Sidney James Hockaday, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2025)

[1] Sidney James Hockaday appeals from his conviction after a jury trial of Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter and his sentencing enhancement. He alleges that the trial court committed instructional errors and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Hockaday and Noelle Riggins considered each other family, calling each other uncle and nephew, respectively. Riggins also purchased marijuana from Hockaday. On October 21, 2022, Riggins negotiated the purchase of one ounce of marijuana from Hockaday for $150. He negotiated the details via social media. At some point prior to the sale, Riggins and Kewaun Johnson, both sixteen years old, changed the plan from a sale to a robbery. The two met Hockaday in his SUV, Johnson brought his gun, and when Riggins gave the signal, Johnson took off with the marijuana.

[3] Hockaday saw Johnson's gun and grabbed onto Riggins’ clothing when he saw him reach into the pocket of his hooded sweatshirt. The two struggled for control of a handgun while Hockaday drove. Hockaday stopped the SUV when he saw the gun and ultimately gained control over it. A girl who was at home at the time of this incident saw Riggins’ door open and saw him run a short distance before hearing gunshots. Hockaday drove from the scene and then passed by a UPS driver whose identification of Hockaday was stipulated to at trial.

[4] Riggins succumbed to his injuries. An autopsy and a ballistics examination led to the conclusion that the first two gunshots traveled from the back to the front of Riggins’ body. And the evidence gathered from the examinations led to the conclusion that the weapon had to have been fired from three feet away.

[5] Investigation of evidence at the scene led officers to identify Hockaday as a suspect in Riggins’ death. A search of the SUV led to evidence connecting Hockaday to the vehicle and to the discovery of at least one spent shell casing. The State filed several charges against Hockaday. Those which proceeded to trial were murder, a felony, and a firearm sentencing enhancement.

[6] Hockaday admitted that he fired the handgun and shot Riggins. But Hockaday claimed he did so in self-defense. After testifying at trial, the jury asked him, “Why did you choose to shoot [Riggins] after you gained possession of the gun?” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 43. Hockaday replied,

I, I was, ah, I was afraid. My mind was just all over the place at the time, and it wasn't like, it was a random thought in my mind to pull the trigger and shoot him. I don't know. I don't know.

Id.

[7] The parties argued extensively about the jury instructions. Hockaday tendered the following two instructions:

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 A person who was actively engaged in the perpetration of a crime may assert self-defense if the criminal activity he was engaged in did not produce the confrontation wherein force was employed.

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 Possession of marijuana or dealing in marijuana by an accused standing alone is insufficient to constitute the “commission of a crime” as used within the definition of self-defense sufficient to prohibit assertion of self-defense by an accused.

Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 66-67. Both instructions were supported by citations to Harvey v. State, 652 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied, and Smith v State, 777 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.

[8] Hockaday's counsel argued in favor of the instructions because he did not want the jury to reach the conclusion that Hockaday was precluded from the defense because of the evidence of and his admission to drug dealing. In pertinent part, Indiana Code sections 35-41-3-2(g)(1) & (3) (2019) provide that a person is not justified in using force if the person is committing a crime, or has entered into combat with another person and the other person continues or threatens to continue unlawful action. And common law has added the requirement that “ ‘there must be an immediate causal connection between the crime and the confrontation.’ ” Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301, 304 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind. 2001)).

[9] Hockaday further argued that his instructions were supported by the holding in Smith, where the majority held that the same tendered instructions correctly stated the law, and the trial court in that case committed reversible error by failing to give them. 777 N.E.2d at 37. The State countered that the failure to give the instructions was not the reason for the reversal inasmuch as “[t]he jury was not informed that it was required to determine whether Smith's contemporaneous criminal act was immediately causally related to the confrontation with [the victim].” Id.

[10] The State argued that it would not be rebutting Hockaday's claim of self-defense as to his marijuana dealing, but rather, his criminal confinement of Riggins because there was an immediate causal connection between the criminal confinement and shooting. However, during closing argument, in addition to claiming that Hockaday should have let Riggins out of the SUV instead of holding him down, the State argued that shooting Riggins was “not within the realm of reasonable behavior over $150 [worth] of Marijuana and a hurt ego. Ego and $150 this man took Noelle [Riggins’] life.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 92. And on rebuttal, the State argued that Hockaday's behavior was not reckless, and additionally stated, “Whether it rises to the level of sudden heat that is a question for you. I'd say no. Being angry about ․ you know, your nephew stealing your weed and setting that up. That doesn't justify you gunning him down. That doesn't justify bringing it down a notch.” Id. at 113.

