BRYANT v. MCGEHEE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jalinn Bryant (Mother) and Cody McGehee (Father) split up after they moved for Father's job from Logansport, Indiana, to Kansas. Mother moved back to Logansport with their infant son, C.M., and petitioned to establish paternity, parenting time, and support. The parties agreed, and the paternity court ordered, that Mother should have primary physical custody but that Father should have two weeks of parenting time each month.

[2] Both Mother and Father later sought to modify this arrangement, with each seeking primary physical custody. The trial court ultimately concluded that Father should prevail, and Mother now appeals. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying physical custody, we affirm.

Facts

[3] C.M. was born in March 2019 when Mother and Father (collectively Parents), who were unmarried, were living in Logansport. Shortly after C.M.’s birth, the family moved to Kansas for Father's job, but Parents’ relationship soon soured. Mother returned to Indiana with C.M. in February 2020 and petitioned to establish paternity, parenting time, and support. In October 2020, the trial court entered an agreed provisional order that determined Father's paternity of C.M., granted Parents joint legal custody and Mother primary physical custody, and established parenting time and support obligations for Father.

[4] While that case was pending, both parents moved on to other romantic relationships. Mother began a relationship with a man with whom she later had a child. Father married in September 2021. His wife, Courtney (Stepmother), has two daughters from a previous marriage. Father and Stepmother have a three-year-old son together as well. They live in Overland Park, Kansas, where Father works as a warehouse supervisor. Mother continues to work and live in Logansport.

[5] In October 2021, the trial court issued an agreed order awarding joint legal custody to Parents, primary physical custody to Mother, and two weeks of parenting time each month to Father. The order required Father to pay $108 in weekly child support.

[6] Less than a year later, Mother petitioned to modify custody, parenting time, and support. Father countered with his own modification request. Parents each sought primary physical custody of C.M.

[7] In a report to the court in May 2024, the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) found both parents to be fit custodians. Although the GAL recognized C.M.’s ties to Indiana and noted that this was a close case, he recommended Father have primary physical custody and that Parents share legal custody.

[8] Finding the GAL's report to offer “a comprehensive analysis and detailed assessment that was both persuasive and appropriate,” the trial court entered a judgment consistent with the GAL's custody recommendations. App. Vol. II, p. 198. Among other things, the court granted Father primary physical custody, with Mother awarded parenting time in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines provisions applicable when distance is a major factor. Mother appeals the custody modification.

Discussion and Decision

[9] We review custody modifications for abuse of discretion, with a preference for latitude and deference to our trial judges in such family law matters. In re Paternity of Snyder, 26 N.E.3d 996, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). Where, as here, the court does not enter findings of facts and conclusions of law, we apply a general judgment standard. In re Paternity of A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d 423, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “Under this standard, we will reverse the award of custody only if the trial court's determination is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id. In making this determination, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Matter of N.K., 249 N.E.3d 607, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[10] The trial court found “a substantial change in circumstances” warranting a modification of custody. App. Vol. II, p. 198. Mother disputes whether the trial court applied the correct standard in making that determination. She also challenges the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Father should have primary physical custody of C.M. Finding no error, we affirm.

I. Mother Has Not Shown That The Trial Court Applied The Wrong Legal Standard

[11] Mother suggests the trial court applied an incorrect standard when modifying custody. A party seeking modification of an existing custody order must prove that: (1) modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there has been a substantial change in one or more specific statutory factors. Ind. Code § 31-14-13-6 (Modification Statute).¹ These statutory factors include: (1) the age and sex of the child; (2) the wishes of the child's parent; (3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least 14 years of age; (4) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest; (5) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community; (6) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; and (7) evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent. Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.

[12] In arguing that the trial court did not correctly apply this standard, Mother relies heavily on the GAL's statement that “[i]f the standard to review this case was characterized by the ․ ‘scales of justice’, I would say that the scales ever so slightly tip in Cody's favor.” App. Vol. II, p. 175. Mother argues the GAL applied a generic preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than basing his recommendation on evidence proving the two prongs of the Modification Statute. See Ind. Code § 31-14-13-6. She then proceeds to assume the trial court did the same, given that it entered a judgment consistent with the GAL's recommendations.

