Tony M. Jackson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Tony M. Jackson appeals his conviction and corresponding sentence for murder, a felony.¹ We affirm.

Issues

[2] Jackson raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it excluded certain evidence.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] During the late hours of May 1, 2021, and into the early morning hours of May 2, Daniel Nolan and his friend Brandon Pearson went to a strip club. While there, Nolan was involved in an “altercation” with Torrese Bobo, who is Jackson's brother. Tr. Vol. 3 at 71. After Nolan and Pearson left the strip club, they went to a barbershop to “chill, shoot dice, drink a little bit, [and] laugh[.] Id. At some point, Pearson left, but Nolan remained at the barbershop. Pearson later received a call that Nolan was asleep in his car in front of the barbershop. Pearson returned and woke Nolan up because Nolan “had a lot of stuff on him[.]” Id. at 74. Nolan drove to his house, which was near a Marathon gas station, and Pearson followed. After he watched Nolan park his car on the street in front, Pearson left.

[4] That same night, Jackson was DJing at a club. After he left, he went to the home of Tyuanaja James, which was not far from Nolan's house. They spoke for a bit outside her home, but he received a phone call and left. A few minutes later, Jackson returned and asked James to take him to purchase marijuana. James drove Jackson in her car to an intersection by the same Marathon gas station that was close to Nolan's house. Jackson exited the car, but James remained. A few minutes later, Jackson got back in James’ car, and they returned to James’ house. Jackson did not “appear to have any marijuana with him.” Id. at 29. Jackson left James’ house but later returned with Bobo. Jackson again asked James to “run him somewhere,” and James drove the two individuals back to the intersection near the gas station. Id. at 27. Jackson and Bobo exited, and James again remained in the car. James then “heard gunshots.” Id. at 29. Jackson and Bobo got back in her car, and James drove back to her house. The car ride was “silent” the “whole way back to the house.” Id. at 30. Surveillance video from the gas station recorded two men approach Nolan's vehicle and then fire multiple shots through the windshield.

[5] Chaminda Gardner, Nolan's girlfriend who lived with Nolan, heard “gunshots” that sounded like they were “right in front of [her] home[.]” Id. at 10. Gardner looked out the window and saw a neighbor standing near Nolan's car. It looked like “something was wrong,” so Gardner ran outside. Id. She saw that Nolan had been shot and that he was not “responsive at all.” Id. at 11. The neighbor called 9-1-1. Officers responded to the scene and observed multiple gunshot wounds to Nolan's body. Nolan was pronounced dead at the scene. A later autopsy revealed that he had sustained twenty-one gunshot wounds. Officers observed a gun on Nolan's lap, and they located $1,505 in his pocket. Officers obtained surveillance footage covering the time period during which Nolan was shot. On one of the videos, officers were able to hear Jackson say: “I'm gonna apply pressure. On my momma, Imma apply pressure tonight. F**k that s**t. Where Buddy a** at?” Id. at 130.

[6] The State charged Jackson with murder, a felony. He was then arrested and held in the Allen County Jail pending his trial. While in jail, Joshua Holt, another inmate, overheard Jackson talking about the offense. Holt heard Jackson say that he and Bobo had “got together” and “went and found” Nolan. Id. at 250. And he heard Jackson say: “Pop, pop, pop,” and “I smoked that n***a” while making “a gun with his hand.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 2. Jackson also told another inmate, Mark Michels, that he had gone to Nolan's to buy marijuana, that Nolan was sleeping in his car with a gun “on his lap,” and that he “didn't want to disturb that,” so he “veered off[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 228. Jackson then told Michels that he and Bobo had gone back to Nolan's car and that Bobo “was the one who shot” Nolan because of the argument he had had with Nolan at the strip club. Id. at 230. Jackson later discovered that Michels had reported Jackson's statements to the State, and Jackson and another inmate assaulted Michels and threatened to kill him if he did not retract his statement. Michels complied and retracted his statement.

