Vance A. Vanlandingham, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Vance Vanlandingham challenges his convictions and consecutive sentences for dealing in fentanyl, dealing in methamphetamine, and related offenses. The charges arose from a search of Vanlandingham's hotel room by police armed with a warrant. Vanlandingham argues the search warrant, which was based on information from individuals who allegedly bought drugs from him, lacked probable cause. He also claims the jury should have been instructed on lesser included offenses and that the judge improperly ran his sentences consecutively. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] While on patrol one night around 2 a.m., Detective Jordan Corral, a drug task force officer, observed a tan van nearly strike his police vehicle. At the time, the van was backing out of a parking space in front of Room 117 of a local hotel. Having previously received anonymous tips and information from the Drug Task Force that Vanlandingham was selling drugs out of that hotel room, Detective Corral followed the van. He initiated a traffic stop after it crossed the center line while making a turn.

[3] The van's occupants were Mary Denton (driver), Joel Hethcote (passenger), and Denton's nine-year-old daughter. Upon further investigation, a police K-9 alerted to the presence of narcotics in the van. After initial denials of drugs in the car, Hethcote admitted that Denton had drugs in her bra. Denton then revealed she actually had the drugs concealed inside her vagina. Denton retrieved a small plastic baggie containing fentanyl while in a female officer's police vehicle.

[4] Hethcote admitted to purchasing the drugs for $200 from Vanlandingham in Room 117. Hethcote told police that he had requested “two separate” items—meaning two one-gram bags of heroin—but that he received only one. Text messages between Hethcote and Vanlandingham on Hethcote's phone revealed their discussions about the transaction.

[5] Based on this information, Detective Corral obtained a search warrant for Room 117. The search revealed over 14 grams of fentanyl, 7 grams of methamphetamine, digital scales, small plastic baggies, spoons, syringes, a butane torch, smoking devices, pills, and $106 in cash.

[6] Vanlandingham admitted to police that he had purchased $500 of fentanyl in Fort Wayne two days earlier and $100 of methamphetamine in Marion the day before. He acknowledged his personal use of both substances via injection and admitted to completing a recent sale to an individual identified only as “T something” via Cash App. Vanlandingham further stated that he typically engaged in such transactions three to four times weekly.

[7] The State charged Vanlandingham with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, dealing in a narcotic drug both as a Level 2 and Level 3 felony, Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance, Level 6 felony possession of a syringe, Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. The State later amended the Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug charge to a Level 4 felony. It also sought and obtained dismissal of the possession of a controlled substance and possession of marijuana counts.

[8] Before his trial, Vanlandingham moved to suppress the evidence arising from the search of his hotel room. The court denied the motion after a hearing. Vanlandingham ultimately was convicted of the four counts on which he went to trial and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment of 25 years for Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, 25 years for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, 10 years for Level 4 felony dealing in a narcotic, one year for Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, and 60 days for Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. The court ordered all the sentences to be served concurrently except for the Level 4 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, which was to be served consecutively to the other sentences. Vanlandingham appeals both his convictions and sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Vanlandingham contends the evidence seized during the search was inadmissible because the warrant authorizing the search was inadequate. He also challenges the trial court's refusal to give jury instructions on lesser included offenses that would have informed the jury that it could find him guilty of possessing, rather than dealing, drugs. Finally, he contests the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. We conclude that the search warrant was adequately supported by probable cause and that the trial court did not err in refusing Vanlandingham's proposed instructions. We also find the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion.

I. Admission of Evidence Seized During Warrant-Authorized Search

[10] We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007); Hill v. State, 169 N.E.3d 1150, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). When reviewing the admission of evidence following the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling along with any uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). And because Vanlandingham's evidentiary claim rests on a claim that the evidence was seized pursuant to a search warrant lacking probable cause, we note that he bears the burden of proving the invalidity of the warrant. Fry v. State, 25 N.E.3d 237, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[11] Vanlandingham claims that probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant did not exist. He asserts that the primary components of the officer's supporting affidavit are: (1) anonymous sources who reported Vanlandingham was dealing drugs in his hotel room; and (2) the statements from Denton and Hethcote. According to Vanlandingham, the reliability of any of these individuals who provided information to the officer was never established.

[12] A warrant must be supported by an affidavit that establishes probable cause for the search. Ind. Code § 35-44-5-2. When the affidavit is based on hearsay, it must either: (1) “contain reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished”; or (2) “contain information that established that the totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay.” When the totality of the circumstances establish that “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,” probable cause exists. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

[13] Here, the search warrant was supported by probable cause. In his search warrant affidavit, Detective Corral reported observing a vehicle leaving the parking lot outside Vanlandingham's room around 2 a.m. He noted that a lawful traffic stop and K-9 alert led to Hethcote's admissions—against his own penal interest—that he had just purchased drugs from Vanlandingham. Detective Corral further explained that Hethcote's statements were corroborated by text messages on Hethcote's phone arranging the transaction. Although Hethcote and Denton initially denied possessing drugs, Detective Corral noted that their subsequent admissions were supported by the physical evidence recovered and by cell phone records.

