Emmanuel Maldonado Gonzalez, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Emmanuel Maldonado Gonzalez appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, as a Class A misdemeanor.¹ Gonzalez raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the early morning hours of March 19, 2024, an anonymous individual called 9-1-1 and reported a single vehicle crash on Lee Road and that “a male was in the area.” Tr. at 25. At 1:49 a.m., Officer Jason Heinuy with the Lawrence Police Department received the dispatch and responded to the scene. When he arrived, Officer Heinuy observed a white Chevrolet Camaro that had crashed into a large tree. Officer Heinuy was able to see “significant front-end damage” to the car, including a fracture in the driver's side windshield that led him to believe that “the driver had potentially struck their head on the windshield at impact.” Id. at 26. Officer Heinuy searched the immediate vicinity, but did not locate anyone. He then called for a tow truck, conducted an inventory search of the car, and found a black wallet that contained Gonzalez's driver's license. Officer Heinuy then pulled the records from the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles and discovered that the car was registered to Gonzalez.

[3] Officer Heinuy was “concerned that somebody was potentially injured,” so he drove the most direct route from the crash site to the address on Gonzalez's driver's license “to see if there was potentially somebody injured and walking alongside the road[.]” Id. at 30. Officer Heinuy did not encounter anyone during the four-mile drive, so he knocked on the front door of the house at Gonzalez's address. Gregory Wilson, Gonzalez's roommate, answered the door and informed Officer Heinuy that Gonzalez was not at home because he “had gone to visit friends somewhere on Lee Road.” Id. at 33. Officer Heinuy returned to his car.

[4] As he left Gonzalez's house to return to the scene of the accident, Officer Heinuy observed Wilson getting into his car while on his phone. Wilson then followed Officer Heinuy back toward the crash site. During this time, at 2:47 a.m., an individual who lived in a neighborhood near the crash site called 9-1-1 and reported that “there was a younger male knocking on the door” and “asking to use the phone.” Id. at 38. Another officer checked the area but did not find anyone walking around. Approximately one mile from the crash site, Wilson turned into the same neighborhood from which the second 9-1-1 call had come. Within “about a minute,” Wilson exited the neighborhood and started driving in the direction toward Gonzalez's house. Id. at 38. Because Wilson's vehicle had been the only one to exit the neighborhood, Officer Heinuy followed Wilson's car. After Wilson failed to signal prior to executing a turn, Officer Heinuy initiated a traffic stop at 2:50 a.m.

[5] Wilson stopped his car, and Officer Heinuy observed Gonzalez in the front passenger seat. Gonzalez had a “significant” laceration and “bleeding” to his “right upper ear area,” his jeans were torn, and he had a “fresh abrasion” to his right knee. Id. at 40. Officer Heinuy detected a “strong odor of an alcoholic beverage” coming from Gonzalez, and he observed that Gonzalez had “red and glassy eyes,” which led Officer Heinuy to believe that Gonzalez was potentially impaired. Id.

[6] Heinuy asked Gonzalez if he had any additional pain or injuries. In response, Gonzalez “stated that he hit a tree and left.” Id. at 41. Gonzalez then consented to a chemical test. Officer Heinuy transported Gonzalez to the police station and administered a breath test at 3:28 a.m. The results indicated that Gonzalez had an alcohol concentration of 0.133 gram of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. While they were in the test room, Gonzalez told Officer Heinuy that he had been “knocking on doors trying to use a phone because he was scared.” Id. at 58.

[7] The State charged Gonzalez with operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, as a Class A misdemeanor (Count 1); operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to 0.08 gram of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, as a Class C misdemeanor (Count 2);² and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, as a Class C misdemeanor (Count 3).³ Following a bench trial, the court found Gonzalez guilty of all three charges but entered judgment of conviction against Gonzalez only on Count 1. The court then sentenced Gonzalez to 365 days, all suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Gonzalez contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[9] To convict Gonzalez, the State was required to show that he had operated a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person. See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2. On appeal, Gonzalez challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence to prove both that he had operated a vehicle and that he was intoxicated at the time. We address each argument in turn.

Operating a Vehicle

[10] Gonzalez first asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that he had operated a vehicle. “Showing that the defendant merely started the engine of the vehicle is not sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.” Hiegel v. State, 538 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). Rather, there “must be some direct or circumstantial evidence to show that [the] defendant operated the vehicle.” Id.

