Julie Lynn Bravard, et al., Appellant-Intervenors v. Angela Rose Televito, Appellee-Respondent (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After father's death, paternal grandmother and paternal aunt (collectively, Bravards) filed a petition for third-party custody of the two minor children (Children), with grandmother later moving to adopt Children. To facilitate parenting time between Children and mother while the contested adoption proceedings were ongoing, the Bravards and mother entered into an agreement, adopted by the trial court as a court order, which awarded mother supervised parenting time or parenting time in a public place. When the Bravards unilaterally determined mother must exercise parenting time at facilities with professional supervision, mother objected to the costs and her visits with Children dwindled. The Bravards were found in contempt for restricting mother's parenting time contrary to the parties’ agreement and they appeal. They contend the trial court abused its discretion by finding them in direct contempt of court based on an ambiguous provision pertaining to mother's parenting time and by affording mother an opportunity to re-plead certain contempt allegations that were not pled with specificity. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Angela Televito (Mother) and Richard Bravard (Father) are the biological parents of Children: T.B., born on November 25, 2012, and P.B., born on September 19, 2016. On August 21, 2018, Father filed a verified petition to establish paternity and to determine custody, support, and parenting time. At some point during these proceedings, paternity was established, and Father was awarded primary custody of Children. Father passed away on May 27, 2022. Prior to his death, he consented to third-party custody of Children to paternal grandmother, Linda Bravard (Grandmother), and paternal aunt, Julie Bravard (Aunt). The Bravards had taken care of Children for ten months before Father's passing, when he was too ill to care for them.

[3] On June 2, 2022, the Bravards intervened in the paternity proceedings, seeking the trial court's approval of their third-party custody of Children and alleging that Mother's “whereabouts were unknown to Father for some time and she was not spending time with the [C]hildren.”¹ Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 31. On December 2, 2022, Grandmother moved to adopt Children, claiming Mother's consent to the adoption was not necessary.² On July 16, 2023, the Bravards and Mother entered into an Agreement on Custody and Adoption (Agreement), which the trial court “approve[d] and enter[ed] ․ as a fully enforceable order” the following day. Id. at 42. The Agreement specified that Grandmother and Aunt would share “joint legal and primary residential custody” of Children while the adoption case was pending, with an obligation to keep Mother informed, consider her input, and make all reasonable efforts to come to an agreed resolution on child-related issues. Id. at 38. In the event the parties could not reach a decision on matters pertaining to Children, “[Aunt and Grandmother] would have the ability to decide[.]” Id. at 38-39. With respect to parenting time, the Agreement stipulated in paragraph 5 that Mother “shall have supervised parenting time or parenting time in a public place for up to four hours on alternate weekends (Saturday or Sunday) and for up to three hours one evening per week.” Id. at 39 (emphasis added).

[4] Unfortunately, parenting time did not go as planned. Some parenting time occurred in public places like the local bowling alley or arcade with the Bravards remaining close by, but gradually the Bravards began to insist that parenting time take place at a professionally supervised facility. The Bravards suggested several agencies, and while Mother initially attended some supervised visits, she objected to the increasingly high cost. With the parties unable to agree on a facilitator for supervised parenting time, Mother's parenting time with Children decreased to a total of five hours over a three-month time period.

[5] On December 15, 2023, Mother filed a Verified Petition for Contempt and Request for Emergency Hearing on Parenting Time, alleging that the Bravards “failed and refused to allow Mother to exercise supervised parenting time in a public place” and “failed and refused to allow Mother to exercise parenting time with any supervisor other than one of their choosing.” Id. at 43-44. In addition, Mother claimed that the Bravards violated the Agreement by: (1) residing with the Children at a different address than the one specified in the Agreement; (2) denying telephone contact with Children; (3) denying Mother's extended family members to contact Children; (4) not allowing Children to attend a funeral of Mother's family member; and (5) generally “engaging in a pattern of alienating behaviors.” Id. at 44.

[6] In their response to Mother's petition, the Bravards contended that:

No specific parenting supervisor was designated in the [Agreement]. The Guardian Ad Litem, Chris Smith [(GAL)], in the paternity matter recommended the use of Oasis Family Centers for Supervised Parenting Time. Oasis charges $50 per hour. Mother did not follow up in contacting Oasis Family Centers. [The Bravards] put forth several other parenting supervisors, but Mother did not follow up with those parenting supervisors either. Further, the [Agreement] states, “[Aunt and Grandmother] ․ make all reasonable efforts to come to an agreed decision, but [Aunt and Grandmother] would have the ability to decide in the event of an impasse.” With the impasse at choosing a parenting supervisor, [Aunt and Grandmother] chose Family Solutions Center.

Id. at 47.

[7] On January 16, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing solely on Mother's emergency request for parenting time with Children and deferred Mother's contempt issues until July 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing and after reading the pertinent part of the Agreement, the trial court remarked:

[Y]ou guys entered into an [Agreement] and simply said what I read to [GAL]. It didn't say therapeutic. It didn't say, hey, we're going to use a facility. It didn't say we had to pay anybody to do supervised parenting time. It just said supervised.