[14] Through these assertions, the search warrant affidavit sufficiently established the reliability of the hearsay on which it relied and a substantial basis for probable cause for the search warrant. See Fry, 25 N.E.3d at 244-246 (finding search warrant affidavit adequately established reliability of hearsay, despite some contradictions, and that search warrant overall demonstrated probable cause for warrant). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained during the search.

II. Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses

[15] Vanlandingham sought instructions on the lesser included offenses of possession of a narcotic drug and possession of methamphetamine. He suggests the lesser included offense instructions were justified due to a serious evidentiary dispute regarding his intent to deliver the drugs.

[16] A party to a criminal prosecution may request a jury instruction on a lesser included offense. Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 668 (Ind. 2021). Upon such a request, “the court must determine whether the lesser offense is inherently or factually included in the charged offense.” Id. “If it is either, the court must then determine whether ‘a serious evidentiary dispute’ exists between the elements that distinguish the offenses.” Id. (quoting Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ind. 1995)). If such a dispute exists, the court must give the instruction. Id.

[17] The existence of a lesser included offense is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. at 667. But we generally review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision to give or reject an instruction. Randall v. State, 115 N.E.3d 526, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[18] Employing the first step of the Larkin analysis, we must determine whether the possession offenses are inherently included in the charged dealing offenses. Simple possession is inherently included in the charged dealing offenses at issue here, as they necessarily involve the possession of a controlled substance. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (providing that dealing in a narcotic drug includes possession with intent to manufacture, finance the manufacture of, deliver, or finance the delivery of a narcotic drug); Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1 (providing that dealing in methamphetamine includes possession with intent to deliver or finance the delivery of methamphetamine).

[19] The second step in Larkin requires us to determine whether the lesser offense is factually included in the charged offense. Here, the charging information alleged that Vanlandingham possessed the drugs with the intent to deliver. The information therefore factually included the lesser offense of simple possession.

[20] Larkin’s third step examines whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute regarding the distinguishing element: intent to deliver. Although Vanlandingham claims such a dispute exists, the record establishes otherwise. Vanlandingham admitted to possessing the drugs and to selling drugs three to four times a week. He also admitted to selling drugs earlier in the day of his arrest. The evidence included about 14 grams of fentanyl and 7 grams of methamphetamine, along with digital scales, baggies, and other paraphernalia consistent with drug dealing. Detective Corral testified that these quantities exceeded typical user amounts.

[21] Given this evidence, there was no serious evidentiary dispute regarding Vanlandingham's intent to deliver the drugs. The evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that he possessed the drugs with the intent to deliver, rather than for personal use. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of simple possession.

III. Sentencing

[22] Finally, Vanlandingham challenges the consecutive sentencing imposed by the trial court. The trial court has discretion to impose consecutive sentencing. Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). But this discretion is limited by Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(d), which caps the aggregate consecutive sentence for specified crimes when they are part of an “episode of criminal conduct.”

[23] An “episode of criminal conduct” refers to “offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(b). When the most serious crime is a Level 2 felony, as in Vanlandingham's case, the total consecutive terms of imprisonment for an “episode of criminal conduct” may not exceed thirty-two years. Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(5). Whether certain offenses constitute an “episode of criminal conduct” is a fact-intensive inquiry focusing on the timing and simultaneous nature of the crimes. Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1143 (Ind. 2022).

[24] Vanlandingham argues his 35-year aggregate sentence exceeds the statutory cap for an “episode of criminal conduct” under Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2. He contends his 10-year sentence for dealing in a narcotic drug (the sale to Heathcote) must run concurrently to his other sentences because all the offenses constituted a single episode of criminal conduct. We disagree.

[25] Although Vanlandingham's crimes occurred at the same location and within hours of each other, they constitute distinct criminal episodes. Around 1:50 a.m., Vanlandingham sold fentanyl to Heathcote. This transaction was complete when Heathcote left the room. When police executed the search warrant around 4:30 a.m., they discovered dealer quantities of both fentanyl (14 grams) and methamphetamine (7 grams), along with packaging materials and digital scales indicating ongoing dealing operations. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(e)(5)-(6) (requiring 3 to 7 grams of fentanyl for Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug); Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1 (requiring 5 to 10 grams of methamphetamine for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine).

[26] Drug sales may constitute separate episodes of criminal conduct when “a complete recount of the first drug buy could be given without reference to the other.” Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Here, Vanlandingham's heroin sale to Heathcote was a discrete criminal act that could be recounted without reference to the later-discovered dealing operation. Moreover, Vanlandingham admitted to regular dealing activity, stating he conducted transactions three to four times per week. The large quantities of drugs and dealing paraphernalia found in his room evidenced an ongoing operation distinct from the single sale to Heathcote.

[27] Because the completed sale to Heathcote and the possession of dealing quantities constituted separate episodes of criminal conduct, the trial court was permitted to order the sentences to run consecutively. Accordingly, the 35-year aggregate sentence does not violate the statutory cap.

[28] We affirm Vanlandingham's convictions and sentence.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Felix concur. Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.