IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.R. and J.B. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] B.I. (“Mother”) appeals an order involuntarily terminating her parental rights over S.R., born May 12, 2016, and J.B., born August 24, 2020, (“Children”) upon the petition of the Delaware County Department of Child Services (“DCS”).¹ While Mother purports to raise several issues, the only issue she has preserved for our review is whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions for the removal or continued placement of Children outside the home will not be remedied. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In or around November 2020, S.R.’s father, Sh.R., had custody of S.R. but was arrested and incarcerated. Sh.R. left S.R. in his home in the care of S.R.’s paternal grandmother, J.R. On November 22, while Sh.R. was still incarcerated, police responded to Sh.R.’s home concerning a physical altercation involving J.R. and her roommate. J.R., who appeared impaired, admitted to using methamphetamine while caring for S.R., and a “meth pipe” was located in the bedroom where S.R. slept. Appealed Order at 2. DCS filed a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) petition, removed S.R. from Sh.R.’s care, and placed him in Mother's care. The CHINS petition was ultimately dismissed the following month after Mother obtained custody of S.R.

[3] DCS next became involved with Mother and S.R. in late April 2022, when Mother, S.R., and J.B. lived with J.B.’s father, R.B. DCS investigated an allegation of “educational neglect and delinquent dental care and oral hygiene” regarding S.R. Id. S.R. had multiple teeth that were substantially decayed, his dental health was “very poor,” and he required surgery. Tr. at 54. S.R. also had behavioral problems at school. After Mother failed to take the necessary steps to obtain the help S.R. needed, DCS filed another CHINS petition regarding S.R. in June 2022 but did not remove S.R. from Mother's care at that time. At the July 11 initial hearing, the court ordered S.R. to remain in Mother's home but admonished Mother regarding “the seriousness of the medical and educational condition of the child.” Id.

[4] The following month, the court adjudicated S.R. a CHINS after Mother executed a stipulation as to the facts contained in the CHINS petition. The court then entered its dispositional decree in October, ordering Mother into reunification services, including remaining in contact with DCS, completing a parenting assessment, and submitting to random drug screens. S.R. remained in Mother's care, along with J.B.

[5] At a review hearing held in November 2022, the court found that Mother had complied with the case plan and had cooperated with DCS and medical and dental providers. At the next review hearing held in February 2023, the court found that Mother had cooperated with school and medical providers and ordered S.R. to remain in Mother's care. However, in May 2023, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, and services “were incorporated to address Mother's substance abuse issues.” Appealed Order at 3.

[6] By the time of the June 2023 permanency hearing, “[m]atters in the home were deteriorating due to Mother's substance abuse and inability to supervise.” Id. Mother “had begun locking [S.R.] in his room which was a safety hazard in the event of fire,” and she “lacked insight to into the seriousness of this matter [as] expressed to her by” the Family Case Manager (“FCM”), the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”), and the family preservation service provider. Id. Mother continued to lock S.R. in his bedroom, allegedly “for safety reasons,” despite DCS providing her with door alarms and the family preservation provider reviewing parenting skills with her. Tr. at 64.

[7] In addition, DCS determined that there were discrepancies with S.R.’s ADHD medication, in that the pill count was off, and DCS asked Mother to submit to a drug screen. Mother did so and tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine. In its permanency order, the court noted the positive drug screen and admonished Mother that another positive result could prompt DCS to seek court-ordered substance abuse treatment and/or remove S.R. from Mother's care “to ensure a sober caregiver.” Appealed Order at 4.

[8] The following month, the CASA requested that the court remove S.R. from Mother's care because he “continue[d] to be in danger of physical and emotional neglect.” Ex. v. 2 at 167. At the August review hearing, the court found that S.R. should remain in Mother's care, but it ordered Mother into additional services, including random drug screens through Cordant. The court further ordered that Mother must ensure that S.R. received a medication management evaluation and that he be seen by a medical provider to assess malnutrition concerns. However, a DCS progress report filed on September 1 and a CASA report filed on September 7 indicated that Mother's compliance with services had deteriorated, and she was facing eviction.

[9] On September 12, 2023, the court entered an order authorizing S.R.’s removal from Mother after finding that Mother: had been unable to ensure S.R.’s safety despite intensive services in the home; had not submitted to random drug screens or attended her psychological evaluation; had not ensured S.R.’s academic progress; had not administered S.R.’s medication properly; and had failed to ensure housing stability. DCS placed S.R. with J.B.’s paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”).

