SMITH v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jasmine Smith (Smith) and the State entered an agreed disposition in two probation revocation causes which hinged on her acceptance in community corrections. Hamilton County Community Corrections (HCCC) evaluated Smith and sent a letter to the trial court indicating its findings. After receipt of HCCC's letter, the Senior Judge sentenced her to executed time contrary to the parties’ agreement. Smith appeals. Because Smith's sentence was not what the parties and trial judge had agreed to impose if she qualified for community corrections, Smith was denied due process and this matter is reversed and remanded.¹

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 29, 2022, Smith pled guilty pursuant to plea agreements in two different causes. In Cause Number 29D03-2106-F5-3173 (F5-3173), Smith pled guilty to Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than 14 years of age and in Cause Number 29D03-2202-F5-838 (F5-838), she pled guilty to Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman. Pursuant to the plea agreement, in each Cause the trial court sentenced her to a fixed term of three years, with two years suspended to probation. The trial court ordered the sentences to be “served consecutively” and for “probation to run concurrently.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 78, 80.

[3] Between May and November 2023, Smith violated probation in both causes. The trial court continued her on probation in F5-838. In F5-3173, the trial court revoked her probation and sentenced her to serve community corrections home detention in September 2023 followed by work release beginning in February 2024. Two months later, Smith violated community corrections work release in F5-3173 by being unaccounted for during a seven-hour period and by submitting a positive drug screen after returning to the facility. She violated probation in F5-838 by not completing her executed sentence in F5-3173 and by submitting a positive drug screen. The trial court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on June 27, 2024.

[4] At the evidentiary hearing, the State and Smith presented to the trial judge an oral agreement resolving both causes. This agreed resolution, as presented by the parties and summarized by the trial judge, provided:

It's a resolution that's going to require [me] to [ ] revoke probation under [F5-3173] and revoke your placement at Hamilton County Community Corrections, I believe. And ․ do the remainder of that sentence at the Hamilton County Jail. Thereafter, under [F5-838], I'm going to modify your probation to require that you serve one year open commitment at Hamilton County Community Corrections and then probation for a year.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 6. The trial judge explained to Smith:

So, [Smith], do you understand that we're going to go through the process of having you admit your violations and then we'll set this out for disposition, and we'll have you re-screened by [HCCC] before we dispose of this case so that you will know for certain that what you've agreed to can be accepted[.]

Id. at 7. After Smith indicated that she understood the agreement, the trial judge stated that if there was any issue with HCCC's screening or the agreement, it would be dealt with at the dispositional hearing. The trial judge then advised Smith of her rights, heard testimony related to her probation violations in both causes, and accepted Smith's admissions to the probation and community corrections violations. At the end of the hearing the trial judge told the court reporter:²

[W]ould you put a note on this that under [F5-838], I'm to give her a sentence of one-year open commitment to Hamilton County Community Corrections followed by one year of probation. And as to [F5-3173], I'm to revoke her probation or her sentence to Hamilton County Community Corrections and require that the balance be served in the Hamilton County jail.

Id. at 11.

[5] On August 1, 2024, HCCC sent its written evaluation to the trial court, which provided, in pertinent part:

Ms. Smith is in arrears $2,191.00 from a prior commitment to Hamilton County Community Corrections (HCCC). Ms. Smith was advised of this arrearage at the time of the screening interview and that HCCC requests that a minimum of $1,096.00 be paid before her return to HCCC supervision. Non-payment of program fees has an adverse effect on the operations of HCCC. As of the date of this notice, no payments have been received towards fee arrearage.

Ms. Smith does not currently meet the guidelines for electronic monitoring home detention supervision.

Ms. Smith is an appropriate candidate for residential work release supervision. Should the Court choose to place Ms. Smith in residential work release, we would accept her. She would be required to comply with supervision guidelines and attend and comply with all rehabilitative programming our agency deems appropriate. She would also be expected to maintain full-time verifiable employment for the duration of residential work release supervision.

Appellant's Suppl. App. Vol. 2 at 2 (emphasis added).

[6] Two weeks later, on August 16, 2024, a Senior Judge presided over Smith's disposition hearing without objection from either party. At the start of the hearing, the Senior Judge noted that, as she read HCCC's letter, Smith was not eligible for home detention, but questioned whether “she would be eligible for [w]ork [r]elease[?]” Tr. at 15. Not really responding to the question, Smith's counsel merely noted that community corrections “wanted her to pay at least half the arrearages before being placed back on [w]ork [r]elease.” Id. Without inquiring further into HCCC's recommendation, the Senior Judge asked the parties for “argument with regard to placement[,]” and heard testimony related to the sentence and placement.³ Tr. at 15.

