PARKER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] John Cameron Parker was convicted of the murder of Michael Blankenship, Jr., and Mitchell Greathouse. Parker appeals his murder convictions, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on the theory of accomplice liability. Parker alternatively contends that his 110-year sentence, which includes two consecutive fifty-five-year advisory sentences, is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 21, 2023, Parker asked Richard Garrett to drive him to a home on Mt. Vernon Avenue in Evansville. Upon arriving at the home, Parker commented that “somebody was going to have to pay for something” and that “somebody had crossed” him. Tr. Vol. II p. 225.¹ Parker was armed with a black, semi-automatic handgun when he exited Garrett's vehicle and entered the home. Caden Harms followed Parker into the home. “[A] minute or so” later, Garrett heard “four or five gunshots.” Tr. Vol. II p. 226. Harms returned to the vehicle and Parker met up with Garrett and Harms about a block down the street. As the three men drove away, Harms asked Parker “what the h[***] did you do?” Tr. Vol. II p. 227. Parker was too out of breath to answer. In the aftermath of the incident, Parker and Harms burned their clothing and buried the gun that Parker had taken into the home. Blankenship's and Greathouse's bodies were discovered the next day, and their causes of death were subsequently determined to be gunshot wounds to the chest and neck, respectively.

[3] On October 30, 2023, the State charged Parker under cause number 82C01-2310-MR-6686 (“Cause No. MR-6686”) with two counts of felony murder, two counts of murder, two counts of Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, two counts of Level 6 felony armed robbery, and one count of Level 6 felony obstruction of justice. The robbery and obstruction-of-justice charges were dismissed prior to trial.

[4] While incarcerated prior to trial, Parker bragged about his crimes, telling another inmate that “I killed them mother f[***]ers man.” Tr. Vol. II p. 241. Parker made it clear that he was referring to Blankenship and Greathouse.

[5] A jury trial commenced on June 24, 2024. In its proposed final jury instructions, the State requested that the jury be instructed on the theory of accomplice liability. Parker objected, arguing

Your Honor, ․ essentially if it's an aiding and abetting accomplice liability kind of instructions[,] Your Honor[,] I believe that the State has not charged that and it provides a significantly different defense and questions that would be asked throughout the course of the presentation of the evidence, we would object to that theory of liability to be presented to the jury at this time.

Tr. Vol. III p. 30. The trial court noted Parker's objection and, over Parker's objection, instructed the jury that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that same offense. Aiding, inducing, or causing is not a separate offense. Anyone who aids, induces, or causes an offense has the same liability as the person who actually committed the offense.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 61. The trial court also granted Parker's motion for a directed verdict on the two counts of felony murder.

[6] The jury ultimately found Parker guilty of the two remaining murder charges. On July 23, 2024, the trial court sentenced Parker to two consecutive, fifty-five-year sentences. In addition, the trial court revoked Parker's probation in cause numbers 82C01-2101-F6-100 (“Cause No. F6-100”) and 82C01-2112-F2-6582 (“Cause No. F2-6582”), noting that (1) at the time Parker committed the murders of Blankenship and Greathouse, he was on probation under Cause Nos. F6-100 and F2-6582 and (2) the State had filed petitions to revoke Parker's probation in both cases after he was charged with two counts of murder.²

Discussion and Decision

I. Jury Instructions

[7] We generally review a trial court's jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. Under this standard, we look to whether evidence presented at trial supports the instruction and to whether its substance is covered by other instructions. When the appellant challenges the instruction as an incorrect statement of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. We reverse the trial court only if the instruction resulted in prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights.

Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 554 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations and quotation omitted). “[A]n improper instruction will merit reversal only if it so affects the entire charge that the jury was misled as to the law in the case.” Hubbard v. State, 742 N.E.2d 919, 921 (Ind. 2001) (internal quotation omitted).

[8] Parker contends that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury, arguing that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on accomplice liability. “In Indiana there is no distinction between the responsibility of a principal and an accomplice.” Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 (Ind. 1999). “Thus, one may be charged as a principal yet convicted on proof that he or she aided another in the commission of a crime.” Id. “If there is some evidence that a second party was involved in the crime, an instruction on accomplice liability is proper.” Id.

