IN RE: Commitment of G.M. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] At the beginning of his involuntary commitment hearing, G.M. demanded to represent himself. Despite the trial court's attempts to explain the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and to question G.M. to determine his capability to represent himself, G.M. constantly interrupted the court and responded to most questions with irrelevant answers or delusional statements. The trial court instructed G.M.’s appointed counsel to continue representing him, and she did so throughout the proceeding. At the end of the hearing, the trial court ordered G.M. to be temporarily committed. Finding this appeal is not moot, we rephrase G.M.’s argument as whether the trial court made an adequate finding that G.M. was not capable of waiving his right to counsel. Because the trial court made an adequate determination, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 15, 2024, G.M. went to the emergency room at Eskenazi Hospital (“Eskenazi”) in Indianapolis after he was asked to leave a homeless shelter during cold weather. The next morning, Eskenazi filed an application for the emergency detention of G.M. The examining physician opined that G.M. was suffering from a psychiatric disorder that made G.M. gravely disabled and that he required involuntary detention, care, and treatment for the following reasons:

[G.M.] is fixated on changing his identity due to paranoia and possible hallucinations (reports hearing people yelling derogatory names at him). Has two pieces of another person's mail with no insight into potential consequences of identity theft. History of Schizophrenia and medication non-compliant. Currently experiencing homelessness in current freezing temperatures, unable to stay at the shelter due to not following rules. Mood is labile, goes from yelling angrily to talking then to crying. Recieved [sic] PRN and refusing medical treatment.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 13.

[3] The trial court found probable cause to grant Eskenazi's application that same day. On October 21, 2024, Eskenazi filed a petition for a final hearing to determine whether G.M. should be temporarily committed.¹ On October 29, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the commitment petition via two-way videoconference.

[4] At the beginning of the hearing, when G.M. was greeted by the trial court, he responded:

Don't forget my future depends upon this. As they say, I'm for me, I say I'm young, strong and active. I'm an activist, I'm not a revolutionary. I got rid of gangs as you go. I paid six months my own work. I paid well, I paid off all the gangs except for Latin Kings. He said I was frightened of them. I don't know why.

Tr. at 7.

[5] G.M. then said he was “a pro se” and wanted “no lawyer, no counselor.” Tr. at 8. The trial court informed G.M. that if he wanted to waive his right to counsel, he had “to be capable of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver” and the court would have to “ask [G.M.] a couple questions.” Id. G.M. took an oath and asked the trial court to not “ask for [his] age because you wanna put me away[,]” and said that he “plan[ned] to live a few 100 years. I take a shower every day. I take a shower every day.” Id. at 8-9.

[6] The trial court explained that “self-representation is almost always not the best choice for someone” and that G.M. would not receive “special treatment” and would be “held to the same standard as an attorney.” Id. at 9. The trial court's efforts to inform G.M. of his rights during the commitment proceeding were met by G.M.’s persistent interruptions. When the trial court began explaining the commitment petition to G.M., he interrupted and unrelatedly declared that “[m]y name was not changed. My name was not – this is under – my name was changed to [J.A.]. My name was not changed to [J.]. My name is [G.A.M.].” Id. at 10.

[7] After several more interruptions, the trial court told G.M. that “right now, the court's not completely confident that you're capable of a knowing and voluntary waiver.” Id. at 12. To this, G.M. responded:

I am -- I am -- you know, I traveled between Chicago, Los -- Chicago and Indiana a lot of times right to get my birth certificate, my ID. I came for my IDs, you know, it's a different state. People don't know me, but they know me, they call me as***** b****. You know, I cry at night. I do.

Id. The trial court stated that it was “going to keep [G.M.’s counsel] here just in case” and that it was ready to start the hearing. Id. G.M responded by asking for “prayers” and “for good luck because I make it and my health see my health. You know I only weigh 119 pounds. They won't give me no sausage in the morning.” Id.

[8] At this point, G.M.’s counsel sought clarification regarding G.M.’s request to proceed pro se. The trial court responded that it “did not make a finding that he can make a capable and knowing voluntary waiver. So you're still here as counsel.” Id. at 13.

