Robert S. Partenheimer, Appellant-Defendant v. Chris Robling, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Robert Partenheimer and Chris Robling were partners in three businesses: Enoco III, LLC; Alevan, LLC; and Otter Resources (collectively, the “Businesses”). The Businesses owned real estate and operated a coal mine. After Partenheimer tried to prevent Robling from being involved in activities of the Businesses, Robling sued Partenheimer for breaching his fiduciary duty and requested a preliminary injunction to prohibit Partenheimer from operating the mine. The trial court entered judgment on Robling's breach of fiduciary duty claim and granted Robling's request for an injunction. Partenheimer filed a motion for relief from judgment which was partially denied. The trial court awarded Robling $343,000 in damages. Partenheimer now appeals and presents three issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying in part Partenheimer's motion for relief from judgment;

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting Robling's preliminary injunction; and

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining Robling's damages.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Partenheimer and Robling share ownership of the Businesses.¹ They are equal members in Alevan and Otter Resources and split the interests of Enoco 45/55 with Partenheimer having the greater share. Together, the Businesses own real estate and operate a coal mine reclamation project at an area known as the Abandoned Mine Land Reclamation Site 978 (“AML”) located in Pike County, Indiana. In 2017, the Businesses began operating this project when a contract allowing them to operate at AML (the “AML Contract”) was assigned to them.

[4] The AML Contract is an agreement with the State of Indiana by which the original mine operator had agreed to reclaim AML, mitigating its environmental impact. During the reclamation, whoever holds the AML Contract may sell any coal or waste produced in the reclamation process. Additionally, in exchange for the opportunity to operate at AML, the original mine operator had to post a bond with the State of Indiana as security to ensure that it will complete the reclamation. This bond accrues interest during the reclamation process. Once the reclamation is completed, the State releases the bond to the AML Contract holder. When the Businesses purchased the rights to the AML Contract in 2017, Partenheimer and Robling assumed the obligation to complete the reclamation. If they did complete the reclamation, they would receive the bond funds. Based on how the parties operated the Businesses, the bond became an asset of Otter Resources. At the damages hearing, Robling testified about purchasing the AML Contract. He stated that he and Partenheimer had planned “to maintain the site and find a buyer to assign the contract” so they could “walk away with several hundred thousand dollars as far as bond money.” Tr. Vol. II at 73.

[5] In 2021, Partenheimer and Robling had the opportunity to execute their plan and sell the Businesses when Dennis Wilzbacher expressed interest in purchasing the rights to the AML Contract. To do this, Wilzbacher was prepared to buy out the value of the bond and purchase two pieces of the Businesses’ mining equipment, a loader and an excavator. Wilzbacher made an offer in 2022, but the sale never occurred because Partenheimer “wouldn't sign the agreement” or allow Wilzbacher to conduct his due diligence on AML. Tr. Vol. II at 63.

[6] In March 2022, operations at AML went into temporary idle status, meaning the United States Department of Labor did not allow further coal extraction at AML.² On May 31, Partenheimer sent Robling a cease-and-desist letter, prohibiting Robling from engaging in “any and all activity” related to the Businesses. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 31. On August 22, Robling sued Partenheimer, alleging in part that Partenheimer breached his fiduciary duty to Robling and engaged in self-dealing. Robling requested damages and judicial dissolution of the Businesses.

[7] On November 14, the trial court ordered the case to mediation. On January 11, 2023, Robling sent his initial discovery requests to Partenheimer, who failed to respond. Partenheimer was in sole possession of the Businesses’ records and assets. The parties were scheduled to mediate in February, but Partenheimer cancelled the mediation the day before it was set to occur. On April 26, two months after the original discovery deadline, Robling filed a motion to compel discovery.

[8] While the case proceedings were heating up, as of April 2023, operations at AML were cooling down. It remained shuttered due to multiple violations of United States Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MHSA”) standards. The Department of Labor allegedly shut down the operations in part because an inspection revealed that Partenheimer had been removing coal from AML despite its temporary idle status. The decision on whether to end the temporary shutdown and continue reclamation at AML was set for October 2023.

