IN RE: D.B. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.F. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order finding his children, D.B., Kh.F., Ka.F., and Ke.F. (“Children”) to be children in need of services (“CHINS”). Father argues that the evidence is insufficient to find that the Children are CHINS. We, however, conclude that the trial court's finding that the Children are CHINS is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Father raises multiple issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court's adjudication of the Children as CHINS is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] D.B. was born in December 2009 to N.B. and T.M. Father and L.W.-R. had two children: Ka.F., who was born in September 2008; and Ke.F., who was born in March 2010. Father and N.B. married in approximately 2013. Accordingly, N.B. is the stepmother to Ka.F. and Ke.F.; and Father is D.B.’s stepfather. Kh.F. was born in October 2013 to Father and N.B.¹ Father and N.B. resided with all four of the Children.

[4] DCS was previously involved with Father when, in approximately 2010, Father and L.W.-R. got into a physical altercation, and Father took the “older child and left the home.” Tr. Vol. II p. 74. Father told L.W.-R. that she would see her child again “in a pine box.” Id.

[5] The family had further legal issues when, on March 7, 2023, the State alleged that D.B. was a delinquent child for acts that would be theft of a firearm, a Level 6 felony, if committed by an adult. The State alleged that D.B. exerted unauthorized control over an AR-15 rifle and pistol owned by Father. D.B. violated the terms of his probation and was placed in secure detention. D.B. was later required to participate in a day reporting program. D.B. later violated his probation again and was returned to secure detention.

[6] On January 24, 2024, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Father was “making threats to kill [D.B.] and that ․ there were concerns with [Father's] mental stability and that [he claimed] he was going to get drugs in the home and [ ] call law enforcement to have the children removed from the home.”² Id. at 72. DCS assessment worker Taylor Murdock responded to Father's residence and discussed the allegations with Father. Murdock asked Father if he “was serious in his intentions with those threats.” Id. at 73. Father looked at Murdock “intently in the eyes” and said, “the kids would not be breathing ․ and that he was going to kill [D.B.] ․” Id. Murdock and Father then discussed a domestic violence incident between Father and D.B. Father then said, “if [D.B.] laid a hand on him he would kill him and that [D.B.] would not be breathing” and “if [D.B.] laid a hand on [Father] he was going to break his neck.” Id.

[7] When Murdock asked if Father would be interested in participating in services, Father said “that he would not do any services even if they were court ordered.” Id. at 85. Although Father was initially calm and cooperative, he became irritated and requested that Murdock and law enforcement leave the residence. Father allowed Murdock to speak with the Children outside. While Murdock was there, Ka.F. attempted to run away, and Murdock and law enforcement calmed Ka.F. down and returned him to the residence, while Father remained inside.

[8] Murdock believed that Father was not “mentally stable.” Id. at 80. Murdock removed the Children from Father's and N.B.’s care that evening due to Father's “erratic and frantic behavior.” Id. at 83. As a result of Father's behavior, the State charged Father with interference with DCS, a Class A misdemeanor.

[9] On January 25, 2024, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. In these petitions, DCS alleged that: (1) Father threatened to kill D.B.; (2) Father struggles with his mental health and is not receiving services; (3) Father uses marijuana; (4) domestic violence has occurred in the home between Father and N.B. and Father and D.B.; and (5) Father has a previous DCS history for domestic violence, suicidal ideation, and threats to kill Ke.F. and Ka.F. DCS filed amended petitions on February 5, 2024, regarding Ka.F. and Ke.F. The trial court issued a no contact order between Father and D.B.

[10] Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Krystal Laxton was initially assigned to the CHINS action. Father was referred to individual counseling, batterer's intervention, and a substance abuse evaluation. Father wanted visits with the Children to be in his residence and refused to do visits in an office. Father also refused to participate in any other services. Father would call DCS two to five times a day and threatened that “he was going to come to the DCS office and take his kids back by any force necessary.” Id. at 93. Father also threatened to “kick [FCM Laxton's] a**.” Id.

[11] As a result of Father's actions, the State charged Father with intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor, and FCM Laxton sought a workplace protection order. During the hearing regarding the workplace protection order, Father was “extremely upset and agitated,” cursed, and called FCM Laxton “a female or that woman” and would not refer to her by name, and Father shoved a chair during the hearing. Id. at 95, 97. FCM Laxton was escorted by an officer back to her office for her safety.

