IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.W. (Mother) and J.W. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] S.W. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to one of her children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the biological mother of J.W. (“Child”), born in March 2022. Paternity for Child was never established. Mother has a long history of Department of Child Services (DCS) involvement, beginning in 2012. Mother has another child, K.W., born in January 2012, who was removed and adjudicated a child in need of services (CHINS) several months after her birth because Mother was homeless and unable to care for her or provide her with a stable living environment. During that CHINS case, Mother was diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive disorder but refused to take medication, was combative with service providers, and didn't complete the recommended therapy or home-based services. In 2015, Mother's parental rights to K.W. were terminated after Mother “wholly failed to remedy” the reasons for K.W.’s removal and continued placement outside the home. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 56.

[3] On March 8, 2022, the day after Child was born, Mother underwent a psychiatric evaluation and was found to exhibit psychosis, paranoia, and delusions. The psychiatrist determined that Mother “could not be safely discharged” with Child, so DCS detained Child at the hospital and later placed him in foster care, where he has since remained. Id. at 35. DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS due to Mother's unaddressed mental-health issues and inability to provide care or a safe home for Child. The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for Child and a separate GAL for Mother. In May, after Mother admitted to some of the allegations in the petition, the court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS and issued a dispositional order requiring Mother to, among other things, maintain safe and appropriate housing, complete a diagnostic assessment and follow all recommendations, participate in home-based casework, and attend and appropriately participate in visitation.

[4] Child “has significant medical needs that require around the clock supervision,” including swallowing issues, neurological issues, and developmental delays. Id. at 57. But Mother “contended that [Child] did not have medical issues” and “did not believe that [his] appointments were necessary [or] that his diagnoses were accurate.” Id. at 57, 58. In June 2022, Child was hospitalized because he wasn't gaining weight, and his physician recommended a gastric tube. When Mother refused to consent to the tube placement, DCS had to get a court order for the procedure. The court also ordered Mother to have supervised visitation with Child at the hospital. At one visit, Mother “pulled plugs that were feeding [Child] from the wall,” and when the DCS Family Case Manager tried to intervene, Mother “shoved” her, and the police had to be called. Tr. p. 28.

[5] In July, Mother was charged with Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief, to which she eventually pled guilty and was sentenced to a year of probation. At a hearing in that case, Mother was found in contempt of court for “yell[ing] and curs[ing], exclaiming the f-word and the s-word multiple times” and ordered to serve twenty days in jail. Id. at 145. While Mother was in jail, DCS had to get another court order so Child could be sedated for an MRI. The court later ordered Mother not to attend Child's medical appointments due to her disruptive behavior during the appointments, including insisting that Child didn't need a gastric tube and, on one occasion, trying to pull the tube out.

[6] In December, the court ordered Mother to undergo a psychological evaluation. Dr. David Lombard evaluated Mother in early 2023 and diagnosed her with schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, and marijuana- and alcohol-use disorder and recommended medication management, dialectical behavior therapy, and skills training. Dr. Lombard found that Mother “demonstrated significant paranoia with the belief that others were trying to harm her” and is “at high risk for neglect and abuse of children.” Id. at 34, 35. Mother sued Dr. Lombard twice in small-claims court, claiming his evaluation “was not done appropriately and caused her harm.” Id. at 35.

[7] In September 2023, Mother began therapy with Megan Harman at SCAN. During her intake, Mother told Harman that someone impersonated her during the evaluation with Dr. Lombard. At first, Mother was engaged in therapy, but when Harman recommended psychiatric care and medication, Mother refused. At one appointment, Mother “became combative, had to be escorted out of SCAN, and services ended.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 57. Mother also sued Harman in small-claims court, alleging that Harman “ruined her ability to move forward in the [CHINS] case.” Tr. p. 43.

[8] Mother similarly struggled with home-based casework. The goal of the casework was to assist with housing and employment, but Mother never obtained her own housing and instead stayed with friends, in emergency housing, or at motels. At some points, she was homeless, but she was unable to stay overnight at a local homeless shelter because she refused to take her medication. Mother had bouts of employment but couldn't maintain a job—she would quit jobs and sue the employers “because she felt like they were stealing money” from her or that “there was some sort of mischievous behavior happening.” Id. at 72.

[9] At a detention hearing in October 2023, the court found that Child was not bonded with Mother and reduced Mother's visitation time because Child would “interact[ ] with the visitation supervisor more than [Mother]” and “become extremely dysregulated, cranky and irritable” after visits. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 56.

[10] In November, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. The termination hearing was held in June 2024. Halfway through the first day of the hearing, Mother “advised [her counsel] that she has heart problems, that ․ her chest hurt, and ․ that she was going to the hospital” and left court. Tr. p. 61. Mother's counsel moved for a continuance, to which DCS and Child's GAL objected, arguing that Mother “was here earlier” and “was walking fine” and that “it just seems like this is a delay tactic on [M]other's end.” Id. at 62. The court denied the motion to continue, noting that “[i]f [Mother] was indeed having a medical emergency,” the court could've gotten her help instead of Mother “walking out observed to be pretty able-bodied in doing so.” Id. at 63.