[9] Back in the pending case, on May 5, Robling filed a motion asking the trial court to enjoin Partenheimer from further operating at AML and seeking dissolution of the Businesses. Robling cited Partenheimer's failure to provide information about the Businesses and the MHSA violations as evidence of Partenheimer causing irreparable harm to Robling's interests in the Businesses. On June 29, the trial court held a hearing on Robling's motion to compel and request for injunctive relief. At the hearing, Partenheimer's attorney Kevin Patmore ³ acknowledged that he had not provided any discovery to Robling, and the trial court ordered Partenheimer to provide discovery by July 20. Based on the parties’ request, the trial court stayed its decision on the injunction pending the possibility of resolution at mediation.

[10] Partenheimer failed to provide discovery by the trial court's July 20 deadline. At a telephonic conference on August 7, the trial court imposed a new discovery deadline of August 14. Again, Partenheimer failed to provide any discovery by the deadline, and, on August 16, the trial court found Partenheimer in contempt, ordering him to pay $3,000 in sanctions.

[11] On September 6, Robling filed a motion renewing his request for injunctive relief, requesting the appointment of a custodian for the parties’ corporate assets, and asking the trial court to order a default judgment on his breach of fiduciary duty claim as a sanction for Partenheimer's failure to provide discovery. The following day, the trial court set a hearing on all pending motions for September 19. On September 11, Patmore filed a motion to withdraw his representation of Partenheimer.⁴

[12] On September 19, the trial court conducted the hearing on all pending motions, and Partenheimer and Patmore failed to appear. At the hearing, the trial court granted Patmore's motion to withdraw. On September 22, the trial court entered findings and conclusions on pending matters, including (1) ordering a default judgment on Robling's breach of fiduciary duty claim; (2) granting Robling's preliminary injunction, prohibiting Partenheimer from operating AML or any activity involving the Businesses; (3) ordering Robling to investigate and report a possible custodian for AML during the injunction; (4) ordering Partenheimer to pay $3,000 in sanctions imposed in August; and (5) leaving damages to be determined at a later time.

[13] We emphasize that the trial court's default judgment against Partenheimer was a sanction for his failure to provide discovery. The trial court discussed its reasoning for the sanction, describing that sanctions were also warranted when a party disobeys an order or delays the judicial process. In pertinent part, the order provides:

Defendant has done both in the current case, leaving the Plaintiff with no remedy for the unrefuted breaches of Defendant's fiduciary duty, unlawful taking of Plaintiff's property, and unnecessary squandering the business assets.

In the present case, despite being present at the June 29, 2023 hearing on Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery responses, Defendant Partenheimer has openly failed to provide the required responses. On August 16, 2023, Defendant was found to be in contempt and ordered to pay $3,000 in attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff and again ordered to answer the discovery. He has done neither. He continues to cause damage to the Plaintiff by continuing in the operation of their shared business interests, while refusing to provide any information about his actions to his business partner and co-member.

As stated at the September 19, 2023 hearing, the Court believes it has given Defendant Partenheimer multiple opportunities not only to secure counsel initially but to respond to discovery, comply with the Court's Order(s) regarding discovery, and to meaningfully progress this case; however, Defendant Partenheimer has indicated, by his lack of cooperation and lack of appearance at the hearing, his unwillingness to engage. For these reasons, the Court believes a default judgment against the Defendant Partenheimer, in favor of Plaintiff on his claims of breach of fiduciary duty is appropriate and warranted in this case. Damages for this breach will be determined at a future hearing.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 131–32.

[14] In addition to providing its reasons for a sanction, the court also discussed the possibility of a custodian to operate AML. The order provides that the potential custodian “may be able to operate [AML] to prevent reclamation by the State of Indiana.”⁵ Appellant's App. Vol. II at 133. Robling intended to have Wilzbacher serve as a custodian of AML due to his experience in mining and familiarity with AML. Wilzbacher initially was interested in serving as custodian but did not go forward because Partenheimer threatened to add him as a third party to this cause.

[15] On October 10, Partenheimer filed a motion for relief from judgment, making multiple claims for relief. Partenheimer asked the trial court to lift the injunction stating that “[t]he only way to avoid a termination of the [AML contract], protect the bond and maintain the viability of [AML] is for Partenheimer to continue operations.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 136. Additionally, he asked the trial court to “dismiss[ ]” its orders from the September 22 hearing, claiming he did not have notice of the September 19 hearing and he underwent a medical procedure that day. Id. at 139. Robling filed a response where he acquiesced to the request to lift the injunction, stating in part that he “believes [Partenheimer's] attempt to operate the mine to be better than letting the mine sit idle, given the refusal of the proposed custodian, and would agree to lifting the current injunction, with specific conditions for his protection.” Id. at 142. On October 13, the trial court lifted the injunction, allowing Partenheimer to operate at AML. The trial court did not provide any further relief Partenheimer sought in his motion.