[11] On appeal, Gonzalez contends that there is no circumstantial evidence to show that he drove the vehicle because there “were no witnesses to the accident,” it is “unknown when the accident took place,” and he was “not found at the scene of the accident.” Appellant's Br. at 10. He further contends that his injuries and statements to Officer Heinuy that he had hit a tree “does not prove” that he was the driver of the car. Id.

[12] However, the evidence most favorable to the judgment supports the court's judgment. Indeed, the evidence shows that an anonymous person called 9-1-1 to report a single-car crash on Lee Road. When Officer Heinuy arrived at the scene, he saw Gonzalez's car, which had crashed into a tree and which contained Gonzalez's wallet and driver's license. Officer Heinuy also saw damage to the driver's side windshield that was consistent with an impact from the driver's head. When Officer Heinuy could not locate anyone at the scene, he drove to Gonzalez's home. There, Wilson told Officer Heinuy that Gonzalez had gone to meet friends “somewhere on Lee Road.” Tr. at 33. Officer Heinuy returned to the scene and received a dispatch that someone in a nearby neighborhood had called 9-1-1 to report that a young man had asked to use the phone. Officer Heinuy observed Wilson enter that same neighborhood, and Gonzalez was with Wilson when he exited. Further, Gonzalez had a laceration to his head and scrapes on one knee, and he stated to Officer Heinuy that he was the person who had knocked on doors asking to use the phone and that “he had hit a tree and left.” Id. at 41.

[13] In other words, the evidence shows that Gonzalez's car was crashed on the same street where Gonzalez was meeting friends, Gonzalez's personal items were found in the car, Gonzalez had injuries consistent with the damage to the driver's side windshield of his car, and he admitted that he had asked to use people's phone and that he had hit a tree. That is circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could infer that Gonzalez had operated the car.

Intoxication

[14] Still, Gonzalez asserts that the State failed to prove that he was intoxicated at the time the crash occurred. Specifically, Gonzalez contends that there is no proof that the chemical breath test taken at 3:28 a.m. related back to a time that he operated the vehicle.

[15] Indiana Code Section 9-30-6-15(b) provides:

(b) If, in a prosecution for an offense under IC 9-30-5, evidence establishes that:

(1) a chemical test was performed on a test sample taken from the person charged with the offense within the period of time allowed for testing under section 2 of this chapter; and

(2) the person charged with the offense had an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol per:

(A) one hundred (100) milliliters of the person's blood at the time the same was taken; or

(B) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person's breath;

the trier of fact shall presume that the person charged with the offense had an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol per ․ two hundred ten (210) liters of the person's breath at the time the person operated the vehicle.

[16] A “test administered under this chapter must be administered within three (3) hours after the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe the person committed an offense under IC 9-30-5[.]” I.C. § 9-30-6-2(c). As such, “if there is proof that the chemical test occurred within three hours of the accident,” the trial court, as the fact-finder, was presumably entitled to relate the alcohol concentration at the time of the breath test back to the time of the accident. Jackson v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1166, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). That three-hour time limit does not begin “from the moment an officer ideates probable cause, but rather from the moment at which the vehicle was operated in violation of I.C. 9-30-5.” Mordacq v. State, 585 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).

[17] Here, in order to relate the results of the breath test back to the operation of the vehicle, the State was required to prove that Gonzalez had operated the vehicle after 12:28 a.m. Gonzalez contends that the State failed to do that because “there is no proof as to when, if at all, [he] drove the wrecked vehicle.” Appellant's Br. at 13. We cannot agree.

[18] The evidence shows that an anonymous person called 9-1-1 regarding the car crash at 1:49 a.m., and that “a male was in the area.” Tr. at 25. Then, at 2:47 a.m., another person called 9-1-1 after Gonzalez had knocked on their door and asked to use the phone. When Officer Heinuy ultimately encountered Gonzalez at 2:50 a.m., Officer Heinuy observed that Gonzalez had a “fresh” scrape to his knee as well as “bleeding” and a laceration to his ear that was consistent with the damage to the windshield. Id. at 40. Based on a 9-1-1 call at 1:49 a.m. and the fresh, bleeding wounds found on Gonzalez that correspond to the accident, it was reasonable for the fact-finder to infer that the accident had happened at the time or shortly before the 9-1-1 call was placed. As such, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Gonzalez had operated a vehicle after 12:28 a.m. such that the test results related back to the time Gonzalez had driven the vehicle.

Conclusion

[19] The State presented sufficient evidence to show both that Gonzalez had operated the vehicle and that he was intoxicated at the time. We therefore affirm Gonzalez's conviction.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2

2.   I.C. § 9-30-5-1(a).

3.   I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a).

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.