IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: R.S. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with then-three-year-old R.S. (“Child”) in April of 2021, after receiving a report that F.S. (“Mother”) had abandoned Child. DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS and placed in foster care. Mother was ordered to complete certain services, which she ultimately failed to do. On March 8, 2023, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child.

[2] During the evidentiary hearings, the DCS family case manager (“FCM”) and the Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) both testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. On October 8, 2024, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights. Mother challenges the juvenile court's order, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the termination of her parental rights. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born to Mother and Ri.S. (“Father”) on October 16, 2017.¹ On April 15, 2021, Child was removed from Mother's care after DCS received reports of abuse and neglect by Mother. On April 19, 2021, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS because Mother, who had a history of substance abuse and a substantiated history with DCS, had abandoned Child.

[4] On August 10, 2021, on Mother's admission, the juvenile court adjudicated Child a CHINS. On September 19, 2021, the juvenile court entered a dispositional decree and ordered Mother into reunification services. Specifically, the juvenile court ordered Mother to complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, submit to random drug screens, and engage in home-based case management and follow the recommendations of the service provider. On March 8, 2023, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing over the course of several days, beginning in August of 2024 and ending in September of 2024.

[5] Stephanie Jefferson provided home-based services to Mother for approximately three years. Jefferson had been scheduled to meet with Mother twice a week since June of 2021. Jefferson testified that she had met with Mother “frequently[,]” but that there had been times when Mother had been “not present” and had gone “a week, two weeks, no communication.” Tr. Vol. II p. 108. Jefferson also testified that she had initially been scheduled to meet with Mother twice a week, but within the “last three months” leading up to the hearing, Mother had become “more sparingly available” and had only met with Jefferson once a week. Tr. Vol. II p. 108. Jefferson also testified that she had worked with Mother to create a budget and to establish stable housing, employment, and transportation. Jefferson testified that while Mother had obtained housing twice, she had been unable to maintain it. Mother had also been unable to maintain employment for “even two months.” Tr. Vol. II p. 109.

[6] FCM Diana Floyd began working with Mother in July or August of 2022. FCM Floyd testified that she and Mother had previously discussed housing, to which Mother “always just says that she's gonna get a place[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 73. FCM Floyd also testified that Mother had been unable to maintain employment for more than seven days. Mother had also been unable to maintain sobriety. FCM Floyd described Mother's progress as “intermittent.” Tr. Vol. II p. 68. FCM Floyd had taken Mother to and from treatment facilities on at least three occasions. FCM Floyd had also assisted Mother by making referrals to treatment centers that Mother had found on her own. FCM Floyd testified that she and Mother had discussed maintaining sobriety “[e]xtensively” but that she did not believe that Mother had completed any treatment programs. Tr. Vol. II p. 74. At one point, Mother had told FCM Floyd, “I love cocaine and cocaine loves me.” Tr. Vol. II p. 74. When asked about how she was able to afford cocaine, Mother had admitted to FCM Floyd that she “sold her body for cocaine.” Tr. Vol. II p. 75.

[7] DCS presented evidence that between July 23, 2021 and July 16, 2024, Mother had been scheduled for a total of two hundred and seventy-six random drug tests. At the end of this period, Mother had a total of two-hundred and twenty-five unexcused missed tests. Between January of 2023 and June of 2024, Mother had tested positive for cocaine use thirteen times. FCM Floyd did not believe that Mother would overcome her cocaine addiction because Mother had admitted to her that she could not. Mother had also admitted to FCM Floyd that she had not appeared at the originally-scheduled final hearing date because she had used cocaine the night before.

[8] With regard to Mother's visitation with Child, FCM Floyd testified that Mother's behavior was “sometimes inappropriate.” Tr. Vol. II p. 72. FCM Floyd testified that some of Mother's conversations with Child had “had to be redirected.” Tr. Vol. II p. 72. Furthermore, Child had begun to experience behavioral issues when he would be picked up for a visit with Mother, only for Mother to fail to attend. Ultimately, FCM Floyd opined that termination of Mother's rights was “in the best interests of” Child, because Mother “cannot beat or address properly her [addiction] with cocaine.” Tr. Vol. II p. 81. FCM Floyd further testified that stability is important for Child “[b]ecause of the numerous disappointments he's had when [Mother] hasn't showed up.” Tr. Vol. II p. 81.

[9] Home-based case manager Jennifer Vogel supervised Mother's visits with Child between February 2024 and July 2024. Vogel was originally scheduled to meet with Mother and Child twice weekly, but this had eventually been changed to once a week due to Mother's “no shows.” Tr. Vol. II p. 140. During the visits, Vogel observed that sometimes, Mother “would have a visit where she scored strong” but other times, she would “have a visit where she was seeming to be tired, hungry, disheveled, not dressed for the weather, and very ․ anxious that there was something going on, like almost like a little paranoia.” Tr. Vol. II p. 141.

[10] During one visit, Vogel testified, Mother “was twitching[,]” and “talking to someone [Vogel] couldn't see[,]” leading Vogel to believe that Mother was “under the influence.” Tr. Vol. II p. 142. At some point during that visit, Child had become frustrated with a mobile game on Mother's phone, and Mother had said, “What would you like me to do, just go out in the street and let a car run over me and, and let them kill me?” Tr. Vol. II p. 143.

