BUCHANAN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Stacey Buchanan (Buchanan) was pulled over for displaying a fictitious “EXEMPT” license plate on her vehicle, she refused to identify herself to law enforcement and she ignored many requests to exit her vehicle voluntarily. She braced her knee in between the steering wheel and center console of her vehicle and briefly grasped the steering wheel with her hand while officers attempted to physically remove her from the vehicle. Following a bench trial, Buchanan was found guilty of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.¹ She appeals, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that she forcibly resisted law enforcement. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] While on patrol on March 30, 2024, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Jacob Scheid (Officer Scheid) observed a Mercury Mountaineer with a license plate that read “EXEMPT[,]” which Officer Scheid knew to be a “sovereign citizen plate.” Ex. at 3; Tr. at 22. Officer Scheid stopped the vehicle driven by Buchanan, identified himself, informed her that she was stopped because of her “fictitious plate[,]” and requested her driver's license, registration, and insurance. Id. at 24. Buchanan ignored Officer Scheid's multiple requests for her documentation and told him that she had the license plate to avoid being bothered by the police.

[3] Because Buchanan refused to identify herself, Officer Scheid opened the driver's side door and asked her “about six times” to “step out of the vehicle, which she did not do.” Id. at 27. When additional officers arrived, the officers attempted to physically remove Buchanan from her vehicle. This encounter was captured by Officer Scheid's body camera.

[4] Initially, an officer guided Buchanan's left arm outside of the vehicle and her body partially followed. With the officer still holding her left arm, Buchanan was able to get her body back into a centered position in her seat. As the officers grabbed her right arm and tried to pull her out of the vehicle, she “brac[ed] herself against the steering wheel with her ․ right knee prohibiting her from coming out of the vehicle.” Id. at 28. Buchanan's right hand was freed, and she briefly grasped the steering wheel before the officers successfully “remove[d] her from the vehicle and she was taken down to the ground on her stomach and placed in handcuffs.” Id.

[5] The next day, Buchanan was charged with Count I: Driving While Suspended, a Class A misdemeanor; Count II: Dealing in Marijuana,² a Class A misdemeanor; Count III: Resisting Law Enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor; Count IV: Refusal to Identify Self, a Class C misdemeanor; and Count V: Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Fictitious Plate, a Class C infraction. Following the bench trial on August 8, 2024, the trial court found Buchanan guilty as charged on Counts III and IV and found that she had committed infractions for Counts I and V.³ The trial court sentenced Buchanan to an aggregate sentence of 365 days suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges is well settled. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). Sufficiency claims “trigger a deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the [fact-finder].’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1090 (Jan. 7, 2019)). When conducting this review, “we consider only the evidence that supports the [fact-finder's] determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id. “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)).

[7] Buchanan only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction for resisting law enforcement. To convict Buchanan of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, the State had to prove that she: (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) forcibly; (3) resisted, obstructed, or interfered with; (4) a law enforcement officer; (5) while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1); Runnells v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[8] Buchanan argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove that her resistance was forcible. She asserts that there was “no evidence of strong, forcible movement by [her] in resisting getting out of the vehicle.” Appellant's Br. at 9. In Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 722-23 (Ind. 1993), the Indiana Supreme Court clarified that ‘forcibly’ is an essential element in the resisting statute that modifies and describes the type of resistance, obstruction, or interference proscribed by the law. A person forcibly resists law enforcement when the individual uses strong, powerful, or violent means to impede an officer in the lawful execution of his or her duties. Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726-27 (Ind. 2013). Cases considering whether a person forcibly resisted a police officer are “necessarily fact-sensitive” with different cases often presenting “facts varying only by slight degrees.”⁴ Id. at 727.While “the statute does not demand complete passivity,” the “force involved need not rise to the level of mayhem” and even a “modest level of resistance” might support the offense. K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013); Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965-66 (Ind. 2009).

[9] In some instances, our appellate courts have found evidence was insufficient to show forcible resistance where the defendant's minor actions or movements during interactions with law enforcement officers resulted in their conviction for resisting law enforcement. See K.W., 984 N.E.2d at 611 (finding insufficient evidence of forcible resistance where the person “began to resist and pull away” while being handcuffed); Runnells, 186 N.E.3d at 1184 (finding insufficient evidence of forcible resistance where the person “pull[ed] away” from an officer); Brooks v. State, 113 N.E.3d 782, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding insufficient evidence of forcible resistance where the person “kept tensing up and pulling away” from the arresting officer); A.C. v. State, 929 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding insufficient evidence of forcible resistance where the person “leaned away” and “pulled” his pants down as the officer pulled them up); Ajabu v. State, 704 N.E.2d 494, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (finding insufficient evidence of forcible resistance where the person “twisted and turned a little” while being grabbed by an officer).

[10] Here, however, there was ample evidence in the record that Buchanan applied at least a modest level of strength or power to resist the arresting officers. To begin with, she refused to comply with Officer Scheid's repeated requests to exit her vehicle, which led to the involvement of additional officers. The officers’ ability to effectively do their job was already inhibited as they were forced into somewhat of a “standoff” situation with Buchanan while she sat in her vehicle ignoring their orders. When a responding officer guided Buchanan's left arm outside her vehicle, her body partially followed. The body camera footage shows that she then actively re-centered herself in her seat. While this movement alone would likely have been insufficient for a finding of forcible resistance, Officer Scheid testified, and the body camera footage confirms, that Buchanan then “brac[ed] herself against the steering wheel with her ․ right knee prohibiting her from coming out of the vehicle.” Tr. at 28. She also grasped the steering wheel before being pulled out of the vehicle.

[11] Unlike the movements in the cases cited above, which lacked any strength, power, or violence, Buchanan's act of bracing her knee between the steering wheel and center console and grasping the steering wheel with her hand “prohibit[ed] her from coming out of the vehicle” as the officers tried to physically remove her from the vehicle. Id. While we agree with Buchanan that “the body cam tells the tale[,]” the tale is not the story presented by Buchanan. Appellant's Br. at 10. Although Buchanan argues she did not forcibly resist, Buchanan's actions of bracing her leg between two immovable objects to prevent the officers from pulling her out of the vehicle and physically holding onto the steering wheel actually required her to actively apply significant strength or power to maintain. See Lopez v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1090, 1093-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that Lopez's refusal to uncross his arms, accompanied by the officers’ inability “to pull his arms out from under him,” indicated he was forcibly resisting rather than remaining passive), trans. denied. We will not reweigh Officer Scheid's testimony that Buchanan's actions impacted the officers’ ability to effectuate her arrest. See Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 726. The evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that Buchanan forcibly resisted arrest beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

[12] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Buchanan's conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).

2.   Buchanan had several individual bags of marijuana and $9,402.00 in her possession at the time of arrest. The State dismissed Count II prior to presenting evidence at the bench trial.

3.   The State charged Count I: Driving While Suspended as a Class A misdemeanor, yet after the bench trial the trial court found that the State “failed to prove one of the elements.” Tr. at 40. However, the court found that the “lesser included [infraction] was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

4.   In Walker, the Supreme Court declined to adopt “any strict bright-line test for whether a defendant acts ‘forcibly[,]’ ” and expressed “confiden[ce] that triers of fact will make the proper determinations when confronted with the facts of the cases before them[.]” Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 728.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.