[7] During the hearing, the Senior Judge received evidence that between the date of the letter (August 1st) and the date of the disposition hearing (August 14th), Smith had not made any payments to HCCC toward her arrearage. There was also evidence that Smith had not exerted any real effort to follow the community corrections rules, and that she squandered the many opportunities she had been given to obtain substance abuse treatment. After hearing all the evidence, the Senior Judge revoked Smith's community corrections placement in F5-3173 and ordered her to serve the remaining 120 days executed in the DOC. In F5-838, the Senior Judge revoked Smith's probation and ordered her to serve 730 days executed in the DOC. Smith's attorney did not object to the sentence in F5-838. Smith appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Smith's challenge on appeal arises from the apparent confusion between the parties and the trial judge regarding the interpretation of HCCC's letter and whether the parties’ agreed sentence must be imposed. Smith argues that since HCCC's letter stated in F5-838 it “would accept her” and she was “an appropriate candidate for residential work release[,]” she satisfied the only contingency that stood between her and the agreed sentence the parties had submitted to the trial judge and the trial judge had conditionally accepted. Appellant's Suppl. App. Vol. 2 at 2.

[9] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). A probation hearing is a civil proceeding, and “the State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence[,]” which “simply means ‘the greater weight of the evidence.’ ” Id.; Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 361 (Ind. 1982)). We review “a trial court's sentencing decision in a probation revocation proceeding for an abuse of discretion.” Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[10] “Although probationers are not entitled to the full array of constitutional rights afforded defendants at trial, ‘the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [does] impose [ ] procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of the conditional liberty created by probation.’ ” Debro v. State, 821 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999), reh'g denied). “The minimum requirements of due process that inure to a probationer at a revocation hearing include: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (b) disclosure of the evidence against him; (c) an opportunity to be heard and present evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; and (e) a neutral and detached hearing body.” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008).

[11] The circumstances surrounding Smith's probation revocation process set the stage for confusion. At the earlier hearing at which Smith admitted she violated probation and community corrections, all parties—including Smith—and the trial judge understood that Smith's agreed upon sentence in F5-838 was contingent upon her being accepted into the community corrections program. The trial judge accepted her admissions and indicated he would implement the agreed upon sentence if she qualified for community corrections.

[12] HCCC interviewed and evaluated Smith for possible placements and notified the court of its findings in its August 1st letter. HCCC's letter qualified Smith for work release and declared her to be “an appropriate candidate[,]” but HCCC also left it up to the trial court's discretion to “choose to place [Smith] in residential work release[.]” Appellant's Suppl. App. Vol. 2 at 2.

[13] A Senior Judge presided over Smith's disposition hearing. Although Smith seemingly qualified for work release, the Senior Judge interpreted HCCC's letter differently and, based on Smith's earlier admissions, imposed a sentence that fell outside the parties’ agreement. This was a violation of Smith's due process rights. If the Senior Judge interpreted HCCC's letter to mean Smith did not qualify for work release, Smith was entitled to revoke her agreement (since she would not meet its contingency), have the State prove the allegations in the petitions by a preponderance of the evidence, and have an opportunity to be heard and present evidence at a hearing or provide the parties additional time to re-negotiate an agreement. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(f) (“[T]he State must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Isaac v. State, 605 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1992) (Due process is satisfied if, among other things, the defendant is given “an opportunity to be heard and present evidence[.]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 922 (1993).

[14] We conclude that Smith was denied due process when she was sanctioned based on admissions that were non-binding if the court was not going to impose the agreed-upon sentence. We reverse Smith's probation revocation and imposed sentence and remand for the court to proceed consistent with this opinion.

Conclusion

[15] Finding Smith's due process rights were violated by the imposition of a sentence different than the one contemplated by the parties’ agreement, we reverse Smith's probation revocation and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[16] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because we find Smith's argument that her due process rights were violated by the imposition of an improper sentence to be dispositive, we refrain from addressing Smith's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2.   Although the trial judge ordered the court reporter to “put a note on this[,]” it is unclear where this particular note was added in the record. Tr. at 11.

3.   During the parties’ argument on Smith's placement, neither party explicitly mentioned the sentence they had agreed upon to resolve the probation violation allegations in both causes and which had been submitted to the trial judge.

DeBoer, Judge.

May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.