[16] On December 11, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on damages where Partenheimer appeared pro se.⁶ Partenheimer still had not provided any discovery, and, at the hearing, he did not offer any exhibits into evidence and his only witness was himself. On February 9, 2024, the trial court entered an order on damages, which in part dissolved the Businesses. Both parties filed motions to reconsider the order on damages, claiming that judicial dissolution would result in a forfeiture of the AML Contract and, in turn, the bond. On March 7, the trial court held a hearing on the motions; Partenheimer failed to appear. There, Robling argued for a judicial buyout instead of a dissolution, asking the trial court to value his interests by the value of the bond and three pieces of mining equipment: a loader, an excavator, and a pump (collectively, the “Equipment”). On March 12, the trial court issued an amended order on damages, ordering Partenheimer to pay Robling $343,000 in damages. Partenheimer now appeals. Additional facts will follow.⁷

Discussion and Decision

[17] Partenheimer challenges both the trial court's September 22 order and its subsequent damages award. Here, the trial court sua sponte entered findings and conclusions in its September 22 order entering the default judgment and granting the preliminary injunction. We will only set aside these judgments and conclusions if they are clearly erroneous, and “due regard shall be given to the trial court's opportunity to judge witness credibility.” Bruder v. Seneca Mortgage Services, LLC, 188 N.E.3d 469, 471 (Ind. 2022) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). We review issues covered by the findings under “a two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123 (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). We review issues not covered by the findings under the general judgment standard, “meaning a reviewing court should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. at 123–24 (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings not challenged on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[18] First, we address Partenheimer's claim that the trial court erred by denying his motion for relief from the default judgment. Second, we address his claims regarding the trial court's preliminary injunction. Third, we address his claims regarding the damages award.

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying in Part Partenheimer's Motion for Relief From Judgment

[19] Partenheimer argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for relief judgment in regard to the default judgment that the trial court issued as a sanction for his failure to provide discovery, disobedience of the trial court's orders, and efforts to delay the proceedings. Partenheimer seeks relief from the default judgment under Indiana Trial Rules 60(B)(6) and 60(B)(1). Initially, we address Partenheimer's argument that the default judgment is void. Next, we address his contention that he deserves relief from the judgment due to mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect.

a. The Default Judgment Is Not Void

[20] Partenheimer argues that the trial court should have set aside the default judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) because it was void. “When a judgment is void under Rule 60(B)(6), the trial court has no discretion to enforce it, and thus, we review the court's decision de novo.” T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023) (citing M.H. v. State, 207 N.E.3d 412, 416 (Ind. 2023)). “A judgment is void when the issuing court lacks personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or the authority to render the judgment.” Id. at 726. Under these circumstances, the judgment “ ‘is a complete nullity’ without legal effect from its inception.” Id. (quoting Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind. 1998)). Partenheimer claims that the trial court lacked the authority to enter the default judgment because he did not receive proper notice of the September 19 hearing, alleging that the trial court violated his due process rights.

[21] Partenheimer's claim rests on an assumption that he should have been served notice individually. However, when the trial court set the hearing, it provided notice to Partenheimer's attorney of record, which was sufficient to provide notice to Partenheimer. See Reynolds v. State, 463 N.E.2d 1087, 1087 (Ind. 1984) (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)) (“Courts have consistently held that notice or information given to an attorney constitutes notice to his client.”). Partenheimer's argument relies on a distortion of the facts where he wrongfully claims that the trial court set the September 19 hearing and his attorney withdrew his representation “the very next day,” Appellant's Br. at 26 (emphasis in original), thus suggesting that this timing would require him to be served notice individually. The record clearly indicates that the trial court scheduled the hearing on September 7, and Partenheimer's attorney filed his motion to withdraw four days later on September 11. Partenheimer's argument ignores the fact that he was represented when the trial court scheduled the hearing, and, notably, he does not argue that his attorney failed to provide notice to him. Additionally, in the trial court's September 22 order, it found that “Partenheimer did not appear at the September 19, 2023 hearing, of which he had notice.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 129. We are unpersuaded by Partenheimer's claim that he was unaware of the September 19 hearing, and we conclude that the trial court's default judgment was not void due to lack of notice.

