Micah D. Bradley, Appellant-Respondent v. Taeonna Bradley, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Micah D. Bradley (“Husband”) appeals the trial court's decree dissolving his marriage to Taeonna Bradley (“Wife”). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Issues

[2] Husband raises four issues for our review, namely,

1. Whether the trial court erred when it retroactively modified his child support obligation.

2. Whether the court abused its discretion when it did not deviate from the presumption of an equal division of the marital assets.

3. Whether the court clearly erred when it included his pension in the marital estate.

4. Whether the court abused its discretion by basing its valuation of the marital residence on inadmissible hearsay evidence.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Husband and Wife started dating at the end of 2012 or the beginning of 2013. By November 2013, they were living together, and Wife was pregnant. In early 2014, the relationship between Husband and Wife ended, and Wife moved out of Husband's house. On March 24, Wife gave birth to their daughter, M.B. (“Child”). Thereafter, in September 2014, Wife, with Child, moved back in with Husband. Husband purchased a house for himself, Wife, and Child in April 2015. And, on January 11, 2016, Husband and Wife married.

[4] Wife left the marital home in December 2019, and, on January 29, 2020, she filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. In March, the parties entered into an agreed entry. Pursuant to that agreement, the parties agreed that Wife would have primary physical custody of Child, with Husband exercising parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. The parties also agreed that Husband would pay $133 per week to Wife for child support and that “[a]ny arrearage in child support is deferred until the final resolution of the case.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 28.

[5] The court held a hearing on Wife's petition on February 20 and May 2, 2024. During the hearing, both parties testified and presented evidence. Wife testified that the parties maintained separate bank accounts and that she and Husband had agreed that Husband would pay for all the expenses related to their home while she would pay for all the expenses related to Child. Wife then testified that, since the agreed entry, both her income and that of Husband's had changed such that Husband's child support obligation should change. She submitted income information for her and Husband along with child support worksheets for the years 2021 through 2024 and asked for the court to calculate Husband's child support obligation for each of those years and calculate his arrears accordingly.

[6] Wife also moved to admit as evidence an appraisal of the parties’ home that valued the home at $150,000. Husband objected on the ground that it constituted hearsay, as the appraiser was not in court to testify. Wife responded that, while “[t]here is no one that is here to lay the foundation,” the method of the appraisal was included in the report. Tr. Vol. 2 at 40. She further asserted that the appraisal “is the one exhibit that both sides agreed to pay for[.]” Id. The court admitted the appraisal over Husband's objection. Wife additionally asked the court to include Husband's pension as a marital asset, and she requested that the court divide the marital estate equally.

[7] In response, Husband requested an unequal division of the marital estate because he owned the home and because he paid “the majority of the bills.” Id. at 83. Husband also acknowledged that he had a pension through his employer, but he testified that he was “not eligible to receive all of the pension” as of the date of the hearing because his employer required that he work there for ten years and be fifty-five years of age but that he had only worked there eight years and was fifty-one years old at the time Wife filed her petition for dissolution. Id. at 139. And Husband submitted as evidence property cards from the local assessor's office that showed a value of $92,700 for the home.

[8] On July 31, 2024, the court issued its decree of dissolution of marriage. In that decree, the court ordered that, as of January 5, 2024, Husband's child support obligation was $255 per week. The court then made a finding regarding the parties’ respective incomes for each of the calendar years from 2020 through 2024 and calculated Husband's support obligation for each of those years. Specifically, the court found that Husband owed $6,916 for 2020, $8,008 for 2021, $9,412 for 2022, $10,972 for 2023, and $1,530 for the first six weeks of 2024. The court then concluded that Husband's total support obligation from December 23, 2019, through February 16, 2024, was $36,838. The court acknowledged that Husband had paid $27,005, so the court ordered that Husband's “arrears are set at $9833.00.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 36.

[9] The court then identified as a marital asset Husband's pension, which was valued at $75,901.00, and awarded that asset to Husband. The court also identified the marital residence as an asset and set its value at $150,000 based on the appraisal the court had admitted as evidence. The court then awarded the home to Husband. After identifying and valuating all the assets and debts, the court ordered that “the marital property will be equally divided amongst the parties.” Id. at 39. In reaching that determination, the court found that the parties were married “for four years before physical separation. Their relationship began in 2012, and they lived together continuously since September of 2014. While [Husband] paid the bills associated with the residence, this was based on agreement that he do so while [Wife] paid the expenses related to their mutual child.” Id. at 39. The court then stated: “In considering the factors listed in Indiana Code [Section] 31-15-7-5, the Court does not find that [Husband] has rebutted the presumption of equal division.” Id.

