Cr.B. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Cn.B. (“Child”) is the biological child of Cr.B. (“Father”) and S.B. (“Mother”).¹ A petition alleging Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) was filed because of alleged domestic violence, substance abuse, and educational neglect. The trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS and entered a dispositional order. Father failed to successfully complete substance abuse and domestic violence referrals, and he continued to drink alcohol and use illegal substances, so a petition to terminate his parental rights was filed. After a hearing, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights to Child. Father now challenges that termination and presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence during the termination hearing; and

2. Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born on July 29, 2013. In February 2022, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report alleging that Child was “bouncing around between both parents,” Mother was struggling with substance abuse, Mother and Father's relationship was violent, and Child was struggling academically due to excessive tardiness and absences. Ex. Vol. I at 32. After investigating this report, DCS requested a Program of Informal Adjustment, which the trial court approved.

[4] On June 29, 2022, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS due to domestic violence in the home, the poor condition of the home, Mother's substance abuse, and Father and Mother's failure to obtain medical care for Child after he was bitten by a dog. The Child was then removed from Father and Mother's care.

[5] After an evidentiary hearing on August 11, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS. In making this determination, the trial court found in relevant part that (1) Father has “at least four (4) separate pending criminal matters including charges of Battery Against a Public Safety Official, Domestic Battery committed in the presence of a child less than 16 years old, Public Intoxication, Resisting Law Enforcement, Invasion of Privacy, and Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury,” Ex. Vol. I at 138–39; (2) “Father uses illicit substances such as, but not limited to, marijuana and methamphetamine,” id. at 139; (3) local law enforcement is frequently at Father's residence, with at least one officer responding to nine calls at the residence since May 1, 2022; (3) on May 27, 2022, “Father was under the influence of alcohol or illicit drugs” and battered his girlfriend, for which he was arrested, id.; (4) on June 7, 2022, officers received reports that Father, who “had been drinking all day,” was “harassing neighbors,” and when Father was arrested, he head-butted an officer, id.; (5) a “female neighbor has a protective order against father,” and on June 27, 2022, Father “was yelling and screaming at the female neighbor,” for which he was arrested, id.

[6] In the ensuing dispositional order, the trial court ordered Father to, among other things, (1) abstain from illegal substances and alcohol, (2) complete a substance abuse assessment, (3) submit to random drug screens, and (4) refrain from committing acts of domestic violence. The trial court also discharged the Program for Informal Adjustment as unsuccessful.

[7] At a hearing on November 27, 2023, DCS requested Child's permanency plan be changed from reunification to adoption, but the trial court “gave parents an additional ninety days.” Tr. Vol. II at 111. After a hearing on February 26, 2024, the trial court changed Child's permanency plan from reunification to adoption. On March 5, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child. On August 8, the trial court held the evidentiary hearing on DCS's termination petition. During that hearing, DCS offered into evidence several exhibits pertaining to Father's criminal cases that were then pending. The trial court admitted those exhibits over Father's objections.

[8] On August 28, the trial court issued its order terminating Father's parental rights to Child. In that order, the trial court concluded in relevant part that there was “a reasonable probability that ․ the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by Father” and there was “a reasonable probability that ․ continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child's wellbeing.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 63. These conclusions were based in part on the following relevant findings of fact:

6. On May 30, 2024, DCS filed recommendations from [Child]’s therapist and visitation with Father ceased. Father has not visited [Child] since one 50 minutes supervised visit which occurred in April. [Child]’s behaviors have improved since ceasing visitation with his Father․

7. Father was arrested for events that occurred when the [CHINS] Petitions were filed and they remain as unresolved felony charges [for resisting law enforcement, various types of battery, driving while suspended, disorderly conduct, public intoxication, criminal recklessness, and unlawful carrying of a handgun]. Father has resolved misdemeanor cases involving Invasion of Privacy and Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury․

8. Father lacks insight regarding his own alcoholism and how it affects his behavior negatively causing aggression and violent outbursts which has caused substantial trauma to [Child] pursuant to his therapist ․

9. Father's anger and aggression fueled by his alcoholism resulting in Petitions for Protective Order and Protective Orders being entered against him by his neighboring sister-in-law and former girlfriend ․ Father lacks insight into how these incidents of domestic violence impact [Child] and his resulting trauma.

10. Father was ordered to participate in Domestic Violence Batterer's Intervention Programming. Despite three separate referrals open from November 2022 until August 2024, Father never completed the much needed domestic violence services. Father cites employment and hospitalization as barriers. Father was neither employed nor hospitalized when he missed his four most recent consecutive sessions on July 15, July 22, July 29 and August 5, 2024 ․

* * *

12. Father reported repeated and chronic alcohol use to his medical providers when seeking medical care for the effects of his alcoholism. Despite his ongoing alcoholism as demonstrated by his medical records and drug screens ․ , Father was not engaged in any ongoing substance abuse treatment. Father did not participate in referrals by the Department of Child Services and was unable to provide documentation of his own attempts at treatment.

13. [Child] has been in licensed foster care placement ․ since January. He is excelling in his home and his academic performance and drastically improved in this stable and nurturing environment ․

* * *

16․ Since November 2023, CASA has advocated for a Permanency Plan of Adoption and believes it is in [Child]’s best interests to be adopted by his current foster [f]ather and that returning to his Father's care would be harmful to [Child] and cause further trauma.

17․ At the Initial Hearing [on the termination petition,] Father declined a public defender and indicated his desire to hire private counsel for the Fact Finding hearing set on Mary 16, 2024.