b. Partenheimer Did Not Show Excusable Neglect

[22] Partenheimer also argues that the trial court erred by failing to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(1). We review a motion to set aside a default judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(1) for abuse of discretion. Riddle v. Cress, 153 N.E.3d 1112, 1113 (Ind. 2020) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 747 N.E.2d 545, 547 (Ind. 2001)). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (citing T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023)). “Once entered, a default judgment may be set aside because of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect so long as the motion to set aside the default is timely and the moving party also alleges a meritorious claim or defense.” Riddle, 153 N.E.3d at 1113. Our Supreme Court has described the nature of Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motions:

Addressed to the trial court's equitable discretion, “[a] Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motion does not attack the substantive, legal merits of a judgment, but rather addresses the procedural, equitable grounds justifying the relief from the finality of a judgment.” [Kmart Corp. v. Englebright, 719 N.E.2d 1249, 1254 (Ind. App. 1999)]. Because “[t]here is no general rule as to what constitutes excusable neglect under Trial Rule 60(B)(1),” “[e]ach case must be determined on its particular facts.” Id. (citations omitted).

Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Car-X Assocs. Corp., 39 N.E.3d 652, 655 (Ind. 2015) (all but second alteration in original).

[23] Partenheimer claims that the trial court should have set aside the default judgment for excusable neglect due to an alleged medical procedure that he had to undergo on the day of the hearing. There is no suggestion that this procedure was an emergency, meaning, if the procedure did in fact occur, Partenheimer could have notified the trial court of this conflict. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Partenheimer's alleged procedure did not amount to excusable neglect and by denying his motion for relief from the default judgment.

[24] Partenheimer also claims that the trial court erred by failing to have a hearing on his Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motion. “Indiana Trial Rule 60(D) generally requires trial courts to hold a hearing on any pertinent evidence before granting Trial Rule 60(B) relief.” Legacy Builders Ind., Inc. v. Crocker, 188 N.E.3d 48, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.). However, if “there is no pertinent evidence to be heard, ․ a hearing is unnecessary.” Id. (citing Thompson, 811 N.E.2d at 904).

[25] Here, there was no pertinent evidence that would require a hearing. Partenheimer's argument on appeal points to evidence that would purportedly address the merits of Robling's breach of fiduciary duty claim. The default judgment was a sanction for Partenheimer's failure to provide discovery instead of a judgment on the merits of Robling's claim. Any meritorious claim at this point needed to address Partenheimer's failure to provide discovery. He offered no such explanation. Thus, the evidence Partenheimer points to on appeal is not pertinent evidence requiring a hearing under Trial Rule 60(D).

2. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Robling's Injunction

[26] Next, Partenheimer challenges the trial court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction. We review the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Willow Haven on 106th St., LLC v. Nagireddy, --N.E.3d--, 2025 WL 546011 at *2 (Ind. 2025). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show (1) a reasonable likelihood of success at trial; (2) the remedies at law are inadequate; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving party from the granting of an injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by granting the requested injunction. Id. at *2–3.

[27] The trial court granted the preliminary injunction on September 22, prohibiting Partenheimer from operating AML. On October 13, the trial court granted in part Partenheimer's request for relief, allowing him to operate AML, meaning the injunction was in effect for approximately three weeks. Initially, we address Partenheimer's contention that the trial court improperly granted the preliminary injunction. Then, we address his argument that the trial court should have awarded him damages based on the injunction.

a. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Granting the Injunction

[28] Initially, Partenheimer claims that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the injunction because “it was entered without notice or a scintilla of supporting evidence.” Appellant's Br. at 49. Again, Partenheimer's argument distorts the facts, claiming that the September 19 hearing was the one and only hearing concerning Robling's request for a preliminary injunction. As discussed above, Partenheimer had sufficient notice of the September 19 hearing and failed to appear, so this argument is of no moment. More importantly, the trial court held another hearing on Robling's motion for preliminary injunction back on June 29; Partenheimer attended this hearing. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Partenheimer's claim that he did not have notice of the hearing on Robling's motion for injunctive relief.