[9] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “no reference to the accomplice liability statute need be included in the charging information in order for a defendant to be convicted of a crime, regardless of whether the evidence showed that he or she acted alone or with an accomplice.” Id. at 1199; see also Taylor v. State, 495 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ind. 1986); Ozuna v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1093, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Despite this clear precedent, Parker “urges” us to conclude that the State was required to include notice in the charging information of its intention to argue accomplice liability, citing to the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Thacker v. State, 556 N.E.2d 1315, 1322 (Ind. 1990), for support. Appellant's Br. p. 16. However, we previously rejected the assertion that Thacker created a notice requirement for alleging that an individual acted as an accomplice. See Ozuna, 703 N.E.2d at 1100. In Ozuna, we stated,

we do not read Thacker to establish a notice requirement. Rather, the holding in Thacker is consistent with the longstanding proposition that a defendant need not be charged as an accessory in order to be convicted of the underlying charge. The Thacker court, in fact, reiterated this well-settled principal of law. The Thacker court's observation that the defendant was given notice was made in addition to its finding that notice was not required and made solely to rebut the defendant's claim to the contrary.

Id. We agree with the Ozuna court that this is a reasonable interpretation of Thacker's holding. Given the clear precedent that no reference to accomplice liability need be included in the charging information in order for a defendant to be convicted as an accomplice, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the theory of accomplice liability.³ See Wise, 719 N.E.2d at 1199; Taylor, 495 N.E.2d at 713; Ozuna, 703 N.E.2d at 1100.

II. Appropriateness

[10] Parker also contends that his 110-year sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[11] Parker was convicted of two counts of murder. “A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). In sentencing Parker, the trial court imposed consecutive fifty-five-year advisory sentences. The advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006). “We are unlikely to consider an advisory sentence inappropriate.” Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “The defendant bears a particularly heavy burden in persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate when the trial court imposes the advisory sentence.” Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[12] With respect to the nature of his offenses, Parker acknowledges that the crime “met the bare elements of the offense” but argues that there was “no evidence that [Parker] caused more harm ․ or that this killing was more brutal than the ‘typical’ murder.” Appellant's Br. pp. 19, 20. Parker further argues his sentence is an outlier because “[n]othing in the record shows that the nature of the offense was aggravating.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. Parker argues that it would have been more appropriate to run his sentences concurrently, rather than consecutively. We cannot agree.

[13] Parker killed two individuals. After being caught, Parker bragged about his crimes, telling another inmate that “I killed them mother f[***]ers man.” Tr. Vol. II p. 241. As the State asserts, Parker is effectively asking for a “two-for-the-price-of-one sentence[.]” Appellee's Br. p. 26.

[14] As for his character, Parker has frequently engaged in delinquent or criminal behavior, accumulating two prior delinquency adjudications, five prior misdemeanor convictions, and three prior felony convictions. Parker murdered Blankenship and Greathouse sixty-three days after being released from jail and was on probation at the time he committed the murders. Parker was also considered a high risk to re-offend. As the State points out, Parker's “criminal activity has not only been consistent, it has increased in momentum.” Appellee's Br. p. 27. Parker has also failed to take advantage of prior opportunities to improve himself, and prior attempts at leniency have been unsuccessful, as Parker has previously failed to comply with the terms of his probation and bond. Parker's criminal history and failure to reform his behavior reflect poorly on his character.

[15] Parker acknowledges that he had “some criminal history,” but argues that “[a] concurrent sentence would be punitive, rehabilitative[,] and in line with what one would typically see in this type of case.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. We disagree. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “when the perpetrator commits the same offense against two victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem necessary to vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more than one person.” Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003). Parker has failed to meet the “particularly heavy burden” of convincing us that his consecutive fifty-five-year advisory sentences are inappropriate. See Fernbach, 954 N.E.2d at 1089.

[16] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While the record on appeal includes transcripts for each of the cause numbers listed on the cover page, all references to the transcript are to the transcript for Parker's murder trial.

2.   While the trial court did not impose any sanction in connection to Parker's probation violation in Cause No. F6-100, the trial court ordered Parker to serve 432 days in connection to his probation violation in Cause No. F2-6582.

3.   Parker argues that “[i]f the Court reverses and remands on the basis of his murder convictions then it should also vacate the finding that he violated probation.” Appellant's Br. p. 21. However, because we affirm Parker's convictions, we will not disturb the trial court's order revoking Parker's probation in Cause Nos. F2-6582 and F6-100.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.