State of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Jerron L. Reed, Appellee-Defendant (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After an attempted traffic stop, Jerron Reed fled to a bar, where he was arrested later that night. Based on his flight and subsequent searches of his person and vehicle, he was charged with several offenses (“Case 1”). At the bar, a woman reported to police that Reed had sideswiped her vehicle, although the charging information and probable cause affidavit do not mention when the incident occurred. Based on this report, the State charged Reed in a separate information with leaving the scene of an accident, to which Reed pleaded guilty (“Case 2”). Reed then moved to dismiss the charges alleged in Case 1 on the grounds that the State failed to join those charges with Case 2. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The State appeals and argues that the trial court erred because the offenses in Case 1 and Case 2 were not part of the same scheme or plan. We agree with the State, and, accordingly, reverse the trial court's judgment.

Issue

[2] The State raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss in Case 1 on the grounds that the charges in Case 1 should have been joined with those in Case 2.

Facts

[3] This case requires us to examine two charging informations, each filed in separate cases, and their accompanying probable cause affidavits. According to the probable cause affidavit in Case 1,¹ on January 19, 2024, at approximately 11:31 p.m., law enforcement officers in Evansville observed Reed driving an SUV for several blocks without activating his headlights. The officers attempted to initiate a traffic stop; however, Reed “immediately accelerated northbound” on North Seventh Avenue at “a high rate of speed.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 19. Later that night, officers located Reed at a bar on Fulton Avenue, where he was arrested. A search of Reed's vehicle uncovered a firearm under the front passenger seat, and a search of Reed's person uncovered cocaine and MDMA.² The probable cause affiant alleged that Reed committed the offenses at “00:23 hundred hours,” and the probable cause affidavit was filed at 2:04 a.m. Id. at 19.

[4] Based on these allegations, on January 22, 2024, the State charged Reed with five counts in Case 1: Count I, unlawful carrying of a handgun, a Level 5 felony; Count II, resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony; Count III possession of cocaine, a Level 5 felony; Count IV, possession of a controlled substance, a Level 6 felony; and Count V, driving without headlights, a Class C infraction. The State amended the information on March 12, 2024, to add Count VI, failure to register as a sex or violent offender, a Level 5 felony.

[5] The probable cause affidavit for Case 2 ³ also referred to Reed's arrest at the Fulton Avenue bar. The probable cause affidavit alleged that, while the affiant was “stationed” at the bar, a woman named Ataiya Johnson reported that Reed “had collided with her vehicle near the intersection of Florence St. and Seventh Ave.” Id. at 42. According to Johnson, she was driving north of Seventh Avenue when Reed “drove up behind her,” attempted to pass her, and “sideswiped” her vehicle. Id. Reed did not stop after colliding with Johnson's vehicle. The probable cause affidavit alleges that the offense occurred “on or about January 18, 2024.” Id.

[6] Based on these allegations, on March 21, 2024, the State charged Reed with leaving the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor, in Case 2. The Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”) in that case shows that, on July 5, 2024, Reed pleaded guilty to this offense. The CCS makes no mention of a plea agreement. The trial court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Reed to eighty-four days in the Vanderburgh County Jail.

[7] On August 22, 2024, Reed filed a motion to dismiss in Case 1. He argued that Case 1 should be dismissed because the charges therein “should have been charged” with those in Case 2 pursuant to the Successive Prosecution Statute, Indiana Code Section 35-41-4-4, and the Joinder Statute, Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-10(c). Id. at 45.

[8] The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on September 11, 2024. Reed presented no evidence, but his counsel argued that the car accident with Johnson's vehicle occurred because Reed was “fleeing” from police after the attempted traffic stop. Tr. Vol. II p. 8. Reed argued that this meant that the charges in Case 1 “should have been included” with those in Case 2 because the charges all “stem from the same incident,” and “both cases result from a distinct nature and have a common modus operandi, as well as common motive.” Id. at 4-5. Because the offenses in Case 1 had not been joined with those in Case 2, Reed argued, Case 1 should be dismissed. The State argued that, based on the facts alleged in the probable cause affidavits alone, there was “no nexus between these cases.” Id. at 5. According to the State, the probable cause affidavits did “not establish[ ]” that the car accident occurred because Reed was fleeing the traffic stop. Id. at 6.

[9] On September 12, 2024, the trial court issued an order dismissing Counts I through V of Case 1. The trial court found that prosecution of those counts “is barred based on IC 35-34-1-10” because those counts were “based on the same conduct and series of acts connected to” Case 2 and “should have been joined” with that case. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 10. Following the trial court's order of dismissal, the State moved to dismiss, without prejudice, Count VI of Case 1, which the trial court granted. The State now appeals the dismissal of Counts I through V of Case 1.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[10] In reviewing the dismissal of a criminal information upon the defendant's motion,

we take the facts alleged in the information as true. In general, we review a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when the court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. However, when the motion presents a pure question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review.

Brittingham v. State, 208 N.E.3d 669, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[11] Additionally, Reed has not filed an appellee's brief in this case. In these circumstances,

we will not undertake the burden of developing appellee's arguments. Instead, we apply a less stringent standard of review and will reverse upon a showing of prima facie error, which is error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. However, this standard still obligates us to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record.

State v. Torres, 159 N.E.3d 1018, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

II. The trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss.

[12] We conclude that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed Case 1 pursuant to the Joinder Statute, Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-10, which provides, in relevant part:⁴

(c) A defendant who has been tried for one (1) offense may thereafter move to dismiss an indictment or information for an offense which could have been joined for trial with the prior offenses under section 9 of this chapter. The motion to dismiss shall be made prior to the second trial, and shall be granted if the prosecution is barred by reason of the former prosecution.

