Chris Gordon, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Chris Gordon appeals his 62-year sentence for murder, carrying a handgun without a license, and resisting law enforcement imposed after a post-conviction court vacated part of his original sentence. He argues that the resentencing court abused its discretion by failing to recognize as a mitigating circumstance his rehabilitative efforts since his original sentencing 15 years ago. Gordon also asserts, and the State agrees, that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay fees related to probation and chemical testing when he was not placed on probation or ordered to engage in such testing. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts 1

[2] Gordon and Watasha Clark were involved in a 16-year, on-and-off relationship and had a son (Son) together. Over the course of their relationship, Gordon committed various acts of domestic violence against Clark, often in the presence of Son.

[3] One night in June 2008, Clark and Gordon became engaged in a heated argument after Clark returned home from an evening out with friends. During the confrontation, Gordon shot Clark in the neck with a handgun. Clark's father, who had been visiting from out of town and was staying overnight at Clark's apartment, was awakened by the commotion and found his daughter gravely wounded with Gordon attempting to provide her aid. Gordon ordered Clark's father to continue the effort, then Gordon fled. Responding officers pursued Gordon, witnessing him discard the weapon before they ultimately apprehended him. Clark died from the gunshot wound.

[4] Gordon was charged with murder, carrying a handgun without a license, and resisting law enforcement. Though Gordon claimed the shooting was accidental and the gun discharged unintentionally from his pocket, the jury found him guilty on all counts in June 2009. The trial court subsequently found him to be a habitual offender based on his prior criminal history. Gordon was then sentenced to 90 years for murder (with 85 years executed and 5 years suspended to probation). This sentence included a 30-year enhancement for the habitual offender finding and concurrent terms of one year each for the handgun and resisting law enforcement convictions.

[5] Gordon's direct appeal was unsuccessful. His subsequent post-conviction proceedings in 2024 ended with an agreed order vacating the habitual offender enhancement, therefore necessitating Gordon's resentencing.

[6] At the resentencing hearing, many of Clark's family members, including Son, testified to the lasting negative impact that Gordon's crimes had on their lives. Gordon then presented evidence of the rehabilitation efforts he had undertaken while incarcerated, including his participation in empathy and peer health courses and his years of work with the Department of Correction's Suicide Watch Companion Program. Gordon also had family members attest to his character. But when Gordon's daughter—who developed a relationship with him only after he was incarcerated—testified, she explained that she was just then learning the facts of Gordon's crimes for the first time. She expressed shock and concern, stating that the Gordon she knew was different. Gordon's counsel argued that this was a testament to the change Gordon had made during his incarceration. But the trial court stated that it viewed the daughter's testimony “a little differently,” as it suggested that Gordon had not been “honest” or “forthright about who [he was].” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 41-42.

[7] At the end of the hearing, the trial court identified several aggravating circumstances: (1) Gordon's criminal history, including domestic violence against Clark and in the presence of Son; (2) his commission of the instant offenses while on parole and in the presence of Son; (3) the nature and circumstances of the offenses; (4) Gordon's failure to successfully complete prior probation sentences; and (5) the lasting impact of the crimes on Clark's family. The court found Gordon's remorse to be the sole mitigating factor and sentenced him to an aggregate executed term of sixty-two years. The court also ordered Gordon to pay $2,100 in probation and chemical testing fees, despite not ordering Gordon to probation or chemical testing. Gordon appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Gordon appeals his resentencing on two grounds. First, he contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to recognize his rehabilitative efforts as mitigating circumstances. Second, he argues—and the State agrees—that the trial court erroneously ordered Gordon to pay inapplicable probation and chemical testing fees. We affirm Gordon's sentence but reverse the improper fees and remand with instructions to correct the sentencing order.

I. Mitigating Circumstances

[9] Sentencing decisions “rest within the discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). One way a trial court abuses its discretion is by omitting from its sentencing statement a mitigating factor that is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Id. at 490-91. Gordon argues that the trial court did just that when it failed to recognize his rehabilitation efforts—including his work as a Suicide Watch Companion and his completion of various DOC programs—as a mitigating factor.

[10] But a trial court is not required to accept a defendant's contention of what constitutes a mitigating factor. Mehringer v. State, 152 N.E.3d 667, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Nor is the court “obligated to explain why,” after hearing argument from counsel on a proffered mitigating circumstance, it did not find the circumstance to constitute a mitigating factor. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d. at 493. Nevertheless, the trial court's sentencing statement here suggests that the court was not persuaded by Gordon's claim of rehabilitation, as it noted that his daughter's shock at learning about Gordon's crimes indicated that he had not been “honest” or “forthright about who [he was].” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 41-42.

[11] This demonstrates that the court considered Gordon's rehabilitation efforts but chose not to recognize them as a significant mitigating factor. We find no abuse of discretion in this decision, as it was not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts before the court.

[12] Even if the trial court had failed to properly address the mitigating factor, we would remand only if we could not “say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered” the alleged mitigating factor. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Given the serious nature of the offense, its profound and lasting impact on Son and Clark's family, and Gordon's extensive criminal history including domestic violence against Clark, we can say with confidence that consideration of his participation in prison programs would not have led to the imposition of a different sentence. See Bryant v. State, 959 N.E.2d 315, 322-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that any alleged failure to find circumstances as mitigating was harmless because defendant had extensive criminal record). We therefore find no reversible error in the trial court's determination of Gordon's mitigating circumstances.

II. Imposition of Fees

[13] Gordon also challenges the trial court's order that he pay $2,100 in probation and chemical testing fees. The State concedes that remand is necessary to correct this portion of the sentencing order.

[14] The Indiana Code allows a trial court to impose probation fees when it places a person on probation (Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1(d)) and to order a defendant to pay the cost of chemical testing as “a condition of participation in an alcohol and drug services program” (Ind. Code § 12-23-14-18(a)). But here, the trial court ordered Gordon to serve his entire sentence as executed time in the Department of Correction, with no period of probation or mandatory participation in any alcohol and drug services program.

[15] Because the statutory prerequisites for imposing probation fees and chemical testing fees were not satisfied, the trial court erred in ordering Gordon to pay these fees. C.f. Berry v. State, 950 N.E.2d 798, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“If the fees imposed by the trial court fall within the parameters provided by statute, we will not find an abuse of discretion.”). We therefore reverse the trial court's imposition of $2,100 in fees and remand with instructions for the trial court to correct the sentencing order by vacating such fees.

Conclusion

[16] We affirm Gordon's 62-year sentence, but reverse the trial court's imposition of probation and chemical testing fees and remand for correction of the sentencing order.

[17] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges May and Scheele concur. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.