[12] FCM Laxton was replaced by another FCM in February 2024 due to “the violence and threats.” Id. at 98. On February 23, 2024, DCS filed a motion to suspend Father's visitations because Father repeatedly threatened to harm DCS staff and providers; Father threatened to take Children by force; and Father had an active warrant for his arrest. On February 27, 2024, the trial court granted DCS's motion and suspended Father's visitation.

[13] A fact finding hearing was held on May 5, 2024. Father testified that he was receiving individual counseling once every two weeks and that he had submitted to a domestic violence assessment. Father denied participating in domestic violence, denied that he had any intentions of harming the Children, but admitted to using marijuana.

[14] On June 13, 2024, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon finding that the Children are CHINS. The trial court found:

21. The Court has considered Father's testimony in light of the other evidence submitted, his motives, and appearance while testifying, and finds that Father greatly minimizes the seriousness of the situation and does not find his self-serving statements credible.

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23. Father's behavior and statements demonstrate a mental health or related need that should be addressed.

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26. This court finds that Father is volatile and dangerous, and the children are at a substantial risk of harm if returned to Father's care at this time.

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28. The children's physical and mental conditions are seriously endangered if returned to Father now.

29. Father neglected [to] supply the children with the necessary supervision and has since refused to exercise visitation.

30. Father told DCS he would not do services, even if they were court ordered.

31. Needed services for the children or Father are unlikely to be provided or accepted by Father if the children were returned to his care.

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33. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that DCS has met their burden and finds that the children are in need of services as defined by law.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 87-88. The trial court then entered dispositional orders on August 27, 2024. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination that the Children are CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, “ ‘the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.’ ” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)); see Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. On review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017)). Here, the trial court entered, sua sponte, findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting the CHINS petitions. “ ‘As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). We review the remaining issues under the general judgment standard, which provides that a judgment “ ‘will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)). We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578.

[16] “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish parents.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but rather is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without the intervention of the court. Id. at 105. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child ․ [T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.” Id. (citations omitted). “A CHINS finding should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.

[17] DCS must prove three elements for a juvenile court to adjudicate a child a CHINS: (1) the child is under the age of eighteen; (2) that one of eleven different statutory circumstances exist that would make the child a CHINS; and (3) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he or she is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. Id. at 580. The trial court here found the Children to be CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, which provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[18] On appeal, Father challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact; the trial court's determination that the Children's physical or mental conditions are seriously impaired or seriously endangered; and the trial court's conclusions that the Children need care that they are not receiving and that the coercive intervention of the court is necessary.

I. Challenges to Factual Findings

[19] Initially, Father challenges several findings that detail DCS assessment worker Murdock's testimony. Murdock testified that Father looked at Murdock “intently in the eyes” and said, “the kids would not be breathing ․ and that he was going to kill [D.B.] ․” Tr. Vol. II p. 73. Father also said, “if [D.B.] laid a hand on him he would kill him and that [D.B.] would not be breathing” and “if [D.B.] laid a hand on [Father] he was going to break his neck.” Id. During the assessment, Ka.F. attempted to run away, and Murdock and law enforcement calmed Ka.F. down and returned him to the residence, while Father remained inside. Murdock also reviewed the prior DCS action against Father in which Father threatened to put one of the Children in a “pine box.” Id. at 74. These findings regarding Murdock's testimony are supported by the evidence.

[20] Next, Father challenges findings based on FCM Laxton's testimony regarding his conduct at the workplace protection hearing. The trial court found: “At the workplace protection hearing, Father referred to FCM Laxton repeatedly as ‘that f**king female’ despite admonishments from the judicial officer. Father also flipped over a chair. For her safety, a bailiff walked FCM Laxton from the courthouse to the DCS office a few blocks away.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 87. FCM Laxton testified that, during the hearing, Father was “extremely upset and agitated,” cursed, and called FCM Laxton “a female or that woman” and would not refer to her by name. Tr. Vol. II pp. 95, 97. Father shoved a chair during the hearing, and an officer had to walk FCM Laxton back to her office for her safety.³ Most of the finding regarding the workplace protection hearing is not clearly erroneous and, to the extent the finding is erroneous, any error is harmless.

[21] Father also challenges the trial court's finding that “Father refused visitation with his children because it would take place at the DCS office.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 86. FCM Laxton also testified that Father wanted visits with the Children to be in his residence and refused to do visits in an office. This finding is also supported by the evidence. Father merely requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475.

