration for a particular term, in this case eighteen months executed, will cause more hardship than a shorter incarceration term, such as the statutory minimum. Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1066, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Significantly, we note that Brown knowingly and voluntarily agreed to a plea deal that capped her period of incarceration at three years even though the advisory sentence for each of Brown's Level 5 felony convictions is three years in the DOC. See I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). Brown's sentence imposed by the trial court is less than the advisory sentence she could have received, despite the finding of several aggravating circumstances. Brown only received half the executed time to which she could have been sentenced under the plea agreement she signed. “A sentencing court is not required to find a defendant's incarceration would result in undue hardship on [her] dependents.” Id. (citing Haun v. State, 792 N.E.2d 69, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)) trans. denied. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find undue hardship as a mitigating circumstance.

Conclusion

[20] Because Brown did not establish that any of the proffered mitigators other than her guilty plea was clearly supported by the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to credit the remaining “mitigators” toward her sentence. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding only one mitigating circumstance.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cash App is a mobile payment service that allows users to transfer money from one telephone number to another.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-5(b)(1)

3.   I.C. § 35-48-4-2(c)(2)

4.   Brown testified that the inmate told her that drugs were coming into the jail “through the laundry workers.” Tr. at 83. Brown claimed she did not report this to her supervisors for fear of retaliation from the inmate.

DeBoer, Judge.

Judges May and Tavitas concur. May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.