[10] The next day, DCS filed a CHINS petition regarding J.B., based on the removal of S.R., Mother's substance abuse issues, and the filing of eviction proceedings against Mother. At the subsequent detention hearing, the court ordered J.B. removed and placed in Grandmother's care. In November, the court adjudicated J.B. a CHINS, to which Mother had stipulated, and it subsequently ordered Mother to participate in services. Meanwhile, in its November review order in S.R.’s case, the court found that Mother had not complied with the case plan, had failed to complete her psychological evaluation, had not commenced substance abuse recovery, and had tested positive for methamphetamine.

[11] DCS referred Mother to Purposeful Parenting with Breyonnah Davis for parenting education and support starting in December 2023. However, Mother was not forthcoming and engaged in blaming others. Davis did not believe that additional parenting services would remedy the reasons that had caused Children's removal, and ultimately, Davis closed the service out. In January 2024, DCS referred Mother to Meridian Health Services for substance abuse treatment, and Ashlea Gernand, a licensed mental health counselor, provided intensive outpatient therapy starting in March 2024. However, Mother tested positive for cocaine during treatment, which she failed to complete, and Meridian closed its services for noncompliance. Gernand recommended that Mother needed inpatient treatment.

[12] At the March 2024 permanency hearing for both Children, the court found that Mother had partially complied with the case plan in that she had maintained contact with DCS, participated in Purposeful Parenting, and completed her psychological intake, but she also had “failed therapy,” failed drug screens, and failed to obtain stable housing. Appealed Order at 5. The court changed the permanency plan for S.R. to adoption and maintained reunification as the plan for J.B. However, in June, the court changed J.B.’s permanency plan to adoption after finding that Mother had not complied with her parenting educator, had completed only one therapy session, had “continued to test positive for illicit substances,” had not participated consistently in substance abuse treatment, and had continued to have unstable housing. Id.

[13] On June 20, 2024, DCS filed termination petitions regarding Children. The court held a permanency hearing on September 11 and found that Mother continued to test positive for illicit substances and struggle with housing instability. The next day, the court held the termination hearing.

[14] At the time of the termination hearing, Children remained in the care of Grandmother, who was “able to provide a loving and stable home for [Children] to ensure their medical and dental care and education.” Id. at 7. S.R.’s dental care had been so deficient at the time of the CHINS petition that he “was believed to be non-verbal,” and Mother had not been “prompt and diligent about providing for [S.R.]’s dental care” and had “complied [in obtaining such care] only upon the insistence of DCS and [the] CASA.” Id. However, by the time of the termination hearing, S.R. had received regular dental care while in relative placement, and he spoke clearly. Moreover, since being removed from Mother's care, S.R. had been behaving appropriately in school and maintaining his academic performance.

[15] While Mother had consistently visited with Children, she had never progressed to unsupervised visits. And while Mother testified that she was sober and would pass a drug screen, she admitted that she had tested positive for cocaine on March 15 and 17 and June 6, 2024. Tr. at 152, 153. Mother had never completed substance abuse treatment. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had lived with R.B. in an apartment for six months, and she was looking for employment.

[16] DCS's plan for Children was adoption. Both the DCS FCM and the CASA supported termination and opined that adoption was in Children's best interests. The FCM believed this was so because “after two years,” Mother had “been unable to obtain and maintain sobriety and complete a substance abuse treatment program,” and had struggled to maintain housing. Appealed Order at 7. DCS also submitted a summary exhibit of Mother's substance abuse from February to September 2024 that the trial court found “compelling.” Id. at 6. The summary exhibit showed that Mother and R.B. had either missed screens or used similar illegal substances at the same time such that “there would not be a sober caregiver” for Children if they were living in the home. Id.

[17] On October 24, 2024, the court entered its termination order, in which it concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by Mother and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Children's well-being. The court also found that termination is in Children's best interests. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[18] We begin our review by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[19] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:

the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

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(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

(5) That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(5) (2024). In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C.§ 31-37-14-2).