Father had failed to retain counsel by the Status hearing on April 22, 2024. The Fact Finding hearing was continued on August 8, 2024. Father had still not retained counsel by the Second Status of Counsel Hearing on July 29, 2024. The Court indicated that the Fact Finding hearing would not be continued and that a public defender would be appointed who was available on the day of the scheduled Fact Finding Hearing.

․ Father appeared at the Fact Finding hearing on August 8, 2024 and reported feeling ill ․

The Court finds that each of these actions by Father are directly related to his alcoholism and represent a pattern of the negative effects of alcohol abuse.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 59–61. Father now appeals.²

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Certain Evidence at the Termination Hearing

[9] Father claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at the termination hearing. In particular, Father contends the trial court erred by admitting Exhibits 55 through 59. At the termination hearing, DCS offered into evidence Exhibits 55 and 56, which were police reports related to two of the criminal matters Father was facing at the time. Father objected to the admission of the reports on hearsay grounds, so DCS clarified that it was offering the reports “for the limited purposes for [Father]’s statements only,” Tr. Vol. II at 83. The trial court admitted Exhibits 55 and 56 “for the limited purpose of ․ [Father]’s statements, as well as dates and times that may be identified within those records.” Id. at 84. The trial court further stated that it would “not consider any statements made by any other person within those records.” Id.

[10] DCS also offered into evidence Exhibits 57, 58, and 59, which were the Chronological Case Summaries and related documents for three other of Father's criminal cases; DCS requested the admission of these exhibits be limited to non-hearsay. Father objected to these exhibits based on hearsay. The trial court took judicial notice of the three cases and admitted Exhibits 57, 58, and 59 with the caveat that it would “only consider the date, time, and location of law enforcement response, as well as the judicial officer's determination of probable cause existed for the arrest and charges that were identified in that probable cause.” Tr. Vol. II at 86.; see also id. at 87, 88.

[11] We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 424 (2024). “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)).

[12] Father claims Exhibits 55 through 59 were inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(8)(B)(i) because they “were investigative reports by police from various departments and contained statements made to police outside of Court verbally by persons and in writing while conducting their investigations.” Appellant's Br. at 22. However, Father fails to acknowledge that DCS limited its offerings of Exhibits 55 through 59 to only the non-hearsay statements contained therein; he further fails to acknowledge that the trial court limited the admission of those exhibits accordingly. Father does not explain how the trial court's decisions to admit Exhibits 55 through 59 were an abuse of discretion in light of the limitations placed thereon. That is, Father does not provide any argument on whether the admitted portions of Exhibits 55 through 59 constituted inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Exhibits 55 through 59 for the limited purposes of Father's statements contained therein; the dates, times, and locations of law enforcement involvement; and the judicial officers’ determinations of probable cause for Father's arrests and charges.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err by Terminating Father's Parental Rights to Child

[13] Father challenges the trial court's termination of his parental rights over Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied. To terminate Father's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that, among other things, there is a reasonable probability (a) the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied or (b) the continuation of Father's relationship with Child poses a threat to the well-being of Child. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023);³ id. § 31-37-14-2.

[14] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Father does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.

[15] Father specifically challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied. In making this argument, Father does not specifically challenge any of the trial court's findings; consequently, we take all the trial court's findings as true, see R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). To the extent Father's arguments can be read to challenge particular findings or conclusions, those arguments are merely invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). For example, Father argues “DCS has not shown that the conditions resulting in removal of Child have not been remedied” because, among other things, DCS did not present evidence that domestic violence was ongoing, DCS did not present evidence that “Father currently consumed alcohol,” and “Father took great strides to improve himself ․ and ․ substantially complied with the Court's orders and with what DCS required of him.” Appellant's Br. at 22.

[16] Contrary to Father's assertions, the record reveals that Father never completed domestic violence services despite receiving three separate referrals for those services. Father reported chronic alcohol use to medical providers through at least June 2024. The record further reveals that Father was not engaged in ongoing substance abuse treatment and did not successfully complete DCS's substance abuse-related referrals. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Father has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for Child's removal or placement outside of Father's care.⁴ Therefore, the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights to Child was not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[17] In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Exhibits 55 through 59, and its decision to terminate Father's parental rights to Child was not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother consented to Child's adoption and thus does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Father fails to support with citations to the record numerous statements of fact in his Statement of Case, Statement of Facts, and Argument, as required by Indiana Appellate Rules 46(A)(5), 46(A)(6)(a), and 46(A)(8)(a), respectively. Father also fails to include all relevant facts in his Statement of Facts, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(6). For example, Father does not include the details of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on the termination petition in his Statement of Facts; instead, he includes those details in only his Argument. Similarly, Father does not provide any facts concerning the limitations DCS requested and the trial court placed on the admission of the evidence Father now challenges. Father further fails to provide a separate heading and the applicable standard of review for his evidentiary claim, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b). Despite Father's noncompliance with our Appellate Rules, we choose to address the merits of his claims, particularly because this appeal concerns Father's parental rights to Child. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015); In re M.I., 127 N.E.3d 1168, 1171 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Neal v. DeKalb Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child., 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 2003)). However, we remind counsel that the purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

3.   Neither Father nor DCS contend that the version of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 that went into effect on March 11, 2024, applies to this case. We therefore assume without deciding that the version of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 in effect prior to March 11, 2024, applies.

4.   Father also argues that the trial court erred by concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii). The trial court was required to find only that one prong of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) has been established. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed.Because we agree with the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in Child's removal from Father's care would not be remedied, we need not address his argument directed at the “threat” prong of Section 4(b)(2)(B). See id.Furthermore, to the extent Father is challenging the trial court's conclusion that termination of his parental rights is in Child's best interest, Father has waived that argument for our review by failing to present cogent argument thereon. See Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1267; App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Foley concur. Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.