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Thomas Anthony NADRATOWSKI, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] A jury convicted Thomas Nadratowski of Level 1 felony child molesting after a sexual assault nurse examiner testified about statements Nadratowski's victim, M.F., made during her examination. The statements relayed that Nadratowski performed both sexual intercourse and oral sex with M.F., and they were corroborated by evidence that Nadratowski's DNA was swabbed from M.F.’s external genitalia the day after the incident.
[2] On appeal, Nadratowski claims the trial court committed fundamental error by not sua sponte excluding M.F.’s statements from evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 403. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he molested M.F. We find no error, let alone fundamental error, in the trial court's admission of M.F.’s statements. We also conclude that the statements and DNA evidence sufficiently proved that Nadratowski molested M.F. We therefore affirm.
Facts
[3] On February 25, 2023, twelve-year-old M.F. attended a sleepover at her friend T.H.’s home. Forty-six-year-old Nadratowski—the boyfriend of T.H.’s mother—also lived at the home. T.H. slept in her bedroom that night, but M.F. chose to sleep in a blanket fort in the attic. When Nadratowski heard M.F. stirring in the middle of the night, he went up to the attic and molested her.
[4] The next day, M.F. disclosed the molestation to her mother, who took M.F. to the hospital. There, M.F. was examined by Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Andrea Tennis. After speaking with M.F. about the incident, Nurse Tennis collected DNA swabs from M.F.’s external genitalia (i.e., her labia majora and labia minora). These swabs were ultimately found to contain DNA that was one trillion times more likely to have originated from Nadratowski than from an unknown individual.
[5] Police arrested Nadratowski shortly after M.F.’s hospital examination. The arrest occurred in the presence of two unidentified companions of Nadratowski. And before the arresting officer explained to Nadratowski the reason for his arrest, Nadratowski stated to his companions: “I'm guaranteeing its [M.F.] because I went up that night to talk to [her],” Exh. 6 at 3:48. “I guarantee [M.F.] tried to say I touched her in some way, and I didn't.” Id. at 3:58. “[M.F.’s] trying to say I touched her, and I know I didn't.” Id. at 4:40. “I didn't even touch [M.F.]” Id. at 4:45.
[6] The State charged Nadratowski with Level 1 felony child molesting and alleged he was a habitual offender. At the ensuing jury trial, M.F. testified that Nadratowski hugged, kissed, and rubbed her on the night of the sleepover. But she had difficulty remembering certain details about the incident, including where Nadratowski touched her and with what. Nurse Tennis, however, testified about M.F.’s description of the incident during her examination at the hospital. According to Nurse Tennis, M.F. relayed that Nadratowski had rubbed his penis on her vagina and “smooch[ed]” her vagina with his mouth (the “Hospital Statements”). Tr. Vol. III, p. 23.
[7] The State also presented evidence that Nadratowski's DNA was found on M.F.’s external genitalia and that Nadratowski made incriminating statements at the time of his arrest. The jury ultimately found Nadratowski guilty as charged, after which he admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court then sentenced Nadratowski to a total of 60 years in prison.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Nadratowski appeals only his conviction, challenging the admissibility of the Hospital Statements and the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he molested M.F. Neither claim prevails.
I. Admissibility of the Hospital Statements
[9] Nadratowski first argues that the trial court erred by admitting the Hospital Statements into evidence at trial. But because Nadratowski did not object when the Hospital Statements were offered into evidence, he must establish that their admission was fundamental error. Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. 2010) (“Failure to object at trial waives the issue for review unless fundamental error occurred.”). “Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant's rights as to make a fair trial impossible.” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[10] We find no error, let alone fundamental error, in the trial court's admission of the Hospital Statements. Nadratowski claims the statements were inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 403, which permits a court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice.” According to Nadratowski, the Hospital Statements had minimal probative value because they were offered into evidence for the limited purpose of showing M.F.’s course of treatment and diagnosis. The State contends there was no such limitation, and we agree.
[11] As the Hospital Statements were the only direct evidence of Nadratowski's acts of molestation, they had tremendous probative value. And that value was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. “Unfair prejudice looks to the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021). While the Hospital Statements were undoubtedly prejudicial to Nadratowski's defense, “all relevant evidence” in a criminal prosecution is “inherently prejudicial.” Id. at 1194. We find nothing illegitimate, improper, or otherwise unfair about the Hospital Statements’ persuasive effect. Thus, Evidence Rule 403 did not require their exclusion.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[12] Nadratowski next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. Id. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[13] To convict Nadratowski of Level 1 felony child molesting, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally performed or submitted to “sexual intercourse” or “other sexual conduct” with M.F. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a). Nadratowski claims the State failed to prove he engaged in any of these acts. We disagree.
[14] “Sexual intercourse” is defined by statute to mean “an act that includes any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-302. The statute “does not require that the vagina be penetrated, only that the female sex organ be penetrated.” Thompson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1307, 1311 (Ind. 1996). And “[p]recedent makes clear that proof of the slightest penetration of the female sex organ, including penetration of the external genitalia, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for child molestation based on sexual intercourse.” Boggs v. State, 104 N.E.3d 1287, 1288 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[15] Here, the Hospital Statements revealed that Nadratowski rubbed his penis on M.F.’s vagina. And the DNA swabs from M.F.’s external genitalia contained DNA that was one trillion times more likely to have originated from Nadratowski than from an unknown individual. From this evidence, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Nadratowski performed sexual intercourse with M.F.
[16] The jury also could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Nadratowski performed other sexual conduct with M.F. “Other sexual conduct” is defined by statute to include “an act involving a sex organ of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5(1) (cleaned up). Here, the Hospital Statements revealed that Nadratowski “smooch[ed]” M.F.’s vagina with his mouth. Tr. Vol. III, p. 23. This evidence alone was sufficient to support Nadratowski's conviction. See Feyka v. State, 972 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding victim's testimony that defendant put his mouth on her vagina sufficient to prove other sexual conduct).
Conclusion
[17] Finding the Hospital Statements were not inadmissible and that sufficient evidence supports Nadratowski's conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting, we affirm.
affirmed
Weissmann, Judge.
Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-1242
Decided: March 24, 2025
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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