Gordon Lee Wilson, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Gordon Lee Wilson, Jr., appeals the imposition of his aggregate, fifty-six year sentence after a jury convicted him of Level 1 felony child molesting of his girlfriend's eight-year-old daughter, and Level 4 felony child molesting of his girlfriend's six-year-old daughter. He contends his sentence commands revision under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). After review, however, we conclude that Wilson has not met his burden of demonstrating his sentence is inappropriate and affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Melissa Anderson is the mother of three children: S.S., a boy; and daughters A.A., and V.A. A.A. is the victim in 48C06-1911-F1-2873 (F1-2873). And V.A. is the victim in 48C06-2302-F4-525 (F4-525).

[3] In February 2017, almost immediately after they began dating, Wilson moved in with Anderson. Although Wilson traveled for work and was gone consecutive days in a row, when he was home, he would touch A.A. in ways that made her uncomfortable. When A.A. was between the ages of nine and eleven, Wilson touched A.A.’s breasts and vagina more times than she could count, both over and under her clothes. Wilson did not say much to A.A. when he touched her, but he did tell her not to tell anyone about what was happening because they would both get into trouble.

[4] On one occasion when A.A. was eleven years old, she was playing on her Chromebook while resting on her mother's bed. V.A. was sleeping beside her. When Wilson came into the room, A.A. pretended to sleep so Wilson would leave her alone. Nevertheless, Wilson shook her to awaken her. He then removed her pants, lifted up her shirt, and rubbed his penis against her genitalia until he ejaculated on her stomach. Wilson said nothing as he wiped his semen off her stomach with a tissue and walked out of the room. This was not the first time Wilson engaged in this behavior with A.A.

[5] Wilson also touched V.A. in ways that made her feel uncomfortable. On one evening, when V.A. was seven years old, Wilson sat down and started touching V.A.’s vagina over her clothing using a circular motion. V.A. pushed his hand away, telling him she needed to use the bathroom. Wilson responded, “you're just trying to get away.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 206. V.A. then joined her siblings in the living room, but she was too afraid to tell them what had happened.

[6] A.A. eventually told her mother what Wilson had been doing to her, but her mother did not believe her or notify the police. Later, A.A. told S.S., her older brother, about Wilson's behavior. S.S. told his grandmother, who notified the police. A.A.’s disclosure led to Wilson's charges in F1-2873. After A.A.’s disclosures, V.A. disclosed Wilson's sexual abuse of her.

[7] The State charged Wilson with Level 1 felony child molesting related to his sexual abuse of A.A. He was charged with Level 4 felony child molesting for his sexual abuse of V.A. After a jury trial, Wilson was found guilty on both charges. During the preparation of his pre-sentence investigation report, Wilson's version of the offenses was that they never happened. He said he believed that A.A. had been coached by others to make up a lie to get him to move out, and the charges related to V.A. were filed because the State did not have enough evidence to support A.A.’s allegations. See Appellant's App. Conf. Vol. III, pp. 16, 17 (PSI-Defendant's Version of Offenses).

[8] At Wilson's sentencing hearing, he testified, echoing his version of the offenses contained in the pre-sentence investigation report but with more detail. And Wilson's son testified on his behalf to the same effect. The trial court imposed a forty-five-year-sentence for F1-2873 and an eleven-year sentence in F4-525. The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of fifty-six years.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Wilson appeals, claiming his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. He seeks downward revision of his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) because the “trial court did not outline reasons consecutive sentences were justified[,]” and in reviewing his character, the court essentially “imposed a life without parole sentence” given Wilson's age. Appellant's Br. p. 7.

[10] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) states, “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” When reviewing a sentence, our principal role is to leaven the outliers rather than necessarily achieve what is perceived as the correct result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). “We do not look to determine if the sentence was appropriate; instead we look to make sure the sentence was not inappropriate.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). Wilson bears the burden to show that his sentence is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’ g, 875 N.E.2d 218.

[11] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). As we assess the nature of the offense and character of the offender, “we may look to any factors appearing in the record.” Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Ultimately, whether a sentence should be deemed inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224.

[12] Although Appellate Rule 7(B) requires us to consider both the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, the appellant is not required to prove that each of those prongs independently renders his sentence inappropriate. Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Rather, the two prongs are separate inquiries that we ultimately balance to determine whether a sentence is inappropriate. Id.

[13] Regarding the nature of the offense, we observe that “the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). The sentencing range for Level 1 felony child molesting is between twenty and fifty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b) (2014). The trial court imposed a sentence of forty-five years for Wilson's conviction in F1-2873. The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is between two and twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven years for Wilson's conviction in F4-525. And the court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively.