[29] Partenheimer's claim that Robling provided no evidence in support of the injunction is also unfounded. Robling provided evidence to the trial court suggesting that Partenheimer's continued operation of AML despite its temporary idle status damaged Robling's interests in the Businesses. In contrast, Partenheimer did not file a response to Robling's requests for injunctive relief, and he did not offer any evidence at the June 29 hearing. The trial court concluded that an injunction was necessary to preserve Robling's interests in the Businesses due in part to Partenheimer's lack of evidence otherwise and his “continued disobedience to the Court's Orders without any explanation or reasoning.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 132. Thus, Robling provided the requisite showing while Partenheimer provided little opposition, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Robling's preliminary injunction.

b. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Not Holding a Damages Hearing after the Injunction Was Lifted

[30] Partenheimer claims that the injunction was “wrongful per se” and that the trial court should have awarded damages pursuant to Trial Rule 65(C). Appellant's Br. at 50. We have held that

the test for determining if a preliminary injunction was wrongfully issued is not whether the injunction was ultimately dissolved but rather whether injunctive relief was warranted under the facts of the case. A defendant's entitlement to attorney fees and costs under T.R. 65(C) arises when he proves that it has been finally or ultimately determined that injunctive relief was not warranted on the merits.

[31] Pflederer v. Kesslerwood Lake Ass'n, Inc., 878 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting National Sanitary Supply Co. v. Wright, 644 N.E.2d 903, 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). Partenheimer argues that the trial court's October 13 order lifting the injunction “implicitly conced[ed] that the facts of the case did not justify enjoining [him] from all business activity.” Appellant's Br. at 51. We cannot agree. The trial court granted the injunction because Partenheimer's continued operation of AML despite its temporary idle status damaged Robling's interests in the Businesses. Later, the injunction was lifted with Robling's consent since he could not get Partenheimer to agree to allow a third party to operate the AML. Having Partenheimer operate it was, according to Robling's consent, better than it sitting idle. We also reiterate that Partenheimer failed to present any evidence regarding the injunction at the June 29 hearing and failed to appear at the September 19 hearing.

[32] Partenheimer also claims that the trial court erred by denying his request to hold a hearing on damages for the injunction. However, in his motion seeking relief from the injunction, Partenheimer did not request damages or ask for a hearing on damages. Partenheimer first mentions damages for the injunction in his “Bench Brief on Damages,” which he filed after the December 11 damages hearing. There, he claims that due to the injunction his “net loss for the four months the AML has been inactive is conservatively $200,000.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 189. Because the injunction was only in place for three weeks, AML was inactive prior to the injunction due to MHSA violations, and Partenheimer failed to provide any evidence of alleged injunction-related damages at the damages hearing, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying his request to have an additional hearing on damages.

3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Its Damages Award to Robling

[33] Partenheimer argues that the trial court erred in its damages award. We review a trial court's damages award for abuse of discretion, and we will not reverse such an award “unless it is based on insufficient evidence or is contrary to law.” Mahvash K, LLC v. Hardwood Timber & Veneer, Inc., 236 N.E.3d 689, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing CT102 LLC v. Auto. Fin. Corp., 175 N.E.3d 869, 872–73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)), trans. pending.

[34] Here the trial court ordered a judicial buyout of Robling's interests in the Businesses and awarded Robling $343,000 in damages. Robling's interests in the Businesses amounted to the value of the bond and the Equipment. The damages also included restitution for Robling's self-dealing claim, sanctions for Partenheimer's discovery violations, and in attorneys’ fees. First, we address Partenheimers arguments about the judicial buyout. Second, we address his claims regarding the restitution award.

a. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Valuing the Judicial Buyout

[35] Partenheimer challenges the damages award concerning the judicial buyout of Robling's interests in the Businesses. The trial court granted Robling's request for a judicial buyout of his interests in the Businesses. The trial court valued the Businesses as Robling requested – the sum of the value of the bond and the equipment. Our Supreme Court has held that a forced sale of parties’ corporate interests may be an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 243 (Ind. 2001). In doing so, the trial court has “has full discretion to fashion equitable remedies that are complete and fair to all parties involved.” Id. (quoting Hammes v. Frank, 579 N.E.2d 1348, 1355 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)). Importantly, Partenheimer does not challenge the remedy itself; rather, he challenges only the execution, namely the valuation of the Businesses’ assets and Robling's interests therein. Partenheimer claims that the trial court improperly valued the Businesses in regard to (i) the bond, (ii) the Equipment, and (iii) an alleged $6,000,000 liability. We address each argument in turn.

i. The Bond

[36] The trial court awarded Robling $200,000 for his interest in the bond, and Partenheimer makes multiple claims regarding this decision. First, he claims that the trial court erred in determining the bond was an asset of the Businesses. Second, he claims that, even if the bond was an asset, the trial court erred in its valuation of the bond. Lastly, Partenheimer claims that the trial court erred in its distribution of the bond's value in reference to Robling's interests in the Businesses. We address each argument in turn.