[11] The trial court agreed with Hockaday that the tendered instructions correctly stated the law, but concluded that Indiana Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction Number 10.0300 (Use of Force to Protect Person) covered that topic, therefore, the tendered instructions were unnecessary. Unfortunately, at the close of the trial, the trial court used a former version of the pattern instruction which indicated that a person is not justified in using force if “He is committing a crime that is directly and immediately connected to the confrontation[.]” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 118. That language was explicitly disapproved of in Gammons, because “the instruction weakened the causal connection required to preclude a claim of self-defense.” 148 N.E.3d at 304.

[12] During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court asking, “On instruction #7, can we get help with the meaning and/or interpretation of the phrase ‘directly and immediately connected to the confrontation? i.e. selling weed in Indiana?’ ” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 126. The court and the parties discussed how to respond. Hockaday's counsel once again suggested reading his tendered instruction. The State again argued that Hockaday's second tendered instruction was an incorrect statement of the law and that the tendered instruction was covered by other instructions. But the parties and the court agreed that the court would ask the jury: “Would further argument by the attorneys regarding self-defense be of assistance to you?” Id. at 129. After the jury responded, “No[,]” the parties agreed to the court's response, “I must refer you back to the entire set of instructions.” Id. at 131.

[13] The jury found Hockaday guilty of the lesser included offense of Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter. Hockaday then pleaded guilty to the firearm sentencing enhancement. The court imposed a twenty-five year sentence for voluntary manslaughter enhanced by twenty years for the firearm enhancement. It later reduced the enhancement sua sponte to seventeen years, citing Hockaday's acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty.

Discussion and Decision

I. Instructional Errors

[14] To summarize, Hockaday's arguments amount to two separate but interrelated claims that the trial court abused its discretion. He argues the court abused its discretion by failing to give his tendered instructions. And he additionally claims that the trial court abused its discretion by giving an erroneous instruction. Although the parties addressed this additional claim as fundamental error and urge us to analyze it as such, we see it differently, and we will address the error more directly.

[15] Instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review its decision only for an abuse of discretion. Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. 2013). “To constitute an abuse of discretion, an instruction that is given to the jury must be erroneous, and the instructions viewed as a whole must misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury.” Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Additionally, “[w]hen reviewing the propriety of the trial court's decision to refuse a tendered jury instruction, we consider the following factors: (1) whether the instruction was supported by evidence in the record; (2) whether the instruction correctly states the law; and (3) whether other instructions adequately cover the substance of the denied instruction.” Washington v. State, 840 N.E.2d 873, 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The purpose of jury instructions “is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001). We will reverse based upon an instructional error only if the defendant affirmatively demonstrates that the error prejudiced his substantial rights. Washington, 840 N.E.2d at 888. Here, Hockaday's tendered instructions were correct statements of the law, but were refused because the trial court stated it would give the Indiana Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction Number 10.0300 (Use of Force to Protect Person). Because this instruction would have covered that topic, Hockaday's tendered instructions would be unnecessary and duplicative. The trial court, however, gave an older version of the pattern instruction, one which was expressly disapproved by Gammons. Thus, on appeal, we are presented with a situation where the trial court refused tendered instructions which were correct statements of the law, but ultimately were covered by an incorrect instruction.

[16] “Any error in instructing the jury is subject to a harmless error analysis.” Lawson v. State, 199 N.E.3d 829, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. To obtain reversal based on these abuses of discretion, Hockaday must demonstrate that those errors affected his substantial rights. See id. “Errors in the giving or refusing of instructions are harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the jury could not properly have found otherwise.” Dill, 741 N.E.2d at 1233. The jury did inquire about how they should apply language contained in the erroneous self-defense instruction. However, the young girl's and Hockaday's own testimony negated his self-defense claim. Although Hockaday was entitled to a self-defense instruction that correctly stated the law, the error was harmless in light of how the evidence unfolded at trial.

