ROJO v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After kicking in the fender of a truck, Michael Scott Rojo was convicted of misdemeanor criminal mischief and ordered to pay $1,700 in restitution to repair the damage. He appeals his conviction and the restitution order, but we find sufficient evidence supports both. However, we remand for clarification of a discrepancy in the sentencing order regarding whether Rojo was placed on probation.

Facts

[2] In March 2023, Trent Crawford parked outside an apartment complex and waited to be picked up for a ride to the airport. He had parked his truck in such a way that it blocked a sidewalk leading from the complex to the street. When Rojo and his mother walked out of the complex, they noticed Crawford's vehicle blocking the sidewalk. Rojo approached the passenger side of the truck and yelled at Crawford about his parking. Rojo then “planted his foot on the passenger fender of the truck” and kicked it, causing a sizeable dent in the front panel. Tr. Vol. II, p. 25.

[3] Crawford called police, and a responding officer took photographs of the damage and collected his vehicle information. Rojo was later charged with Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief. At a bench trial, Crawford recounted the incident, testifying that Rojo yelled at him and kicked his truck. Crawford then explained that when he first took his vehicle to a repair shop in 2023, the estimate was $890 to fix the fender. However, the cost of the repair increased to $1,700 when he went back to the shop for an updated estimate a week before the June 2024 trial. Crawford testified that according to the repair shop, labor and material costs had increased.

[4] The trial court ultimately found Rojo guilty as charged and sentenced him to 365 days in jail, all suspended, with $2 in fines, $189 in court costs, and $1,700 in restitution. Rojo appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] On appeal, Rojo challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both his conviction and the amount of his restitution. Unpersuaded by either argument, we affirm. However, we remand for clarification of a sentencing discrepancy as to whether Rojo was ordered to probation.

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[6] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without reweighing it or reassessing witness credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm the conviction “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[7] To convict Rojo of criminal mischief as a Class A misdemeanor, the State was required to prove that he recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damaged Crawford's property without his consent, causing a pecuniary loss of at least $750 but less than $50,000. See Indiana Code § 35-43-1-2(a)(1). Rojo argues that the State failed to prove the pecuniary loss met the $750 minimum threshold for elevating the offense to a Class A misdemeanor. We disagree.

[8] The evidence most favorable to the judgment provides substantial support that the damage exceeded the statutory threshold at the time of the offense. Critically, police documented the damage with photographs taken on the day of the incident, providing the court with contemporaneous visual evidence of the severity of the damage. Crawford testified that after the incident, he obtained a repair quote of $890, which exceeded the statutory threshold of $750. Though this initial estimate was only identified as being from sometime in 2023, a reasonable factfinder could conclude it reflected the damage value at the time of the offense since it was the earliest estimate obtained and contemporaneous photographic evidence corroborated the severity of the damage. The $890 repair estimate was also well above the $750 threshold.

[9] Crawford later received a second, higher estimate of $1,700, explaining that the repair cost had increased due to rising labor and material costs—suggesting the damage value had only grown from an already-substantial starting point. Notably, Rojo presented no contrary evidence challenging the extent of the damage or offering alternative, lower estimates. Rojo's suggestion that the damage might have been lower on the day he kicked the truck is merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence which we will not do.¹ See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.

II. Restitution Order

[10] Rojo next challenges the trial court's order requiring him to pay $1,700 in restitution. We review restitution orders for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court's determination is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or “the reasonable, probable and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” R.L.H. v. State, 738 N.E.2d 312, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[11] Rojo specifically argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the cost to repair at the time of the offense and that the trial court therefore erroneously relied on the costs to repair at the time of trial. We disagree, as the restitution order properly reflects the “actual loss incurred by a victim.” Martin v. State, 127 N.E.3d 1235, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). This loss is generally measured by the “actual cost of repair (or replacement if repair is inappropriate).” Id. Here, Crawford testified that the most recent estimate to repair the damage caused by Rojo was $1,700. This figure represents the actual cost Crawford would incur to repair his vehicle to its pre-damaged condition.

[12] This evidence is sufficient to support the restitution award. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 990 N.E. 2d 517, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (affirming restitution order based on victim's testimony as to value of stolen items at hearing one year after theft offense). It presents a “reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.” S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[13] Rojo's reliance on S.G. v. State is misplaced. In that case, the victim delayed replacing her stolen iPhone until a newer model was available before requesting the cost of the new model as restitution. Id. at 684. But here, Crawford is not replacing his damaged fender with a newer or better model. Rather, he is simply seeking to repair the same fender and be compensated for the actual cost he would incur to repair the damage caused by Rojo. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's restitution order.

III. Sentencing Order Discrepancies

[14] As Rojo correctly notes and the State agrees, there are discrepancies between the trial court's oral sentencing statements and the written sentencing orders. Specifically, there are inconsistencies regarding whether Rojo was placed on probation and whether his conviction resulted from a plea agreement or a trial verdict. When a trial court's oral sentencing statement conflicts with its written sentencing order, we may remand for clarification or correction. Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[15] During the sentencing hearing, the court stated that Rojo was “sentenced to 365 days, all suspended, and a fine of $2, court costs of $189, and restitution in the amount of $1,700.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 55. The written judgment states the same and leaves blank the line next to “days probation.” App. Vol. II, p. 12. However, Rojo also signed a document titled “Order on Probation,” which appears to show that he was sentenced to 365 days probation. Id. at 13. The document states that Rojo was sentenced to probation “according to the plea agreement [he] signed.” Id. But Rojo never entered into a plea agreement, and the other sentencing orders do not reflect a term of probation.

[16] The record as a whole clearly shows that Rojo was convicted following a bench trial, meaning the reference to a plea agreement was a clerical error. See Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 445 n.8 (Ind. 1999) (finding inconsistencies in sentencing documents were clerical errors where intent of trial court was unambiguous). Therefore, the only inconsistency that remains unclear is whether Rojo was placed on probation. We remand solely for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to clarify whether Rojo was placed on probation and, if so, the specific terms and duration of that probation.

Conclusion

[17] We affirm Rojo's conviction for Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief and the trial court's restitution order of $1,700. We remand solely for clarification of Rojo's probation status under the sentencing order.

[18] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Rojo also argues that Crawford's testimony about the initial $890 estimate is “not evidence” because it was elicited to impeach Crawford on cross examination. Appellant's Br., p. 10. To support this claim, he states that “evidence admitted for impeachment purposes may not be used as substantive evidence,” id. at 9, and cites Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). But in Weedman, the evidence at issue was hearsay testimony that was objected to and then admitted only for the purpose of impeachment. In contrast, Crawford's statement here was not hearsay, but was factual testimony based on his personal knowledge and its admission was not limited in any way. See generally Ind. Evidence Rule 602 (providing witness may testify to matters within their personal knowledge). Regardless of which party elicited it, Crawford's testimony about the $890 estimate constitutes substantive evidence that the trial court properly considered when determining pecuniary loss.

Weissmann, Judge.

May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.