(d) A defendant who has been sentenced on a plea of guilty to one (1) offense may move to dismiss an indictment or information for a related offense. The motion shall be granted if the plea of guilty was entered on the basis of a plea agreement in which the prosecutor agreed to seek or not to oppose dismissal of other related offenses or not to prosecute other potential related offenses.

(e) Subject to the provisions of section 11(a) of this chapter, two (2) or more offenses which are within the jurisdiction of the same court and which could have been joined in one (1) prosecution constitute related offenses.

[13] The Joinder Statute refers to Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-9, which provides, in relevant part:

(a) Two (2) or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment or information, with each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses:

(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or

(2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.

The Joinder Statute, thus, provides for the dismissal of criminal charges when those charges could have been charged in an earlier case and certain circumstances are met.

[14] Additionally, although not cited by the trial court, Reed argued in his motion to dismiss that the Successive Prosecution Statute, Indiana Code Section 35-41-4-4, applied. The Successive Prosecution Statute provides, in relevant part:

(a) A prosecution is barred if all of the following exist:

(1) There was a former prosecution of the defendant for a different offense or for the same offense based on different facts.

(2) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction of the defendant or in an improper termination under section 3 of this chapter.

(3) The instant prosecution is for an offense with which the defendant should have been charged in the former prosecution.

I.C. § 35-41-4-4 (emphasis added).⁵ Our Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he words ‘should have been charged’ ” in the Successive Prosecution Statute “must be read in conjunction with” the Joinder Statute. Williams v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2002).

[15] We conclude that neither the Joinder Statute nor the Successive Prosecution Statute warrant dismissal here because, based on the charging informations and probable cause affidavits, the offenses alleged in Case 1 and Case 2 did not constitute parts of a “single scheme or plan.” Ind. Code § 35-34-1-9. Reed presented no evidence during the motion to dismiss hearing and, therefore, we have only the informations and probable cause affidavits on which to rely. The probable cause affidavit for Case 1 indicates that, on January 19, 2024, the officers attempted to perform a traffic stop at approximately 11:31 p.m., but Reed fled and headed north on North Seventh Avenue. The probable cause affidavit does not mention any observations that Reed collided with another vehicle during his flight. Reed was arrested later that night at the Fulton Avenue bar sometime after midnight.

[16] The probable cause affidavit for Case 2 indicates that, at the bar where Reed was arrested, a woman told an officer that Reed sideswiped her car while attempting to pass her near the intersection of Florence Street and Seventh Avenue. But the probable cause affidavit only alleges that the offense occurred “on or about January 18, 2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 42. It is, thus, unclear when the car accident occurred, let alone whether it occurred in connection with the attempted traffic stop in Case 1. The woman reported that she “did not see any police around when the crash occurred.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 42.

[17] In his motion to dismiss, Reed relied on Williams, 762 N.E.2d 1216. In that case, the defendant sold cocaine to an undercover officer, the officer called in additional officers to conduct an arrest, and, when the defendant “saw several police cars coming toward him,” he ran into an apartment building and locked himself inside one of the units. Id. at 1218. The State initially charged the defendant with residential entry and possession of cocaine. The defendant pleaded guilty to the possession of cocaine charge. The State, however, then filed additional charges for dealing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and possession of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school.

[18] The defendant moved to dismiss the second set of charges. During a “pre-trial hearing,” the defendant testified that, after seeing the police cars, he “ran and the police pursued him” into the apartment. Id. at 1220. The trial court denied the motion to suppress; however, our Supreme Court reversed this ruling. The Court held that the initial and subsequent charges “were based on a series of acts so connected that they constituted parts of a single scheme or plan” and, therefore, “should have been charged in a single prosecution.” Id.

[19] Reed argued that, as in Williams, the charges in Case 1 should have been joined with those in Case 2 because he committed leaving the scene of an accident while “fleeing” police after they attempted to initiate a traffic stop. Tr. Vol. II p. 8. But, unlike in Williams, no record evidence establishes that Reed committed this offense while fleeing the officers, and the probable cause affidavits shine no light regarding this contention.

[20] Having reviewed the probable cause affidavits, we are not persuaded that they contain sufficient information to establish that the charges in Case 1 and Case 2 “constituted parts of a single scheme or plan.” Williams, 762 N.E.2d at 1220. Accordingly, the State has shown prima facie error in the trial court's grant of the motion to dismiss. See Brittingham, 208 N.E.3d at 675 (holding that, because two sets of offenses “were not part of the same single scheme or plan,” trial court did not err by denying motion to dismiss for failure to join charges).

[21] The State also argues that the Joinder Statute does not warrant dismissal because: (1) Reed pleaded guilty in Case 2 and, therefore, Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-10(c)—which is limited to motions to dismiss following a trial—is not applicable; and (2) there was no agreement that the prosecutor would not file additional charges in exchange for Reed's plea agreement, so Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-10(d) is also not applicable. Because we find that the offenses in Case 1 and Case 2 were not part of the same scheme or plan, we do not address these arguments.

Conclusion

[22] The State has shown prima facie error in the trial court's grant of the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse.

Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cause No. 82C01-2401-F5-491.

2.   MDMA, also known as “ecstasy,” stands for methylenedioxymethamphetamine and is classified as a schedule I controlled substance. Hyche v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1176, 1177 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Ind. Code § 35-48-2-4(d)(13)), trans. denied.

3.   Cause No. 82D07-2403-CM-2001.

4.   Subsections (a) and (b) of the statute concern the joinder of offenses upon motion by the defendant, the State, or the trial court, which is not at issue in this case.

5.   Reed raised no double jeopardy arguments.

Tavitas, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Brown concur. Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.