[10] The court attached to its dissolution decree its Exhibit A, which listed the assets and debts and identified to which party they were assigned. Based on its division, the court ordered Husband to pay an equalization payment of $141,374.68 to Wife. Then, on September 27, the court issued an amended decree of dissolution. The amended decree was identical to the original decree except that it reduced Husband's equalization to $83,544.64. The trial court referenced its Exhibit A in the amended decree but did not attach it. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[11] Husband appeals the trial court's amended final decree dissolving his marriage to Wife. As our Supreme Court has explained:

[T]here is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters. Appellate courts are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence. On appeal, it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal. Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.

Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, where, as here, the dissolution court enters findings and conclusions, “the appellate court reviews issues covered by the findings with a two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 123.

Issue One: Child Support

[12] Husband first contends that the court erred when it calculated the amount of his child support arrearage. Decisions regarding child support generally rest within the trial court's sound discretion. Dore v. Dore, 782 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “We will reverse a trial court's decision in child support matters only for an abuse of discretion or if the trial court's determination is contrary to law.” Id. On appeal, Husband specifically contends that the court erred when it retroactively modified his child support obligation for years 2021 through 2024 and then used those modified obligations to calculate his arrears. We agree.

[13] As this Court has stated:

Indiana Code Section 31-15-4-14 states, “A provisional order terminates when: (1) the final decree is entered subject to right of appeal; or (2) the petition for dissolution or legal separation is dismissed.” Indiana Code Section 31-15-4-15 states, “The terms of a provisional order may be revoked or modified before the final decree on a showing of the facts appropriate to revocation or modification.” It logically follows, then, that the terms of a provisional order may not be revoked or modified before the final decree unless such a showing is made.

Troyer v. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d 1130, 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (emphasis in original), trans. denied. In addition, it is well settled that a “trial court has discretion to make a modification of child support relate back to the date the petition to modify is filed, or any date thereafter.” Becker v. Becker, 902 N.E.2d 818, 820 (Ind. 2009). But the “modification of a support obligation may only relate back to the date the petition to modify was filed, and not an earlier date, subject to two exceptions not applicable here.”¹ Id.

[14] This Court has previously addressed this issue in a nearly identical case. In Troyer, the trial court entered a provisional order that required the husband to pay $53 per week, effective the date the wife filed the petition for dissolution. The wife “did not petition to modify” that provision. 987 N.E.2d at 1141. However, in its final decree following a hearing, the court analyzed five years of the husband's income for child support purposes and ordered the husband to pay $155 per week, effective six months prior to the court's final decree. Id. at 1142.

[15] On appeal, the husband argued that, because the provisional order addressed child support and because the wife “never petitioned to modify” the support order, the court's “authority in the Final Decree was limited to setting Husband's obligation[ ] ․ from the date of the Final Decree and beyond.” Id. This Court “agree[d]” with the husband. Id. In so holding, this Court stated that “the practical effect” of the court's findings “was to modify the terms of the Provisional Order as to child support ․ , even though Wife made no request for such, much less a showing of the facts appropriate to such modifications before the hearing on the Final Decree.” Id. In other words, the Court held that, because the wife never moved to modify the preliminary support order, the trial court could not make any increase in the husband's support obligation retroactive to a date before the final dissolution decree.

[16] Here, in an agreed entry, the court issued an order requiring Husband to pay $133 per week to Wife in child support. Then, despite Wife having never filed for a modification of that order, the court nonetheless modified the terms of the provisional order when it recalculated Husband's child support obligation from 2021 up until the date Wife filed her petition for dissolution. Again, the modification of a support order may only relate back to the date the petition to modify was filed, and not an earlier date. Becker, 902 N.E.2d at 820. There was no petition to modify filed here. As in Troyer, the court here exceeded its authority when it ordered a retroactive increase of Husband's support obligation. We therefore reverse the court's determination of Husband's child support arrearage and remand with instructions for the court to recalculate what, if any, arrearage Husband owes.

Issue Two: Equal Division of Estate

[17] Husband next contends that the court abused its discretion when it equally divided the marital estate. Our standard of review of a trial court's decision regarding distribution of marital property is well-settled:

The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Hartley v. Hartley, 862 N.E.2d 274, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law or disregards evidence of factors listed in the controlling statute.” Hatten v. Hatten, 825 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. When we review a claim that the trial court improperly divided marital property, we must consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's disposition of the property. Id. Although the facts and reasonable inferences might allow for a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id.

Love v. Love, 10 N.E.3d 1005, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[18] The division of marital property is governed by Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5, which provides:

The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

[19] This statutory list is nonexclusive, and no single factor controls the division of property. Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 227 (Ind. 2022). The trial court may additionally “consider the length of the parties’ marriage in dividing the marital pot.” Id. And a “short-lived marriage may rebut the presumption favoring equal division, especially if one party brought substantially more property into the marriage.” Id.