[14] As for his character, Wilson suggests we consider two things. First, he notes that he was fifty years old at the time of his sentencing on May 31, 2024. He says his earliest possible release date, according to the Department of Correction website, is November 13, 2071. He argues the court “effectively imposed a life without parole sentence” and that his sentence is nine years shy of the maximum sentence for murder, and eleven years more than the minimum sentence for murder. Appellant's Br. p. 11. He also argues that the court's statement that Wilson was not the “worst of the worst” should reflect favorably on his character. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 101.

[15] We assess a defendant's character by engaging in a broad consideration of his qualities. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). An offender's character is shown by his ‘ “life and conduct.” ’ Adams v. State, 120 N.E.3d 1058, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). A typical factor we consider when examining a defendant's character is criminal history. McFarland v. State, 153 N.E.3d 369, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[16] Here, since Wilson was nineteen years old, he has been convicted of three felonies and seven misdemeanor offenses. He has been sentenced to prison twice and was most recently released from prison in September 2015. Less than four years later, Wilson began molesting A.A. and V.A. multiple times over the course of two years. But for the ultimate disclosure of Wilson's sexual abuse of A.A., there is no indication that Wilson would have ceased engaging in that behavior. And despite his prior contacts with the judicial system, his criminal behavior has not been deterred. See Webb v. State, 149 N.E.3d 1234, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“having committed multiple crimes is a ‘poor reflection on the defendant's character, [as] it may reveal that he or she has not been deterred even after having been subjected to the police authority of the State.’ ” (quoting Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 526 (Ind. 2005)). Therefore, we cannot say that Wilson's age is a substantial virtuous trait in light of his life and conduct, consisting of the repeated commission of criminal offenses from which he failed to reform. See Borroel v. State, 241 N.E.3d 8, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“defendant's advanced age [55-years-old] and poor health do not militate in favor of revision” of 45-year sentence where defendant had no prior criminal history), trans. denied.

[17] We are likewise unpersuaded by Wilson's argument that the court's comment, “you're not the worst of the worst,” painted Wilson's character in a positive light. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 101. This comment is taken out of context. Placed in context, when explaining its sentencing decision, the court said that because of the multiple victims and multiple acts, “it'll be off the advisory. Will it be the maximum, no.” Id. The court added, “I chose not to [impose the maximum sentence] because I couldn't come up with a compelling reason to make it the maximum because that's supposed to be for the worst of the worst and Mr. Wilson you're not good.” Id. The court concluded, “Don't take my statement that you're not the worst of the worst to say oh, you're okay, you're an all right guy. I'm not saying that in the least.” Id. We conclude that Wilson has not persuaded us that his sentence is in need of revision in light of his character.

[18] We next turn to the nature of Wilson's offenses. For two years, Wilson molested A.A. more times than she could count. He told her not to disclose the sexual abuse or they both would get in trouble. Instead of correcting his behavior, he molested V.A. as well. We conclude that Wilson has not persuaded us that his sentence is in need of revision in light of the nature of his offenses.

[19] Wilson also argues that we should focus on the character prong of our analysis. However, we have already determined that his character does not warrant a revision of his sentence. Although our Supreme Court has held that “a strong showing on one prong” may “outweigh a weak showing” on the other prong[,]” the evidence of Wilson's character does not amount to a strong showing. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024).

[20] Wilson's argument is framed as seeking relief under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), but he also appears to argue the trial court abused its discretion in two separate ways. First, he argues that the court did not elaborate on why it imposed an enhanced sentence for his Level 4 felony conviction. He also argues that the court did not explain why it imposed consecutive sentences.

[21] “The decision to impose consecutive sentences lies within the discretion of the trial court.” Gilliam v. State, 901 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “A trial court is required to state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences or enhanced terms.” Id. “However, a trial court may rely on the same reasons to impose a maximum sentence and also impose consecutive sentences.” Id. And, “ ‘when the perpetrator commits the same offense against two victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem necessary to vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more than one person.” Upton v. State, 904 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003)).

[22] Here, the trial court identified the following aggravating circumstances: (1) multiple victims; (2) Wilson's criminal history; (3) his violation of a position of trust; and (4) the nature and circumstances of the crime. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 94, 98. And with respect to F1-2873, his crime was done in V.A.’s presence. Id. “[A] single aggravator may be used both to enhance a sentence and impose consecutive sentences[.]” Lewis v. State, 31 N.E.3d 539, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Any one of the aggravating circumstances generally articulated by the court is sufficient to support enhancing the sentence in F4-525. Furthermore, as to consecutive sentencing, the trial court explicitly stated “two victims, they've gotta run consecutive in my mind. There is no way they're gonna be concurrent. Uh, it was never an option.” Tr. Vol. IV, p. 102.

[23] We do not find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's sentencing decision here.

Conclusion

[24] Wilson has not met his burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). And we find no abuse of discretion in the court's enhancement of Wilson's sentence in F4-525 or ordering the sentences to be served consecutively.

[25] Affirmed.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Judges Bradford and Scheele concur. Bradford, J., and Scheele, J., concur.