․

The reality of it is if the parties f – wanted to have a, uh, facility or felt like it was going to be something professionally done, then I would've [ ] thought the parties would have entered into the [A]greement and said a lot more than just supervised but they didn't.

Transcript at 94, 95. On February 7, 2024, the trial court entered its Order on Supervision of Parenting Time, specifying that Mother's parenting time shall be supervised at all times by Mother's sisters.

[8] During the contempt hearing on July 2, 2024, the trial court concluded that the Agreement merely stated that parenting time was to be “supervised or not [ ] supervised[,]” not that it included “professional supervision.” Tr. at 182. Because the Bravards insisted on professionally supervised parenting time, the trial court orally found them in contempt. In its written contempt order (Contempt Order), the trial court reiterated its finding “that the [Bravards’] contempt was in requiring Mother's parenting time to be agency supervised[.]” Appellant's App. Vol 2 at 23. The trial court took “no action” on the other allegations in Mother's December 15, 2023 petition because the allegations were not specific enough to provide the Bravards with sufficient notice—stating that if Mother wished to pursue contempt findings as to those matters, she could “re-plead those allegations with specificity.” Id. at 24. The trial court ordered the Bravards to pay Mother's agency fees and attorney fees.³

[9] On August 13, 2024, the Bravards filed a motion to correct error, to which Mother responded. Three days later, the trial court issued its order, partially granting the Bravards’ motion and concluding, in pertinent part, that:

Mother was entitled to “supervised parenting time OR parenting time in a public place.” Thus supervised parenting time was not required for ALL parenting time, just parenting time that was not in a public place.

․

It was inappropriate for [the Bravards] to infer and impose any more restrictions on Mother's parenting time than those specifically stated and Ordered by this Court.

․

[The Bravards] willfully violated the terms of the [Agreement] and the Court's finding of contempt is appropriate, albeit the Court's error was in finding [the Bravards] in indirect contempt; however, the Court corrects that error and finds [the Bravards’] action regarding Mother's visitation to be in Direct Contempt of this Court's Order due to their actions in regards to Mother [sic] visitation between August 2023 and February 2024.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 26, 27 (capitalizations in original). The Bravards appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[10] “It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). This court “will reverse a trial court's finding of contempt only if there is no evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding.” Id. “The trial court has the inherent power to maintain its dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, rebuke interference with the conduct of business, and punish unseemly behavior.” Id. (internal quotations and revisions omitted)

[11] Before starting our analysis, we note that Mother did not file an appellee's brief. “[W]here, as here, the appellee[ ] do[es] not submit a brief on appeal, the appellate court need not develop an argument for the appellee[ ] but instead will ‘reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.’ ” Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014)). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC, 5 N.E.3d at 758). This less stringent standard of review “relieves [us] of the burden of controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We are obligated, however, to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record to determine whether reversal is required. Id.

1. Contempt Finding

[12] Contempt of court generally involves “disobedience of a court or a court order that undermines the court's authority, justice, and dignity.” In re A.S., 9 N.E.3d 129, 131 (Ind. 2014). Here, the trial court based its contempt finding on the Bravards’ imposition of an additional condition that Mother could only exercise parenting time if it occurred in a facility which professionally supervised her despite the Agreement's written provision awarding Mother “supervised parenting time or parenting time in a public place.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 39 (emphasis added). The Bravards claim the Agreement's provision is ambiguous making it an abuse of the trial court's discretion to rely upon it as a basis for a finding of contempt. They point to the trial court's January 16, 2024 hearing, in which the trial court clarified the Agreement and appointed Mother's sisters to supervise Mother's parenting time, indicating that the court would not have needed to do so had the language of the Agreement been clear.

[13] To be held “in contempt for failing to comply with a court order, a party must have willfully disobeyed the order.” Bandini v. Bandini, 935 N.E.2d 253, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “The order must have been so clear and certain that there could be no question as to what the party must do, or not do, and so there could be no question regarding whether the order is violated.” City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ind. 2005). “A party may not be held in contempt for failing to comply with an ambiguous or indefinite order.” Id.

[14] We agree with the trial court's reading of the Agreement that Mother's parenting time was either to be supervised or in a public place. The Agreement failed to include any further details. By denying Mother the opportunity to exercise parenting time in a public place and insisting instead on professionally supervised parenting time only, the Bravards did not exploit an ambiguity in the Agreement but rather unilaterally imposed a condition which did not exist in it.

[15] Contrary to the Bravards’ contention, we do not find the trial court's appointment of Mother's sisters as parenting time supervisors in the January 16, 2024 hearing proof that the trial court was eliminating an ‘ambiguity’ in the Agreement. Rather, in all likelihood, the court was attempting to provide specificity to the Bravards to fend off further unjustifiable restrictions on Mother's parenting time. Appointing Mother's sisters was a cost-effective alternative in line with the parenting time's requirement of “supervision.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 39. The trial court did not waiver from its interpretation that the “[A]greement ․ doesn't say anything about” professional supervision. Tr. at 182.

