PERKINS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] James D. Perkins appeals the trial court's calculation of his accrued credit time in Cause No. 03C01-2308-F6-4154 (“F6-4154”) and Cause No. 03C01-2306-F6-2910 (“F6-2910”). Perkins argues that the trial court failed to award him proper accrued credit time, but we conclude that Perkins is not entitled to additional accrued credit time. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Perkins raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly awarded Perkins’ accrued credit time.

Facts

[3] On June 8, 2023, the State charged Perkins with auto theft, a Level 6 felony, in F6-2910. Perkins was in custody as of June 14, 2023, and Perkins posted bond on August 3, 2023.

[4] On August 8, 2023, the State charged Perkins with theft, a Level 6 felony, in F6-4154, and a warrant was issued. When Perkins failed to appear at a hearing in F6-2910 on August 28, 2023, another warrant was issued. Perkins was in custody on the warrants as of September 21, 2023.

[5] On October 19, 2023, the trial court reinstated the original bond in F6-2910. As a condition of release in F6-2910, the trial court ordered Perkins “to follow all conditions of the Pretrial Release Report filed in” F6-4154. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 90. Perkins posted bond on November 3, 2023. After Perkins failed to appear for another hearing, warrants were again issued in both cases. Perkins was in custody again on May 8, 2024.

[6] On June 27, 2024, Perkins pleaded guilty to auto theft, a Level 6 felony, in F6-2910, and theft, a Class A misdemeanor, in F6-4154.¹ At the sentencing hearing on July 18, 2024, the presentence investigation report indicated that Perkins had accrued credit time in F6-2910 for 166 actual days in jail (6/14/23 to 8/3/23; 9/21/23 to 11/3/23; and 5/8/24 to 7/17/24) and that Perkins had accrued credit time in F6-4154 for 115 actual days in jail (9/21/23 to 11/3/23 and 5/8/24 to 7/17/24). The trial court sentenced Perkins to 360 days in jail in F6-4154 consecutive to 912 days in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) in F6-2910.² The trial court awarded Perkins 166 days of accrued credit time in F6-4154 with 166 days of good time credit. The trial court did not award Perkins any accrued credit time in F6-2910. Perkins now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Perkins argues that the trial court erred in calculating his accrued credit time. According to Perkins, the trial court erred by failing to give him accrued credit time in F6-2190.³

[8] “Because pre-sentence jail time credit is a statutory right, trial courts have no discretion in awarding or denying that credit.” Glover v. State, 177 N.E.3d 884, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. A defendant's “ ‘time spent in confinement before sentencing applies toward [the defendant's] fixed term of imprisonment.’ ” Id. at 885-86 (quoting Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ind. 2004)); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-3-2 (noting that a judgment must include “the amount of credit time earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing, including time on pretrial home detention”).

[9] To determine whether a prisoner is entitled to pre-trial credit for actual time served, we must determine whether the defendant was confined before trial and whether that confinement was the result of the criminal charge for which the sentence is being imposed. Maciaszek v. State, 75 N.E.3d 1089, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. It is well-settled that,

[i]f a person incarcerated awaiting trial on more than one charge is sentenced to concurrent terms for the separate crimes, he or she is entitled to receive credit time applied against each separate term. However, if the defendant receives consecutive terms, he or she is only allowed credit time against the total or aggregate of the terms.

Id.; see also State v. Lotaki, 4 N.E.3d 656, 657 (Ind. 2014) (“[W]hen consecutive sentences are involved, credit time is deducted from the aggregate total of the consecutive sentences, not from an individual sentence.”) (per curiam).

[10] Here, Perkins received consecutive terms for his sentences in F6-2910 and F6-4154. Accordingly, he is only allowed accrued credit time against the aggregate sentence, not both sentences as he argues. Perkins’ 166 days of accrued credit time can only be applied one time, not to both sentences. The trial court applied the accrued credit time to Perkins’ sentence in F6-4154, and Perkins was not entitled to further accrued credit time in F6-2910.⁴ Accordingly, the trial court's accrued credit time award was not erroneous.⁵

Conclusion

[11] The trial court's accrued credit time award was proper, and accordingly, we affirm.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The plea agreement provided: “You have credit days from September 21, 2023 to November 3, 2023; June 14, 2023 to August 3, 2023; then from May 8, 2024 to present.” Tr. Vol. II p. 56.

2.   The trial court recommended that the DOC place Perkins “in a dual diagnosis facility that accommodates both substance use and mental health.” Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 165.

3.   Perkins does not appeal the good time credit calculation.

4.   To the extent the trial court erred by applying the 166 days of accrued credit time to Perkins’ sentence in F6-4154 rather than his sentence in F6-2910, any error was harmless. In Paul v. State, 177 N.E.3d 472, 476 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), we noted that, after our Supreme Court's opinion in Lotaki,[O]ur legislature substantially revised Indiana criminal law and eliminated the uniform credit time class. See I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1, -4 (2014). Under the new system, sentences could carry different rates for earning good time credit. Id. Because of this potential for differences, courts must allocate credit time to a specific sentence. Indeed, without knowing which sentence produced the good time credit, it would not be possible to accurately calculate the time remaining in the aggregate term.Under Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-4(a), “[a] person: (1) who is not a credit restricted felon; and (2) who is imprisoned for a Level 6 felony or a misdemeanor or imprisoned awaiting trial or sentencing for a Level 6 felony or misdemeanor; is initially assigned to Class A.” (emphasis added). Here, Perkins was convicted of a Level 6 felony and a Class A misdemeanor, which are in the same good time credit class. Accordingly, the concerns expressed in Paul are not applicable here.

5.   Perkins also argues that he is entitled to five months of accrued credit for the time he was on pretrial release from November 4, 2023, through April 12, 2024, because his “liberty was restricted” during this time period. Appellant's Br. p. 10. Perkins, however, was not on home detention or incarcerated during this time.Perkins concedes that no relevant authority supports his assertion that he was entitled to credit time on pretrial release. See Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1 (noting credit for pretrial home detention); Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220, 224 n.6 (Ind. 1999) (“Absent legislative direction, we believe that a defendant is only entitled to credit toward sentence for pre-trial time served in a prison, jail or other facility which imposes substantially similar restrictions upon personal liberty.”). Accordingly, Perkins’ argument fails.

Tavitas, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.