Taniah Johnson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Marion Superior Court convicted Taniah Johnson of Class B misdemeanor failure to remain at the scene of an accident and Class C misdemeanor refusal to identify self. At the sentencing hearing, the court ordered Johnson to pay $2,400 in restitution to the victim for the damage to the victim's vehicle. Johnson appeals the restitution order and argues that it is not supported by the evidence.

[2] Concluding that the restitution order is not supported by the evidence, we reverse and remand with instructions to conduct a new restitution hearing.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 13, 2023, Johnson was driving her red sedan in a McDonald's drive-thru in Indianapolis. Wykeia Derival was driving her vehicle, a Dodge Durango, which was also in the drive-thru lane directly behind Johnson's red sedan. Johnson suddenly put her vehicle in reverse and began to back up in the drive-thru lane. Derival honked her horn, but Johnson continued to reverse her vehicle, and she crashed into the front of Derival's car.

[4] Johnson then pulled her sedan forward and exited the vehicle. Derival also exited her vehicle and approached Johnson, who told Derival that she was going to go home. Johnson gave Derival her name and phone number and told Derival that “she'd chop it up with [Derival] when she got home.” Tr. p. 43. Johnson told Derival that her insurance information was at home, and she did not provide her address or car registration to Derival.

[5] Derival took a photograph of Johnson's license plate before Johnson drove away. Derival then called 9-1-1. Officer John Frederick responded to the 9-1-1 call, and Derival provided him with the photograph of Johnson's license plate. The officer proceeded to drive toward Johnson's address, and when he observed a vehicle matching the description of Johnson's car and displaying the license plate in Derival's photograph, he activated his lights and siren. Johnson pulled over and told the officer that she was not involved in a hit and run. But then she stated, “[t]hat bitch ratted me out.” Tr. p. 31.

[6] Officer Frederick instructed Johnson to exit the vehicle and informed her that her vehicle would be towed. She admitted to the officer that she did not have a driver's license. Johnson refused to give her date of birth to the officer, and he arrested her. The day after the accident, the State charged Johnson with Class B misdemeanor failure to remain at the scene of an accident and Class C misdemeanor refusal to identify self.

[7] The day before Johnson's bench trial, she filed a motion requesting a restitution hearing. The next day, the trial court denied Johnson's request for a hearing, and her bench trial commenced. Derival described the damage that the accident had caused to the driver's side fender, front fender, and front bumper of her vehicle. Id. at 45. Derival did not have car insurance at the time of the accident, and her vehicle had not been fixed on the date of trial. Id. at 50. Derival did not testify to a value of the damages sustained to her vehicle.

[8] The trial court found Johnson guilty of both counts and proceeded to hold Johnson's sentencing hearing immediately thereafter. The State requested the court to order Johnson to serve 180 days on probation and to pay restitution to Derival. The State told the court the estimate of damage to Derival's vehicle was $2,400. Johnson testified that she was twenty-one years old, that she was pregnant, and had a nine-month-old child. Id. at 55-56. Johnson was not employed and lived with family.

[9] The court ordered Johnson to serve an aggregate 180-day sentence on kiosk probation and ordered her to pay $2,400 in restitution to Derival. The court asked her to make a good faith effort to pay restitution and recommended that she submit a claim through her insurance company.¹ Id. at 57-58.

[10] Johnson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Johnson argues that the trial court's restitution order is not supported by the evidence. A restitution order is within the trial court's discretion and we will reverse only when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Sickels v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1010, 1013 (Ind. 2013).

[12] “A restitution order must be supported by sufficient evidence of actual loss sustained by the victim of a crime.” Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1249, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; see also Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3(a). The injury, harm, or loss must come as “a direct and immediate result of the criminal acts of a defendant.” Huddleston v. State, 764 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Vanness v. State, 605 N.E.2d 777, 783 (Ind. 1992)). And “[e]vidence supporting a restitution order is sufficient ‘if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.’ ” J.H. v. State, 950 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting T.C. v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

[13] For crimes involving harm to property, a trial court must base its restitution order upon the actual loss incurred by the victim, which includes cost of repair, or replacement if repair is inappropriate. S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. “The amount of actual loss is a factual matter which can be determined only upon presentation of evidence.” Id.

[14] Here, the State presented evidence that Johnson had caused damage to Derival's Dodge Durango. However, Derival did not testify how much it would cost to repair the damage. And the State did not present any evidence of the cost to repair Derival's vehicle. During its argument at sentencing, the State asserted, without evidence, that “we have an estimate of the damages of $2400, so we'd ask that the restitution amount be entered as a term of the sentence.” Tr. p. 55. But no estimate was entered into evidence, and arguments of counsel are not evidence. See Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 694 (Ind. 2019) (citing Piatek v. Beale, 999 N.E.2d 68, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied).

[15] Because the restitution order is not supported by evidence, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the order and conduct a new restitution hearing. See Iltzsch v. State, 981 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ind. 2013).

[16] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court did not enter the restitution order as a condition of Johnson's probation, and, therefore, the court was not required to inquire into Johnson's ability to pay restitution. Cf. Archer v. State, 81 N.E.3d 212, 217 (Ind. 2017); Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(6).

Mathias, Judge.

Judges Foley and Felix concur. Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.