[16] If the Bravards believed parenting time should occur in a supervisory facility, they should have brought their concerns to the attention of the trial court through a petition to modify parenting time and allowed the trial court to determine whether Mother's parenting time should be adjusted in some way. But because the Agreement was clear and certain about Mother's “supervised parenting time or parenting time in a public place[,]” and the Bravards did not seek the assistance of the trial court to modify Mother's parenting time, their willful insistence on a professional facilitator as the only option for Mother to exercise parenting time amounted to a violation of the court-approved Agreement. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 39. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the Bravards in contempt. See Bandini, 935 N.E.2d at 264; City of Gary, 822 N.E.2d at 170.

2. Direct versus Indirect Contempt

[17] In its order on the Bravards’ motion to correct error, the trial court concluded that the Bravards’ “action regarding Mother's visitation [was] in Direct Contempt of this Court's Order[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 27. The Bravards challenge the trial court's characterization of their contempt as ‘direct’ and claim that it is properly identified as indirect contempt. We agree.

[18] The disobedience of a court order may be categorized as either civil or criminal contempt, depending on the nature and purpose of the sanction imposed. See Gerber v. State, 167 N.E.3d 792, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Citations for civil contempt are “for the benefit of the aggrieved party” and are intended to be coercive or remedial in nature, while those for criminal contempt benefit the State and are meant to be punitive. Id.

[19] Contempt may be further characterized as either direct or indirect. In re A.S., 9 N.E.3d at 131. Direct contempt involves “acts which are committed in the presence of the court or in such close proximity to it so as to disrupt its proceedings while in session[;]” whereas indirect contempt involves those acts “committed outside the presence of the court ‘which nevertheless tend [ ] to interrupt, obstruct, embarrass or prevent the due administration of justice.’ ” Id. at 132 (quoting 6 Ind. Law Encyc. Contempt § 2 (1958)).

[20] Here, the Bravards’ conduct constitutes classic indirect contempt. The Bravards violated the court-ordered Agreement by insisting on a professional facilitator to supervise Mother's parenting time, this conduct occurred outside the presence of the court, and the trial court sanctioned their disobedience by ordering the Bravards to reimburse Mother for the costs of agency supervision. See Ind. Code § 34-47-3-1; Davidson v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that “[g]enerally, a person who willfully disobeys any order lawfully issued by any court of record or by the proper officer of the court is guilty of indirect contempt.”) While the trial court improperly found the Bravards in direct contempt, under the circumstances before us, this error is harmless as the proper sanction for civil contempt under either the direct or indirect prong is remedial in nature. Here, the trial court appropriately required the Bravards to reimburse Mother's costs in an attempt to make her financially whole again. The Bravards cannot escape the fact that they violated the court's order and any attempt to divert attention from those facts fails.

3. Specificity of Contempt Allegations

[21] In its Contempt Order, the trial court concluded that it took “no action on the allegations in paragraphs 14-16 of [Mother's] Petition for Rule to Show Cause as they do not provide [the Bravards] with sufficient notice[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 24. The trial court advised Mother to re-plead these allegations with specificity if she wished to pursue additional contempt allegations. The Bravards now dispute the trial court's advice to re-plead and maintain that these contempt allegations were specific, have been decided by the trial court, and are barred from being re-plead pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.

[22] The level of specificity for indirect contempt allegations is governed by Indiana Code section 34-47-3-5(b) and states that the allegations must:

(1) clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged to constitute the contempt;

(2) specify the time and place of the facts with reasonable certainty, as to inform the defendant of the nature and circumstances of the charge against the defendant; and

(3) specify a time and place at which the defendant is required to show cause, in the court, why the defendant should not be attached and punished for such contempt.

The allegations of paragraphs 14 to 16 pertained to the Bravards’ refusal (1) to allow Mother's extended family members to contact Children “since July 2023[,]” (2) to allow Children to attend a funeral after Mother “had a death in the family in September[,]” and (3) by generally “engaging in a pattern of alienating behaviors.”⁴ Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 44.

[23] These issues were specifically not decided by the trial court at any point for purposes of constituting res judicata. Because the trial court took no action on the statutorily deficient allegations, the court did not abuse its discretion by advising Mother of the option to re-plead these allegations with sufficient specificity. We affirm the trial court's Contempt Order.

Conclusion

[24] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the Bravards in contempt based on their willful violation of the parenting time provision in the Agreement nor did the court err in allowing Mother to re-plead certain allegations should she decide to do so.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On August 19, 2022, the paternity cause was transferred from Hancock Circuit Court to Marion County Superior Court and bundled with a then-pending child in need of services cause involving Mother.

2.   After the petition to adopt Children was filed in Hancock Superior Court, the paternity cause was transferred to Hancock County Superior Court from Marion County Superior Court and bundled with the adoption case.

3.   The trial court ordered the Bravards to reimburse Mother $645 for costs she paid for agency supervision and $500 in attorney fees.

4.   In their appellant's brief, the Bravards conceded that the allegation about alienating behavior is insufficiently specific and can be re-plead by Mother.

DeBoer, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Vaidik concur. Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.