Rahmere Javonte Dunn, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Rahmere Javonte Dunn appeals his murder conviction and accompanying firearm enhancement. Dunn raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow Dunn the use of hypothetical questions during voir dire;

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded a witness from testifying after the witness violated the separation of witnesses order; and,

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to admit hearsay statements from an unavailable witness.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 12, 2021, Dunn agreed to sell marijuana to his friend, Jediah Perry. They agreed to meet in the parking lot of Kelly's Soul Food in Gary, Indiana. Later that afternoon, Dunn drove his 2017 Chrysler 300 to the meeting location, and Perry arrived in a white Honda Civic. Once Dunn and Perry had parked their vehicles, Dunn, who was armed with a .380 caliber pistol, exited his vehicle and entered Perry's vehicle. They conversed briefly, and Dunn then returned to his own vehicle to retrieve the marijuana to give to Perry.

[4] Dunn re-entered Perry's vehicle, and Perry paid him $40 in cash. Perry stated that he would electronically transfer the rest of the money. While Dunn was waiting for the electronic transfer to process, Perry showed Dunn his handgun, a Glock 40. Dunn claimed that Perry then attempted to rob him of his wallet, cash, and phone. Dunn removed his .380 caliber pistol from his pocket and shot Perry in the head five times. The entrance wounds from the gunshots established that one gunshot entered Perry's head near his upper right jaw, and the firearm was level with the entrance wound and in front of Perry. The four remaining gunshots were fired into the rear right side of Perry's head. The gunshot wounds were fatal.

[5] Dunn fled the scene with both his and Perry's firearms. Dunn then drove to his friend's house, and he gave his friend both firearms.

[6] At approximately 9:00 p.m. that evening, the owner of Kelly's Soul Kitchen called the Gary Police Department because he was concerned about the white Honda, which had been parked near his restaurant for several hours. The officer dispatched to the restaurant observed that the vehicle's engine was running, and he saw Perry's body slumped against the driver's side door. The officer opened the driver's side door and discovered that Perry had been shot and was dead.

[7] When police officers searched the driver's side of Perry's vehicle, they found two small packages that the officers believed contained drugs, a loaded magazine for a Glock .40 caliber handgun, and over $200 in cash. The officers also recovered four spent ammunition cases on the driver's seat and one in the rear driver's side seat.

[8] Law enforcement contacted Perry's parents and asked them to come to the coroner's office. When they arrived, Perry's parents identified the deceased man as their son. Perry's mother informed the investigating officers that one of Perry's friends, Jaylen Green, had sent her “Remy Dunn's” Facebook page. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 50. “Remy Dunn” is the Facebook username of defendant Dunn.

[9] Law enforcement officers obtained security camera footage from Kelly's Soul Food restaurant. The cameras showed Perry's Honda Civic and Dunn's Chrysler 300 arriving in the restaurant's parking lot around 5:00 p.m. on November 12. Other video footage established the Chrysler 300's location in Gary shortly before the murder and returning to East Chicago, where Dunn lived, shortly after Perry was shot. Dunn's phone records established his location near Kelly's Soul Food restaurant at 4:58 p.m. on November 12, and Perry had contacted Dunn earlier that afternoon to purchase marijuana from Dunn. Dunn also attempted to delete text messages he had sent to Perry about the transaction.

[10] On January 28, 2022, the State charged Dunn with murder and filed an enhancement because Dunn had used a firearm in the commission of his offense. Dunn's jury trial commenced on April 29, 2024. During voir dire, Dunn's counsel began to ask the prospective jurors a hypothetical question to attempt to discern the jurors’ views on self-defense. The State objected to defense counsel's use of a hypothetical question. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 100. The court agreed with the State that hypotheticals can be “more problematic than useful” and instructed counsel to avoid his use of hypothetical questions. Id. at 103-08.

[11] During trial, Dunn sought to introduce into evidence a statement that Jaylen Green had made to an investigating officer. Specifically, Green told the detective that Perry had asked Green to go with him to rob Dunn. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 29-30. Dunn issued subpoenas to Green ordering him to appear to testify at trial, but Green did not appear. Dunn sought to introduce Green's statements claiming that he was an unavailable witness and that certain hearsay exceptions applied. The trial court excluded Green's statement after concluding that the statement was inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 31-32. Dunn later requested that the court issue a body attachment for Green, and the court denied the request. Id. at 235-38.

[12] Dunn testified in his own defense. He admitted that he had agreed to meet Perry on November 12, 2021, to sell him marijuana. Dunn testified that, when Perry arrived at their meeting location, Perry was dressed in all black and was wearing a black ski mask. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 116-17. Dunn stated that he remained in Perry's vehicle while he was waiting for Perry's funds to electronically transfer to his account, and Perry pointed a Glock .40 caliber pistol in his face. Id. at 124. Dunn said he laughed and thought that Perry was just showing him the gun. Id. at 126. Dunn testified that Perry stated, “[y]ou know what this is. Flip your pockets inside out.” Id. Dunn stated that he handed over his cellphone, a second package of marijuana, and his wallet. Dunn then told the jury that he still had his .380 caliber pistol in his right front pocket, and, because he feared for his life, he took it out of his pocket and shot Perry five times. Id. at 132-33.