[9] G.M. again protested that he had the right to proceed pro se and the trial court agreed to “go into that a little bit more.” Id. The trial court led G.M. through additional questioning but again its questions were mostly met with confusing, rambling, and irrelevant responses. For example, when asked to describe his mental state, G.M. responded:

You know, okay. I'll tell you exactly. I talk to Google. Google is the government. They say search, I say well search the government. They took -- I'm the smartest man alive. I got us out of World War -- no, I got out of war with China. Twenty-two atomic missiles, 22,000 atomic missiles aimed at each other in 1977. Remember? Maybe you're too young. But I wrote to the President, Jimmy Carter, I think, do you remember the peanut farmer? The president? I wrote to him, I said, take that stuff off to -- you work with people go to war because most of them, I says if you achieve a war and destruction, buster that's it. That's your end. And, and as the president rule, I got the idea.

Id. at 14.

[10] G.M. also testified that this was his “[f]irst time in front of a judge.” Id. In other answers, unrelated to the issue of self-representation, G.M. discussed communism, China, revolution, war, having been an “advisor to four presidents[,]” “warn[ing] Donald Trump that Obama is not an American [c]itizen,” and having never committed murder. Id. at 15, 16. The trial court then told G.M. it was “going to take [his] request under advisement” and moved forward with the proceeding with G.M.’s attorney representing his interests. Id. at 16.

[11] At the outset of Eskenazi's direct examination of Dr. Jayme Ahmed, a psychiatrist on Eskenazi's inpatient psychiatric unit, G.M. began repeatedly interrupting the testimony. Because the trial court had already warned G.M. not to interrupt the proceedings at least ten times, to no avail, the court muted G.M. and told him that when it was his turn to testify, the court would unmute him.

[12] Dr. Ahmed testified that she examined G.M. during a previous hospitalization on September 6, 2024, as well as on October 17, 2024. Dr. Ahmed discussed G.M.’s disruptive behavior, paranoia, diagnosis of schizophrenia, and inability to engage in meaningful discharge planning. After G.M.’s counsel cross-examined Dr. Ahmed and Eskenazi rested, the trial court unmuted G.M. and stated on the record that it could see G.M. “shouting a lot and gesturing a lot and standing up and doing jumping jacks and showing us [the] skin on [his] arm.” Id. at 30. When G.M.’s attorney asked him questions, at times his answers were responsive and at other times they were completely unrelated and resembled irrelevant rants.

[13] In an oral ruling, the trial court found that Eskenazi had shown by clear and convincing evidence that G.M. was suffering from the mental illness of schizophrenia and was gravely disabled. Consistent with its ruling, the trial court issued an order of temporary commitment that required G.M. to be discharged on or before January 27, 2025.

Discussion and Decision

[14] The issues before us are whether G.M.’s appeal is moot and whether the trial court made an adequate ruling on G.M.’s request to waive his right to counsel.

1. Mootness

[15] Preliminarily, Eskenazi argues that this appeal is moot because the temporary commitment order expired on January 27, 2025.² However, our Court has held that appeals from expired involuntary civil commitment orders are not moot when the orders carry consequences past the term of the commitment and appellate review could provide meaningful relief from those collateral consequences. C.P. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 219 N.E.3d 142, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). This can include when an involuntary temporary commitment order, “if invalid but left in place, would add to the history of hospitalizations on [the respondent's] medical record and make future involuntary commitment proceedings against him more likely to be successful.” M.T. v. Cmty. Health Network, 219 N.E.3d 151, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “We have long recognized that a ‘history of mental illness requiring hospitalizations’ may be probative of whether a person is ‘gravely disabled and should be involuntarily committed.’ ” Id. at 155 (quoting Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.). Here, as the record shows that G.M. had been previously hospitalized and examined by an Eskenazi inpatient psychiatrist about one month before the instant hospitalization, potential negative collateral consequences exist beyond the expiration of the temporary commitment order, so the appeal is not moot and we will address the merits. See id.