[7] The trial court held a jury trial from March 12 through 15, 2024. During the trial, James testified about her involvement with Jackson on the night that Nolan was killed. On cross-examination, Jackson asked her: “Isn't it true that your brother ․ is charged and convicted of murder?” Id. at 56.² The State objected on the ground that the question was irrelevant. Jackson responded that it was relevant because James “thought she could help her brother by testifying for the State. She's letting us know about her motive[.]” Id. at 57. Jackson continued that James’ testimony about her motivations “goes to credibility” because “she think[s] she has something to gain by testifying[.]” Id. at 58. In support, Jackson quoted from a deposition of James and stated:

She states—after the question, “Is there any part of you that is hoping that your testimony here will help your brother?”—that's page 51 of our deposition—“Answer: Will help who? Your brother. Answer: Yes, I do hope it will help him. I hope it reduce [sic] some time for him, sitting in for the long time, for the long to be his age. Yes, I hope it helped. I want my brother home, but, I mean, it's not like that, it's not that easy[.]” She answered honestly.

Id.

[8] The State then responded that the next question in the deposition asked if James had “ever talked to anybody about that,” to which she responded in the negative. Id. The court sustained the State's objection. In an offer to prove, Jackson asked James: “Ma'am isn't it true that you hope you can assist your brother here today with your testimony against Tony Jackson? Isn't that true?” Id. at 68. James responded: “No. I never asked for Tony to be locked up and I never asked for my brother to be locked up, so—.” Id. at 67.

[9] The State also called Pearson as a witness. On re-cross, Jackson asked Pearson: “I think you stated earlier that Mr. Nolan had a lot of stuff on him and that made you concerned; can you tell me what that's about?” Id. at 86. The State objected and asserted that that question violated an order in limine that prohibited references to “any prior bad acts allegedly done by any of the State's witnesses[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 98. The State argued that Jackson's question was “looking for drug evidence, which is prior bad acts on the part of the victim.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 86. The court sustained the objection. In an offer to prove, Jackson asked Pearson if Nolan had any enemies, and Pearson responded: “Not to my knowledge.” Id. at 89. Jackson also asked Pearson if he had shared “theories about who killed” Nolan with officers, and Pearson replied that there were “several stories going around.” Id. Pearson also stated: “I didn't know no exact nothing[.]” Id.

[10] Detective Paul Meitz also testified at the trial. He testified that he had performed a “historical cell site analysis” for Jackson's number and discovered that Jackson's cell phone had two “transactions” near the gas station around the time that Nolan was killed. Tr. Vol. 4 at 29, 33.

[11] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Jackson guilty, and the court entered judgment of conviction accordingly. During a sentencing hearing, Jackson asked the court to identify certain mitigating factors, including the hardship his incarceration would cause his seven children. However, the court declined to identify that as a mitigator, stating:

Any sentence that takes a parent away from a child is a hardship. And note that you have seven children, you've denied being court ordered to pay child support for most of the children. You have one child that you are paying child support for and are in arrears on that, so I don't know what the status of that is, but I decline to find that, because any impact on children is unfortunate when parents are sentenced to prison.

Tr. Vol. 4 at 175. Then, as aggravators, the court identified Jackson's criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the crime. The court sentenced Jackson to sixty-five years executed in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Exclusion of Evidence

[12] Jackson first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded certain evidence. As our Supreme Court has stated:

Generally, a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is accorded “a great deal of deference” on appeal. Tynes v. State, 650 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind. 1995). “Because the trial court is best able to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, we review its rulings on admissibility for abuse of discretion” and only reverse “if a ruling is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.’ ” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013)).

Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015). Jackson specifically contends that the court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence about possible other causes of Nolan's death and when it excluded testimony from James about her brother's incarceration. We address each argument in turn.

Other Causes of Death

[13] Jackson first contends that the court abused its discretion when it prohibited him from asking Pearson about the “stuff” Nolan had on his person. Appellant's Br. at 14. Following the State's objection, Jackson made an offer to prove and questioned Pearson about rumors surrounding Nolan's death. Jackson asserts that Pearson's testimony would corroborate this theory that someone else could have killed Nolan.