[11] Mother appeared for the second day of the termination hearing. At the start, her counsel moved to exclude the evidence heard in Mother's absence the first day, and the trial court denied the motion. When asked whether she believes Child has medical issues, Mother responded that “[h]e has normal issues that most little kids have” and said he “was healthy at birth.” Id. at 123, 137. Mother testified that she was attending individual therapy weekly, was on a wait list for government housing, and had visitation with Child for one hour a week.

[12] In July, the court terminated Mother's parental rights to Child.

[13] Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Mother's due-process rights were not violated

[14] Mother first contends her due-process rights were violated when the termination hearing proceeded in her absence. When the State seeks to terminate a parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). “ ‘[T]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[t]he process due in a termination of parental rights proceeding turns on the balancing of three [Mathews] factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” Id. Because both a parent's and the State's countervailing interests are substantial, when faced with a claim of denial of due process in a termination case, we focus on the second factor: the risk of error created by DCS's and the trial court's actions. Id. at 917-18.

[15] Mother claims her due-process rights were violated when the trial court denied her counsel's motion to continue on the first day of the termination hearing “despite her being absent due to becoming ill, and she was therefore prevented from participating in the [hearing].” Appellant's Br. p. 12. Though Mother was absent that afternoon, her counsel and GAL were present and had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses (which her counsel did), so the risk of error in proceeding without Mother, if any, was minimal. See In re C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (where mother did not appear for termination hearing, finding that “counsel's representation of Mother's interests at the ․ hearing vastly reduced the risk of error, which was minimal”). And Mother had an opportunity to be heard on the second day of the hearing, which she attended in its entirety and during which she testified at length. See In re C.G., 933 N.E.2d 494, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding no due-process violation where “Mother's counsel vigorously cross-examined DCS's witnesses on both days of the hearing and introduced evidence in defense of the action,” and “Mother testified on both days of the hearing, so her version of events was presented to the trial court”), aff'd, 954 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. 2011). Given that Mother was present for most of the two-day termination hearing and was represented by counsel and a GAL throughout, we cannot say that conducting an afternoon of the hearing in Mother's absence violated her due-process rights.

II. The trial court did not err in concluding there is a reasonable probability that Mother will not remedy the conditions that led to Child's removal and continued placement outside the home

[16] Mother also argues there is insufficient evidence to meet the statutory requirements for termination. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016).

[17] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023).¹ DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. If the trial court finds the allegations are true, the court “shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[18] Mother challenges the trial court's determination that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. We first note that the trial court also concluded that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being, and Mother does not challenge this conclusion. Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) (2023) is written in the disjunctive and requires the trial court to find only one of the three provisions has been established by clear and convincing evidence, “[s]tanding alone, the finding that the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the child[ ] satisfies the requirement listed in subsection (B).” In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Thus, Mother's challenge to the court's conditions-remedied conclusion is inconsequential because even without this conclusion, Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is satisfied.

[19] Even so, there is sufficient evidence to support the court's determination that there is reasonable probability Mother will not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home. In making this determination, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis: first, the court identifies what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. This second step requires the court to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, considering evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014).

[20] Mother contends that by the time of the termination hearing, “the reasons for DCS involvement were either remedied, or very nearly so.” Appellant's Br. p. 21. This is simply untrue. To begin, Mother has never accepted Child's medical diagnoses or shown an ability to provide him with the care he needs. She didn't believe his appointments or the procedures his doctors recommended were necessary, so DCS had to get court orders for the procedures. Throughout the proceedings, Mother insisted Child didn't need a gastric tube, and at one visit, she tried to pull out the tube, leading the court to eventually prohibit her from attending Child's appointments due to her disruptive behavior. And Mother still hadn't accepted Child's medical issues by the time of the termination hearing—she testified that Child was healthy at birth and merely “has normal issues that most little kids have.”

[21] Though Mother underwent a psychological evaluation as ordered and participated in some services, she has not benefitted from them. Rather than taking medication as Dr. Lombard recommended, Mother claimed someone impersonated her during her evaluation and sued Dr. Lombard twice in small-claims court because she didn't agree with his diagnoses. Mother initially engaged in therapy but refused Harman's recommendation for medication and psychiatric treatment. Harman eventually had to end services after Mother became combative during a session and had to be escorted out, and then Mother sued Harman. And Mother still wasn't taking the recommended medication by the time of the termination hearing. Additionally, Mother didn't achieve any goals of her home-based casework. Her employment was sporadic and she often quit her jobs and then sued her former employers because she thought they were stealing her money. She never secured her own housing and instead stayed at friends’ homes, shelters, or motels or was homeless. At the time of the hearing, Mother was on a wait list for housing but was still living at a shelter. As our Supreme Court has noted, “simply going through the motions of receiving services alone is not sufficient if the services do not result in the needed change.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 50 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied. The evidence supports the court's conclusion that there is reasonable probability Mother will not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective March 11, 2024, several months after DCS filed its termination petition in this case. See Pub. L. No. 70-2024, § 4. In ruling on the petition, the trial court applied the pre-amendment version of the statute. Mother does not argue that this was erroneous, so we do the same.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.