[11] When Jefferson had been supervising the visits with Mother and Child, she had, on occasion, ended the visits early because Mother had appeared to be under the influence. On those occasions, Mother had been aggressive, and she had been unable to control herself, her limbs, or her muscles. Mother had further admitted to Jefferson that she was still using cocaine on her last visit, which had been approximately one week before the final termination hearing.

[12] Home-based case manager Tina Teague testified that she had been working with Child and his foster family for six to eight months before the final termination hearing. Teague had visited with Child weekly and had occasionally been called upon to address Child's behaviors. Teague testified that Child had sometimes had tantrums when Mother “had made promises to show up and didn't come[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 122. Teague had stopped telling Child when he was having a visit with Mother “because every time he would be let down, he would have behavior. So I would pick him up and because I was mentoring him, he thought that we were just going to do our visit that he and I do.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 123–24.

[13] GAL Katrina McGhee recommended adoption as the permanency plan for Child due to the “lack of engagement from [Mother] ․ and just him being in [foster] care for over 15 out of 22 months.” Tr. Vol. II p. 132. Child had reported to GAL McGhee that he was happy and that he wanted to stay with his foster family. GAL McGhee testified that Child appeared happy, healthy, and “very bonded” to his foster parents. Tr. Vol. II p. 133. She also testified that she believed termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption to be in Child's best interests. On October 8, 2024, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.

Discussion and Decision

[14] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[15] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[16] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[17] Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights to Child. DCS was required to prove the following:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree․

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent ․ for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months ․ as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] ․

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a [CHINS];

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).² Mother argues only that the evidence is insufficient to prove that termination of her parental rights was in Child's best interests.³

[18] In concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests, the juvenile court concluded the following:

e. Permanency is in [Child]’s best interests and DCS has an appropriate permanency plan of adoption with [Child]’s preadoptive foster care placement.

f. Mother has not demonstrated the ability to provide [Child] with a permanent, safe and stable home environment and to provide for the [Child]’s long-term and short-term needs. She means well, but her conduct has not followed her intentions for several years. Testing negative “on occasion,” having “stretches” of sobriety, and being well-intentioned, are not enough to overcome the track record of substance abuse that has permeated this case. There was no evidence before the Court – and [Mother] had three chances to offer it – to support the proposition that [Mother]’s track record will change should her parental rights not be terminated at this time.

g. Both the FCM and the GAL believe that the termination of parent-child relationship between Mother and [Child] and the adoption of [Child] by his placement is in [Child]’s best interests.

h. The Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and [Child] is in the best interests of [Child].

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 37–38. In challenging the juvenile court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests, Mother contends that “the people who worked with Mother the most, FCM Floyd and case worker Jefferson, both testified they believe it is in Child's best interests to have contact with ․ Mother.” Appellant's Br. p. 23. However, while FCM Floyd responded in the affirmative to a general question about whether it would be in Child's best interest to have some contact with Mother, both FCM Floyd and GAL McGhee testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Tr. Vol. II p. 118.

[19] FCM Floyd opined that termination of Mother's rights are “in the best interests of” Child, because Mother “cannot beat or address properly her [addiction] with cocaine.” Tr. Vol. II p. 81. The record reflects that Mother had numerous unexcused missed tests and positive screens, and FCM Floyd noted Mother's stated love for cocaine and admission to having “sold her body for cocaine.” Tr. Vol. II p. 75. FCM Floyd further indicated that Mother had admitted that she had failed to appear for the originally-scheduled final hearing date because she had used cocaine the night before, supporting the inference that Mother was still actively using cocaine when her parental rights were terminated. FCM Floyd also testified that permanency and stability are important to Child's well-being “because of the numerous disappointments he's had when [Mother] hasn't showed up.” Tr. Vol. II p. 80. In sum, FCM Floyd testified that the continuation of the parent-child relationship was a threat to Child's well-being due to Mother's instability, lack of housing and employment, and her failure to obtain sobriety. GAL McGhee also opined that termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption by foster parents was in Child's best interests, citing Mother's “lack of ․ engagement[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 132.

[20] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence regarding Child's best interests, Mother argues that the evidence “reveals her continued and repeated desire and efforts to better herself.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. While the juvenile court acknowledged Mother's efforts, and even included in its findings that Mother “means well,” it also noted that Mother's “conduct has not followed her intentions for several years,” and that Mother's “[t]esting negative ‘on occasion,’ having ‘stretches’ of sobriety, and being well-intentioned, are not enough to overcome the track record of substance abuse that has permeated this case.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 37.

[21] Despite Mother's claim to the contrary, we conclude that FCM Floyd's testimony, GAL McGhee's testimony, and the ample evidence regarding Mother's inability to maintain stable housing, employment, or sobriety, is more than sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests. See Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests), trans. denied. Mother's claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[22] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father is deceased, having passed away in 2023.

2.   Although Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 has been amended, effective March 11, 2024, those provisions do not apply to this case.

3.   Mother's assertion that the juvenile court improperly terminated her parental rights for a single reason, i.e., Child's need for permanency, is not supported by the record or the juvenile court's order. The juvenile court ordered termination of Mother's rights for a combination of reasons, not only including Child's need for permanency, but also Mother's inability to maintain sobriety, housing, or employment, which resulted in her inability to provide Child with safety and stability.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.