[37] Initially, Partenheimer claims that the trial court erred by concluding that the bond was an asset of the Businesses. It appears that Partenheimer is claiming that the bond is an asset of the State because it has the sole power to release the funds of the bond or order a default in the event of a failed reclamation. However, Robling presented evidence that Otter resources listed the bond as an asset, and Partenheimer confirmed this in a later court filing. Additionally, Robling testified that the original plan for the Businesses was to get the bond money, and Wilzbacher's offer to buy the Businesses involved paying for the value of the bond. Thus, we are unpersuaded that the trial court erred in determining that the bond was an asset of the Businesses.

[38] Alternatively, Partenheimer argues that, even if the bond is an asset of the Businesses, the trial court erred in valuing the bond. Partenheimer claims that trial court incorrectly valued the bond at $400,000, claiming that the record is “devoid of any evidence” purporting to show the value of the bond. Appellant's Br. 39. We disagree, and we reiterate that any lack of evidence concerning the Businesses is due in large part to Partenheimer's failure to provide discovery and actively participate in this litigation. Robling provided a tax return that showed the value of the bond at $394,353 in 2019 and showed that the bond would have accrued interest since that time. Notably, Partenheimer testified that the value of the bond “is greater than 400,000 I think now with all the interest that's accrued.” Tr. Vol. II at 127. We conclude that the trial court did not err in valuing the bond at $400,000.

[39] Lastly, Partenheimer claims that the trial court erred by giving Robling half the value of the bond. Partenheimer claims that if the bond was an asset of the Businesses, then it would be an asset of ENOCO, meaning Robling was only entitled to 45% of the value. Once again, Partenheimer distorts the facts. The tax documents and Partenheimer's own court filing confirm that the bond is an asset of Otter Resources, and the parties are equal partners in Otter Resources. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in awarding Robling half the value of the bond.

ii. The Equipment

[40] The Equipment was owned by Alevan, in which Robling and Partenheimer each have an equal interest, and the trial court awarded Robling $41,000 for his interest in the Equipment. Partenheimer claims that there is no evidence to support the trial court's valuation. However, Robling submitted evidence of recent sales of and estimates for comparable pieces of equipment, and Wilzbacher testified that he had offered the parties $100,000 for two of the three pieces of the Equipment. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its valuation.

[41] Partenheimer also claims that the trial court failed to account for equipment that Robling allegedly took from the Businesses. Outside of a brief discussion of this equipment during one of the hearings, Partenheimer did not provide any evidence about this equipment and did not make any claim at the trial court regarding this equipment. We note that Partenheimer had the opportunity to present evidence of the value of this other equipment but failed to do so. Thus, the trial court did not err by excluding this equipment from its valuation of the Businesses.

iii. The Alleged $6,000,000 Liability

[42] Alternatively, Partenheimer argues that even if the trial court did not err in valuing the assets discussed above, the trial court erred in valuing the Businesses by ignoring an alleged $6,000,000 liability. In support, Partenheimer points to the following testimony from Wilzbacher at the damages hearing:

A My estimates contingent on due diligence showed 500 to 600,000 tons left to sell out of there if it was mined properly.

Q Okay.

A There's 200,000 tons of really high-quality stuff, there's 200,000 tons of really poor quality stuff, and there's 200,000 tons of mediocre stuff, and you had to develop a very detailed plan that you took some of each to sell it all. If you go in and take all the good stuff then you won't sell the bad stuff because you can't and so yes, on that 600,000 tons I estimate six million dollars’ worth of reclamation that has to be done to reclaim the site to the specifications.

Q What was that number again?

A Six million dollars.

Q Six million dollars, so this is a six million dollar liability; is that a fair thing to say?

A Yes.

Tr. Vol. II at 67.