[13] Dunn stated that, after he had killed Perry, he called his friend Jonathan Igras, and he told Igras that Perry had tried to rob him and that he had killed Perry. Id. at 145-46. Dunn claimed that he then drove to Igras's home and gave him both his pistol and Perry's Glock.

[14] Next, Dunn's counsel attempted to call Igras to the stand to testify. Id. at 202. But the State and the trial court noted that Igras had been in the courtroom for more than fifteen minutes during Dunn's testimony. Id. at 202-04, 231-32. Because the court had issued a separation of witnesses order, the State argued that the court should exclude Igras's testimony. Id. at 204. The court granted the State's request. Dunn made an offer of proof and stated that Igras would have testified that Dunn arrived at his home after the shooting and gave Igras his firearm and Perry's Glock and cell phone, that Igras would have identified the firearms as a .380 caliber pistol and a Glock 40, and that Igras later gave the firearms to a neighbor. Id. at 229-30.

[15] The jury found Dunn guilty of murder. Dunn then waived his right to a jury trial on the firearm enhancement and admitted that a firearm was used in the commission of the offense. The trial court held Dunn's sentencing hearing, after which the court ordered him to serve sixty years in the Department of Correction.

[16] Dunn now appeals.

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied counsel's request to ask hypothetical questions during voir dire.

[17] Dunn argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited counsel from asking a hypothetical question to potential jurors to determine their views on self-defense. “A trial court has broad discretionary power to regulate the form and substance of voir dire.” Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946, 955 (Ind. 2009).

[18] The purpose of voir dire “is to ascertain whether jurors can render a fair and impartial verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence.” Perryman v. State, 830 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). This court has explained that, during voir dire, the parties may pose hypothetical questions designed to disclose “the jurors’ attitudes towards the offense charged and to uncover preconceived ideas about defenses that the defendant intends to use,” but those questions should not suggest prejudicial evidence not adduced at trial. Adcock v. State, 933 N.E.2d 21, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

[19] In support of his argument, Dunn directs our attention to Black v. State, 829 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. In that case, we held that the trial court's decision to grant the State's motion in limine prohibiting counsel from referring to self-defense during voir dire violated the principles of due process. Id. at 612. We explained that

basic fairness dictates that a defendant has a valid right to exclude persons who cannot be fair to his position when making a claim of self-defense. We conclude that the ability to question prospective jurors regarding their beliefs and feelings concerning the doctrine of self-defense, so as to determine whether they have firmly-held beliefs which would prevent them from applying the law of self-defense to the facts of the case, is essential to a fair and impartial jury.

Id. at 611.

[20] Here, the trial court prohibited counsel from posing hypothetical questions to the potential jurors but also explicitly stated that it was not prohibiting a discussion of self-defense during voir dire. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 106. And Dunn's counsel asked the potential jurors questions to determine their beliefs about self-defense. See, e.g., id. at 120-28.

[21] Although trial courts may allow hypothetical questions during voir dire, Dunn has not directed our attention to any authority from which we would conclude that courts are required to permit such questioning. Here, the trial court acted within its discretion when it prohibited counsel from using hypothetical questions during voir dire due to the court's concern that doing so might cause confusion about the facts of the case. And Dunn cannot establish error because he was permitted to ask the potential jurors questions to determine their beliefs about the doctrine of self-defense.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Igras's testimony.

[22] Next, Dunn argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow Igras to testify because Igras violated the separation of witnesses order. Indiana Evidence Rule 615 provides in pertinent part that, “[a]t a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony. Or the court may do so on its own.” The purpose of the rule is to promote the truthfulness of witnesses’ testimonies. See Harrington v. State, 584 N.E.2d 558, 562 (Ind. 1992); Morell v. State, 933 N.E.2d 484, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). And the rule ensures that memories are not “tainted by hearing others testify and denies witnesses the opportunity to shape their testimony to match or contradict what others have said.” Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 95 (Ind. 2021) (citing Harrington, 584 N.E.2d at 562).

[23] “The determination of the remedy for any violation of a separation order is wholly within the discretion of the trial court.” Joyner v. State, 736 N.E.2d 232, 244 (Ind. 2000) (citing Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ind. 1995)). “We will not disturb the trial court's decision on such matters absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.

“[T]he common law presumption is that it is an abuse of discretion to exclude witnesses for violations of a separation order when the party seeking to call the witness had no part in the violation of the order.” Jiosa v. State, 755 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ind. 2001). Instead, trial courts “may issue contempt citations and permit evidence of witnesses’ noncompliance to impeach their credibility.” Id. The trial court may exclude witnesses if the party is at fault or the testimony does not directly affect the party's ability to present its case. Id.