[20] On appeal, Husband contends that the court erred when it equally divided the marital property because “it is apparent that the trial court did not consider” the short length of the marriage when it divided the estate and because Husband “brought substantially more property into the marriage[.]” Appellant's Br. at 14-15. In particular, Husband asserts that he purchased the home before the marriage and that he “paid the bills associated with the” residence. Id. at 15. And he maintains that “practically all of the parties’ assets were acquired by [him] without any contribution from Wife[.]” Id. at 16.

[21] Contrary to Husband's assertions, the trial court did consider the length of the parties’ marriage. Indeed, the court specifically noted that the parties “were married for four years[.]”² Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 54. And the court acknowledged that Husband “paid the bills associated with the residence[.]” Id. However, the court also found that the parties had lived together “continuously” since 2014 and that Husband had paid the household expenses “based on an agreement that he do so while the [Wife] paid the expenses related to their mutual child.” Id. The court then considered the factors outlined in Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5 and determined that Husband had not rebutted the presumption that an equal division of the marital estate is just and reasonable. That finding is entitled to substantial deference and was supported by the evidence. We therefore affirm the court's decision to equally divide the marital estate.

[22] Still, within this issue, Wife properly directs our attention to the fact that the court erroneously undervalued her 401(k).³ During the hearing, Wife submitted statements from her 401(k) account that identified a balance of $9,011.16. See Ex. Vol. 2 at 89. However, Wife rightfully testified that more than $5,600 should “be added back in” because there was a loan against that account. Tr. Vol. 2 at 45. Nonetheless, the court valued her 401(k) account at $9,011.16. On appeal, Wife contends the court “did not consider her verbal correction regarding” her 401(k) account and that the correct amount should be $14,683.32. Appellee's Br. at 46. Wife is correct that her 401(k) statement shows an outstanding loan balance of $5,672.06.⁴ See Ex. Vol. 2 at 89. We therefore remand to the trial court with instructions to increase the value of her 401(k) by the amount of the outstanding loan.

Issue Three: Husband's Pension

[23] Husband next contends that the court clearly erred when it included his pension in the marital pot. The marital pot includes property: owned by either spouse prior to the marriage; acquired by either spouse after the marriage but before final separation; or acquired by the spouses jointly. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a). The “one pot” theory “prohibits the exclusion of any marital asset in which a party has a vested interest from the scope of the trial court's power to divide and award.” Baglan v. Baglan, 137 N.E.3d 271, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotation and citation omitted). “The requirement that all marital assets be placed in the marital pot is meant to [e]nsure that the trial court first determines that value before endeavoring to divide property.” Id.

[24] Husband contends that the court abused its discretion when it included his pension, which was valued at $75,901, in the marital pot. “Property,” for the purposes of a dissolution, is defined as:

All the assets of either party or both parties, including

(1) a present right to withdraw pension or retirement benefits;

(2) the right to receive pension or retirement benefits that are not forfeited upon termination of employment or that are vested ․ but that are payable after the dissolution of marriage[.]

Ind. Code § 31-9-2-98(b). “Thus, in order for pension benefits to be included as marital property, the benefits must not be forfeited at the termination of employment or the benefits must be vested and payable before or after the dissolution.” In re Marriage of Nickels, 834 N.E.2d 1091, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[25] On appeal, Husband contends that the court abused its discretion when it included his pension in the marital pot because “[a]t the time of filing, [he] was not eligible to receive the pension.” Appellant's Br. at 17. In particular, Husband contends that, “[i]n order to begin receiving his pension,” he was required to have worked “for ten years and have had reached fifty-five years of age.” Id. at 17-18. And he maintains that, at the time Wife filed her petition for dissolution, he had worked at his place of employment for only eight years and was only fifty-one years of age.

[26] However, Husband ignores the evidence presented to the trial court that his benefits would not be forfeited if he left his employment. Indeed, he testified that, if he leaves his employment, his “pension does not go away.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 165. Further, in an affidavit, the Senior Director of Human Resources with Husband's employer stated:

As of January 11, 2016, [Husband] had 3.5000 years of work service with the company and was not yet vested in the Retirement Plan. Assuming [Husband] had terminated employment on January 29, 2020, and assuming [Husband] were to elect his Retirement Plan benefits in the form of a single life annuity, he would be eligible to receive a qualified monthly gross pension benefit in the amount of $192.23 commencing on October 1, 2026 (age 55), or a qualified monthly gross pension benefit in the amount of $474.64 commencing on October 1, 2036 (age 65).