[43] Partenheimer claims that this testimony shows that the Businesses bear a $6,000,000 liability under the AML contract. We cannot agree. Wilzbacher testimony is merely speculation concerning the possible costs required to properly reclaim AML rather than a liability on the Businesses. Additionally, Partenheimer ignores that Wilzbacher also testified that sale of the remaining coal at the site would be enough to exceed the estimated costs of the reclamation. Although Partenheimer was in sole possession of the records for the Businesses, he did not provide any evidence to the trial court about this alleged liability. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred by not including this alleged liability when valuing Robling's interests in the Businesses.

b. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Its Restitution Award

[44] Partenheimer also argues that the trial court erred in calculating the restitution award. In its September 22, 2023, order, the trial court determined that Partenheimer breached his fiduciary duty to Robling in part by engaging in self-dealing. Following the damages hearing and presentation of evidence, the trial court awarded Robling $89,000 in damages on his self-dealing claim. Partenheimer claims that this award is based on a “mathematical error.” Appellant's Br. at 45. We have previously described the proper damages calculation when a fiduciary misappropriates company property:

“[W]hen the basis of liability is a failure to conform to a fiduciary duty, the measure of damages is the entire loss sustained.” W & W Equip. Co. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 576 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) reh'g denied, trans. denied. When a fiduciary misappropriates property, the victim is entitled to the property and “all the fruits of such property.” Winstandley v. Second Nat. Bank of Louisville, Ky., 13 Ind.App. 544, 41 N.E. 956, 957 (1895).

Bunger v. Demming, 40 N.E.3d 887, 899 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[45] Here, Robling presented evidence that Partenheimer made $89,000 worth of unauthorized distributions from the company to his personal account and to Basin Land Services, a company owned solely by Partenheimer. Because the evidence demonstrates that Partenheimer misappropriated $89,000 worth of company funds, the trial court did not err in awarding the same in damages. See Bunger, 40 N.E.3d at 887. Partenheimer claims that Robling is only entitled to 45% of the $89,000, reflecting his ownership interest in ENOCO. This argument mischaracterizes this damages award. The order is clear that this figure is due to the self-distributions made by Partenheimer and is not part of the judicial buyout of the Businesses. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $89,000 for Robling's self-dealing claim.

Conclusion

[46] The trial court did not err in denying Partenheimer's motion for relief from judgment, granting Robling's preliminary injunction, and awarding damages to Robling. We affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[47] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   There is also evidence concerning a business named T&T Consulting (“T&T”), which was named in early filings in this cause. Partenheimer claims that this business is ENOCO's equal partner in Otter resources. However, there is also evidence suggesting that ENOCO purchased T&T. Because T&T is not relevant to the parties’ arguments on appeal or the trial court's judgment, we need not resolve this discrepancy.

2.   Neither party explains why operations at AML went idle, and, due to Partenheimer's continued refusal to provide any discovery throughout litigation, we have limited available facts regarding the Businesses and the operations at AML.

3.   Patmore was Partenheimer's second counsel of record in this case. Partenheimer's first attorney withdrew from the case in March 2023 just a few days before a hearing, causing the hearing to be continued.

4.   Patmore's notice of intent to withdraw, which was addressed to Partenheimer and included with the motion, provides in part:I believed that we could resolve this matter ․ assuming that you promptly provided all information necessary to [Robling's] then pending Notice to Compel ․Since that time, despite numerous requests and meetings with you, and court hearings and orders, you have failed to provide most of the information necessary to respond to the discovery, and are in contempt for this failure.․[Y]our failure to communicate with me makes our continued relationship untenable under our agreement and the rules of professional conduct.Appellant's App. Vol. II at 124.

5.   Neither party explains how AML operations were able to continue in some capacity despite the temporary shutdown in April and its previous idle status.

6.   Although he chose to proceed pro se, Partenheimer is held to the same standard as a licensed attorney. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014) (citing In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158 (Ind. 2014)) (“A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.”). We also note that, unlike most pro se litigants, Partenheimer is an attorney although he had an inactive attorney license, meaning he should have been aware of the importance of providing discovery responses, presenting evidence, and cooperating with the trial court's orders.

7.   We note that Robling has failed to include a Statement of the Facts in his brief as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6). Although he includes a section labeled as such, he only provides the procedural history that would be required in a Statement of the Case.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Weissmann concur. Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.