[17] Hockaday testified at trial that while driving and tussling with Riggins, he saw Riggins pull a gun out of his pocket. He said he parked the SUV and continued to struggle for control of the gun. After he gained control of the gun, he had a random thought in his mind to shoot Riggins. He also testified “I didn't know that me and him was going to be fighting over a gun or nothing like that. And I wasn't expecting to, to, to shoot the gun either.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 31. He said he was scared and “didn't care about [the marijuana] at all.” Id. at 32. And he admitted, Riggins was “[m]aybe three (3), four (4) feet” away from him when the gun went off. Id. He also admitted that when he shot Riggins, Riggins was out of the SUV in the grassy area before he reached the sidewalk.

[18] A girl in the neighborhood where the shooting occurred testified that she saw the SUV come to a stop. She then saw the passenger door open, saw Riggins run, and then heard shots. The autopsy and ballistics examinations revealed that the first two gunshots traveled from the back to the front of Riggins’ body. And the evidence gathered from the examinations led to the conclusion that the weapon had to have been fired from three feet away. “To be sure, ‘[f]iring multiple shots undercuts a claim of self-defense’ once a defendant disables the purported aggressor.” Gammons, 148 N.E.3d at 305 (quoting Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 395 n.2 (Ind. 2001)).

[19] And counsel argued their respective positions about the criminal activity leading up to Riggins’ death. Hockaday argued that he was acting in self-defense because Riggins and Johnson were committing an armed robbery. The State argued that Hockaday committed criminal confinement of Riggins by keeping him in the vehicle and shot him after he exited the SUV.

[20] Here, the evidence negated Hockaday's self-defense claim because he shot Riggins in the back after he had gained control of the gun and Riggins was retreating from the confrontation.

[21] Unlike self-defense, the existence of sudden heat is a ‘mitigating factor’—not an affirmative defense—and it ‘reduces what otherwise would be murder to voluntary manslaughter.’ ” Carmack v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452, 459 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Isom v. State, 651 N.E.2d 1151, 1152 (Ind. 1995); Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(b) (2018)). Nor is sudden heat an element of voluntary manslaughter. Isom, 651 N.E.2d at 1152. “Sudden heat exists when a defendant is ‘provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection.’ ” Carmack, 200 N.E.3d at 459-60. Evidence of sudden heat may be found in either the State's case or the defendant's. Id. at 460.

[22] Hockaday argued that he was scared for his life and that he could not explain why he shot Riggins after gaining control of the gun other than to say he had a random thought to do so. Thus, the evidence clearly supports the jury's verdict that Hockaday was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. And the multiple gunshots fired after Hockaday gained control of the gun and Riggins was running away, cuts against giving a self-defense instruction in the first instance. Under the specific facts of this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court's error rises to the level of reversible error.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[23] Hockaday asks that we revise his firearm sentencing enhancement pursuant to our authority under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[24] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Under Rule 7(B), the burden is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether a sentence is inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that “ ‘the maximum possible sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders.’ ” Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Evans v. State, 725 N.E.2d 850, 851 (Ind. 2000)).

[25] “Sentencing decisions rest within the discretion of the trial court and, as such, should receive considerable deference.” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Our review begins with the statutory ranges established by the legislature for each class of offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. Indiana Code sections 35-50-2-11(d), (g) (2021), provide that a court may sentence the person to an additional fixed term of imprisonment between five and twenty years if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. Hockaday ultimately received a seventeen year firearm sentencing enhancement.

[26] Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11 provides no legislative guidance on what the advisory sentence is for the firearm sentencing enhancement at issue here. As Hockaday notes, however, Indiana Code section 35-50-2-13 (2022) does provide guidance in terms of degrees of sentencing caps. That statute provides that when a person knowingly or intentionally uses or possesses a firearm while committing dealing in a Schedule I, II, or III controlled substance, the court may sentence the person to an additional fixed term of imprisonment of not more than five years. Id. However, the fixed term of imprisonment can be enhanced by up to ten years if the firearm is a sawed-off shotgun and up to twenty years if the firearm is a machine gun or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler. Id.

[27] Given the facts of this specific case, we find the legislature's guidance in situations where a firearm is used while a person is dealing in marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, to be useful. Consequently, we exercise our authority to revise sentences to reduce Hockaday's sentencing enhancement to a term of five years. Although the jury rejected Hockaday's claim of self-defense, he did shoot Riggins after being ambushed during a failed drug transaction, by a person he considered to be like family.

Conclusion

[28] In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the instructional errors do not rise to the level of reversible error. However, we revise Hockaday's sentencing enhancement to an additional fixed term of five years.

[29] Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.

Shepard, Senior Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge DeBoer concur. Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.