[13] Mother misconstrues the GAL's statement. The GAL's reference to the “scales of justice” was simply an analogy illustrating the GAL's view that this was a close case. In any case, the trial court correctly treated the GAL's report as advisory. Before entering judgment, the court expressly conducted an independent assessment and ultimately concluded that a substantial change justifying modification of custody had occurred. Mother has failed to show that the trial court applied the wrong standard. See In re Paternity of A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d at 431 (“Absent clear indications to the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered all the relevant statutory factors when making its decision to modify primary physical custody”).

II. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Modifying Custody

[14] Mother contends Father neither proved a substantial change in statutory factors nor that C.M.’s best interests dictated a change in physical custody. But in Mother's petition for modification of custody, parenting time, and support, Mother herself alleged a substantial change in “circumstances”—that she wanted to enroll C.M. in preschool—had occurred. App. Vol. II, p. 109.

[15] In any case, the evidence supports the trial court's finding of a substantial change in statutory factors and that a change in physical custody was in Child's best interests. Although the court did not specify which statutory factor(s) had changed, the record supports a finding of substantial changes in C.M.’s age (toddler versus nearly elementary age), interrelationships (C.M. had new siblings and his parents had new partners), and adjustment to school (a move from preschool to elementary school). See Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2(1), (4), and (5). Given that Mother and Father lived about eight hours apart, C.M.’s enrollment in elementary school seemingly would prevent the parties from adhering to the order then in effect, which called for C.M. to stay two weeks every month in Kansas. Given this evidence, we find no error in the trial court's finding of a substantial change in statutory factors.

[16] Equally unavailing is Mother's claim that Father did not prove that a transfer of primary physical custody to him was in C.M.’s best interests. Mother notes that C.M.’s maternal and paternal family members largely live in the Logansport area and that C.M. has lived with Mother since his birth except when Father exercised parenting time. Mother claims the evidence also shows that C.M. relies more heavily on Stepmother than Father for care due to Father working nights. Mother also views the evidence as showing Father obstructed C.M.’s education, failed to provide medical care and full child support, and declined to facilitate connections with her family during Father's parenting time.

[17] Mother's arguments are merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence that we must decline. See Matter of N.K., 249 N.E.3d at 617. The record contains evidence refuting many of Mother's contentions on appeal. For instance, the GAL testified that Mother's household environment, particularly the relationship between C.M. and Mother's boyfriend, who had a criminal history, compared less favorably to that at Father's home. Additionally, Mother's actions, such as failing to list Father as an emergency contact at C.M.’s preschool and withholding medical information despite shared legal custody, were seen as obstructive to effective co-parenting. Mother also was tardy in obtaining C.M.’s vaccinations.

[18] The GAL viewed Stepmother as a positive force in C.M.’s life and as a peacemaker between Father and Mother when their co-parenting relationship faltered. And although the GAL found that both Mother and Father were fit parents, he recommended Father's primary custody of C.M. This recommendation was based partly on Mother's resistance to facilitating C.M.’s contact with Father's family living in Indiana. Additionally, the record shows that the elementary school that C.M. would attend in Kansas was across the street from Father's home and that C.M. would not have to attend daycare before or after school in Kansas, as he had in Indiana.

[19] Although the trial court's explanation of its ruling is sparse, the court found the GAL's report to be “a comprehensive analysis and detailed assessment that was both persuasive and appropriate.” App. Vol. II, p. 198. Absent a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law under Trial Rule 52(A), a court hearing a modification request need only “consider” the statutory factors and is not required to enter specific findings and conclusions. See In re Paternity of A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d at 431. And as previously noted, absent clear indications to the contrary, the court is presumed to consider all the requisite factors when deciding to modify custody. Id.

[20] After making an independent evaluation based on the evidence presented during the modification hearing, the court concluded that the GAL report “complimented and supported” the court's own assessment. App. Vol. II, p. 198. As in most family law cases, the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the conflicting evidence in this case and determine the child's best interests. See In re Paternity of Snyder, 26 N.E.3d at 998 (noting Indiana's preference “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters”). Because the evidence supports modification of custody in favor of Father, the court's determination is not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the resulting reasonable inferences.

[21] As no abuse of discretion occurred, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

affirmed

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties erroneously rely on the modification statutes applicable to parents who married each other (Indiana Code §§ 31-17-2-8, -21). Although similarly worded, a different set of statutes (Indiana Code §§ 31-14-13-2, -6) applies to custody modifications in paternity actions such as that involved here.

Weissmann, Judge.

May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.