Ex. Vol. 2 at 95-96. Because Husband's benefit would not be forfeited at the termination of his employment, the court did not abuse its discretion when it included Husband's pension in the marital pot.⁵

Issue Four: Marital Residence

[27] Finally, Husband contends that the court abused its discretion when it valued the marital residence at $150,000. “The trial court has broad discretion in ascertaining the value of marital property and such valuation will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Showalter v. Brubaker, 650 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

[28] Here, Husband contends that the court abused its discretion when it valued the marital property because its valuation was based “solely on an appraisal” that constituted hearsay. Appellant's Br. at 19. “Hearsay” means a statement that “is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing” and that is “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). And hearsay “is not admissible” unless the Indiana Rules of Evidence or other law provides otherwise. Evid. R. 802.

[29] Wife concedes that the appraisal was hearsay and that the trial court “erred when it stated it based its valuation of the marital residence on the appraisal report[.]” Appellee's Br. at 53. However, Wife asserts that any error in the court's admission of that evidence was harmless because she “also testified to the value of the marital residence,” the report was completed by someone “[H]usband chose,” and Wife “relied upon the report ․ and she included that value in her exhibit 1, as a summary of her testimony” which was “admitted without objection.” Id. at 53-54. We agree.

[30] As Wife points out, in addition to the appraisal report, Wife submitted her Exhibit 1, which was a document that listed the parties’ assets and debts and their values according to Wife. In that document, which was admitted without objection,⁶ Wife listed the marital home and a corresponding value of $150,000. See Ex. Vol. 1 at 5. Further, Wife also testified that she believed the value of the home to be $150,000. And “it is well settled that ‘[t]he owner of real estate is assumed to possess sufficient acquaintance with it to estimate the value of the property[.]’ ” R.P. Leasing, LLC v. Chem. Bank, 47 N.E.3d 1211, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Jordan v. Talaga, 532 N.E.2d 1174, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)) (alteration original to R.P. Leasing). Because Wife submitted her testimony and documentation listing a value of $150,000, the court's admission of the appraiser's report was harmless. We therefore affirm the court's valuation of the marital residence.

Conclusion

[31] The trial court exceeded its authority when it, in effect, retroactively modified Husband's child support obligation and calculated his arrearage based on the modification. We therefore reverse the court's order on his arrearage and remand with instructions to recalculate what, if anything, Husband owes in child support. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it divided the marital estate equally, when it included Husband's pension in the marital pot, or when it valued the house at $150,000. However, the court failed to include a debt owed to Wife's 401(k), so we remand with instructions for the court to revalue Wife's 401(k) plan and recalculate the equalization payment that Husband will make to Wife in order to accomplish an equal division of the assets.⁷ We therefore affirm the amended decree in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

[32] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Retroactive modification is permitted in two instances: (1) when the parties have agreed to and carried out an alternative method of payment which substantially complies with the spirit of the decree; or (2) the obligated parent takes the child into the obligated parent's home and assumes custody, provides necessities, and exercises parental control for a period of time that a permanent change of custody is exercised. See Becker, 902 N.E.2d at 820 at n.4.

2.   Husband briefly asserts that the court's finding that the parties had been married for four years was clearly erroneous. However, the evidence shows that the parties were married on January 11, 2016, and the parties separated on December 29, 2019. That amounts to approximately two weeks less than four years. We hold that any error in the court's finding that they had been married four years is harmless.

3.   In his Reply Brief, Husband asserts that Wife has waived these claims by failing to include these allegations in her statement of the issues, in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(4). However, it is our preference to resolve cases on their merits, and we may elect to do so unless a party's noncompliance with Rule 46(A) is sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015). Here, while Wife did not identify any of her raised claims of error as separate issues on cross-appeal, her noncompliance is not so substantial as to impede our review. As such, we will address her claims.

4.   We note that Wife's verbal statement to the court and her argument on appeal both provide a loan balance of $5,672.16, not $5,672.06.

5.   Husband briefly asserts that, even if his pension was correctly included in the marital pot, “the trial court still committed error by failing to divide the parties’ retirement accounts in the Amended Decree.” Appellant's Br. at 18. He maintains that, by failing to attach its Exhibit A to the amended decree, the court did not properly divide the retirement accounts. While Husband is correct that it did not attach its Exhibit A to the amended decree, the court clearly incorporated that Exhibit by reference. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 54. And, in that Exhibit, the court specifically identified and divided the parties’ retirement accounts.

6.   When asked if Husband objected, he responded: “Just as their summary, no, not as, you know, taking it for, you know ․ that it's, yeah, that it's true, just for summary only.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 39. Thus, while Husband essentially said that he had no objection to the document as a summary, he did not lodge any actual objections.

7.   Because we remand with instructions for the trial court to add value to one of the marital assets awarded to Wife, which will require the court to recalculate its equalization payment, we need not address Wife's argument that the court “made a mathematical error” when it calculated the equalization payment in the amended decree. Appellee's Br. at 46.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and DeBoer concur. Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.