[20] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[21] Here, in terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[22] The trial court's findings of fact include that Mother: has been unable to obtain sobriety; has been unable to obtain employment or stable housing; and has failed to complete a substance abuse treatment program. On appeal, Mother does not challenge any of the factual findings made by the trial court. When findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[23] Mother challenges the court's conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Children's removal or continued placement outside the home probably will not be remedied, and that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parental relationship poses a threat to Children.² Because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, we need only address whether the trial court erred in concluding that there exists a reasonable probability that Mother will not remedy the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or continued placement outside the home.³

[24] When we consider the likelihood of remediation of conditions, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the first step, we consider not only the initial reasons for removal, but also the reasons for continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[25] However, the court must also “evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted); see also In re M.S., 898 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting the “trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development are permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship”).

[26] In evaluating the parent's habitual patterns of conduct, the court may disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and weigh the history of the parent's prior conduct more heavily. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013). And DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Moore, 894 N.E.2d at 226.

[27] As previously observed, Mother does not specifically claim that any finding is unsupported by the evidence. Rather, she contends that the evidence showed that S.R.’s dental health and educational behaviors had improved by the time of the termination hearing, and, therefore, the reasons for S.R.’s removal had been remedied. However, her argument fails to acknowledge three key facts that were also supported by the evidence.

[28] First, it was not Mother who remedied S.R.’s dental health and behavior at school but Grandmother and DCS; in fact, Mother had not been “prompt and diligent about providing for [S.R.]’s dental care” and had “complied [in obtaining such care] only upon the insistence of DCS and [the] CASA.” Appealed Order at 7. It was Grandmother who had been “able to provide a loving and stable home for [Children] to ensure their medical and dental care and education.” Id.

[29] Second, Mother does not say how the conditions that led to J.B.’s removal were likely to be remedied. J.B. was removed primarily because of Mother's substance abuse and housing instability. And, while Mother testified that she and R.B. had housing at the time of the termination hearing, the evidence showed that she and R.B. either had refused drug testing or used similar illegal substances at the same time such that “there would not be a sober caregiver” for Children if they were living in the home. Id. at 6.

[30] Third, the evidence supports the court's conclusion that Mother likely would not remedy the reason Children remained out of her care since September 2023; namely, her unstable housing, continued drug use, and failure to complete a substance abuse treatment program. Mother's habitual unwillingness or lack of commitment to address her substance abuse issues demonstrates the requisite “reasonable probability” that the removal conditions and retention conditions will not change. Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

[31] Mother also briefly asserts that “DCS did not fulfill its obligation as it is required by Indiana Code” to provide her with necessary “assistance,” but she fails to cite any statutory authority to support that argument. Appellant's Br. at 17. Moreover, the evidence shows otherwise; DCS referred Mother to multiple services throughout the CHINS case, including family preservation services in the home, Purposeful Parenting for parenting education and support, and Meridian for substance abuse services. However, Mother never successfully completed any of those services. And Children “cannot wait indefinitely” for Mother “to work toward preservation or reunification.” Matter of Ma.H. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re Ma.H.), 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648).

Conclusion

[32] The uncontested facts clearly and convincingly support the trial court's conclusion that there exists a reasonable probability that Mother is unlikely to remedy the reasons for Children's removal and continued placement outside her home, and that conclusion supports the order terminating Mother's parental rights to Children.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Sh.R., Father of S.R., has filed a separate appeal under Case No. 24A-JT-2845, but neither Sh.R. nor R.B., Father of J.B., participates in this appeal.

2.   Mother asserted only that the State failed to comply with Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)(5) because J.B. was not, on two (2) separate occasions, adjudicated a child in need of services. However, DCS never alleged that the basis for the termination actions is subsection (d)(5); rather, it only asserted that subsections (d)(3) and (4) supported the terminations. See App. at 21, 24.

3.   In addition, we note that, although Mother purports to challenge the conclusion that continuation of the parental relationship poses a threat to Children, she does not articulate any reasoning or argument for that alleged challenge. Similarly, she purports to raise constitutional claims under the First and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution but fails to make any argument in support of those alleged claims. Therefore, Mother's claim regarding the alleged lack of a threat to Children's well-being and her First and Ninth Amendment claims are waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A); see also, e.g., Burnell v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1167, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting the presentation of the appellant's contentions must contain a clear showing of how the issues and contentions relate to the particular facts of the case under review, and we will not review undeveloped arguments).

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.