[22] Finally, Father challenges the trial court's finding that he uses marijuana. Father admitted at the fact-finding hearing that he uses marijuana. Accordingly, the finding is not clearly erroneous.⁴

II. Serious Endangerment

[23] Next, Father challenges the trial court's finding that “[t]he children's physical and mental conditions are seriously endangered if returned to Father now.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 88; see Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1(1). The trial court found that Father is “volatile and dangerous” and that the Children “are at a substantial risk of harm if returned to Father's care at this time.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 87.

[24] DCS presented evidence that an assessment was performed due to concerns regarding Father's mental stability and Father's threats to kill D.B. During the assessment, Father threatened that the “kids would not be breathing” and that he was going to break D.B.’s neck. Tr. Vol. II p. 73. The assessment worker believed that Father was not “mentally stable,” and the Children were removed due to Father's “erratic and frantic behavior.” Id. at 80, 83. After the Children's removal, Father's erratic behavior continued, and he threatened FCM Laxton to the point that FCM Laxton filed a petition for a workplace protection order against Father. Father's volatile behavior continued at the hearing on the workplace protection petition.

[25] At the fact-finding hearing, Father claimed that he was participating in therapy every other week and that the Children had food, a home, and supervision. The trial court, however, was free to weigh Father's testimony against the evidence of Father's volatility. In fact, the trial court specifically did not find Father's “self-serving statements credible.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 87. Given the evidence presented, the trial court's finding that the Children's physical and mental conditions were seriously endangered is not clearly erroneous.

III. Necessity of Care, Treatment, or Rehabilitation for the Children

[26] Next, we consider whether the Children “need[ ] care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: (A) the child[ren are] not receiving.” Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1(2)(A). Father challenges the trial court's finding that “Father neglected [to] supply the children with the necessary supervision ․” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 88. Father argues that the Children's needs were being met and that his threats were part of a “common culture for African-American parents.” Appellant's Br. p. 12.

[27] DCS presented evidence of Father's volatile and dangerous behaviors—from threatening the Children's lives to threatening DCS workers and demonstrating erratic behavior in court. Father's claim that his threats against the Children were normal in his culture is undermined by his similar behavior against the DCS workers and in court. Father's arguments are merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475. Given Father's volatile behaviors, the trial court's finding that the Children were not receiving the necessary care is not clearly erroneous.

IV. Necessity of Coercive Intervention

[28] Next, Father challenges the trial court's conclusion that the Children need care that “is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.” Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1(2)(B). This “element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life because ‘[n]ot every endangered child is a child in need of services, permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family.’ ” In re D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287), trans. denied. Courts “should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” Id.

[29] The trial court here found that “[n]eeded services for the children or Father are unlikely to be provided or accepted by Father if the children were returned to his care.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 88. During the initial assessment, Father told Murdock “that he would not do any services even if they were court ordered.” Tr. Vol. II p. 85. Father told FCM Laxton that he wanted visits with the Children to be in his residence and refused to do visits in an office. Father also refused to participate in any other services. Although Father claimed at the fact-finding hearing that he was participating in therapy every other week and had participated in a domestic violence assessment, no corroborating evidence of those services was presented. Given this evidence, the trial court's finding that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary is not clearly erroneous.⁵

Conclusion

[30] The trial court's adjudication of the Children as CHINS is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   T.M., N.B., and L.W.-R. do not participate in this appeal.

2.   Although not completely clear from the record, Father argues that this report came from his therapist. Father argues that the therapist did not consider Father a threat to the Children except for D.B. The therapists’ statement, however, was made during the detention hearing. At that time, the trial court noted that no party had called the therapist as a witness and that the trial court could not consider the therapist's evidence.

3.   DCS concedes that the evidence shows Father referred to FCM Laxton as “that female” rather than “that f**king female” and that it is unclear what curse words Father used. Appellee's Br. p. 12.

4.   To the extent Father challenges Finding Nos. 9, 11, 13, 18, 21, and 23, Father has waived the contentions because he failed to make a specific, cogent argument regarding each finding. To the extent Father challenges Findings Nos. 26, 28, 29, 30, and 31, we address the arguments below.

5.   Father also argues that the DCS employees along with the trial court have an “inherent bias” against Father due to his “racial makeup.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. DCS, however, argues that “Father's claim that the judge was biased because the family was African American is without any support and based solely on pure conjecture.” Appellee's Br. p. 20. The trial court's judgment is supported by the evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing and is not clearly erroneous. Moreover, there is no evidence that the DCS employees or the trial court were biased against Father. Accordingly, Father's argument fails.

Tavitas, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.