2. Waiver of the Right to Counsel

[16] Indiana Code section 12-26-2-2(b)(4) grants a person alleged to have a mental illness the right to be represented by counsel in civil commitment proceedings. To waive this right, a person must be “capable of making such a decision” and the decision must be made “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”³ Commitment of L.B. v. Richard L. Roudebush Veterans Aff. Med. Ctr., 191 N.E.3d 281, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting GPH v. Giles, 578 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), reh'g denied, trans. denied).

[17] In Commitment of L.B., the appellant argued that the trial court erred by accepting his waiver of the right to counsel without first making a finding on the record that he was competent to waive that right. Id. Our Court agreed, holding that a “trial court must expressly find, on the record, that a civil-commitment respondent is capable of knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving the right to counsel before accepting the respondent's waiver of that right.” Id. at 285. How the trial court reaches this determination will depend on the circumstances. Id. When mental competency is doubtful, the trial court “may need to diligently observe and question the respondent in person[,]” whereas “[o]ther cases may not require such a deep inquiry.” Id.

[18] Unlike Commitment of L.B., where the trial court accepted L.B.’s waiver before hearing any evidence that L.B. could knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to counsel, here, the trial court carefully considered G.M.’s circumstances during the hearing. The trial court noted G.M.’s constant interruptions and inappropriate responses to its questions before explicitly directing G.M.’s appointed counsel to continue representing him and stating that it had not yet made a finding that G.M. could make a knowing and voluntary waiver. G.M.’s inability to competently waive his right to counsel and to represent himself became increasingly apparent with his irrelevant statements or delusional rants, including that Google is the government, that his actions avoided a war between the United States and China, and that he had been an advisor to four presidents. These comments, among many others, demonstrated G.M. did not possess a fundamental understanding of reality or his legal proceedings.

[19] Undoubtedly, the trial court could have been more explicit in its on-the-record determination of whether G.M. was capable of knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving his right to counsel. But viewed in the context of G.M.’s hearing, the trial court's verbiage and actions on the record were a functional denial of G.M.’s request to proceed pro se due to his lack of ability to waive his right to counsel.⁴ Moreover, the record overwhelmingly supports this determination, and G.M received the benefit of being represented by competent, trained counsel throughout the proceeding. Any imprecision in the fact that the trial court's ruling came in the form of a statement that it “did not make a finding that [G.M.] can make a capable and knowing voluntary waiver” of his right to counsel, followed by a directive for appointed counsel to continue representing G.M., did not constitute error. Tr. at 13.

Conclusion

[20] The record overwhelmingly supports that G.M. could not have knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and the trial court's careful consideration of G.M.’s competency, together with its statements on the record, constituted a denial of G.M.’s request to represent himself in his involuntary civil commitment proceeding.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Eskenazi's form petition stated that they sought a “temporary or regular commitment.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 16. However, the attached physician's statement indicated that temporary commitment would be sufficient, which is consistent with Eskenazi's request at the final hearing.

2.   Pursuant to Indiana Code section 12-26-6-1, temporary commitment orders may not extend for more than 90 days.

3.   Eskenazi argues that we must decide “whether Indiana recognizes a [Fourteenth Amendment] due process right for a civil commitment respondent to proceed pro se.” Appellee's Br. at 15. We disagree. Our appellate courts have consistently found that civil commitment respondents may waive their statutory right to counsel and proceed pro se, so long as they are capable of waiving their right to counsel “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” See A.A. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown CMHC, 97 N.E.3d 606, 613 (Ind. 2018); Commitment of L.B. v. Richard L. Roudebush Veterans Aff. Med. Ctr., 191 N.E.3d 281, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022); GPH v. Giles, 578 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

4.   We also note that the trial court timely made this ruling before the evidentiary portion of the civil commitment hearing began. See A.A., 97 N.E.3d 606, 615-16 (Ind. 2018) (finding that the grouping of rights in Indiana Code section 12-26-2-2(b), including the right to counsel, “share a common temporal characteristic” in that “they attach before a commitment hearing” and the right to counsel has “limited worth if a respondent cannot exercise it before a hearing begins”).

DeBoer, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Vaidik concur. Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.