IN RE: R.S. (Child in Need of Services) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] R.C. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's Order on Motion for Permanency entered at the conclusion of the Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) proceeding involving his minor child, R.S. (“Child”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born in September 2021 to Father and K.S. (“Mother,” and together with Father, “Parents”). On November 1, 2021, the Allen County Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a verified petition alleging Child to be a CHINS after Child was born “substance exposed and required treatment for withdrawal symptoms after birth.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 16. Child was removed from Parents’ care and placed with her maternal grandmother. On November 30, 2021, the trial court found Child to be a CHINS upon the admissions of both Father and Mother and entered a dispositional order.

[3] Among ordered services, DCS ordered Father to “[c]ommence proceedings to establish paternity” and referred Father for a substance use assessment. Id. at 20. Both Parents were ordered to have supervised visitation with Child. Parents initially participated in supervised visits together, but in February of 2022, Father requested separate visits. Father's paternity was established on March 2, 2022, under cause number 02D07-2112-JP-669 (“Cause No. JP-669”).

[4] Although Father completed a substance use assessment, he was noncompliant with recommended services thereafter. On February 12, 2024, the court held a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determined it would place Child with Mother for “a trial home visit.” Id. at 9. Father was present at the hearing but “walked out” stating that “he was done with the case.” Transcript Volume II at 18. After the hearing, Father canceled all services with DCS, blocked the phone numbers of the visit supervisor and Family Case Manager Diandra Bruen (“FCM Bruen”), and subsequently refused all visitation with Child. When FCM Bruen went to Father's home to speak with him, he advised her that he intended to wait until the CHINS case was “closed” before he would seek visitation with Child in the future. Id.

[5] On April 2, 2024, DCS filed a Motion for Permanency and Change of Custody. The court held an evidentiary hearing on August 13, 2024. During the hearing, FCM Bruen testified that DCS recommended that Mother be granted “sole custody” of Child and that Father be granted “supervised visitation.” Id. at 21. She noted her concerns regarding Father's history of “aggression” and “domestic violence.” Id. at 20. She also noted concerns with Father's “stability” and with him not showing “patience” with Child. Id. FCM Bruen stated that while Mother had completed and benefitted from services, Father had done neither. Court Appointed Special Advocate Christina Collins (“CASA Collins”) testified that Child was doing “great” and absolutely “thriving” since being placed back in Mother's home, and that she believed it was in Child's best interests for Mother to be granted “full custody.” Id. at 27. Regarding Father, CASA Collins stated that he was manipulative and “controlling” with Child. Id. at 29. CASA Collins recalled an incident involving Father when he intentionally set off the house alarm because he was upset, which was “very scary” for Child, and this was just one example of the “concerning behaviors” she personally witnessed in which Father “purposely put [Child] in [an] uncomfortable scary position.” Id. CASA Collins stated that she had “safety concerns” regarding Father and therefore it was in Child's best interests that any visitation granted to him “be supervised.” Id.

[6] Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order awarding Mother custody of Child, granting Father supervised visitation, and terminating DCS's wardship over Child. The court ordered that “[a]ll future issues concerning custody, parenting time, and support of [Child] and any modification of this order shall be addressed” in Cause No. JP-669. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 11.

Discussion

[7] Father asserts that “DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the trial court's order of supervised parenting time” for him. Appellant's Brief at 10. DCS notes that “it is no longer involved in this matter because the trial court awarded custody to Mother and dismissed the CHINS case” and thus, any dispute over visitation is “between Father and Mother, who is the proper appellee.” Appellee's Brief at 8 (citing T.R. v. E.R., 134 N.E.3d 409, 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (after CHINS case was closed, dissolution court handled Father's challenge to custody and visitation, with Mother being the appellee)).

[8] Regardless, both Father and DCS agree that “[i]n all visitation controversies, courts are required to give foremost consideration to the best interests of the child.” Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. “In reviewing a trial court's resolution of a visitation or custody dispute, we reverse only when the trial court manifestly abused its discretion. If there is a rational basis for the trial court's determination, then no abuse of discretion will be found.” Downey v. Muffley, 767 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Further, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Rather, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's visitation decision to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom support the trial court's decision. Walker v. Nelson, 911 N.E.2d 124, 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[9] Ind. Code § 31-14-14-1, which outlines the visitation rights of a noncustodial parent in a paternity action, provides that “[a] noncustodial parent is entitled to reasonable parenting time rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time might: (1) endanger the child's physical health and well-being; or (2) significantly impair the child's emotional development.” “Even though section 31-14-14-1 uses the term ‘might,’ this court interprets the statute to mean that a court may not restrict visitation unless that visitation would endanger the child's physical health or well-being or significantly impair the child's emotional development.” Farrell v. Littell, 790 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “By ‘its plain language,’ Indiana Code section 31-14-14-1 requires a court to make a specific finding ‘of physical endangerment or emotional impairment prior to placing a restriction on the noncustodial parent's visitation.’ ” Id. (citation omitted); see Matter of Paternity of J.K., 184 N.E.3d 658, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (observing that supervised parenting time requires a finding that the supervision restriction be justified by a risk of harm to the child).

[10] Here, the trial court heard ample evidence to support its order of supervised visitation. Both FCM Bruen and CASA Collins testified regarding Father's concerning history and behaviors, and each opined that supervised visitation with Father was in Child's best interests. In its written order, the trial court specifically found that due to Father's demonstrated “hostility” and inability “to control his anger as well as his controlling and manipulative behavior,” there are “safety concerns” justifying supervised visitation. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 10. We find this language sufficient to satisfy the statutory mandate regarding a specific finding of physical endangerment or emotional impairment. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court's order constitutes an abuse of discretion.

[11] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order.

[12] Affirmed.

Brown, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Tavitas concur. Altice, C.J., and Tavitas, J., concur.