Spinks v. State, 122 N.E.3d 950, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[24] Here, Igras was present in the courtroom during a portion of Dunn's testimony. The trial court recalled seeing him in the courtroom for “quite some time.” Tr. Vol. 5, p. 207. Dunn agreed with the court that the parties were tasked with informing their potential witnesses of the separation order, which included telling witnesses to remain in the hallway until they were called into the courtroom. Id. at 207-08. And Dunn's counsel stated he always instructs his witnesses not to enter the courtroom until the witness is asked to do so. Id. at 242. Therefore, Dunn argues that he was not at fault for Igras's decision to enter the courtroom.

[25] Dunn also argues that none of the testimony that Igras heard was relevant to Igras's proposed testimony, i.e., Dunn's activities after the shooting. Id. at 244. The State disagrees and observes that it is unclear from the record on appeal how long Igras sat in the courtroom during Dunn's testimony. Therefore, it is possible that Igras heard Dunn's testimony concerning Dunn's activities and communications with Igras on the day of the shooting. The State also notes that Igras entered the courtroom despite being instructed not to do so. And Igras's statement to the trial court that he was only in the courtroom for a few minutes was at odds with the bailiffs’ and trial court's recollection of how long they had observed Igras in the courtroom.

[26] Finally, Igras's testimony would not have corroborated Dunn's version of the shooting and the events that led up to it. Igras was only going to testify about the events that occurred after the shooting. Id. at 229. Specifically, that Dunn gave Igras his gun and Perry's gun after he shot Perry. Therefore, the trial court's decision to exclude Igras's testimony did not affect Dunn's right to present his chosen defense. And we agree with the State that Dunn's decision to dispose of the firearms shortly after shooting Perry could reasonably be construed as evidence of Dunn's guilt. Appellee's Br. at 24.

[27] For all of these reasons, although exclusion of a witness is an extreme remedy, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it prohibited Igras from testifying because he violated the separation of witnesses order.

III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit Green's hearsay statements into evidence.

[28] Third, Dunn argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to admit hearsay statements by a witness who was not available to testify. We review the trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of that discretion. Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “We reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[29] Specifically, Dunn sought to admit Green's statements to a law enforcement officer that Perry had asked Green to help him rob Dunn. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 45. Green also told the officer that Perry never picked him up on the day that Perry was murdered. Green's statements to the officer were hearsay, i.e., an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c).

[30] Dunn argues, as he did to the trial court, that Green's statements were admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 804(b)(3), which states in relevant part:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness․

A statement that [ ] a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability.

A statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both the declarant and the accused, is not within this exception.

[31] We first consider whether Green qualified as an unavailable witness. Under Rule 804(b)(3), a declarant is unavailable if the declarant “is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure ․ the declarant's attendance or testimony ․” Evid. R. 804(a)(5)(B).

[32] At trial, Dunn informed the trial court that he had attempted to secure Green's attendance by sending him two subpoenas. The first subpoena was “left in the door jam[b]” of Green's apartment building at his last known address in Mishawaka approximately six weeks before trial. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 11-12. A copy of the subpoena was also delivered via U.S. mail to that address. The second subpoena was left at the same address two days before Green was asked to appear for trial. Id. at 12-13. Green had previously told a law enforcement officer that he did not want to testify in the case, and Dunn believed that Green was purposefully ignoring the subpoenas. Id. at 14. Dunn also scheduled a deposition for Green on two dates, and Green failed to appear both times. Id. at 49. Finally, Dunn attempted to ascertain Green's whereabouts by speaking to Green's probation officer. Dunn made reasonable attempts to secure Green's attendance or testimony for trial, and, therefore, we conclude that he was unavailable as defined by Rule 804(a).

[33] We turn now to whether Green's statements were admissible at trial pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3). Contrary to Dunn's argument on appeal, we do not agree that Green's statements would have subjected him to criminal liability. Green told a law enforcement officer that Perry had asked him to help him rob Dunn. Green did not tell the officer that he had agreed to help Perry rob Dunn, just that Perry had asked him to do so. Green also told the officer that Perry never picked him up on the date Perry was shot. But Green's statement that he had expected Perry to pick him up does not expose him to criminal liability. Therefore, Green's statements were not admissible under the hearsay exception defined in Rule 804(b)(3).

[34] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to enter Green's statements into evidence.

Conclusion

[35] Dunn has not persuaded us that the trial court committed reversible error in this case, and we affirm his murder conviction. Specifically, the trial court acted within its discretion when it refused to allow counsel to use hypothetical questions during voir dire. And the court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Igras from testifying after he had violated a separation of witnesses order or when it excluded Green's hearsay statements.

[36] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Judges Foley and Felix concur. Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.