[14] Specifically, Jackson asserts that he

was not intending to offer the evidence under some convoluted theory that because Nolan was in the drug dealing business that he somehow deserved what occurred on that early morning. Instead, Jackson simply sought to introduce the evidence that Nolan was known in the area to be a person who had a lot of money on him, and may very well had drugs with significant street value on his person at the time, and, as a result, was in a vulnerable position and that a great number of individuals may have wished him ill that morning.

Id. at 15. Stated differently, Jackson attempted to introduce evidence that another individual may have had a motive for Nolan's murder.

[15] However, before evidence of an alternative perpetrator is admissible, the defendant must show some connection between the alternative perpetrator and the crime. Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494, 504 (Ind. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039 (Ind. 2013). While a defendant may present alternative perpetrator evidence at trial in order to cast doubt on the defendant's guilt, the defendant must first lay an evidentiary foundation to establish that the alternative perpetrator evidence has an inherent tendency to connect the alternative perpetrator to the actual commission of the charged crime. Pelley, 901 N.E.2d at 505.

[16] Here, Jackson did not lay a foundation that an unidentified third party was connected to the crime. Indeed, even during the offer of proof, Pearson testified that, “to [his] knowledge,” Nolan did not have any enemies. Tr. Vol. 3 at 89. Further, when asked if he had shared any theories with the detectives, Nolan responded: “I told him, yeah, there were several stories going around” but that he “didn't know no exact nothing. [The detective] asked did I hear this and I said yes, did I hear this, I sure did.” Id. at 89-90. And, when asked if a gang had been involved in the murder, Pearson stated that the officer had “mentioned them” but that it “wasn't [Pearson's] theory.” Id. at 90. Thus, at best, Pearson's testimony would have simply informed the jury that officers had discussed vague, nonspecific rumors with Pearson. There is nothing within Pearson's offered testimony to identify an alternative perpetrator, let alone establish any connection between that alternative person and the commission of the crime.

[17] To the extent that Jackson contends the court's ruling “prevented [him] from placing before the jury his theory of defense” in violation of his due process rights, Appellant's Br. at 15, we note that the jury heard other evidence that Jackson had over $1,500 on his person when he died, that he had fallen asleep with a gun on his lap, that he ran a dice game, and that he was involved with dealing marijuana. Stated differently, the jury was already provided with evidence that Nolan was involved with dangerous activities. The court did not deny Jackson an opportunity to present a defense. As such, the court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Pearson's testimony as evidence.

James’ Testimony

[18] Jackson next contends that the court abused its discretion when it did not allow him to question James about her motive behind her testimony. Jackson contends the court should have allowed him to present that evidence to show that she was biased. It is well settled that

[t]he Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ․ to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965). Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution similarly provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to ․ meet the witnesses face to face.” Both the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 guarantee the right to cross-examine witnesses. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974); McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ind. 2001).

McCain v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1202, 1206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). But the right to cross examine witnesses “is subject to reasonable limitations placed at the discretion of the trial judge.” Smith v. State, 721 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ind. 1999).

[19] Here, Jackson attempted to cross-examine James about her motivation for testifying. In particular, Jackson wanted to ask James if she was testifying for the State only in an attempt to get leniency for her brother, who had been convicted of a separate murder. Jackson maintains that evidence of a “possible benefit” for James’ brother was “relevant to the jury's determination of [the] weight and credibility” of her testimony. Appellant's Br. at 17.

[20] After the State objected, Jackson read from James’ deposition, in which James acknowledged that she “hope[d]” her testimony would help her brother. Tr. Vol. 3 at 58. However, the next question asked if she had ever “talked to the detective about it,” and she responded in the negative. Id.; see also Ex. Vol. 2 at 14. Thus, even if she had hoped it would help, she never spoke to anyone about whether that would be a possibility, there was no indication that any hope or belief that she may have had was based on anything that police told her.

[21] In any event, even if the court abused its discretion, any error was harmless. “Errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.” Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). In other words, we will find an error in the exclusion of evidence harmless if its probable impact on the jury, in light of all of the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the defendant's substantial rights. Id.

[22] Here, James testified that she drove Jackson to the gas station near Nolan's house twice, once by himself and once with Bobo. She also testified that, during the second trip, Jackson and Bobo got out of the car while she stayed behind and that she heard gunshots. That evidence was corroborated by cell phone location data that places Jackson near the gas station at the time of the murder, and a surveillance video from nearby that recorded Jackson's voice saying: “Imma apply pressure.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 130. Thus, even if Jackson had discredited James, the jury still heard other, unchallenged evidence that he was at the scene of the crime on the night in question.

[23] Further, there is other evidence of Jackson's guilt. In particular, Holt testified that he overheard Jackson say that he and Bobo had “got together” and “went and found” Nolan. Id. at 250. And he heard Jackson say: “Pop, pop, pop,” and “I smoked that n***a” while making “a gun with his hand.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 2. In addition, Jackson told Michels that he had gone to Nolan's to buy marijuana but that Nolan was sleeping in his car with a gun on his lap, so he left. But Jackson also told Michels that he and Bobo went back to Nolan's car.

[24] In light of all of the evidence before the jury, including surveillance videos and Jackson's statements to other inmates that essentially amount to a confession, we can say with confidence that the probable impact of the exclusion of James’ testimony about her motivation for testifying was sufficiently minor so as to not affect his substantial rights. Accordingly, we conclude that any error in the exclusion of that evidence was harmless. We therefore affirm Jackson's conviction.

Issue Two: Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[25] Jackson next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.³ Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[26] The sentencing range for murder is forty-five years to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). Here, the court identified as aggravating factors Jackson's criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the offense. The court did not identify any mitigators. Accordingly, the court imposed the maximum sentence of sixty-five years.

[27] On appeal, Jackson contends that the court abused its discretion when it did not identify the hardship to his dependents as a mitigating factor. The finding of mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the trial court. Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 248-49 (Ind. 2000). An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating circumstance requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Id. at 249. The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Id.

[28] Jackson claims that the court abused its discretion when it declined to identify the hardship on his dependents as a mitigator because it is a “statutory mitigator.” Appellant's Br. at 19. And he contends that the court's statements that “any time an individual serves an executed sentence, they'll be away from their dependents” demonstrates that “the trial court does not find that undue hardship on an individual's dependent is a valid mitigator.” Id. In other words, Jackson asserts that the court's statement demonstrates that the court does not acknowledge that factor as a valid mitigator.

[29] But contrary to Jackson's assertions, we do not read the court's statement as a blanket refusal to identify an undue hardship on dependents as a mitigator. Rather, the court here considered the mitigator but expressly rejected it. Indeed, the court noted that Jackson has seven children but that he denied “being court ordered to pay child support for most of” them. Tr. Vol. 4 at 175. The court continued that Jackson has one child that he is “paying child support for” but that he is “in arrears on that[.]” Id. Stated differently, while Jackson has seven children, he does not support most of them, and he is in arrears on the support order for one. The court clearly determined that Jackson's incarceration would not cause an undue hardship on dependents when he is already not supporting them. Jackson has not demonstrated that his proffered mitigator is significant or clearly supported by the record. The court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Jackson.

Conclusion

[30] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of other hypothetical causes of Nolan's death. The court also did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of James’ motivation for testifying but, if there was error, it was harmless. Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Jackson. We therefore affirm Jackson's conviction and sentence.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1

2.   James’ brother was involved in a separate murder unrelated to this case.

3.   Jackson purports to argue that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. However, the crux of his argument is that the court abused its discretion. To the extent he attempts to make an argument under Appellate Rule 7(B), we note that he acknowledges that the nature of the offense is “egregious” and that he makes no argument regarding his character. Appellant's Br. at 18. He has therefore waived any purported argument under Rule 7(B).

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.